Tag Archives: Venezuela

Central Banks and Governments and their gold coin holdings

Within the world of central bank and government gold reserves, there is often an assumption that these gold holdings consist entirely of gold bullion bars. While this is true in some cases, it is not the fully story because many central banks and governments, such as the US, France, Italy, Switzerland, the UK and Venezuela, all hold an element of gold bullion coins as part of their official monetary gold reserves.

These gold coin holdings are a legitimate part of gold reserves since under International Monetary Fund (IMF) definitions, “monetary gold consists of gold coins, ingots, and bars”. In central banking parlance, monetary gold is simply gold that is held by a central bank or government as a reserve asset. Other central bank reserve assets include foreign exchange holdings and holdings of IMF Special Drawing rights.

Elsewhere in IMF definitions, it is stated that “monetary gold is generally construed to be at least 995/1000 pure. Many government and central bank gold coin holdings consist of previously circulated gold coinage. Since gold coins often had  – and still have – a purity of less than 99.5% gold due to the addition of other metals for added durability, this ‘generally construed’ leeway in the IMF definition is undoubtedly a practical consideration that allows gold coins to be classified as monetary gold.

Central banks and governments hold gold for the same reasons that private citizens hold gold. Gold is real money with no counterparty risk, gold is a store of value, and gold is a safe haven asset. In general, central banks and governments are as happy holding bullion in gold bar form as in gold coin form. This is because physical gold is physical gold, and a gold coin and a gold bar will both provide their holders with the same benefits and protections. Only the physical form differs. In practice, the types and quantities of gold coins held by central banks and governments are extensive and varied as a quick tour d’horizon reveals.

collage-gold-coins-and-bars-2

Starting with the largest official sector gold holders, 3 of the top 5 gold holding countries have substantial gold coin holdings in their claimed reserves. The Banque de France, the guardian of France’s gold reserves, holds 2435.4 tonnes of gold consisting of a massive 100 tonnes of gold coins, and 2,335 tonnes of gold bars. Of these gold coins, 45% are French gold coins (probably Napoleans) and 55% are foreign gold coins, some of which are from the US. In the past, the Banque de France had melted part of its gold coin holdings into gold bars without considering their potential numismatic value. But after finding some US 20 dollar gold coins were worth USD 20,000 a piece, the Bank’s current policy is to scrutinise every coin.

Banca d’Italia stores approximately half of Italy’s 2451.8 tonnes of gold under its headquarters in Rome, with most of the other half stored at the Federal Reserve in New York. Of the 1199.4 tonnes of Italian gold in Rome, Banca d’Italia states that it holds 4.1 tonnes of gold coins, in the form of 871,713 coins. This would give each gold coin an average gold content of 0.151 troy ounces. This hoard most likely includes historic gold Italian 10 Lira and 20 Lira coins.

The US Treasury, the official holder of the US gold reserves, claims to hold gold coins containing 73,829.5 fine ounces of gold (2.3 tonnes) in the custody of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. While a small subset of these coins weighing 377.4 ounces is on display in New York, the remaining coins, containing 73,451 fine ounces of gold, are held in The New York Fed’s vault compartment K in 384 bags weighing a gross 80,855.70 ounces. These coins are all either 0.9 fine or 0.9167 fine gold. For details see page 132 here. These US Treasury held gold coins at the Fed are in addition to the 2,783,218.6 (86.5 tonnes) of gold coins that the US Treasury claims to hold within the US Mint’s working stock.

Venezuela’s gold holdings, which have practically all been sold off or swapped for foreign exchange recently, also contain gold coin holdings in the form of historic gold US Eagles, as well as gold US Liberty and ‘Indian Head’ coins (see page 17 here). Notably, the Venezuelan central bank says that these coins would have a numismatic premium valuation depending on their scarcity, design and condition. Given the ongoing and deteriorating economic situation in Venezeula, expect these gold coins to be either sold on the market or else melted down and shipped out of the country, probably to Switzerland.

Speaking of Switzerland, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) in its publications, says that its “gold holdings are mainly in the form of gold bars, with the remainder in gold coins“. The SNB doesn’t elaborate on what type of gold coins it holds, and when asked recently, in the spirit of central bank secrecy, it not surprisingly declined to elaborate. Most likely this Swiss hoard includes historic Swiss Franc gold coins, and even old Latin Monetary Union gold coins.

The United Kingdom, through HM Treasury’s Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA), claims to hold 310.3 tonnes of gold in its reserves, all of which is held in custody at the Bank of England. The EEA 2014/2015 accounts states that “The gold bars and gold coin in the reserves were stored physically at the Bank’s premises“. As to what type of gold coins the UK holds, HM Treasury didn’t repond to a recent query, but undoubtedly, the Treasury holds gold Sovereigns as HM Treasury archives reveal.

Among other central banks, Romania holds 14% of its monetary gold in the form of gold coins, amounting to approximately 14.43 tonnes. The Central Bank of Peru includes 552,191 troy ounces (17.7 tonnes) of gold coins in its monetary gold holdings. These coins are described as “commemorative coins” and are held domestically “in the vault of the Central Bank”. Interesting the Peruvians apply a small valuation provision for “for cost of converting gold coins to high purity or ‘good delivery’ gold bars” for potential use on the wholesale gold market. The Central Bank of Ireland is custodian for Ireland’s circa 6 tonnes of gold, 5.7 tonnes of which is supposedly stored in bar form at the Bank of England in London, while approximately 10,000 ozs are in gold coin form stored at the Central Bank’s currency centre facility in Dublin.

Even Canada made headlines with its gold coin holdings recently when the Bank of Canada sold off the last of that country’s eventually tiny gold holdings which had been exclusively in the form of gold coins since the early 2000s. These gold coins were King George $5 and $10 Canadian coins, the best examples of which were sold to collectors with the rest melted down into gold bars by the Royal Canadian Mint and sold on the wholesale gold market, yet again highlighting gold’s high liquidity.

Central banks will always downplay the existence of gold on their balance sheets since gold competes against national fiat paper currencies. However, the actual course of action of central banks and governments in holding vast amounts of gold bars, as well as substantial quantities of gold coins, demonstrates that central banks and sovereigns continue to view gold as a strategic reserve asset and as the ultimate money. Luckily, private individuals too can replicate the holdings of these giants by also acquiring and accumulating gold bars and gold coins for the same reasons as sovereign entities and monetary authorities do. Doing as central banks do, not as they say, is certainly a better strategy than blind faith in today’s distorting and reckless centrally planned monetary policies.

 

Lars Schall Matterhorn Interview with Ronan Manly

I was recently interviewed by financial journalist Lars Schall on behalf of Swiss based Matterhorn Asset Management. Our interview covered the German and Russian gold markets, Venezuela’s official gold reserves, the secrecy of the London gold market, and the outlook for the gold price, among a number of other topics. Matterhorn kindly granted me permission to post the audio interview and transcript below. The original interview titled  “Economics will dictate that the price of gold is going to rise” can be found on the GoldSwitzerland website.

Interview Transcript

Lars Schall: Howdy ladies and gentlemen, I am connected right now with Ronan Manly at the London Business School. BullionStar and Ronan have just recently published a major work of research related to the gold markets all around the world. Before we’ll talk about this let me ask you, Ronan, to give us some background on you. When, how, and why did you become interested in the precious metal markets to start with?

Ronan Manly:  Hello. Yes, I think I became first interested in precious metals around 2003-04, when there was a bull gold market in precious metals mining stocks. About that time I was interested in investing in equities. And it was from the perspective of the bull market in gold and silver stocks catching my eye that I started reading about gold. And that really led me into thinking about gold as an investment asset class. In 2005 and 2006, when I was in the London Business School as a student, I did a research paper on adding commodity assets to existing portfolios of bonds and equities as a diversification technique.  So it was during that time again I did a little bit more research about precious metals, and gold, and silver as an asset class.

And then I was working in the City of London in the equity investment management space for a few years. And I actually forgot about precious metals, because it wasn’t really on my radar at that time. When I left that role in 2011 I had some free time, and I started going to the Bank of England archives to start to research in gold again. I’d gone to a GATA conference in the summer of 2011 in London, and that sparked my interest in gold.  And I thought well, because I’m living in London, with the Bank of England just down the road, I might as well go and have a look at their archives. So that started really me on the road of doing research about monetary gold. And I went on a number of occasions to the Bank of England. And I even went across to Paris to the Bank of France archives. And that again was very eye-opening.  Because of the nature of archives, there’s a 30 year, or 35 year [access] rule.  So you can’t really look at anything beyond say the 1980s, early 80s.  But even then I could start piecing together the importance of gold, and the monetary system, and it just fed my interest, and the fact that gold was at the front and center stage of the financial system. But this role has unfortunately been lost.

Myself and a lot of other people who grew up  being educated in the 1980s and 1990s thought gold had somehow fallen off the financial curriculum. And it was really, because I started realizing that gold was a fascinating area that was interconnected with so many other areas like economic history, the IMF, the financial system, and various industries, like banking and mining, that it attracted my attention. And also the fact that it was quite opaque. In a very strange way it was a challenge, because it’s difficult to find out information about the gold market without really putting in a lot of effort. But it’s very rewarding when you do find information that other people don’t have.  And I think that’s what I’m trying to get across in my blog, sharing information that maybe is there, it’s available in public, but it’s very difficult to get. So once I find some good information I like to share it.

LS:  Yeah.  And as already mentioned you did something like that, because at BullionStar you’ve published recently some sort of an encyclopedia of gold markets around the world.  Now, why did you consider it necessary to do this at BullionStar, and what is the purpose?

RM: That’s a good question, because we’ve actually just launched this a week, or two ago – BullionStar Gold University. It took a few months to get all the research together. The concept was one that BullionStar devised as a way of sharing information with the general public. You can look at it more as a portal of precious metals information, more time independent information, and factual information. You can even look at it as like a Wikipedia of up-to-date information on precious metals.

It’s actually a group effort. I was doing a lot of the writing. But various other people in BullionStar have been part of the project from day one including I.T. developers and graphic designers, and the BullionStar CEO who devised the whole concept.

So the first phase of this is a profile of gold markets around the world. It includes about 21 different profiles covering 25 markets, really captures the essence and characteristics of each of those markets from some of the very large ones the people know about to less well-known ones. So it includes markets like London, New York, Shanghai, India, Hong Kong, Japan, down to probably less well-known markets, like Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia. And there’s a slight regional focus on Asia, because BullionStar is based in Asia. But it includes markets like South Africa, Germany, Italy, France, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Turkey. So there’s really something there for everybody.

And the main reason was to create up-to-date information that people can go to as a source of reference if they’re writing articles. Journalists, for example, can use it as a source of reference. Because there was nothing really up-to-date in one place that captured that information. So really what we’re trying to do is make it easy for people to – if they have a question about one gold market in a different place they can go and consult the Gold University. This is only the first phase. We’re going to be having a lot of other topics and concepts rolled out as part of this umbrella information portal in the near future starting with precious metal vaults, central band gold policies, refineries and mints, then down the road adding other areas such as if you want to find out about the tax on precious metals in a certain area or jurisdiction, or the legal / legislative [position] of  various governments, what their view is on allowing their citizens to purchase precious metals. So it’s really a wide coverage.

LS: Now, talking about those profiles, according to your analysis, which is the most credible gold market that you’ve seen as part of your research?

RM: Well, after 25 different markets I actually think that the German gold market is a very deep and thorough markets with a lot of liquidity. It’s very accessible to the public. Now, I have to say that I didn’t really know much about the German market before I began researching it. I was pleasantly surprised to learn there were so many different participants in the German market from commercial banks down to wholesalers, down to large retailers. And the German public really seems to get gold as an investment asset class.

But I started looking at Germany, literally I knew that maybe a few large banks were involved. But as I did more research I realized that there’s a lot of different levels of participants in the German market, starting with the Landesbanks, the Bayern Landesbank, LBBW, and Helaba, and some of the other regional banks. And there’s Reiffeisenbank, and Commerzbank, even though it’s based in Luxembourg, you could classify that as a German bank. And as you know, Lars, the customers of the Sparkasse savings banks can go in and buy gold quite easily. And Germany has like over 100 tons of consumer gold demand each year. So I really think that the market hangs together very well. It’s very deep and liquid. It’s interconnected with Austria, and Switzerland, and you’ve also got at least five or six very well-known and well-regarded gold refineries like Heraeus, and now Degussa has bought a new refinery in there. Is it Pforzheim?

LS: Yes.

RM: So I think the German psyche for a number of reasons has a very good understanding, grasp, and respect for gold. And I think this is exemplified by the very deep and widespread network within the German gold market. It’s one that I would never have thought about six months ago if you would’ve ask me. But now it’s definitely one of the more intriguing markets out there.

LS: Yeah. And your positive impression of the German gold market was also supported by a recent trip that you took to Berlin.

RM:  That’s right, yeah. At the beginning of February I was invited by BullionStar to what’s called the World Money Fair in Berlin. This is an annual fair that takes place in February at which all the big refineries and mints from around the world go to exhibit. There’s a lot of numismatic dealers as well. But more interestingly it seems to be the event of which a lot of precious metal participants go to meet each other for commercial meetings, and to just meet, and greet, and update each other.

