Tag Archives: silver futures

CME Stays Silent on Cause of COMEX Silver Price Glitch

Silver futures prices on the COMEX futures trading platform briefly plummeted at approximately 7:06am Singapore time yesterday, with the price for the front month (most active) September silver contract falling from a US$16.06 quote down to a low of US$14.34 all within  a 1 minute interval. The futures price then recovered nearly all of its losses in the subsequent 2-3 minute period. High to low, this COMEX silver futures contract saw its price fall by just over 10.7%, before rebounding nearly 11%.

During this time when the COMEX price crashed, there was nothing fundamentally happening in the wider financial markets, or indeed in the physical silver market, to justify these price gyrations in COMEX silver futures prices. Which all goes to show that the COMEX ‘paper’ futures silver prices is completely detached from the physical silver market, and that COMEX silver futures prices have no anchoring in the real silver market.

This price movement in the September 2017 silver futures contract (contract code SIU7 aka SIU17) can be seen in the below 1-minute tick candlestick chart from CME. Times in the chart are New York Time (NYT), which is 12 hours behind Singapore.

During this one minute period between 19:06 NYT and 19:07 NYT, the SIU7 contract saw trading volume of 4954 contracts (the 4.954K in the chart below), with the price falling from a high of 16.065 to a low of 14.34, before ending that minute period at US$ 14.68.

The COMEX SI silver futures contract, which is a deliverable contract but which in practice is rarely delivered; is a futures contract for 5000 troy ounces of silver. The 4954 contracts traded during the 1 minute period in theory represent 24.77 million ounces (770 tonnes) of silver and would be valued at $397.8 million at the opening price of US$ 16.06 at 19:06 NYT.

Overall within these 4 minutes, more than 8,300 September silver contracts were traded.

COMEX September Silver futures (SIU7): Flash crash at 19:06 NYT 6th July

Following this 1 minute flash crash, in the subsequent minute between 19:07 NYT and 19:08 NYT,  the SIU7 contract price rebounded sharply, rising from US$ 14.67 to US$ 15.62 on a trading volume of 1495 contracts. This rebound reflected in the below chart which also shows the opening and closing prices of each minute period. The price continue to rebound between 19:08 and 19:09 on volume of 936 contracts to close the minute at US$ 15.07, and then between 19:09 and 19:10, the price again closed higher at US$ 15.90 on volume of 932 contracts.

Overall, from the low quote of US$ 14.34, the price had rebound within the next 3 minutes to US$ 15.90, a rebound of 10.95%, and just 1% lower than the price had been (US$ 16.06) 4 minutes earlier.

COMEX Sept Silver futures (SIU7): Rebound between 19:07 – 19:10 NYT 6th July

Note that the same price flash crash also affected the next most actively traded COMEX silver contract for December 2017 (code SIZ7). See COMEX silver futures summary table below, and notice the lows for the September 2017 and December 2017 contracts at US$ 14.34 and US$ 14.44, respectively.

CME Summary table of COMEX Silver Futures contract prices showing Highs and Lows

What caused this momentary price plummet in the COMEX silver futures is not clear. This is because the CME Group, operator of the COMEX futures platform, has provided no explanation for these price gyrations. Possible causes could include market illiquidity, deliberate manipulation, a trading error or errors, or algorithmic trading programs triggering stop losses or inducing abnormal trading patterns.

Until the CME Group releases a statement on this (which it probably won’t), the exact cause of this futures price flash crash remains unclear. What the CME did do yesterday however was as follows:

At 19:06:38, the CME systems implemented a 10 second halt in the COMEX silver futures contracts. Within 20 minutes, CME made an announcement in a messaging broadcast that it was reviewing all SIU7 (September futures) trades that had taken place under US$ 15.84 and all SIZ7 (December futures) trades that had taken place under US$ 15.94. After another 20 minutes, CME announced in a messaging broadcast that for SIU7, any trades executed below US$ 15.54 would be adjusted up to US$ 15.54, while for SIZ7, all trades executed below 15.64 would be adjusted up to US$ 15.64.