So for example, the reason I went there was to meet up with my colleagues from Singapore. But we were introduced to a lot of heads of refineries, heads of mints, some of the large wholesalers from the US. And it as a great to see the precious metals markets in action. The fact that it was in Berlin again, I think highlights the fact that Germany is a very important gold market, and people don’t really seem to realize that. If you asked a lot of people on the street outside of Germany they probably wouldn’t realize that Germany is such a buoyant gold market.

LS: And which of the markets that you examined will be the most interesting to watch going forward?

RM: I think there are quite a few interesting markets. But the one that fascinated me the most, and that I think will be very important going forward: Russia. And it’s more because the Russian gold market for the last number of years has been dominated by central buying purchases from the Russian Central Bank. And it’s sister organization called the Gokhran, which is the state fund for precious metals. And again, I wouldn’t have really thought about this until I started researching it. But at the moment the majority of the gold production that comes out of Russia every year is purchased by the central bank. But they do via a very clever process, where the commercial banks intermediate. So the commercial banks finance gold producers who mine the metal, which is then sent to the refineries, but it’s purchased by commercial banks like Sperbank, NOMOS, VTB, Gazprombank. And then they sell it on to either the Gokhran, or to the central bank.

So what you see is that, for example, seven or eight years ago in 2007, the Russian Central Bank only had 400 tons of gold in its official reserves, and now 10 years later it has just over 1,400 tons. And I think another part of the equation that people don’t seem to grasp, and it’s quite opaque, is the fact that the Gokhran is also purchasing gold. So I think what is happening is that sometimes if the central bank reserves are being updated it transfers from the Gokhran, like the way that we suspected maybe the PBoC in China is transferring metal from other Chinese state entities.

So from a supply perspective it’s also interesting because if the Russian state system is gobbling up a lot of Russian gold output, that means there’s less gold at the margin for world supply. So I think it’s going to be really important to look at this continued trend where a lot of Russian gold production is being taken by the state. And that will definitely have an impact on world gold supply if demand continues to outstrip supply.

LS: Yeah. Now, when it comes to the market that you look at in the most critical way I think the candidate could be London, correct?

RM: Yes. I think that’s because London is the largest market. So in one way you think that there is a lot of information out there about the London market. And in some ways there is, but in other ways there’s not, because it’s quite opaque, and the people who run the London gold market choose not to divulge very much information about it – be it the Bank of England, or the Bullion banks that are represented by the LBMA. So again, it’s because London is one of the two centers for gold price discovery that in some ways it’s so important and critical to world gold market that it makes sense to critically analyze it. And over the last number of years there’s been numerous times where I’ve become frustrated where I’m trying to do some research on the London market, and I just can’t get anywhere, because there’s a lack of data there. And that’s the biggest question, why is that? And I think it’s because the LBMA, and the banks that they represent do not really want anyone poking around and finding out what’s really going on in the London gold market.

And you and I, Lars, know both that because it’s such an important market for price discovery that if there’s any, for example, large transactions that are going on that aren’t in the public domain that’s quite important, because it is affecting the price globally, and it’s affecting every participant in the larger global market. So it’s something I think is worth putting a lot of effort into it to try to find out as much as possible about.

LS:  Yeah, worth noting is also what you wrote recently about the gold of Venezuela. Can you tell us about this please, and why is this of significance?

RM: Like a lot of research that I do, it started off as a small focus. I found some information that had come out about the repatriation of Venezuela’s gold back in 2011-12. And for people who maybe don’t recall exact details Hugo Chavez wanted to repatriate all of his gold that was held internationally, which is about 210 tons. Eventually he repatriated 160 tons, and left 50 in London. And they added the repatriated gold to what was already held in Caracas, Venezuela, which was about 150 tons. So it made a very good case study, because very few central around the world will ever divulge information about gold. But Venezuela at that time chose to do so.

The Bank of Central Venezuela was quite forthcoming in telling people about how much gold they have, where it was located, how much they wanted back. And that in itself was a good case study. But what has happened more recently with all the economic problems in Venezuela is that a lot of that gold has started to go to where it probably was held originally. Some of it’s being flown into Switzerland; various banks like Citibank, Deutsche are supposedly doing swaps with some of that gold giving U.S. dollar financing to the Venezuela government.

And I think that particular set of episodes is very good as a case study, because what it applies to is that there could be a lot of similar for example swaps going on with Central American banks and international Bullion banks. And I know that there are a few. But that doesn’t get written about. Because again the information is withheld. So I think the repatriation and the subsequent re-export of Venezuelan gold back to Europe serves as a reminder that gold is a liquid asset, and that it is a very important asset in the financial system. But for whatever reason central banks and governments always try to downplay it.

LS: Yeah. But given that we have a debt crisis you think that gold will be a winner of this crisis?

RM: Yeah, I do think that it will start to become – to play a more central role in a future monetary system. As regards what exact role that will play it’s difficult to know, but I definitely think that I see gold really emerging to the front stage of a revised, or a reset monetary system. Because gold doesn’t have any counterparty risk. It doesn’t have any default risk. We’ve seen before though a stable international monetary system that had gold playing an important role.

LS: Yeah. But do you think that we will then see more efforts to repatriate gold from New York and London to the original countries?

RM: I don’t really think so, unless it’s done in a very gradual way. I think the Chavez episode was more of a nationalistic triumphalist symbolic exercise. And it backfired. Not because of the actual repatriation, but because of unfortunately for Venezuela, its economic standing has gone down. But I tend to think that all the different central banks around the world cooperate so closely that they wouldn’t really put pressure on each other in that regard by pulling out gold that might make it look like they’re unhappy with either the Bank of England, or the Federal Reserve. I think if it’s being done, it’s being done in a very surreptitious way.

LS: Yeah, just as the Germans do?

RM: Well, that’s a very strange one. I still haven’t understood fully what they are doing. Is it more of a gesture to the population, or – they could’ve easily done this without telling anybody, like they did in the early 2000s when Bundesbank repatriated, what was it, 900 tons from the Bank of England? Nobody knew about that.

LS: Yeah. Yeah. Okay, let’s come to our final point, and that would be the question what are your overall expectations for gold in 2016?

RM: Well, you know, that’s a good question. Seeing that we’re nearly at the end of the first quarter, and that’s been one of the best quarters in a long time. I still think that the gold price in USD terms will end the year higher than it is now. And I say that, because I think that there’s such a huge excess demand for physical gold for various places like China. If you look at the supply side there isn’t a huge supply increase. There’s a lot of gold gone through gold refineries in places like Switzerland, and unless there is some hidden source of supply that we don’t know about, simply economics will dictate that the supply outweighing demand would mean that the price is going to rise.

I was talking to Koos Jansen from BullionStar yesterday, and he’s actually working now doing estimates of Chinese gold importation from 2015 where he takes various trade statistics from Switzerland, U.K., Australia, and Hong Kong, and he’s coming up with a figure of 1500 tons are being imported last year into China. And if you add to that the Chinese domestic production of around 450 tons, and then some scrap recycling, that’s over 2,000 tons of gold. And the World Gold Council are only saying there’s a 1,000 tons of domestic demand. But if you also take the annual gold-mining output say for example 3,000 tons, if you take away China’s 415, you take 200 and something tons from Russia, then the rest of world is having to compete for dwindling physical annual gold-mining output. And really just from a simple economics point of view I think that the gold price should end up higher at the end of this year. Whether it will is a different question.

LS: Of course.

RM: I’m not really qualified to answer that. I think it’s very dangerous speculating on gold prices in general, because there seems to be a lot in the price action of the gold market that doesn’t follow common sense.

LS: Yeah. But you would say in the long run gold is a good investment?

RM: I think it is a good investment to have some of a total investment. And what I mean is that it’s a good investment to have, and to diverse my portfolio.  And I think it’s also from a collector’s point of view, it’s nice to have some of your assets in a physical tangible substance that is nice to own. And you still have it at the end of the day even if it’s changed in fiat currency terms.

LS: Yeah. But we would like to underline this again: Gold has no counterparty risk.

RM: That’s  right, yeah. And so for example, any gold products that may involve a few different layers of counterparties like an ETF, for example, physical gold doesn’t have that. As long as you have it in your possession, or store it in a reliable storage space.

LS: Okay. Thank you very much for this interview.

RM: My pleasure. Thanks Lars.

LS: Thank you.

 

Venezuela says adiós to her gold reserves

Five months ago in my article “Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 2: From Repatriation to Reactivation“, I concluded that:

“given the deteriorating state of Venezuela’s international finances and international reserves at the present time, it may be sooner rather than later before Venezuelan gold could be on the move again out of the country.

One thing is for sure. Gold leaving Venezuela on a flight back to London, New York, or elsewhere, will not get the fanfare and celebration that was accompanied by the same gold’s arrival into Caracas a few short years ago.

Those predictions now seem to have come to pass because there is now evidence that the Banco Central Venezuela (BCV) shipped gold out of Maiquetía Airport (Caracas international Airport) in early July 2015, and there is also separate evidence that Venezuela’s official gold reserve holdings, which are managed by the BCV, dropped by 60 tonnes between March and April 2015. These are two distinct events.

The 60 tonne drop in gold reserves in March-April

On 28 and 29 October respectively, Bloomberg and Reuters filed reports highlighting a decline in Venezuela’s gold reserves through the end of May 2015. The Bloomberg report is here, the Reuters report is here.  Both reports merely focused on the currency value of Venezuela’s gold reserves, and neither report addressed the critical metric that is needed in any discussion of central bank physical gold dealings, i.e. quantity or weight of gold. Furthermore, neither Bloomberg nor Reuters seems to grasp how the BCV values its gold reserves.

From Reuters:

Venezuelan central bank gold holdings declined in value by 19 percent between January and May, according to its financial statements, likely reflecting gold swap operations and lower bullion prices…

 ..Central bank financial statements posted this week on its website show monetary gold totaled 91.41 billion bolivars in January and 74.14 billion bolivars in May

 From Bloomberg:

“The value of the central bank’s bullion holdings fell 28 percent at the end of May from a year earlier, while the spot price for the metal declined just 12 percent.”

The problem with the above is that comparing the change in value of Venezuelan gold reserves over two points in time relative to the spot price change of gold over those same two points in time is not the correct approach because the BCV does not use the latest market price to value its gold holdings. The BCV uses a nine month rolling average valuation price methodology.

Without knowing the correct valuation price used at each month-end valuation point, the quantity of gold being valued cannot be calculated accurately. Conversely, doing some simple research (looking up the footnotes to the BCV accounts) and a few quick spreadsheet calculations gives a very accurate estimate of quantity of gold held at each month-end valuation point. Perhaps next time the major financial news wires can go the extra mile.

[Note: The Spanish translations in this article use a combination of Google Translate and Yandex Translate, and some instinctive re-sequencing.]

bcv Merentes

Valuation of monetary gold by the BCV

The BCV’s valuation methodology for monetary gold holdings, taken from 2014 year-end accounts, is as follows:

“Oro monetario…se valora mensualmente utilizando el promedio móvil de los nueve (9) últimos meses del fixing a.m. fijado en el mercado de Londres,

“Monetary gold…is valued monthly using the moving(rolling) average of the last nine (9) months of a.m. fixings set in the London market

Because the BCV holds a small percentage of its monetary gold in the form of gold coins, the valuation methodology also addresses how to value the coins, which, although not material to this discussion, is as follows:

“..más un porcentaje del valor promedio de la prima por el valor numismático que registren las monedas que conforman este activo.”

“..plus a percentage of the average value of the premium for the numismatic value of the coins which comprise this asset”

 (Note 3.3. to the 2014 BCV financial accounts)

To check this moving average calculation and how it works, you can apply it to the 2014 year-end monetary gold valuation figure and make use of note 7 in the same set of accounts. Note 7 states:

“Nota 7 – Oro monetario

Al 31 de Diciembre de 2014, las existencias de oro monetario se encuentran contabilizadas a un precio promedio de USD 1.257,80 por onza troy y totalizan Bs. 91.879.349 miles, equivalentes a USD 14.620.691 miles y su composición y valoración se corresponde con los criterios descritos en la nota 3.3”

“At December 31, 2014, the stock of monetary gold is recorded at an average price of USD 1257.80 per troy ounce and total Bs. 91,879,349 thousands, equivalent to USD 14,620,691 thousands, and its composition and valuation corresponds to the criteria described in Note 3.3

(Note 7 to the 2014 BCV financial accounts)

The Venezuelan accounting convention of USD 14.620.691 miles just means USD 14.6 billion.

check mate

361 tonnes of gold at year-end 2014

As at 31 December 2014, in its balance sheet, the BCV valued its monetary gold at Bs 91,879,349,000 (bolívares fuertes). Technically, since 2007, the Venezuelan currency is called the bolívar fuerte (strong bolivar) since at that time the Venezuelan government re-based the previous inflation ravaged bolivar and re-set 1000 old bolivars = 1 ‘strong’ bolivar. The updated name is in retrospect ironic given that the Venezuelan currency is now one of the weakest fiat currencies in the world as the Venezuelan economy begins to experience out-of-control price inflation.

This brings us to the next part of the BCV gold valuation equation. The BCV uses an ‘official’ Venezuelan exchange rate in its financial accounts. This official rate is a static 6.3 bolivars to the US dollar and is based on a February 2013 government edict called “Convenio Cambiario N° 14“.

Again, this exchange rate is another fantasy when compared to the unofficial market exchange rate for the Venezuelan bolivar in terms of the US dollar. This unofficial exchange rate, for example, is currently ~786 according to the Dolartoday website. The bolivar’s unofficial rate versus major currencies will no doubt go even higher in the near future as the currency continues to crumble and potentially goes into hyperinflationary territory.

The final part of the gold valuation equation is the London gold fixing (a.m.~morning) price (more recently LBMA Gold Price), whose daily price dataset can be downloaded here. Note that prior to 20th March 2015, the London gold auction ‘fixed’ price was known as the London gold fixing. Even though the London gold price is now still ‘fixed’ (in more ways than one) during the re-gigged auctions, the LBMA has opted for the less loaded name of the ‘LBMA Gold Price’ auction.

I calculate that the 9 month rolling average of the London morning gold price from 1 April 2014 to 31 December 2014 was USD 1257.49. This is pretty close to the BCV specified value of USD 1257.80 above. The BCV’s extra 31 basis points may reflect the numismatic premium on its gold coin holdings or some other calculation difference.

However, the important point to all of this is that the manual calculation method of arriving at the BCV’s gold valuation price (by calculating the 9 month moving average directly) looks accurate and is in line with the BCV’s number. Based on the BCV’s 31 December 2014 monetary gold value of Bs 91,879,349,000, and the BCV’s USD 1257.80 valuation price, Venezuela held 360.64 tonnes of gold at year-end 2014. This 360.64 tonnes figure is pretty close to the figure reported by the World Gold Council of 361.02 tonnes as at end of fourth quarter 2014 (which itself is not set in stone).

The Sale of 61 tonnes?

The BCV publishes monthly balance sheets (including the monetary gold valuation figure), but currently there is a 4 month lag on date publication, so the latest balance sheet is from May 2015 (the same month-end date that Bloomberg and Reuters referred to above). The monthly balance sheets for January to May 2015 can be downloaded here, here, here, here and here:

Using the valuation methodology described above, and some simple reverse engineering, shows that over the two month period between the end of February 2015 and the end of April 2015, the BCV’s gold holdings dropped by over 60 tonnes, with a 33 tonne drop in gold reserves during March, followed by a 27.7 tonne drop in April. The data below is taken from the 6 monthly balance sheets from Dec 2014 to May 2015, and the LBMA daily price dataset.

BCV gold jan - may 2015

My calculations for month-end January 2015 show Venezuela’s gold holdings to be 360.39 tonnes, nearly identical to the BCV’s month-end version for December 2014. I haven’t included any numismatic premium for gold coin holdings since its immaterial. My calculations show a 2.4 tonne increase in gold holdings at February month-end. I’m not sure what this increase refers to but it could be the monetization of some domestic gold mining production by the BCV (purchasing some Venezuelan mining output and classifying it as monetary gold), or conversion of some small residual BCV non-monetary gold holdings into monetary gold.

Adding domestically produced gold to monetary gold holdings in Venezuela has a precedent. So does conversion of already held non-monetary gold. For example in 2011 the BCV purchased 1.6 tonnes of domestic gold. The same year the BCV also converted 3.6 tonnes of ‘non-currency gold’ that it was already holding into monetary gold.  For details, see section “Changes to Venezuela’s gold reserves since early August 2011″ in my article “Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 1: El Oro, El BCV, y Los Bancos de Lingotes“.

For March 2015, my calculations indicate that the BCV’s gold holdings witnessed a 33.17 tonne reduction, and ended the month at 329.64 tonnes. Similarly, in April 2015, my calculations find that the BCV gold reserves saw another outflow of 27.74 tonnes, bringing total holdings down to 301.90 tonnes. Between March and April, the combined gold reduction amounts to 60.91 tonnes. There was no material change in gold holdings between April and May, save a tiny 0.27 tonne increase, which could be calculation noise. The main damage to the gold holdings happened in the narrower time period of March and April, a fact that was not highlighted in the Reuters 4 month period reference, and the Bloomberg 1 year period reference.

On its website, the World Gold Council (WGC) publishes a “Quarterly times series on World Official Gold Reserves since 2000″ spreadsheet, which is based on data from the “International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) and other sources where applicable.

Interestingly, this WGC spreadsheet states that as of the end of Q4 2014, Q1 2015, and Q2 2015, Venezuela’s gold reserves remained unchanged at 361.02 tonnes, and the WGC does not reflect any of the above monthly reductions in Venezuela’s gold holdings. The WGC spreadsheet also states in a disclaimer that “While the accuracy of any information communicated herewith has been checked, neither the World Gold Council nor any of its affiliates can guarantee such accuracy.

This just goes to show the many problems that can arise by relying solely on IMF and WGC data sources for official sovereign gold holdings, in addition to the more problematic ‘gold receivables’ accounting fictions employed by central banks.

maria

BCV operations: First and Second?

To see what was happening with Venezuela’s gold holdings in March and April 2015, it is worth reading the last few sections of my “Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 2: From Repatriation to Reactivation” article, especially the last section about the 5 questions Maria Corina Machado, parliamentarian and opposition party leader in Venezuela, posed to Nelson Merentes, president of the BCV on 12 March 2015.

Also important to know from that article are:

a) the details of the Venezuelan gold swap with Citibank which emerged in late April and was for only 1.4 million ounces (43.5 tonnes post haircut), and the gold to be used in the swap was the 50 tonnes of gold that had been left by the BCV in the Bank of England vaults in January 2012

b) the BCV was in discussions with a number of investment banks about harnessing its gold reserves, and that the BCV revealed on 5 March that six investment banks were making a pitch to the BCV, namely Credit Suisse, Goldman, BTGP Brazilian, Deutsche, Bank of America and Citibank. The favourites were said to be from a short-list of Deutsche Bank, Bank of America and Citibank, but another Caracas media source thought that Credit Suisse and Bank of America were involved

c) Goldman Sachs had previously been discussing a gold swap with the BCV, this news becoming public in November 2013

The 61 tonne reduction in Venezuela’s gold reserves over March-April 2015 cannot be accounted by the Citi gold swap since a) the Citi gold swap was for less than 45 tonnes, b) gold swaps usually stay on central bank balance sheets as an asset of the central bank, and c) if there was a gold swap transaction that did get taken out of the balance sheet, it would not be a reduction over 2 months, it would be one transaction.

Therefore, I think that this 61 tonne reduction over March-April 2015 represents something else entirely. It could be another transaction with one or more of the other investment banks above, or it could be an entirely separate gold sale to another entity such as the Chinese government.

Nicolas Maduro

Since Banco Central Venezuela is entirely non-cooperative in answering questions about gold posed by the media, some speculation is, in my opinion, acceptable. For example, for the articles referenced above, Bloomberg states that “The central bank’s press department declined to comment on the decline in gold holdings.” Reuters states that “The central bank declined to comment“. Another example of arrogant central bankers who consider themselves above normal standards of accountability and transparency.

A few clues about the gold holdings reduction are in the letter Maria Corina Machado sent to Nelson Merentes on 12 March. In the letter Machado asked these 5 questions of Merentes:

  • Are all of Venezuela’s gold reserves in the vaults of the Central Bank of Venezuela as stated by the former president Hugo Chavéz on 17 agusto 2011, when he ordered “repatriation of our gold”?
  • Is the BCV in negotiations with foreign banks for the sale or pawning of monetary gold?
  • Is it true that in the operation to pawn gold currently under discussion, it is intended to dispose of gold with a market value of US$ 2.6 billion? Does this represent / involve almost 20% of the total gold reserves of the Republic, in this first operation?
  • Is it true that they would be negotiating a second operation similar to the previous one for an even greater amount?
  • Do these operations involve removing the gold from the vaults of the BCV and returning it abroad?

Machado’s questions are very specific, i.e. US$2.6 billion, almost 20% of gold reserves, first operation, second operation, physical removal of gold, return of gold to abroad etc, and suggest that her questioning was based on sources that appear to have thought that this specific information was indeed factual.

In early March 2015, 20% of Venezuela’s gold reserves of 360 tonnes would be 72 tonnes, (while 61 tonnes would be 17% of gold reserves). Based on an average gold price of $1,200 in the first week of March, US$2.6 billion would be 67.4 tonnes. These figures are far closer to the actual reduction of gold holdings in March and April of 61 tonnes and suggest that there was a ‘first operation’ that was distinct from the gold swap with Citibank, and that necessitated the actual removal of 61 tonnes from the BCV balance sheet.

Then what about a ‘second operation‘ that could be ‘for an even greater amount‘ in the words of Machado?

aerporto maduro

Gold Flights from Caracas in July 2015

Caracas international Airport, where the flights laden with Venezuela’s repatriated gold arrived at during the period November 2011 to January 2012, is officially known as Simón Bolívar International Airport, but colloquially known as Maiquetía Airport since it’s in an area of Caracas called Maiquetía (the airport is beside the ocean).

On 01 July 2015, Venezuelan news site La Patilla published an article titled “El BCV reexporta para empeñarlo el oro que Chávez repatrió” (BCV re-exported for pledging, the gold that Chavez had repatriated), in which it featured two snippets from a letter written by the Banco Central Venezuela (BCV) to Maiquetia International Airport Air Customs (SENIAT) sometime just before July, probably written in June. SENIAT is the Venezuelan customs and tax authority, officially called Servicio Nacional Integrado de Administración Aduanera y Tributaria, or National Integrated Service for the Administration of Customs Duties and Taxes.

The first snippet of the BCV letter to SENIAT, and highlighted by La Patilla, stated:

Tengo el agrado de dirigirme a usted en ocasión de manifestarle que el Banco Central de Venezuela realizará exportación de valores, cuyas especificaciones y demás características se detallarán en actas a suscribirse con con funcionarios del Ministerio del Poder Popular de Economía, Finanzas y Banca Pública -Seniat y este instituro, las cuales serán presentadas a las autoridades competentes el día de salida en la Aduana Principal Aérea de Maiquetía

“I have the pleasure of addressing you on the occasion to inform you that the Central Bank of Venezuela will ​​export values, whose specifications and other characteristics will be detailed in Minutes to be signed with officials from the Ministry of Popular Power for Economy, Finance and Public Bank -Seniat and this Institute, which will be presented to the competent authorities on the day of departure in Maiquetía’s Main Air Customs”

The La Patilla article commented that:

Los “valores” a los que se refiere la comunicación sería oro monetario según nos respondieron dos economistas con experiencia en las operaciones del BCV.”

According to two economists with experience of BCV operations who responded to us, the ‘values’ to which the communication refers to is monetary gold.

The 2nd snippet of the letter, with the BCV stamp, is even more interesting, and I have included it below:

BCV SENIAT airport July letter

Although not fully legible on the very left hand side of the photo, the text, as far as I can make out, says:

“…el reconocimiento, pesaje y embalaja de la materia en referencia, en el Departamento de administracion del Efectivo, ubicado en el sótano 2 del elemento Sede de esta instituto. La…[  ]… actividad, se tiene previsto realizarla en los dias 02, 03 y 06/07/2015, a partir de las 8:00…[ ]. En caso de que la referida actividad se extienda más del tiempo prevista, le será notificado…[ ]

“acknowledgement, weighing and packing of the material in question, in the Cash Management Department, located in Basement 2 of the Headquarters of this Institute. The .. [  ].. activity is planned for the days 02, 03 and 07.06.2015, from 8:00…[  ]. In the event that the referred to activity extends beyond the planned time, you will be notified…[  ]”

It’s not unusual for letters about specific gold shipments from central banks to security carriers or other agencies to avoid to mention the actual cargo. I have seen the same approach used in historical Bank of England letters to companies like MAT Transport and the Metropolitan Police, phrases such as “we would like to go ahead with the matter we discussed’, and ‘we have now completed the aforementioned assignment bla bal bla, I trust everything was in order”. It’s merely phrased this way for security reasons.

Venezuela is short of hard currency bank notes such as USD and EUR. Venezuela would hardly be flying out hard currency cash. Nor would it be flying out worthless bolivar bank notes. The BCV letter refers to weighing and packing, which can only mean gold bullion.

The letter snippets in this ‘La Patilla’ news article look to be what they purport to be, and they do indeed appear genuine, so there is a high probability that the BCV was flying out cargos of monetary gold from Caracas International Airport on 2nd July (Thursday), 3rd July (Friday) and 7th July 2015 (Tuesday), and maybe after 7th July if the operation needed extended time as the contingency in the letter planned for.