These speedily introduced price adjustments would appear to suggest that the CME Group quickly determined that whatever caused the sharp price falls in the COMEX silver futures prices was not part of normal COMEX futures market trading, and that the CME made the call to back out and cancel at least some of the effects of this abnormal market trading. This would also seem to suggest the CME found evidence of something untoward, either price manipulation, or unfair algorithmic trading, or unjustified stop-loss triggering etc.

While these ‘paper’ trading markets in the form of the OTC London silver market and the COMEX futures market unfortunately do have a real impact on the international silver price that is inherited by these physical markets, this latest pricing fiasco on the COMEX again demonstrates that COMEX trading of precious metals futures and London trading of fractionally-backed unallocated precious metals spot and forwards contracts are becoming more and more detached from the underlying reality of the physical gold and silver markets.

This also has an adverse effect on investor sentiment in these paper markets and could in time be a trigger for shifting gold price discovery from paper to physical.

Bullion Banks line up in London to support LME’s Gold Futures

The London Metal Exchange (LME) and World Gold Council have just confirmed that their new suite of London-based exchange-traded gold and silver futures contracts will begin trading on Monday 10 July. These futures contracts are collectively known as LMEprecious.

The launch of trading comes exactly 11 months after this LMEprecious initiative was first official announced by the LME and World Gold Council on 9 August 2016. Anyone interested in the background to these LMEprecious contracts can read previous BullionStar articles “The Charade Continues – London Gold and Silver Markets set for even more paper trading” and “Lukewarm start for new London Gold Futures Contracts”.

This 10 July 2017 launch is itself over a month behind schedule given that LMEprecious was supposed to be launched on 5 June but was delayed by the LME.

Underlying What?

As a reminder, these LMEprecious gold futures and silver futures contracts represent unallocated gold and silver and there is no direct connection in the contracts to physical gold or physical silver, since settlement is via unallocated gold and silver balance transfers across LME Clearing unallocated metal accounts at member banks of London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL).

Still, this hasn’t stopped LME from using terminology in the contract specs that attempts to link them by association to real precious metal. For example, the gold contract spec says that the:

 “underlying material” is “Loco London Fine Gold held in London and complying with standards relating to good delivery and fineness acceptable to the Precious Metal Clearer of the Clearing House”.

This is similar to how an estate agent (realtor) would describe a house that’s located in a bad area, i.e. that it’s not too far from a good area.

The LME also fails to mention the fact that the LBMA/LPMCL unallocated account system is a fractionally-based paper gold and paper silver trading system, with trading volumes of unallocated gold and unallocated silver that are 100s of times higher than the available physical metal sitting in the London precious metals vaults. Ironically, these gold and silver futures are starting to trade in a month in which the LBMA has still not begun publishing the actual quantities of gold and silver in the LBMA vaults in London, despite promising to.

For both gold and silver, the LME futures contract suite will consist of a daily trade date (T) + 1 contract (T+1), known as TOM, and daily futures from a T + 2 (equivalent to Spot settlement) out to and including all trade dates to T + 25. Beyond this, there are approximately 36 monthly futures contracts covering each month out to 2 calendar years, and then each March, June, September and December out to 60 calendar months (12 more quarters out to 5 years).

All LMEprecious contracts will centrally clear on LME’s clearing platform LME Clear. The contracts can be traded on LME’s electronic trading platform LMESelect between 1am and 8pm London time, and can also be traded 24 hours a day ‘inter-office’ over the blower (voice-based trading). Apart from trading hours differences, the only other difference between LMESelect and phone is that of the daily contracts, only T+1 to T+3 can be traded via LMESelect, while T+1 to T +25 can be traded over the phone.

The LME also plans to roll out options products and calendar spread products based on these futures, but as to when these will appear is not clear.