When the last flight of repatriated gold flew into Caracas from Eorope on 30 January 2012, it was carrying 14 tonnes of gold in 28 crates. Based on this metric, 3 flights going out from Caracas in early July 2015 could carry 42 tonnes of gold, if not more. Therefore there is a realistic upper bound of at least 42 tonnes to the amount of gold that the BCV could have been flying out of Maiquetía airport on 2nd, 3rd and 7th July 2015.

This article has focused on two sets of events, 1) the drop in Venezuela’s monetary gold reserve holdings in March and April 2015 which looks to be distinct from the Bank of England vaulted gold used in the BCV-Citibank gold swap, and 2) a series of cargo flights of what looks like BCV monetary gold being flown out of Caracas International Airport in early July 2015.

Venezuela’s international reserves, managed by the BCV, are now down to USD 15.120 billion as at 29th October 2015, from USD 16.4 billion at the end of September 2015. Investment bank reports and the financial media are abuzz with speculation that (to paraphrase) “Venezuela will need to use its gold reserves to raise international funds for imports etc etc“. Which is no doubt true, but what the analyst reports and media reports are missing, in my opinion, is that a good chunk of Venezuela’s gold reserves are already in play and that any new repos, swaps or sales will have to line up and utilise whatever Venezuelan gold reserves are not already under lien, claim, encumbrance or collateralisation.

In the second half of October, Barclays’ two New York based Latin American economists, the two Alejandros (Arreaza and Grisanti) said that:

“Our quarterly cash flow model suggests that Venezuela will have a deficit of approximately USD10bn just during this quarter and will have to finance almost all of it with its own assets. Currently, liquid international reserves are likely less than USD0.5bn. The rest of the reserves are gold, SDRs and the position at the IMF. Therefore, assets besides reserves will need to be used.

We estimate that disposable assets (in and out of reserves) are about USD15.1bn. Assuming a gold repo of USD3.0bn before year-end, the disposable assets could end the year at about USD8.0bn. With these assets and a possible additional use of gold reserves, we expect Venezuela to meet its debt obligations at least until Q1 16″

Which is all very fine, except the fact that if the BCV gold reserves are 61 tonnes lighter due to outflows in March and April, and if there were additional gold outflows via international cargo flights in July, which looks likely, then a further USD 3 billion repo (circa 80 tonnes without deep haircut) will have to use additional BCV vaulted gold, a lot of which is in US Assay Office melt bars, which are not necessarily up to the expected quality of modern-day Good Delivery bars.

From my Part 1 article, I had calculated that “there were 12,357 bars held in the BCV vaults in Caracas before the gold repatriation started, and 25,176 bars in the BCV vaults when the repatriation completed“, since “12,819 good delivery bars” (160 tonnes) were repatriated. About 4,089 bars were left in London in 2012. The bars that were originally in Caracas are mainly if not exclusively US Assay office bars.

If the Caracas vaulted gold is being sold by Venezuela in the international market, it most likely would be of current Good Delivery standard (not US Assay office bars). With 160 tonnes of repatriated Good Delivery bars in 2011-2012, then if 61 tonnes was sold in March-April, and various flights happened in July 2015, there may not be enough modern Good Delivery bars remaining in Caracas to satisfy an additional USD 3 billion transaction.

In my Part 2 article in May, I had said:

“Venezuela (via the BCV) will put up 1.4 million ozs of gold as collateral in exchange for a $1 billion loan of foreign currency from Citibank. Since 1.4 million ozs of gold, valued at the late April 2015 price of $1,200, is roughly $1.68 billion, then Venezuela is having to accept a near 40% discount on the specified gold collateral.

Note that 1.4 million ounces is about 43.5 tonnes.

lpmcl

Interestingly, Barclays analysts Feifei Li and Dane Davis in their ‘Metals Markets Outlook’ piece from 26 October 2015 (last week) titled ‘Mixed Messages’ reiterated the above view and said:

“Earlier this year Venezuela executed a gold swap to raise $1bn. About 45 tonnes of gold was committed, indicating a haircut of around 40% for gold prices at the time. If we apply a similar haircut to the current gold price, it would imply that close to 140 tonnes of gold would be needed for $3bn. Thus if $3bn extra gold swaps were executed, half of Venezuela’s 361 tonne gold reserve would have been utilised.”

But 140 tonnes of gold will bring into play a lot of Venezuela’s US Assay Office bars, given that some other counterparties have already raided the Caracas vaults to get the best bars. While a lot of Venezuela’s US Assay office bars probably contain the fine gold count that they claim to hold, some probably don’t, as was illustrated in the sardonic yet jovial Zerohedge article “No Indication Should, Of Course, Be Given To The Bundesbank…” published back in September 2012.

So its buyer beware time for the counterparties that are now queued up to get their hands on Venezuela’s last remaining ingots of gold, before the entire Caracas stash may well get looted.

Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 2: From Repatriation to Reactivation

This is Part 2 of a two-part series. Part 1, titled “Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 1: El Oro, El BCV, y Los Bancos de Lingotes“, provided a historical overview of Venezuela’s gold and looked at where the gold, and the claims on gold, were located just prior to repatriation in 2011, especially the gold held abroad.

Part 1 was necessary so as to set the scene for the, in some ways, theatrical gold flights and convoys of Part 2, and to also illustrate that a percentage of Venezuela’s gold (50 tonnes) was retained in the vaults of the Bank of England so as to be available for activation into international gold transactions.

And so, the analysis below covers Venezuela’s actual gold repatriation operations in late 2011 and early 2012, especially the first and last flight. You will see that the first batch of gold bars came in on an Air France cargo flight, which opens up key questions about France and the Banque de France as a source for some of the repatriated gold. You will also see the arrival and unloading of the last flight, a World Airways cargo freighter.

The analysis wraps up with a look at the gold swap discussions between Venezuela and a set of investment banks which culminated in a gold swap being agreed with Citibank. The question then arises as to whether further similar gold swaps are in store for Venezuela’s domestically held monetary gold.

convoy

The Repatriation – Flights and Convoys

The Venezuelan gold repatriation transport operation took just over two months to complete, beginning on 25 November 2011, and winding up on 30 January 2012. During this time, 23 shipments (by air) are said to have arrived in Caracas, with 160 tonnes of gold flown in.

As Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV) governor Nelson Merentes stated in an end of year 2012 report (page 16):

“In 2012, the central bank completed the repatriation of monetary gold , which began in late 2011. This unprecedented process, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the nation, constitutes the largest movement of physical gold in the world market in recent years . A total of 23 gold shipments were moved, totalling 160 tonnes of metal that had been custodied abroad.”

Notwithstanding the fact that the German Bundesbank claims to have quietly and secretively moved 940 tonnes of its gold from the Bank of England in London to its Bundesbank headquarters in Frankfurt between 2000 and 2001, the Venezuelan gold repatriation is still probably the “largest movement of physical gold in the world market” since that time.

merentes car

The first and last shipments of Venezuela’s gold repatriation arrived into Maiquetía Airport (aka Simón Bolívar International Airport) in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, so the presumption is that the other shipments did also. Both the first and last shipments received huge media coverage in Venezuela and extensive coverage internationally. Given that the Venezuelan State facilitated and encouraged this domestic media coverage, as well as street scenes thronged with Chavez supporters, this is not surprising. The majority of the other shipments after the first and before the last ones got little or no coverage, probably due to security procedures.

Reuters quoted Nelson Merentes on the day of the first shipment arrived as saying that:

“We cannot give exact dates (for when the rest of the bars will arrive) due to questions of security. When we bring the last shipment, the people will learn about it.

The Reuters report also quoted a Venezuelan government source as saying that there would be ‘several’ cargo flights.

“A senior government source involved in transporting the bars, which amount to 90 percent of Venezuela’s gold held abroad, has told Reuters they will be shipped in several cargo flights that will be completed before the end of the year.

The total cost of the operation will be no more than $9 million, the source said, without elaborating.”

The First Shipment (by air) came from France

The gold from the first shipment, which consisted of 5 tonnes of gold, was moved from Maiquetía airport to the central bank vaults in Caracas on Friday 25 November 2011 amid much fanfare and coverage. Although the airport to bank journey happened on 25 November, an article here claims that the “the repatriation of gold reserves began on 23 November”.

In various news footage videos below, which cover the transport of the gold from the airport on 25 November 2011, there are no shots of any aircraft being unloaded, which may suggest that the first shipment did indeed arrive prior to 25 November, possibly on 23 November. The first shipment was flown in using Air France (see below).

In contrast, during the last operation on 30 January 2012, the arrival of the aircraft into the airport played a starring role in proceedings, possibly because the shipments were then being wrapped up and there was little harm in broadcasting the identify of aircraft, which you will see below was a chartered World Airways MD-11 cargo freighter.

The first video below from 25 November 2011 shows black plastic crates (presumably with the gold in them) on pallets which in turn are on trailers, positioned beside a line of armoured cars ready for loading.

Very interestingly, central bank governor Merentes (at 0:22) states that this first shipment of gold came from European countries “via Francia” (by way of France).

This is very odd that the first shipment came from France. Given that the gold was stored at the Bank of England and with the BIS, none of the Venezuelan gold should ever have been in France. And with air charters from Europe, there would be no need to fly into and out of a French airport en route from London to Caracas.

A November 2013 article from Venezuelan newspaper ‘El Nacional’ stated that the first batch of gold had come directly from France:

Los primeros lingotes vinieron de Francia en medio de un operativo denominado Oro Patrio y en el que participaron más de 500 funcionarios.”

The first ingots came from France in the middle of an operation called Golden Homeland and in which over 500 staff participated.”

The most compelling piece of evidence, however, that the first shipment came from France is the fact that the gold was flown into Caracas on Air France, and there were labels on the side of the crates stating this. See screenshot below taken from one of the videos:

Air France - air waybill

This label above shows the ‘Air Waybill No’ of ‘057-53208470′, the ‘Destination’ of CCS (Caracas), and the ‘Total No of Pieces’ – 10, i.e. 10 crates.

See also the below photo of one of the crates, with the same Air Waybill number 057-53208470, after it was loaded into the back of one of the armoured security cars:

Air France labelled crate on pallet

Air France Cargo fleet consists of 2 long-range Boeing 777- 200LRF cargo freighters, registration numbers F-GUOB and F-GUOC. You can see a video of F-GUOC taking off (from another airport) here.

These 777F aircraft have “a maximum payload of 102 tonnes, a total capacity of 37 pallets and a maindeck that can take 3-metre pallets“. The videos below of the first gold shipment, and the video of the last unloading on 30 January 2012, shows these huge 3-metre pallets on the ground and, in the case of the last shipment, being unloaded.

Since the gold in the first shipment was flown from France, this gold may have come from the Banque de France in Paris, which would suggest that the bullion banks and/or the BIS had to resort to sourcing gold from the Banque de France. BNP Paribas was one of the five bullion banks that had a borrowed gold liability to the BCV, so this fact may be relevant. (See a section below about the French connection).

The second Venezuelan video from 25 November 2011 states that gold which was located in US, Canadian, and English banks was being repatriated to Venezuela. This does not mean, however, that the gold flights originated in all or any of these locations. The US, Canada and England just refer to the headquarters of the bullion banks involved in the repatriation.

The third video from 25 November 2011 refers to “foreign banks,” “principally in Europe,” and mainly English banks.

Reuters quoted Merentes as having said that “The gold comes from several European countries.

 

1. Length: 2:26 – Nelson Merentes interview, and gold ready for loading. 25 November 2011

 

2. Length: 2:06 – Armoured cars and convoy getting ready to leave the airport, and then departing the airport. 25 November 2011

 

3. Length 1:53 – Convoy leaves airport and drives to the central bank. 25 November 2011

 

4. Length 11:03 – Air France label is shown beginning at 9:42. This longer video has extended footage of the unloading and loading operation. 25 November 2011

 

The BCV’s 2011 Economic Report (see link above, page 92) states that the first shipment on 25 November 2011 consisted of 5 tonnes of gold. In the media coverage of the first shipment, the exact tonnage of gold involved was not stated beyond the fact that  “Nelson Merentes said a little over 300 million dollars was brought in the first batch of gold that came to the country on Friday.”

At a price of $1,688 per ounce on 25 November 2011, that would be roughly 5.5 tonnes. Whether it was 5 tonnes of 5.5 tonnes is not that important. With each of the crates holding 500 kgs or 0.5 tonnes, that would be 10 – 11 crates in the first shipment. There appear to have been 10 crates given that’s what it said on the crate labels and that’s what the BCV maintain their were.

Once the gold was loaded up into the fleet of security vans, a huge convoy of military vehicles and personnel (said to be between 400 – 500 personnel) accompanied the vans out from the airport (by the ocean) and around the mountain to the central bank building in downtown Caracas, on a route, some of which was lined with Chavez’ supporters, especially where they had congregated near the bank’s entrance.

 As mentioned, there was little coverage after the first shipment, although a local media article referred to a second shipment arriving from Europe on Tuesday 6 December 2011. After this, the media didn’t really cover the repatriation until the last shipment arrived by air on Monday 30 January 2012.

repatriation gold caracas

The Last Shipment – The Final Flight of MD-11, N275WA

The final shipment arrived into Maiquetía – Simón Bolívar airport on Monday 30 January 2012 consisting of 14 tonnes of gold in 28 boxes. The novel significance of the media coverage on this day was that news crews were allowed to film the airplane taxiing into the landing area and unloading its cargo.