Banks, Banks and more Banks

The official line is that LMEprecious has been developed by a consortium of the LME, the World Gold Council and a group of investment consisting of Morgan Stanley, ICBC Standard, SocGen, Goldman Sachs and Natixis, as well as prop trading firm OSTC, but to what extent each of the 5 banks and OSTC has had input into the product development and trading rules of LMEprecious  is unclear.

On 3 August 2016, the World Gold Council established a UK registered company called ‘EOS Precious Metals Limited’ to house the arrangement between the Council and the aforementioned banks and OTSC. The first director of EOS was Robin Martin, managing director of market infrastructure at the World Gold Council, while the first registered address of EOS was actually the World Gold Council’s London office at 10 Old Bailey in the City of London.

A slew of other directors were then appointed to EOS Precious Metals Ltd on 9 November 2016, namely:

  • Aram Shishmanian, CEO of World Gold Council
  • Raj Kumar – ICBC Standard Bank (formerly of Deutsche Bank and formerly a director of London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL)
  • Bradley Duncan – ICBC Standard Bank (resigned as director March 2017 and replaced by Richard England)
  • Francois Combes – SocGen (formerly a director of London Gold Market Fixing Limited)
  • Vinvent Domien – SocGen (formerly a director of London Gold Market Fixing Limited)
  • Matthew Alfieri – Goldman Sachs (resigned May 2017 and replaced by Donald Casturo)
  • David Besancon – Natixis
  • Bogdan Gogu – Morgan Stanley
  • Hanita Amin – Morgan Stanley
  • Jonathan Aucamp – Exec chairman of OSTC

Some of these directors, as you can see above, are very much connected to the existing and previous mechanisms of the London Gold Market, eg, LPMCL and the old London Gold Fixing.

But apart from ICBC Standard Bank, suspiciously absent from the list of banks cooperating with the LME and World Gold Council are the big guns of the LBMA and LPMCl members, i.e. HSBC, JP  Morgan, UBS, Scotia, all of which are big players in the London gold and silver markets and vaulting scenes in London, New York, and in UBS’s case Zurich. As they control LPMCL, perhaps there is no need for them to be involved in a gold and silvers futures sideshow.

Notably, also on 6 July, the LBMA held its Annual General Meeting in London at which the LMPCL member banks maintained their stranglehold on the LBMA Board:

  • Peter Drabwell of HSBC was re-elected to the Board
  • Sid Tipples, of JP Morgan  was re-elected to the Board
  • Raj Kumar of ICBC Standard (formerly of Deutsche Bank) was elected to the Board
  • Kumar replaces Steven Lowe of Scotia who had been on LBMA board Vice-Chairman

When EOS Precious Metals Ltd was established, it only had 1 A share and 1 B share, both held by WGC (UK) Limited. In the incorporation documents, A shares were defined as having voting rights, an ability to appoint a director and a board observer but no rights to dividends. B shares were defined as having no voting rights but with an entitlement to dividends.

On 26 October, a further 999 A shares and 699 B shares were allotted and said to be paid-up. In the in the allotment filing, these B shares are listed in various tranches i.e. 400 B shares, 100 B Shares, 100 B shares, and 99 B shares, with different total amounts paid for each of these tranches.

In total, there are now 1000 A shares and 700 B shares issued in EOS (with a nominal value of US$ 0.10 each), but there is nothing in the filings listing how many shares of each class are owned by each of the companies and banks that have director representation. Given that there are 6 trading entities as well as the World Gold Council, it could be that each of the 7 entities holds 100 B shares.

There are currently also 10 directors on the EOS board, 2 each from the World Gold Council, SocGen, ICBC Standard, and Morgan Stanley, and 1 each from Goldman Sachs and Natixis. Therefore, its possible that the 1000 A shares could be divided out in the same ratio, 200 for each of the World Gold Council, SocGen, ICBC Standard, and Morgan Stanley, and 100 shares each for Goldman and Natixis.

In a related development, on 23 February 2017 Reuters reported that the LME had agreed a 50-50 revenue sharing agreement with EOS precious Metals under which Morgan Stanley, ICBC Standard, SocGen, Goldman, Natixis and OSTC will attempt to generate trading certain volumes (liquidity) in the LMEprecious gold and silver contracts in return for 50% of the LME’s revenue on the products. The terms of this agreement are not public and it’s unclear if the performance of the banks and OSTC will be measured on customer flow or liquidity guarantees, or perhaps some type of credibility measurement of the contracts in the marketplace.

In early March, Reuters also reported that 3 additional banks and a broker had agreed to come on board with LMEprecious as clearing members, specifically, Commerzbank, Bank of China International, Macquarie Bank, and broker Marex Financial

Most recently, on 6 July, Reuters reported that of these 4 additional participants from the Commerzbank / Bank of China / Macquarie / Marex group, the LME has said that only Marex is ready to participate as a “general clearing member”.

Clearing Unallocated into LPMCL

This brings us to the different types of LME clearing members. Of the 6 participants which came on board to LMEprecious in 2016, 4 of these (SocGen, Goldman, Morgan Stanley and ICBC Standard) are General Clearing Members (GCMs) for LMEprecious. However, Natixis is only an Individual Clearing Member (ICM). Furthermore, OSTC is a Non-Clearing Member (NCM).  Marex, as mentioned above, is also a General Clearing Members (GCM). See list of GCMs, ICMs and NCMs for LMEprecious here.

According to LME Clear’s membership rules (Rule 3.1 Membership Categories and Application Process):

a “General Clearing Member” or “GCM”, which may clear Transactions or Contracts on its own behalf and in respect of Client Business

an “Individual Clearing Member” or “ICM”, which shall be permitted only to clear Transactions or Contracts on its own behalf

On 6 July, Reuters also reported that an algorithmic trading firm called XTX Markets which is based in Mayfair in London, will also start as a Non-Clearing Member (NCM) participant. Obviously, the Non-Clearing Member (NCM) don’t clear trades, instead they use  ‘Administrative clearers’ to do their clearing. XTX will use Marex, and OSTC will use SocGen.

As to why  Commerzbank, Bank of China International  and Macquarie Bank are still not ready to participate is unclear, but this seems odd given that they announced their intent to participate over 4 months ago.

Unallocated account at LPMCL member needed to clear trades of LMEprecious

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss

In Summary:

– there are now 8 bullion banks, a prop trading firm, and a high speed algo firm lined up to help these LME gold and silver futures get out the gate

– these LMEprecious futures will be trading unallocated gold and unallocated silver.

– unallocated gold and unallocated silver is fractionally-backed paper gold and paper silver

– clearing members of LMEprecious require an unallocated precious metal account with an LPMCL member so as to transfer these unallocated gold and silver balances

– the 5 LMPCL banks offering these unallocated accounts are HSBC, JP  Morgan, UBS, Scotia and ICBC Standard

– the trading of these LMEprecious futures therefore comes full circle and does nothing to change the structure of the London Gold Market or the London Silver Market

– the World (Paper) Gold Council, which claims to promote gold on the behalf of the gold mining industry, is instead front and center in the promotion of more paper gold trading

With similar recently launched London gold futures from CME Group and ICE not having taken off, all eyes will be on these LMEprecious products to see if they can go where no London gold futures have gone before. Therefore, the LME monthly trading volumes page will be one to watch in future.

The Charade Continues – London Gold and Silver Markets set for even more paper trading

Today the London Metal Exchange (LME) and the World Gold Council (WGC) jointly announced (here and here) the launch next year of standardised gold and silver spot and futures contracts which will trade on the LME’s electronic platform LMESelect, will clear on the LME central clearing platform LME Clear, and that will be settled ‘loco London’. Together these new products will be known as LMEprecious’ and will launch in the first half of 2017.

However, although these contracts are described by the LME as delivery type Physical, settlement of trades on these contracts merely consists of unallocated gold or silver being transferred between LME Clear (LMEC) clearing accounts held at London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL) member banks (i.e. paper trading via LPMCL’s AURUM clearing system).