The arriving aircraft was a three-engine long-range McDonnell Douglas MD-11 CF (convertible freighter), registration number N275WA, serial number MSN 48631, registered to World Airways. You can see the fleet number (nose code) of ‘275’ above the front (nose) wheel in the photo below.

flight N275WA

Six of these MD-11 CFs were built and World Airways were flying two of them at this time. Ironically, the parent company of World Airways, called Global Aviation Holdings Inc, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 5 February 2012, six days after N275WA had delivered the last shipment of Venezuela’s gold to Caracas. Interestingly, Global Aviation Holdings was also “the largest commercial provider of charter air transportation for the US military”.

Other photos of World Airways’ N275WA from around the world can be seen here and here. N275WA, which had been converted into a freighter in 2002, went out of service and into storage in July 2012. Global Aviation Holdings again entered bankruptcy in November 2013, after which time World Airways was shut down. This explains why one of the MD-11 captain for World Airways (possibly captaining some of the gold flights) left World Airways in March 2014.

See video below of aircraft N275WA arriving into Caracas on 30 November 2012

 

5. Length 1:53 – N275WA arriving and unloading its cargo on 30 November 2012

 

6. Length 3:27 – This is a well produced promotional video from “Servicio Pan Americano de Protección”, the company that transported the gold from the airport to the bank. The video shows the entire unloading and loading operation from 30 January 2012 and is well worth watching.

 

An MD-11 CF freighter can transport 26 large pallets and has a maximum payload of 89,000 kgs (or 89 metric tonnes). Technically, Venezuela could have had all of its repatriated gold flown in on a lot less than 23 flights. Insurance and other risk management considerations probably dictated the diversification requirement, as well as the gold possibly only becoming available in piecemeal fashion from November 2011 to January 2012.

BCV address and lot 20

If there were indeed 23 flights over 2 months totalling 160/161 tonnes, each flight could have flown in 7 tonnes of gold, since this adds up to 161 tonnes (23 * 7). Given that the last batch was said to be 14 tonnes and the first batch 5 tonnes, each of the other 21 flights could have carried a batch of about 6.70 tonnes.

However, a number of batches could have arrived on the same flight, such as the last flight which is said to have flown 14 tonnes. Video footage from the last shipment day, 30 January 2012, shows a crate with lot number ’20’ displayed on it – See above screen shot. So there were at least 20 ‘lots’. Overall, there would have been about 360 crates.

Given that Venezuela was able to repatriate 160 tonnes of gold in cargo flights over the Atlantic Ocean from Europe within 2 months, this proves that the German Bundesbank could have easily repatriated its intended target of 300 tonnes of gold from New York in 2013, by flying the entire 300 tonnes over to Frankfurt within 4 months. Venezuela’s successful operation proves that the Bundesbank’s seven-year repatriation plan is laughable, and that the excuses coming out of Frankfurt are hiding something far more critical to the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve and US Treasury than logistical flight details.

 

The French Connection – Banque de France

It’s not clear where the last gold shipment on World Airways N275WA aircraft originated from, although Nelson Merentes made the general statement for the overall operation that “the gold comes from several European countries.

However, in the case of the first shipment on Air France from France, there are not that many places where the flight could have come from, the main suspect being from Charles de Gaulle airport (CDG) in Paris, where Air France has one of its two main cargo hubs (the other hub being Amsterdam – i.e. these are Air France-KLM’s two cargo hubs). This then also makes a good case for the first shipment of gold having come from the Banque de France. If this was the case, then it meant that bullion banks and/or the BIS needed to source gold from the Banque de France. Would this have been feasible? Yes.

A May 2012 article from CentralBanking.com (subscription only) quoted George Milling-Stanley, independent gold consultant, and formerly of the World Gold Council, who had some interesting insights into the role of the Banque de France in being able to mobilise gold:

‘”Gold stored at the Bank of England vaults … can easily be mobilised into the market via trading strategies, or posted as collateral for a currency loan. The London vaults of JPMorgan, HSBC, and other bullion dealing investment banks have a similar status,” says Milling-Stanley.’

‘Of the Banque de France, Milling-Stanley says it has “recently become more active in this space [mobilising gold into the market], acting primarily as an interface between the Bank for International Settlements in Basel [BIS] and commercial banks requiring dollar liquidity. These commercial banks are primarily located in Europe, especially in France”.’

Milling-Stanley’s reference to the Banque de France acting as an interface to the BIS and commercial banks in Europe may be implying that the Banque de France was a party to the 2010 BIS gold swaps which involved 10 commercial banks including BNP Paribas, Societe Generale and HSBC.

In July 2010 the FT said that “three big banks – HSBC, Société Générale and BNP Paribas – were among more than 10 based in Europe that swapped gold with the Bank for International Settlements in a series of unusual deals.” Note that BNP Paribas and HSBC are two of the five bullion banks with which the BCV had outstanding gold loans to in August 2011.

Despite the BIS’ cryptic, short, and obscure explanation that in these swaps, the commercial banks provided gold to the BIS in return for US dollar liquidity, it could be the case that commercial bullion banks borrowed central bank gold held at the Banque de France via financing from the BIS as part of a tripartite transaction.

Under this type of tripartite transaction, which was first proposed by Adrian Douglas, a Venezuelan – Banque de France version would have involved the Banque de France arranging gold lending to the bullion banks who then transfer the title of this gold to the BIS. The BIS transfers US dollars to the bullion banks who then either transfer this currency to the Banque de France, or owe a cash obligation to the Banque de France. The gold is recorded in the name of the BIS but is actually kept in the Banque de France until required by the bullion banks who borrowed it, then, when needed, gold is withdrawn by the bullion banks and used to pay back central bank gold lenders such as Venezuela’s BCV. Either French gold or Banque de France customer gold (such as IMF gold in Paris) could have been used in such a transaction. This would explain why Venezuela received crates of gold flown in to Caracas by Air France cargo.

The FT also noted in its 2010 BIS gold swap article that “In a short note in its annual report, published at the end of June, the BIS said it had taken 346 tonnes of gold in exchange for foreign currency in “swap operations” in the financial year to March 31.” (2010)

This 346 tonne BIS gold swap figure was said to have continued to grow after March 2010 and was estimated to be as high as 380 tonnes by July 2010.

Venezuela’s 50 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England

At the time of the arrival of the last gold shipment to Caracas in January 2012, Nelson Merentes was reported to have noted that “gold stored in BCV will reach 86% of the total while the rest, about 50 tonnes, will stay in the banks in which the Republic needs to maintain open accounts for international financial operations.” In August 2011, Chavez had referred to wanting to reach a target of 90% of the gold being stored in Caracas, but 86% is quite close.

The 50 ton amount remaining at the Bank of England was possibly chosen as a ’round number’ tonnage by the BCV and its international advisors. From the above bar/ingot total calculations, it seems that there were 4,089 good delivery bars left in London. This 50 tonnes, left in situ in London in January 2012, was to play a far greater role in Venezuela’s international financing arrangements than many envisaged at the time.

 

 

Maduro

The Reactivation of Venezuela’s Gold Reserves

The death of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez in March 2013, and the election of Nicolás Maduro as his successor marked a re-establishment of the relationship between the international investment banks and the Venezuelan central bank.

Recall that in August 2011 when Chavez called for the repatriation of Venezuela’s gold reserves, he also called for the transfer of the BCV’s operating reserves away from US and European banks. These operating reserves, such as cash deposits and short-term fixed interest investments, had been invested with the BIS (BPI in Spanish), Barclays, JP Morgan, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, the FRB (repos), the World Bank and Bladex (the Panamanian based LatAm trade bank). Sight deposits were with JP Morgan, time deposits with the other commercial banks and the BIS, and it negotiable (fixed rate) instruments with the BIS (FIXBIS). See “Proposed Relocation of the International Reserves“.

Operating Reserves August 2011

Prior to the Chavez about-turn, Venezuela had cultivated close working relationships with some of the biggest global investment banks (or vice-versa), and seemed to be especially fond of Wall Street banks. This is illustrated, obviously, by the manner in which it used the investment banks to invest both the operating and gold components of its international reserves, where the names involved read like a who’s who of investment banking giants. But as important as the deposit taking banks appear to be to Venezuela, the advisory and corporate finance relationships look to be as equally important.

According to the Venezuelan media, in the early 2000s, JP Morgan was said to be very close to the Venezuelan finance ministry and finance minister Alejandro Dopazo, and Credit Suisse New York was also said to have had a close relationship with the government.

The use of Venezuelan gold as loan collateral was also not something new to the Maduro years. A Venezuelan media report from August 2011 claims that a few years prior to 2011, Venezuela was involved in financing discussions with New York based investment banks where the banks raised the issue of gold collateral as a means of lowering the required coupon in the financing strategies and products being discussed. These meetings were said to have taken place in the New York offices of Francisco Illaramendi, former manager of the PDVSA pension funds. According to the media report, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and Barclays separately proposed that in order to  “avoid the penalty of high coupons, Venezuela could place ‘equivalent in gold in the banks’ to support the issue”, with Credit Suisse proposing that Venezuelan gold be deposited with it in London and Barclays proposing likewise.

Since the Maduro presidency, the investment banks, and especially the Wall Street based banks, have been actively involved again in Venezuela’s financial affairs. Late last year, in December 2014, Venezuela sold Goldman Sachs a $4 billion credit owed to Venezuela by the Dominican Republic which was outstanding under the Petrocaribe arrangement. Petrocaribe is a regional oil programme by which Venezuela supplies oil to other countries in the region.

Lazard, the French investment bank, is a financial advisor to the state of Venezuela, and last year Lazard was chosen by Venezuela to handle the sale of Citgo Petroleum on behalf of the Venezuelan state owned oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.). Citgo is a US subsidiary of PVDSA. This sale didn’t go ahead but then Deutsche Bank’s New York office was chosen in January 2014 to handle a bond and loan capital raising exercise for Citgo and advisory services for PDVSA. Deutsche had previously worked with PDVSA.

Bank of America-Merrill Lynch also now has a close relationship with the Venezuelan central bank and the Venezuelan government in the form of its chief economist for the Andean region, Francisco Rodríguez. Rodríguez, was chief economist to the National Assembly of Venezuela from 2000-2004, and joined Bank of America in 2011. More about Rodríguez below.

outriders

Goldman Gold Swap Plan

The first sign that Venezuela’s gold was back in the sights of the investment banks came in November 2013, when it was reported that the BCV (and the Venezuelan government) were in negotiations with Goldman Sachs about the arrangement of a gold exchange, in other words, a gold – US dollar swap with gold as collateral. A lot of the reporting at the time did not provide very much detail about this swap, so here are some summary details of the Goldman gold swap.

The gold swap was to be between the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) and Goldman Sachs International in London. Eudomar Tovar was BCV president at that time. The swap would involve Venezuela swapping gold from it’s reserves with Goldman Sachs international in exchange for a US dollar loan, with the gold serving as collateral for the loan.

The swap was to be for a four-year duration between 2016 and 2020 (although another media source said it was to be for a seven-year duration from late 2013 until late 2020). The swap was to be for 1.45 million ounces of gold (or nearly 1.45 million ounces according to one media source) which was expected to be deposited at the Bank of England and transferred to Goldman Sachs International at an agreed time. At the time, 1.45m ozs of gold was valued at over $1.85 billion at the then market price of $1,282 per ounce. Venezuela would also pay an annual interest rate of 8% on the loan.

BCV Goldman Adar gold swap

The above screenshot is from a document here.

If the price of gold fell over the life of the swap, the BCV would need to deposit more gold into a margin account. If the price of gold rose, Goldman Sachs International would be required to deposit more currency into a margin account.  At the swap’s maturity, the contributions made by each party into the margin accounts would be returned to the respective parties.

The swap was said to contain a built-in hedge that would benefit Goldman, which reflected a 10% adjustment of the value of the swap if the gold price fell. The gold swap was said to be tradable on the market. The terms of the swap allowed the BCV to repay the loan and keep the gold, but if the BCV didnt repay the loan, the gold would go Goldman. One report said that the gold would continue to appear on the BCV’s balance sheet throughout the term of the swap.

The BCV had contracted Adar Capital Partners (of which Diego Marynberg is a director), as a consultant to design the swap with Goldman Sachs International. Adar Capital Partners would received 0.25% per annum of the value of the gold in the contract at beginning of each year over the life of the contract.

Any dispute between the parties would  be resolved in English courts. Some media articles on the BCV-Goldman gold swap can be viewed in Spanish here and here and here.

Given that there were said to be 16,908 of Venezuela’s gold bars held abroad, of which 12,819 bars were repatriated, this left 4,089 of Venezuela’s bars in the vaults of the Bank of England from early 2012. These 4,089 bars are roughly equal to 51 tonnes, or 1.635 million ounces. It looks like the Goldman swap factored in a 10% adjustment on 50 tonnes of gold (roughly 1,607,500 ozs) at the Bank of England,  to arrive at 1.45 million ounces (i.e. 1,607,500 * 0.9 = 1,446,750 ozs). This is the 10% adjustment referred to above. So Goldman would have had an extra buffer built-in as protection against a downward gold price movement.

The discussion of the swap at the time in November 2013 did not reveal what US dollar amount the BCV was to receive from Goldman in exchange for transferring 1.45 million ozs of gold to Goldman. i.e. it did not reveal the intended discount that the BCV was expected to take on gold with a US dollar value of $1.85 billion.

The BCV maintains that this gold swap with Goldman Sachs International did not go ahead, despite what look like detailed terms and negotiations. But the framework of the gold swap discussed with Goldman Sachs looks very similar to the swap structure that was ultimately chosen in April 2015, so it appears that the BCV re-used in some way the plan that they had drawn up with Adar Capital Partners and Goldman Sachs.

Goldman and Ecuador

Where Goldman did get a Latin American gold swap out the door was Ecuador, approximately six months after its negotiations with Venezuela hit a wall.

In early June 2014, it was announced that Ecuador had agreed to swap 1,165 bars of gold as collateral with Goldman, and in return Goldman agreed to provide Ecuador with “instruments of high security and liquidity” i.e. a loan. This gold swap was for 3 years, from 2014 to 2017 after which it will be reversed and Ecuador will get its gold back and pay the 2017 gold price to Goldman.

Rodríguez, Bank of America and the BCV vault visit

In September 2014, there was a rather unusual story from Bloomberg in which Francisco Rodríguez, the Bank of America economist (see above), related the fact that he had been allowed a rare visit into the Venezuelan central bank gold vault to view the gold bars. Rodríguez maintains that he was at a routine meeting in the BCV headquarters when his request to see the gold was granted, and that he and four other people who had attended the meeting were brought down to the underground vault in which all of the gold was stacked in “five small cells that were not even full to the top”, and that the bars were of “different types”.

While Rodríguez is said to be close to the BCV and the Venezuelan government, it still seems odd that at a routine meeting, a Bank of America representative (and some unnamed others) would pop down to see the gold in the vault, while external attendees at countless other meetings at the BCV’s headquarters would not do this tour. Could it he that the Bank of America was running the slide ruler over the Venezuelan gold in preparation for a loan of their own to the Venezuelan State?

Role Call Recall

At this point its worth recalling some of the banks that were interacting with the Venezuelan state and finance ministry, and/or interacting with the BCV (not including the gold deposits and gold lending).

In 2011, Venezuela’s operating reserves were invested with Barclays, JP Morgan, BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank. Earlier in the 2000s, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse and Deutsche were said to be close to or working with Venezuela on various financing matters.

It was also said that a few years prior to 2011, Barclays, Credit Suisse and Deutsche, at meetings in New York held in the PDVSA offices, had proposed that Venezuela could put up gold as collateral so as to lower coupons on unspecified products.

Then there was Goldman Sachs purchasing outstanding debt that the Dominican Republic owed to Venezuela. Then there were Lazard and Deutsche advising the PDVSA and/or Citgo in the US. Finally there was Goldman Sachs negotiating a gold swap with Venezuela in 2013, and Bank of America taking a look at the gold in the BCV vaults in 2014.

 

Investment Bank beauty parade – March 2015

The topic of Venezuelan gold swaps was again raised on 10 March 2015 when Reuters reported that the BCV was said to be in advanced discussions with a group of Wall Street banks about conducting a 4 year gold swap for 1.4 milion ozs of gold, and that the swap operation would be agreed by the end of April. Reuters reported that the discussions involved at least two institutions, namely “Bank of America and Credit Suisse”.

At the time, the swap was said to involve an exchange of 1.4 million ozs (43.5 tonnes) of Venezuelan gold for cash, on which interest would be paid, and that Venezuela had the option of re-purchasing the gold after the expiry of the 4 year term. Interestingly, it was also said that Venezuela “would most likely be able to maintain the gold as part of its foreign currency reserves” during the swap, i.e. double-counting of gold reserves.

Amid the publicity about these March 2015 swap discussions, confusion arose as to whether the Goldman Sachs gold swap had happened or not, but the BCV stated generally that although it had “received proposals to carry out a similar operation” in late 2013, it “denied any agreements had been completed.“

Local media went further, and named additional investment bank names said to be involved in the pitch to secure the gold swap deal. On 5 March 2015, Nelson Bocaranda Sardi claimed in Venezuelan newspaper El Univeral that there was a pitch competition (implied to be for effect) by Credit Suisse, Goldman, BTGP Brazilian, Deutsche, Bank of America and Citibank, and that it was really a three horse race in which Deutsche Bank, Bank of America and Citibank would be chosen for the gold swap, but for $500 million each. Furthermore, Sardi said that Venezuela was paying $70 million to each bank as a risk premium. El Universal was previously said to be critical of Chavez, but may now not be so critical of Maduro.

On 12 March, on a web site of an organisation called Aporrea, Fresia Ipinza retorted (possibly with more up-to-date information) that rumours were saying that the gold swap would be over 4 years for 1.4 million ozs, and that allegedly Bank of America and Credit Suisse were involved. Aporrea were known to be Chavez supporters.

So, its very possible that the list of investment banks pitching to Venezuela for the gold swap were as follows: Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and BTGP. BTGP refers to BTG Pactual, a Brazilian investment bank.

Citigroup Rescue

 

The Citibank Gold Swap

In the last week of April 2015, it emerged that Citibank had exclusively won the mandate for the gold swap with Venezuela. It was reported that Citi was chosen from a group of ‘five’ banks that had pitched.

A combination of sources (see links) yield the following details about the gold swap with Citi. The details are said to be derived from newspaper ‘El Nacional’ and also a former director of the BCV, and also from Reuters.

Venezuela (via the BCV) will put up 1.4 million ozs of gold as collateral in exchange for a $1 billion loan of foreign currency from Citibank. Since 1.4 million ozs of gold, valued at the late April 2015 price of $1,200, is roughly $1.68 billion, then Venezuela is having to accept a near 40% discount on the specified gold collateral. Venezuela also pays interest on the loan at between 6% and 7% per annum.

The swap is for a 4 year duration, and Venezuela will have the “right of first refusal” to re-purchase the gold after 4 years. The 1.4 million ozs of gold (43.5 tonnes and just less than 3,500 Good Delivery bars equivalent) will be held at the vaults of the Bank of England. If Venezuela does not pay the interest payments on time, Citibank can gain control of the gold. The loan was expected to be for $1.5 billion but its unclear why this changed, but probably would have something to do with a bigger haircut being imposed.

According to ‘Venezuela Analysis‘ the “current value [of the gold] will continue to appear on the Central Bank’s balance sheet – an advantage that Goldman Sachs denied the country in earlier talks.” ‘Venezuela Analysis’ also said that some sources think Citibank holds title to the gold, while other say Venezuela holds title. Another relevant newspaper link is here.

None of the media commentary mentioned Adar Capital Partners Ltd in conjunction with the Citibank swap but its possible that this company could have been involved in the more recent swap negotiations, given that it was involved in the late 2013 gold swap negotiations involving Goldman Sachs and a lot of the swap terms are similar. On the other hand, the BCV could have just taken its gold swap file on the Goldman proposal out of the top drawer and reused the Goldman – Adar plan.

Why might Venezuela need a loan now?

Does Venezuela really need extra foreign currency now? In some ways, yes. Venezuela’s international reserves keep falling and as Nathan Crooks of Bloomberg said recently, reserves are now under $18.8 billion and at the lowest level since October 2003.

Venezuela’s international reserves fell by about US$2 billion during April from a level of $20.8 billion at the beginning of April. Lower oil prices have impacted the country’s ability to comfortably meet principal and interest payments on foreign bond borrowings and  for financing imports. Inflation in Venezuela is running high, and there are reports of a shortage of essential goods and an impact on some public services. In short, the economy is contracting.

Rodriguez, the Bank of America economist, said that the gold swap was the ‘logical’ course of action for Venezuela to take. As to why Venezuela can’t negotiate oil swap deals in the current environment or get more financing from the BRICS or China, that is probably more of an international political issue and a reputational issue with the international capital markets.

 

Maria Corina Machado

On 12 March 2015, Maria Corina Machado, a deputy in the Venezuelan National Assembly and political leader of the opposition party, sent an offical letter to Nelson Merentes, president of the BCV, asking the following 5 questions about the gold swap, which at the time, in early March, was being rumoured.

Questions 1 and 2 are quite standard and to be expected in light of the general rumours about the swap, but questions 3, 4, and 5 seem to suggest that Machado had heard something about the negotiations that made her think that the size of the swap was going to be far larger ($2.6 billion), and that there would be a ‘second operation’ with an even larger swap, and that this would require moving gold out of Venezuela again. See the 5 questions below:

  1. ¿Está todo el oro de las reservas venezolanas en las bóvedas del BCV de Venezuela tal como afirmó el ex presidente el Hugo Chavéz 17 de agusto 2011, cuando ordenó “repatriacion de nuestro oro”?

Are all of Venezuela’s gold reserves in the vaults of the Central Bank of Venezuela as stated by the former president Hugo Chavéz on 17 agusto 2011, when he ordered “repatriation of our gold”?

2. ¿Está el BCV en negociación con la banca extranjera para la venta o empeño del oro monetario?

Is the BCV in negotiations with foreign banks for the sale or pawning of monetary gold?

3. ¿Es cierto que en la operacion de empeño del oro actualmente en discusión se pretende disponer de oro por un valor de mercado de 2,6 mil millones US$?
¿Esto representaría comprometer casi el 20% del total de reservas en oro de la Républica en esta primera operación?

Is it true that in the operation to pawn gold currently under discussion, it is intended to dispose of gold with a market value of US$ 2.6 billion?
Does this represent / involve almost the 20% of the total gold reserves of the Republic, in this first operation?

4. ¿Es cierto que estarían negociando una segunda operacion de empeño similar a la anterior por un monto aun mayor?

Is it true that they would be negotiating a second operation similar to the previous one for an even greater amount?

5. ¿Estas operaciones implican sacar el oro de las bóvedas del BCV y regresarlas al exterior?

Do these operations involve removing the gold from the vaults of the BCV and returning it abroad?

In the letter, Machado claimed that “the [gold swap] exchange would jeopardize the achievement of economic stability” and “would compromise the future of the Republic and the welfare of millions of Venezuelans“.

She also called for the monetary gold bullion held by the BCV and the exact amount held abroad  to be “certified by an independent and trusted international body”.

There does not seem to be any publicly available response from the central bank to Machado’s letter, so its unclear as to which answers, if any, Machado received from the BCV. However, given the deteriorating state of Venezuela’s international finances and international reserves at the present time, it may be sooner rather than later before Venezuelan gold could be on the move again out of the country.

One thing is for sure. Gold leaving Venezuela on a flight back to London, New York, or elsewhere, will not get the fanfare and celebration that was accompanied by the same gold’s arrival into Caracas a few short years ago.

 

Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 1: El Oro, El BCV, y Los Bancos de Lingotes

Venezuela’s gold reserves have rarely stayed out of the financial news headlines over the last four years. From initial gold repatriation announcements in August 2011, through to gold shipments from Europe to Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, in late 2011 and early 2012, as well as the more recent negotiations on using gold in swaps and for loan collateral, the Venezuelan gold story has filled many column inches.

However, much of the coverage has been disjointed and purely focused on the story of the day. The analysis below aims to take a broader overview and to provide a big picture treatment. To understand where Venezuela’s gold got to where it is today, you have to understand where it’s been.

The analysis is divided into two parts. Part 1 starts with a short historical overview of Venezuela’s gold up to 1992, followed by an examination of where the gold, and the claims on gold, were located just prior to repatriation in 2011. It also drills down into the composition of the gold now held in the BCV vaults and shows that these bars would be expected to consist of roughly equal percentages of London Good Delivery bars and US Assay Office ‘melt’ bars.

Part 2 examines the actual repatriation exercises in late 2011 and early 2012, and takes a look at the renewed circling of the Venezuelan gold by the international investment banks, most recently illustrated by Venezuela’s gold swap negotiations with Goldman Sachs in late 2013, and the more recent gold swap agreement with Citibank in April 2015.

Since Venezuela was able to fly 160 tonnes of gold on cargo flights across the Atlantic Ocean from Europe to Caracas in 2 months, it begs the question, why has the German Bundesbank not been able to fly 300 tonnes of gold from New York to Frankfurt in 4 months?

repatriacion del oro armoured-cars

 

El Oro y El BCV – Some History

According to the World Gold Council’s latest list of IMF collated and reported World Official Gold Holdings as of May 2015 (IFS), Venezuela’s central bank, Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV), officially holds 367.6 tonnes of gold within its international reserves, ranking Venezuela as the world’s 16th largest official gold holder. This gold comprises 68.9%, by value, of Venezuela’s total international reserves. Given that many of the countries on the IMF list employ very opaque reporting standards for their gold, Venezuela would probably rank a number of places higher in a more realistic world list, even since re-commencing active management of some of its gold reserves through swaps.

In March 2010, the BCV published a very useful Powerpoint presentation (in Spanish) explaining the history of the Bank’s gold reserves and how it’s gold had been accumulated since 1940. Some additional history about the Venezuelan gold is also contained in a short Venezuelan Government publication also in Spanish (Venezuela oro encarteasamblea Reservas Int).

The BCV was established as Venezuela’s central bank in 1939 and has it’s headquarters in Caracas. As early as 1940, the BCV’s international reserves totalled $31 million, of which $29 million (~26 tonnes) was in the form of monetary gold. This gold had been mostly transferred to the BCV from Venezuela’s private banks, and was used as a backing for bank-note issuance which was a function that the BCV took over from the private banks.

33 Liberty: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Manhattan

In 1942, the BCV’s gold reserves totalled $67 million dollars (59.78 tonnes), with 36.23 tonnes in the BCV vaults and 23.55 tonnes in the custody in the gold vault of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) under 33 Liberty in Manhattan.

By the end of World War II, the BCV’s gold holdings had increased to approximately 180 tonnes, most of which was classified as monetary gold. This rapid accumulation of gold at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (in the form of US Assay office melt bars) arose from US payments of gold to Venezuela in exchange for Venezuelan oil exports to the US, i.e. gold-for-oil transactions.

Following World War II, the BCV continued to convert any surplus income not required for import payments into gold, and in 1948 Venezuela had built up holdings of 287 tonnes of gold, making it the 8th largest gold holder in the world, and the largest gold holder in Latin America. During this period, the BCV says that it “streamlined the transfer of gold” from FRBNY custody to the BCV vaults in Caracas. In 1957, the BCV also bought two large ‘lots’ of fine gold bars from the IMF. As a result, in 1957-1958, Venezuelan gold holdings reached their highest level ever at nearly 640 tonnes.

The gold-for-oil transactions between Venezuela and the US are also referenced in the BCV’s 2011 Economic Report (large file – page 91) which states:

“A mediados de los años cincuenta, el acervo de oro alcanzó 639 toneladas, en la medida en que las exportaciones petroleras a Estados Unidos fueron pagadas a la nación con barras de oro del Banco de la Reserva Federal de Nueva York.”

“In the mid-fifties, the stock of gold reached 639 tonnes, to the extent that oil exports to the United States were paid to the nation with gold bars of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.”

In 1961, the BCV needed to acquire foreign exchange from the IMF, some or all of which was paid for with gold, and Venezuela’s gold reserves fell by nearly 300 tonnes, to approximately 340 tonnes, and then rose slightly in the 1960s to between 356 and 357 tonnes.

Fast forwarding to 1986, the BCV made a decision to engage in the “proactive management of monetary gold in the international market“, and in the late 1980’s moved “a significant portion” of gold from its vaults in Caracas to the Bank of England vaults in London as a prelude to “investing” this gold in the London Gold Market. The BCV adopted the good delivery standard for the gold sent to London and invested these holdings in interest-earning financial transactions such as swaps and gold deposits. These gold operations were established with “first-class financial institutions as enshrined in the Central Bank Law“, which “narrowed” the allowable counter-parties (i.e. narrowed the counter-parties to certain LBMA bullion banks).

To the Bank of England and beyond

Specifically, as at 31 December 1986, 14.7% of Venezuela’s 356 tonnes of gold was held at the FRB vaults in New York, and 85.3% was held at the BCV vaults in Caracas. Six years later, on 31 December 1992, 14.7% of this same 356 tonne quantity of gold was still at the FRB in New York, 43.3% was still at the BCV in Caracas, but now 28.5% had moved to the Bank of England and 13.4% was said to be with the BIS (note: this adds up to 99.9% due to rounding errors).

Distribution of Venezuelan gold in 1986 and 1992

There are slight discrepancies in the data sources as to whether the BCV held 357 tonnes or 356 tonnes in the late 1980s / early 1990s, but the Venezuelan Government figures at the end of December 1992 were 154.5 tonnes in Caracas (43.3% of the gold reserves), 101.8 tonnes at the Bank of England (28.5%), 52.2 tonnes in the FRBNY (14.7%), and 47.79 tonnes with the BIS (13.4%). This gold distribution adds up to 356.29 tonnes.

Note that initially in the late 1980’s, 89.72 tonnes of gold was transferred from the BCV to the Bank of England, and this amount appears to have been augmented slightly to 101.8 tonnes by the end of 1992. This would also suggest that the gold deposited with the BIS was via the BIS’ gold account at the Bank of England in London.

Various Venezuelan news articles such as here claim that gold began to be moved to London, initially surreptitiously, from the BCV in Caracas beginning with 8 tonnes on 5 August 1988, and then another 8 tonnes on 21 February 1989 when the newly elected president, Carlos Andres Perez, came to power for a second time.

The above historical account should go someway towards explaining how Venezuelan gold ended up at the Bank of England in the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, it is not the full story. To get a fuller picture, you also have to work in reverse from 2011 back to 1992. Luckily, the BCV has provided a roadmap that helps in this regard.

 

Blueprint of Venezuelan gold holdings as at 8 August 2011

In early August 2011, Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, pronounced a series of directives which would dramatically alter how the country’s international reserves were invested and managed. These directives, which were contained in a document titled “Proposed relocation of the International Reserves“, called for:

  • the transfer of operating reserves from banks in Europe and the US to banks in Russia, China and Brazil, within a two month period
  • the transfer of monetary gold held abroad back to the BCV vaults in Venezuela, within a two month period

Note that the BCV classifies international reserves into a) operating reserves (“liquid reserves”), comprising short-term cash and cash like instruments invested with institutions such as investment banks and the BIS, and b) non-operational reserves such as gold and SDRs.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the BCV’s gold holdings had remained static at 357 tonnes until the 2008/2009 period. During 2008, the BCV’s board made a decision to send its non-monetary gold holdings abroad for “strategic use” (i.e. investment operations). Some of this non-monetary gold was purchased from Venezuelan gold mine production. In early 2009 and 2010, the BCV “monetized its non-monetary gold” by having it refined into good delivery bars and then moved this gold to London to participate in return generating transactions. This led to the 357 tonnes total rising to 361 tonnes in 2009 and then 364 tonnes in 2010. By 2011, Venezuela’s gold holdings had reached nearly 366 tonnes.

Eagles Liberty Indian head

Type of bars held and monetary coins

In page 17 of its Powerpoint presentation (March 2010), the BCV lists an inventory of its monetary gold as consisting of:

  • Amonedado (coins) comprising “Eagles, Liberty and Indian Head”
  • Barras Bóvedas BCV (bars in the BCV vaults) comprising “Fed Melted Bars” *
  • Bóvedas BI y otros (bars in Bank of England and others) comprising “Good Delivery” bars

* The “Fed Melted Bars” that the BCV refer to are US Assay Office melts (batches of ~ 18 to 22 bars), and the BCV notes that these bars “exceed 995 fine, but lack a refiner seal certifying assay“. What the BCV means is that although these bars have the correct fineness to be good delivery bars, they are not good delivery until they have been individually weighted and individually stamped (i.e. until the Melts have been broken). See “The Keys to the Gold Vaults at the New York Fed – Part 3: ‘Coin Bars’, ‘Melts’ and the Bundesbank” for an explanation of US Assay Office ‘melts’.

Based on this BCV inventory, the entire repatriation by Venezuela would be expected to have consisted of London Good Delivery bars. It also would mean that following the repatriation, the BCV vaults held a roughly 50% – 50% combination of US Assay Office ‘melt’ bars and London Good Delivery bars. See section below on ‘How many Gold Bars did Venezuela have in August 2011′.

Venezuela’s Gold in August 2011

The August 2011 international reserves document from Chávez, which was actually issued by the then BCV president, Nelson Merentes, and the then Venezuelan finance minister, Jorge Giordani, included a detailed breakdown of the composition and location of Venezuela’s gold reserves as at 8 August 2011, in the form of the table below. This table illustrates that Venezuela’s gold that was held abroad had experienced some very interesting transformations between 1992 and 2011.

Gold on deposit vs Gold time deposits

According to the table, as at 8 August 2011, Venezuela held 365.82 tonnes of gold, with 154.47 tonnes in Venezuela custodied in the vaults of the BCV (42.22% of the gold), and 211.35 tonnes held abroad (57.78% of the gold). The gold held abroad was classified into two broad categories, namely, “Sólo Depositado” (gold deposited only or on deposit only) totalling 128.48 tonnes, and “A Plazo” (gold ‘time’ deposits or ‘term’ deposits) totalling 82.87 tonnes.

Since the English equivalent of these two phrases can be confusing, the “Sólo Depositado” can be considered to be physical gold that has been deposited with a bank, much like a sight deposit at a bank, while the “A Plazo” is gold lent by the central bank to commercial bullion banks whereby the banks pay interest to the central bank for borrowing the gold. The central bank has a claim to the gold that it lent, and the bullion banks have a gold liability to the central bank.

bank_for_settlements

Bank of England, the BIS, and J.P. Morgan

Of the 128.48 tonnes of physical gold deposited abroad, this was deposited with three entities, namely, The Bank of England, The Bank for International Settlements, and J.P. Morgan. The lion’s share of this deposited gold, 99.21 tonnes, was with the Bank of England. A further 11.85 tonnes was deposited via the BIS and a further 17.42 tonnes was deposited with JP Morgan. Each of these three entities is listed next to the country of its “headquarters” i.e. England, Switzerland and the US, respectively.

It’s not clear if the Venezuelan gold held by the Bank of England was held ‘under earmark‘ (i.e. specific bars allocated in custody via a Bailor-Bailee relationship), or held ‘on a fine ounce basis‘ (i.e. within a larger pool of gold (pool allocated) where Venezuela would own a specific number of fine ounces but not specific bars). Given that there is no mention of ‘earmarked’ gold in the table, and given that the deposit was described as a sight deposit (see below), the gold attributed to the Bank of England was probably held as a deposit on a fine ounce basis.

The same logic would apply to the gold deposited into a BIS account (probably also at the Bank of England). Gold lending only works if the lent gold is fungible which enables the Bank of England or the BIS to transfer bars to the borrowers and get back other bars at a future date. Its unclear from the table as to where the gold deposited with JP Morgan was stored, and also unclear if this gold was unencumbered and free of other liens, claims and hypothecations.

 

Table 1: How Venezuela’s gold reserves were distributed as of 8 August 2011

Distribution of Venezuelan monetary gold as at 8 August 2011

 

Of the 82.87 tonnes of lent gold that comprised gold time deposits (22.65% of Venezuela’s gold), these time deposits were shared out between five bullion banks, namely, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Barclays, Standard Chartered, HSBC and BNP Paribas. The countries listed next to these five bank are, in all cases, the countries where their ‘headquarters’ are based, except for BNP Paribas, which strangely, is listed with a country of ‘United States’ despite its headquarters being located in Paris, France. So it appears that a BNP Paribas US entity was involved in borrowing Venezuelan gold. Note that BNP merged with Paribas in 2000 after a takeover battle involving Société Générale.

These gold time deposits represent the gold that was lent by the BCV to the bullion market in order to generate a return to the BCV. This gold, when lent, was either sold or lent on further by the original bullion bank borrowers or used by them in a proprietary manner, or some combination of the three.

Note that London entities of all six bullion banks in the above table are members of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA). Five of them are now LBMA market makers (except BNP Paribas), and four of them are clearing members of London Precious Metals Clearing Ltd (LPMCL), namely HSBC, JP Morgan, Scotia and Barclays.

For all of the above deposits / investments, the BCV’s allocation table specified the year of commencement of operations (fecha de inicio de operaciones), and in the case of the time deposits, the expiration date of the placements (fecha de vencimiento de colocaciones). For the gold on deposit with the Bank of England, BIS and JP Morgan, these deposits were described as ‘sight’ deposits with no expiration date.

In this table from 2011, the gold on deposit at the Bank of England is stated as having commenced in 1980. However, this contradicts the BCV pie-chart (see graphic above) which stated that in 1986, the Venezuelan gold was only held at the BCV and the FRBNY, and also contradicts the BCV history which maintained that “initially in the late 1980’s, 89.72 tonnes was transferred from the BCV to the Bank of England”.

Given that all bar gold at the BCV and the FRBNY would have been in the form of US Assay Office melts, it implies that all of the Venezuelan bars that ended up at the Bank of England and in the London market needed to be, at a minimum, individually weighted and stamped when received. Given that there have been concerns about the quality of US Assay Office 995 fine bars (for example the gold given by the FRBNY to the Bundesbank in 1968), some US Assay Office bar holders may decide to refine them to bring them up to a correct and trustable good delivery standard.

According to the BCV table, Venezuela only deposited gold with the BIS beginning in April 2009, while the gold deposit with JP Morgan commenced in 1999 (so the JP Morgan deposit was in existence for more than 11 years). Note that JP Morgan merged with Chase Manhattan in 2000. Since Venezuela had previous deposited gold with the BIS from as early as December 1992, the record of an April 2009 deposit with the BIS looks like a fresh allocation to a BIS account at that time.