For example, the contract specs for the LME’s planned spot gold trading state that the LME’s proposed settlement procedure is one of:

“Physical settlement two days following termination of trading. Seller transfers unallocated gold to LMEC account at any LPMCL member bank, and buyers receive unallocated gold from LMEC account at any LPMCL member bank

The range of LME contracts for both gold and silver will consist of a trade date + 1 contract (T+1), aptly named TOM, as well as daily futures from T + 2 (equivalent to Spot settlement) out to and including all trade dates to T + 25. Beyond the daily futures, the suite of contracts also includes approximately 36 monthly futures contracts covering each month out to 2 calendar years, and then each March, June, September and December out to 60 calendar months. The LME / WGC press release also mentions plans for options and calendar spread products based on these futures.


As well as trading electronically on LMESelect, these precious metals futures will also be tradeable via telephone market (inter-office market). Trading hours for the daily contract (TOM) will be 1am – 4pm London hours, while trading hours for all other contracts will be 1am – 8pm London hours, thereby also covering both Asian and US trading hours. Detailed contract specs for these gold and silver contracts are viewable on the LME website. The trading lot size for the LME gold contracts will be 100 ozs, which is significantly smaller than the conventional lot size of 5000 -10,000 ozs for gold trading in the London OTC market (and conventional OTC minimum of 1000 ozs of gold). The planned lot size for the LME’s silver contracts is 5000 ozs, again below the conventional lot size of 100,000 – 200,000 ozs for silver trading in the London OTC market (and conventional OTC minimum of 50,000 ozs of silver).

These LME contracts are being pitched as a real alternative to the incumbent over the counter system of gold and silver trading in London which is overseen by the London Bullion Market Association, an association whose most powerful members are the clearing and vaulting banks in London, namely HSBC, JP Morgan, Scotia, and to a lessor extent UBS and Barclays, but increasing ICBC Standard bank as well. But given that the LME’s clearing will sit on top of the LPMCL clearing system and use unallocated transfers, the chance of any real change to the incumbent London gold and silver market is non-existent. Nor will the trading of these LME products give any visibility into the amount of physical gold and silver that is held within the London Market, nor the coverage ratio between ‘unallocated account’ positions and real underlying physical metals.

Five Supporting Banks

This new LME / WGC initiative is being supported by 5 other investment banks and a trading entity called OSTC. These bank backers comprise US banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, French banks Natixis and Société Générale, and Chinese controlled bank ICBC Standard Bank. According to a Reuters report about the launch, the World Gold Council had approached 30 firms about backing the launch, so with only 5 banks on board that’s a 16.6% take-up ratio of parties that were approached, and 83.4% who were not interested.

Earlier this year in January, Bloomberg said in a report said that the five interested banks were “ICBC Standard Bank Plc, Citigroup Inc., Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Societe Generale SA“, so somewhere along the line Citigroup looks to have taken itself off the list of interested parties, while Natixis came on board. The World Gold Council’s discussions about a proposed gold exchange and its discussions with ‘5 banks’ appear to have begun as early as the 4th quarter of 2014 and were flagged up by the Financial Times on 02 April 2015, when the FT stated that:

“The WGC has hired a number of consultants and spent the past six months pitching a business case for banks to consider the alternative trading infrastructure”

“The World Gold Council…and at least five banks are participating in initial discussions”

Notably, this was around the time that LME found out it had not secured the contracts to run either the LBMA Gold Price or LBMA Silver Price auctions. Note, that all 5 of the LME supporting banks, i.e. Goldman, ICBC Standard, Morgan Stanley, SocGen and Natixis, are members of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), with Goldman, Morgan Stanley, ICBC Standard and SocGen being LBMA market members, and Natixis being a full member of the LBMA. Goldman, Morgan Stanley, ICBC Standard and SocGen are also direct participants in the LBMA Gold Price auction operated by ICE Benchmark Administration. None of these 5 banks are direct participants in the LBMA Silver Price auction. Notably, none of these banks except for ICBC Standard is a member of the precious metals clearing group LPMCL. ICBC Standard Bank also recently acquired a precious metals vault in London from Barclays and also joined the LBMA’s Physical Committee (see BullionStar recent blog ‘Spotlight on LPMCL: London precious MEtals Clearing Limited‘ for details). Therefore, ICBC Standard seems to have a foot in both camps.

Unallocated Balances, Unsecured Creditors

Given the long build-up to this LME / World Gold Council announcement, and the fact that these LME spot and futures products were supposed to be a genuine alternative to the LBMA bank controlled OTC trading system, the continued use of unallocated settlement and the use of LPMCL accounts by these planned LME contracts underscores that the LME contract do not represent any real change in the London Gold and Silver Markets.

As a reminder, the resulting positions following transfers of unallocated gold and silver through the LME Clear accounts of LPMCL members essentially means the following, in the words of none other than the LBMA:

“Unallocated account basis. This is an account where the customer does not own specific bars, but has a general entitlement to an amount of metal. This is similar to the way that a bank account operates” 

Additional LBMA definitions of unallocated transactions are as follows:

settled by credits or debits to the account while the balance represents the indebtedness between the two parties.

“Credit balances on the account do not entitle the creditor to specific bars of gold or silver or plates or ingots of platinum or palladium but are backed by the general stock of the precious metal dealer with whom the account is held: the client in this scenario is an unsecured creditor.

Alternatively, a negative balance will represent the precious metal indebtedness of the client to the dealer in the case where the client has a precious metal overdraft facility.

Should the client wish to receive actual metal, this is done by “allocating” specific bars, plates or ingots or equivalent precious metal product, the metal content of which is then debited from the unallocated account”.

LME bows to LPMCL

However, it should come as no surprise that these LME spot and futures contracts haven’t taken a new departure away from the entrenched monopoly of the London gold and silver clearing and vaulting systems, for the LME specifically stated in quite a recent submission to the LBMA that it will never rock the boat on LPMCL’s AURUM platform. When the LME presented to the LBMA in October 2014 in a pitch to win the contract for the LBMA Gold Price auction (which it didn’t secure), the pitch said that a centrally cleared solution “would only be introduced with market support and respecting LPMCL settlement“. [See right-hand box in below slide]:

LME potential credit models

In the same pitch, the LME also stated that:

LME Clear fully respects existing loco London delivery mechanism and participants

[See bottom line in below slide]:

LME Pathway to cleared solution

Interestingly, following the announcement from the LME and the World Gold Council, the LBMA provided a very short statement that was quoted in the Financial Times, that said:

“The LBMA saw the announcement with interest and reconfirms it has no direct or indirect involvement in this project”.

While that may be true, what the LBMA statement didn’t concede is that 5 of its member banks, 4 of which are LBMA market makers, do have a direct involvement in the LME / World Gold Council project. Nor did the LBMA statement acknowledge that settlement of the planned LME gold and silver contracts will use the LPMCL infrastructure, nor that the LPMCL is now in specific scope of the LBMA’s remit.

Recall that in October 2015, the LBMA announced that:

“the London Precious Metals Clearing company took part not only [in the LBMA] review, but we have now agreed to formalise our working relationship, with the LBMA providing Executive services going forward. I’m grateful to the LPMCL directors for their leadership and their support for removing fragmentation from the market.”

With the LME contracts planning to use LPMCL, this ‘new dawn’ view of the LME / World Gold Council initiative is in my view mis-guided.

Even COMEX has more Transparency

Anyone familiar with the rudimentary vaulting and delivery procedures for gold and silver deliverable under the COMEX 100 oz gold and 5000 oz silver futures contracts will know that at least that system generates vault facility reports that specify how much eligible gold or silver is being stored in each of the designated New York vaults, the locations of the vaults, and also how much of the eligible gold or silver in storage has warehouse warrants against it (registered positions). The COMEX ‘system’ also generates data on gold and silver deliveries against contracts traded.