BoE Gold and forklift

Scotia, Barclays, StanChar, HSBC and BNP Paribas – Time Deposits

Of the five gold time deposits arrangements, the relationship with Bank of Nova Scotia was stated as commencing in 1992, while the operations with the other four bullion banks are listed as beginning in 2004. However, a note to the table states that “Since 2004, the Central Bank has kept automated records of the operations with these institutions. However, the first operations (manual) are dated from previous years” (i.e. prior to 2004).

Interestingly, three of these bullion banks, namely Barclays, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Standard Chartered, are the same three banks that the central bank of El Salvador had recently engaged in gold time deposits with. See “El Salvador’s gold reserves, the BIS, and the bullion banks” for details. In fact, these three names crop up hosting gold time deposits with other Latin American central banks. More on that in a future article.

The gold time deposits appear to have been generally for periods of approximately one month because, as of 8 August 2011, all of the deposits expired between 8 and 14 September 2011.

Note, the final ‘total’ row in the above table is named ‘Total Oro‘ but only totals to 237.34 tonnes. This looks like a typo whereby the 154.47 tonnes at the BCV was added to the 82.87 tonnes of time deposits, but the 128.48 tonnes of real gold deposits were omitted.

The transformation of Venezuela’s gold from 1992 to 2011

Given that we know the geographic allocation of Venezuela’s gold on 31 December 1992 (start of period) and also know how the geographic allocation stood in August 2011 (end of period), as well as when the end of period distributions started, it’s possible to draw some observations.

Recall that at the end of 1992, Venezuela held 154.5 tonnes of gold at the BCV vaults in Caracas (43.3%), 101.8 tonnes at the Bank of England (28.5%), 52.2 tonnes in the FRBNY (14.7%), and 47.79 tonnes with the BIS (13.4%).  A total of 356.29 tonnes, and note that the FRBNY and BIS holdings add up to 99.99 tonnes (let’s call it 100 tonnes).

At the beginning of August 2011, Venezuela held 154.47 tonnes at the BCV, 99.21 tonnes at the Bank of England, 17.42 tonnes with JP Morgan, 11.82 tonnes with the BIS, and 82.87 tonnes as time deposits with five bullion banks. A total of 365.82 tonnes, i.e. 9.53 tonnes more than in 1992.

Bullion-Banks

Through the 1990s and 2000s

1. The 154.5 tonnes of physical gold that was at the BCV in Caracas in 1992 was still at the BCV in August 2011.

2. Gold, in a practically equivalent amount to that deposited at the Bank of England by December 1992 (i.e. 101.8 tonnes) was still deposited at the Bank of England in August 2011 (i.e. a 2.59 ton reduction to 99.21 tonnes). This was not necessarily the same gold though since it could have been involved in multiple transactions between 1992-2011.

3. The gold that was’ in custody’ at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in 1992 (i.e. 52.2 tonnes) was no longer accounted for as being at the FRBNY in 2011. This gold may have been physically moved to the Bank of England or else swapped to London, however, some or all of it may have stayed in the FRBNY vault or in the vicinity of New York. This is so because some bullion banks such as JP Morgan have in the past had gold accounts at the FRBNY when they held sovereign gold as collateral for loan advances (e.g. lending to Spain in the 1950s).

The FRBNY will insist that commercial banks cannot hold gold accounts at the FRBNY, however, commercial banks have been named gold account holders at the FRBNY (holding gold as collateral) in the past. Furthermore, JP Morgan’s gold vault is right next door to the FRBNY gold vault(s) and may be connected to the FRBNY vault area.  See “The Keys to the Gold Vaults at the New York Fed – Part 2: The Auxiliary Vault” for details. So it’s possible that the 17.42 tonnes that was deposited with JP Morgan was held in New York in JP Morgan’s vault or in the name of JP Morgan at the FRBNY vault.

Interestingly, given that there were 52.2 tonnes of Venezuela’s gold at the FRBNY in 1992, its notable that the totals for the gold deposit with JP Morgan,  and the time deposits with BNP Paribas (US), Bank of Nova Scotia and Standard Chartered in the above table add up to a combined 51.41 tonnes, which is quite close to the 52.2 ton FRBNY total (a difference of 0.79 tonnes). So the FRBNY gold could have been divided out to these four entities in the 1990s and 2000s.

4. The 47.79 tonnes at the BIS in 1992 had, by 2011, become only 11.82 tonnes at the BIS, i.e. a drop of 35.97 tonnes. Gold deposited to the Bank of England by a foreign central bank can be transferred in and out of the BIS gold accounts at the Bank of England and also in and out of the commercial LBMA bullion bank gold accounts at the Bank of England. Given these transfer possibilities, it’s not surprising that Venezuela’s gold positions with the BIS have fluctuated widely over time.

5. From being stored with four official sector entities in 1992 (according to the BCV data), the Venezuelan gold, in 2011, was being ‘minded’ by nine entities, six of which were commercial bullion banks / investment banks.

6. Roughly speaking, the combined 100 tonnes of gold custodied by the FRBNY and the BIS in 1992 had become 112.14 tonnes in 2011 spread over the BIS, JP Morgan, Barclays, HSBC, Scotia, StanChar and BNP Paribas. This transformation in the 1990s and 2000s of custodied gold into lent gold as well as physical gold deposited with a bullion bank (in the case of JP Morgan) is in line with the BCV’s stated intention in the late 1980s to proactively move some of its gold to London (in the form of good delivery gold), so as to actively participate in the financial market for gold and earn a return on the participating gold.

The 12.14 tonne increase from 1992 to 2011 among the above entities was due to a real increase in 9.53 tonnes of Venezuela’s gold over 1992 to 2011 (non-monetary gold converted to monetary gold and sent to London) as well as a net 2.59 ton reduction in the amount of gold deposited with the Bank of England (9.53 + 2.59 = 12.12).

This 12.14 ton net increase, when added to the reduction of 35.97 tonnes held with the BIS, equals 48.11 tonnes, which is very close to the combined gold lent (time deposits) to Barclays and HSBC of 48.89 tonnes ( i.e. 45.84 + 3.05 = 48.89 tonnes), and just leaves a 0.78 ton difference, which is the residual amount that was left over in the above FRBNY calculation. So in theory, the Barclays and HSBC time deposits could have been sourced from a transfer from Venezuela’s BIS gold account balance as well as the extra gold that the BCV sent to London in 2009 and 2010.

7. There may have been many other bullion banks that held gold time deposits for Venezuela over the period 1992 – 2011. The 2011 data is just an end-of-period snapshot. Likewise, some of Venezuela’s gold could have moved in and out of Bank of England and BIS gold accounts, and, less likely, moved in and out of a FRB gold account, over the intervening period. Without the inventory records, it’s not possible to know.

Chavez sign

Changes to Venezuela’s gold reserves since early August 2011

Venezuela’s current gold holdings (in May 2015) of 367.6 tonnes versus early August 2011 total holdings of 366 tonnes mask some fluctuations over the period which were due to various small purchases and sale transactions.

In late August 2011, Nelson Merentes, president of the BCV, announced that Venezuela would be purchasing 7 additional tonnes of monetary gold. This would have brought the total holdings up to 373 tonnes at the end of 2011.

Then, in the BCV’s end of year 2012 report (page 16) it was announced that:

“Purchases of gold made by the BCV in the country reached 1.6 tonnes of fine gold for Bs. 328.88 million. In 2012, 3.6 tonnes of non-currency gold in stock were refined to the condition of good delivery. Those bars bought directly from the domestic market comprised this stock. This amount was monetized and included as asset of the reserves in currency gold of the issuing body, thus maintaining the same heritage of the previous year.”

However, in October 2012, the FT reported that:

“According to the latest IMF data, Venezuela sold 3.7 tonnes in August alone, bringing total sales so far this year to about 10.9 tonnes. Venezuela now has 362 tonnes of gold reserves, compared to 372.9 tonnes at the beginning of this year [2011].”

Other small purchases since the end of 2012 brought the total back up to the current 367 tonnes.

 

How many Gold Bars did Venezuela have in August 2011?

In the BCV’s 2011 Economic Report (see link above) on page 92, it states that:

El instituto emisor logró la repatriación de 160 toneladas de oro monetario (12.819 barras good delivery)”

“The Central Bank managed the repatriation of 160 tonnes of monetary gold (12,819 good delivery bars)”

In a Venezuelan media article from November 2011, it states that:

“El pasado 23 de agosto, Merentes anunció la repatriación de 16.908 lingotes de oro de los 29.265 lingotes que Venezuela posee.”

“On August 23, Merentes announced the repatriation of 16,908 gold bullion ingots of the 29,265 ingots that Venezuela owns.”

These bar numbers roughly equate to tonnes as follows. Assuming a good delivery bar is a 400 oz bar, then 12,819 bars = 159.49 tonnes, and 16,908 bars = 210.36 tonnes, and the difference of 4,089 bars = 50.87 tonnes. The total of 29,265 bars = 364.10 tonnes. These figures are very close to the stated gold totals in the above BCV table from August 2011.

The reference to 16,908 bars was therefore assuming that all the gold held abroad was being repatriated, which turned out not to be the case and approximately 50 tonnes was left behind at the Bank of England in London. From the numbers above we therefore know that Venezuela owned 29,265 bars in total, with 16,908 bars held abroad (including claims on bars containing the equivalent number of fine ounces that were deposited or lent), of which 12,819 bars were repatriated, and 4,089 bars left in the Bank of England’s vaults. It also means that there were 12,357 bars held in the BCV vaults in Caracas before the gold repatriation started, and 25,176 bars in the BCV vaults when the repatriation completed.

Both the gold repatriated and the gold left in the Bank of England are assumed to be entirely made up of London Good Delivery bars, since all the bars that entered the London market would have to be Good Delivery bars. The gold that was in the BCV vaults in Caracas prior to the repatriation is assumed to entirely consist of US Assay Office or other US Mint ‘melts’. Therefore, following repatriation of the gold, 50.92% of the bars in the BCV vaults should have been London Good Delivery bars, and 49.08% should have been in the form of US ‘melts’.

Since there were 211.35 tonnes of Venezuela’s gold stored abroad, the average fineness of the good delivery bars was 401.875 fine ounces. Since there were 154.47 tonnes of Venezuela’s gold stored in Caracas before the repatriation, most if not all of which were in the form of US Assay Office melt bars, the average fineness of these bars was therefore 401.90 fine ounces. This is assuming the ingot numbers are correct and that they were not reverse calculated in any way by the BCV from older records of bar numbers and fine ounces.

 

gunners

Delayed Repatriation?

The Chávez declaration from 8 August 2011 called for the transfer of gold back to Venezuela so that 90% of the country’s gold would end up stored in the BCV vaults, and interestingly, it envisaged that the gold transfers would be completed by October 2011.

This timeline of an August – October repatriation never materialised, and the gold shipments to Caracas only commenced in late November 2011 and ended on the last day of January 2012. It’s unclear as to what caused this delay or indeed if the October deadline was merely an unrealistic expectation by Chavez and the BCV, or a real delay caused by gold sourcing or other logistical issues from the Bank of England, BIS and bullion banks. Neither the BCV nor the media (Venezuelan or international) appears to have covered or explained this shifting completion deadline.

What is clear is that the move by Venezuela to repatriate very large quantities of gold, which was publicly announced in early August 2011, was one of the key drivers that caused a run-up in the gold price before, during, and after August  2011, and which culminated in a multi-year high price of over $1900 on 6 September 2011. See BullionStar Chart for US Dollar gold price movements before, during, and after August 2011.

With five bullion banks needing to provide nearly 83 tonnes of gold to Venezuela in a short space of time so as to close out their gold deposit liabilities, it would be realistic to assume that this had a material impact on bullion demand in the London and possibly wider gold market. Based on normal protocols as well as market intelligence, the bullion banks in question, as well as the BIS and Bank of England would most likely have known about the approaching BCV/Chavez announcement for a significant period of time prior to August 2011.

As to whether demand tightness was heightened even more by Venezuela’s closing out of physical deposits with the Bank of England, BIS and JP Morgan is hard to quantify. It would depend on the extent to which these deposits were free of other claims, that might necessitate sourcing replacement gold elsewhere.

The manner in which all of the gold was sourced for fulfilling Venezuela’s repatriation request may never fully be known. What is known is that the repatriation operations to fly the gold to Caracas International Airport, and transport it to the BCV’s downtown vaults, included some of the largest and most public gold moving operations that most people are ever likely to witness.

These operations, over a two month period from the end of November 2011 to the end of January 2012 included gold flown in on Air France and World Airways aircraft.

Part 2 of this Venezuelan gold reserves analysis, titled “Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 2: From Repatriation to Reactivation“, covers the gold repatriation operations and these very public airport operations, and features some interesting videos of the transport operations taken by camera crews who were effectively part of the operation. Part 2 also covers the extensive re-involvement with Venezuela’s gold reserves by some of the largest names in global investment banking.