However, nothing in the above planned LME contract specs published so far gives any confidence that anyone will be the wiser as to how much gold or silver is in the London vaults backing up the trading of these spot and future contracts, how much gold or silver has been converted post-settlement to allocated positions in the vaults, nor how much gold or silver has been delivered as a consequence of trading in these spot and futures contract, nor importantly, where the actual participating vaults are.

This is because the LMPCL system is totally opaque and there is absolutely zero trade reporting by the LBMA or its member banks as to the volumes of gold and silver trading in the London market, and the volumes of physical metals held versus the volumes of ‘metal’ represented by unallocated account positions. Furthermore, the LBMA’s stated goal of introducing trade reporting looks as dead as a dodo, or at least as frozen as as a dodo on ice.

LBMA stall on Trade Reporting, LPMCL clear as Mud

On 9 October 2015, the LBMA announced that it had launched a Request for Information (RFI) asking financial and technology providers to submit help with formulating solutions to deficiencies which regulators thought the London bullion market such as the need for transparency, and issues such as liquidity that had supposedly been recommended as strategic objectives by consultant EY in its report to the LBMA, a report that incidentally has never been made publicly available. On 25 November 2015, the LBMA then announced that it had received 17 submissions to its RFI from 20 entities spanning “exchange groups, technology firms, brokers and data vendors”.

On 4 February 2016, the LBMA then issued a statement saying that it was launching a Request for Proposals (rRfP) and inviting 5 of these service providers (a short-list) to submit technical solutions that would address requirements such as an LBMA data warehouse and that would support the introduction of services such as trade reporting in the London bullion market. The RfP statement said that the winning service provider would be chosen in Q2 2016, with a planned implementation in H2 2016.

However, no progress was announced by the LBMA about the above RfP during Q2 2016, nor since then. The only coverage of this lack of newsflow came from the Bullion Desk in a 27 May article titled “Frustration Grows over London Gold Market Reform” in which it stated that the 5 solution providers on the short-list were “the LME, CME Group, the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), Autilla/Cinnobar and Markit/ABS“, and that:

“the pace at which the LMBA is moving forward are causes for consternation in some quarters of the sector”

A quote within the Bullion Desk article seems to sum up the sentiment about the LBMA’s lack of progress in its project:

“It’s not going to happen any time soon. Look at how long it’s been going on already,” another market participant said. “Don’t hold your breath. It seems like we still have a long way to go.” 

What could the hold up be? Surely 17 submissions from 20 entities that were whittled down to a short-list of 5 very sophisticated groups should have given the LBMA plenty of choice for nominating a winning entry. Whatever else this lack of progress suggests, it demonstrates that increased transparency in London gold and silver market trading data is not going to happen anytime soon, if ever.

Furthermore, the opacity of the London clearing statistics that are generated out of the LPMCL clearing system need no introduction to most, but can be read about here.


According to the LBMA, ‘Loco London’ “refers to gold and silver bullion that is physically held in London“, however, given the secrecy which surrounding trading data in the London gold and silver markets, and the lack of publication by any bank about the proportion of unallocated client balances in gold or silver that it maintains versus the physical gold or silver holdings that it maintains, this ‘loco London‘ term appears to have been abused beyond any reasonable definition, and now predominantly refers to debit and credit entries in the virtual accounting systems of London based bullion banks. Nor, in my opinion, will the LME contracts change any of this. One would therefore be forgiven in thinking that the real underlying inventories of gold and silver in the London market and their associated inverted pyramid unallocated account positions are too ‘precious’ to divulge to the market. The Bank of England is undoubtedly licking its chops to the continued opacity of the market.

And its not just my opinion. This latest LME / World Gold Council / investment bank announcement has generated other skeptical reactions. The last word goes to Jim Rickards, who tweeted this in reaction to the latest LME / World Gold Council news: