Tag Archives: good delivery

How many Good Delivery gold bars are in all the London Vaults?….including the Bank of England vaults

Each year in June, the Bank of England publishes its annual report which quotes financial data up to the end of February (its financial year-end). The Bank’s annual report also states the amount of gold, valued at a market price in Pounds sterling, that it holds under custody for its customers, which comprise central banks, international financial institutions, and LBMA member banks.

The Bank of England as gold Custodian

In 2014, the Bank of England stated that, as at 28th February 2014, it held gold assets in custody worth £140 billion for its gold account customers, while in 2013, the corresponding figure was £210 billion. In June 2014, Koos Jansen of Bullionstar calculated that the Bank of England therefore held 5,485 tonnes of customer gold at the end of February 2014, and 6,240 tonnes of customer gold at the end of February 2013. This meant that between the two year end dates, end of February 2013 to end of February 2014, the amount of gold in custody at the Bank of England fell by 755 tonnes.

In his personal blog in June 2014, Bron Suchecki of the Perth Mint, also discussed the 2013 and 2014 Bank of England gold custody tonnage numbers, and derived the same 755 tonne drop between February 2013 and February 2014, and he also went back all the way to 2005 and calculated yearly figures for each February year-end from 2005 to 2014. (See table in Bron Suchecki’s blog).

Bank of England gold in custody down another 350 tonnes during 2014

Applying a similar exercise to the Bank of England 2015 Annual Report (large file), the report states (on page 34) that:

“As of 28 February 2015, total assets held by the Bank as custodian were £514 billion (28 February 2014: £594 billion), of which £130 billion (28 February 2014: £140 billion) were holdings of gold.” 

Since 28th February 2015 was a Saturday, the afternoon London Gold Fixing price in GBP on Friday 27th February 2015 was £787.545 per ounce.

£130 billion @ £787.545 per ounce = 5134.37 tonnes = ~ 410,720 Good Delivery bars

This means that between 28th February 2014 and 28th February 2015, the amount of gold stored in custody at the Bank of England fell by another 350 tonnes, from 5,485 tonnes in February 2014, to 5,134 tonnes on 28th February 2015.

Now only 500,000 bars in the entire London vaults system

On page 19 of a London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) presentation on 15th June 2015 in Texas, given by LBMA CEO Ruth Crowell to the International Precious Metals Institute (IPMI), it stated that:

There are ~500,000 bars in the London vaults, worth a total of ~US$237 billion

Page 19 of LBMA presentation from 15th June 2015
Page 19 of LBMA presentation from 15th June 2015

 

500,000 bars ~= 6,250 tonnes

On 15th June 2015, the morning LBMA Gold Price was set at $1178.25, which would make $237 billion worth of gold equal to 201.145 million ounces, which is 6,256 tonnes.

So, there are now only about 6,250 tonnes of gold in the London vaults, including the gold in the Bank of England vaults.

 

From 9,000 tonnes to 7,500 tonnes to 6250 tonnes

The LBMA stated earlier this year on a vaulting page on its website that:

In total it is estimated that there are approximately 7,500 tonnes of gold held in London vaults, of which about three-quarters is stored in the Bank of England.

Based on this metric, that comes out as (7500 * 0.75) or 5,625 tonnes of gold bars in the Bank of England vaults, and 1,875 tonnes of gold bar in other London vaults.

An earlier version of the same LBMA vaulting page with a website imprint from April 2014 stated that:

In total there is approximately 9,000 tonnes of gold held in London vaults, of which about two-thirds is stored in the Bank of England.”

So that earlier reference would have been (9000 * 0.66) or 6,000 tonnes in the Bank of England and 3,000 tonnes in the other vaults. To summarise:

Earliest quotation

  • 9,000 tonnes in all London  vaults = 720,000 bars
  • 6,000 tonnes in Bank of England (BoE) = about 482,000 bars
  • 3,000 tonnes in  London ex BoE vaults = 238,000 bars

Second quotation

  • 7,500 tonnes in all London vaults  = ~600,000 bars   => lost 120,000 bars (1500 tonnes)
  • 5,625 tonnes in Bank of England = ~ 450,000 bars  => lost 32,000 bars (375tonnes)
  • 1,875 tonnes in Ldn ex BoE  vaults = ~150,000 bars  => lost 88,000 bars (1125tonnes)

Third quotation: June 2015

  • There are ~500,000 bars in the London vaults, worth a total of ~US$237 billion

 

The London vaults refer to at least the LBMA London vaults, and may include other non-LBMA gold vaults in London, depending on how the LBMA collected these figures from the vault operators. Apart from the Bank of England gold vaults, the LBMA ‘London’ vaults, are the vaults of JP Morgan and HSBC Bank in the City of London, the vaults of Brinks, Malca Amit and Via Mat (Loomis) out near Heathrow, and the vault of G4S in Park Royal, and not to forget the Barclays vault which is run by Brinks.

In the cases of the 9,000 tonnes and 7,500 tonnes quotations, the tonnage figures and the fractions are probably rounded to an extent for simplicity, so are ballpark figures, but a comparison between the two earlier quotations indicates that the Bank of England lost 375 tonnes, and the rest of the London vaults lost 1,125 tonnes. In total that’s 1,500 tonnes less gold in London between the time the first figure was complied and the time the updated (second) figure was published.

Factoring in the “There are ~500,000 bars in the London vaults, worth a total of ~US$237 billion  quotation, which equates to 6,250 tonnes, this means that another 1,250 tonnes of gold (approximately 100,000 Good Delivery bars) has now gone from the London gold vaults compared to when there was 7,500 tonnes of gold in the London vaults, as quoted on the vaulting page of the LBMA’s web site as recently as earlier this year.

A total of 6,250 tonnes is also 2,750 tonnes (about 220,000 Good Delivery bars) less than the 9,000 tonnes quoted on the LBMA web site in April 2014, which may have referred to a period earlier than  2014.

All of the gold in the Bank of England would be London Good Delivery bars (i.e. variable weight bars each weighing about 400 oz or 12.5kgs), and most, if not all, of the gold in the other London vaults would also be London Good Delivery bars, because importantly, all the gold held by the ETFs in London, primarily the SPDR Gold Trust at the HSBC vault in London, is required by the ETF prospectuses to be in the form of London Good Delivery gold bars.

In fact, Stewart Murray, the then CEO of the LBMA stated at a presentation held in Paris in November 2011 that the gold in the London vaults was “Virtually all in the form of Good Delivery bars”, although by August 2015, a very recent presentation (slow file to load) by current LBMA CEO Ruth Crowell in Goa India, stated that, in the London gold market, “Almost all gold is held in the form of Good Delivery bars“.

Symantics maybe between ‘virtually‘ and ‘almost all‘, but there are probably some kilobars held in the London gold vaults now that might not have been as common in 2011. Note that the LBMA and the Shanghai Gold Exchange recently executed a mutual recognition agreement for a 9999 gold kilobar standard, so each body now recognises the kg bars manufactured by all of the gold refiners that each body has accredited.

The LBMA has also recently made reference to a potential 995 gold kilobar standard which it has referred to as a ‘draft for discussion and possible endorsement”. See the Goa presentation from Ruth Crowell, above.

BoE Gold and forklift

What time period did 9,000 tonnes refer to?

LBMA launched a new version of its website in approximately March 2014. It’s not clear what exact month this 9,000 tonnes of gold in the London vaults figure refers to, but a lot of the text on the new LBMA website in 2014 was already on the previous version of the website prior to the revamp, so the tonnages specified on the new website in April 2014 could have been on the previous version of the website before April 2014 and merely been copied across to the new website. However, there is a way to infer the latest date at which the 9,000 tonne figure could have been referring to.

At the Fifth LBMA Assaying & Refining Seminar, held in London between 10th and 12th March 2013, Luke Thorn from the Bank of England gave a talk about the “Bank of England’s role in the physical gold market”, in which he stated:

“At our premises at Threadneedle Street, London, we have approximately £200 billion worth of gold stored over 10 vaults.”

On 11th March 2013, the GBP price for an ounce of gold was £1059 (average of AM and PM fixes in Sterling). At £1059 per oz, $200 billion of gold is 188,857,412 ounces, or 5,874 tonnes, or about 469,940 Good Delivery bars.

Recalling the two totals discussed above at the Bank of England of 6,000 tonnes and 5,625 tonnes, this 5,874 tonnes figure is quite close to being halfway between 6000 and 5625 (i.e. 6000 + 5625 / 2 = 5812.5 tonnes). So its realistic to assume that Luke Thorn’s number lay somewhee in time between the two LBMA quotations, and that therefore, the 6,000 tonnes total at the Bank of England, and by extension the 9,000 tonne total in all London vaults, most likely referred to the state of the London gold market before 11 March 2013.

In other words, the 9,000 tonnes in the London vaults, and the 6,000 tonnes in the Bank of England, were referring to the amount of gold in the London vaults before the major drop in the gold price in April 2013 and June 2013, and before the huge 2013 withdrawals of gold from the gold ETFs which store their gold in London, and before most of the 755 tonnes of gold was withdrawn from the Bank of England (BoE) between 28th February 2013 and 28th February 2014.

 

 Only 90,000 Good Delivery bars outside BoE vaults – this includes all London ETF gold

If there are now only 500,000 Good Delivery bars in the London vaults, as LBMA CEO Ruth Crowell’s presentation of June 2015 states, then with 410,000 Good Delivery gold bars in the Bank of England vaults (5,134 tonnes from 28th February 2015), then there are only 90,000 Good Delivery gold bars in the other London gold vaults, which is 1,125 tonnes.

Not only that, but nearly all of this 1,125 tonnes in the other London vaults is gold belonging to the physical gold-backed ETFs which store their gold in London. The ETFs that store their gold bars in London are as follows:

(Note: PHAU and PHGP are the same ETF. They are just two ISINs of the same underlying ETF. PHAU is in USD, PHGP is in GBP. The same structure applies to the other ETF Securities ETF known as GBS. GBS and GBSS are the same ETF. GBS is the USD ISIN and GBSS is the GBP ISIN).

The SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) currently holds 682 tonnes of gold in the vault of HSBC in London. That leaves only 443 tonnes of gold from the 1,125 tonnes above that is not in the GLD.

The iShares Gold Trust (IAU) gold is held in 3 vaults in 3 countries, namely the JP Morgan vault in London, the JP Morgan vault in New York, and the Scotia vault in Toronto. On the surface, this is an unusual vaulting arrangement for IAU. This arrangement just arose due to the way the IAU prospectus was worded in 2004, and the way the original iShares Gold Trust custodian, Scotia Mocatta, stored the gold in London, New York and Canada. JP Morgan took over as custodian for IAU in the second half of 2010, and just maintained this 3 vaults in 3 countries arrangement for whatever reason. Some of the Authorised Participants of IAU include Barclays, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Scotia, and UBS.

In the JP Morgan vault in London, IAU currently holds 7,265 Good Delivery gold bars (2.907 million ounces), which is 90 tonnes. That leave only 353 tonnes in the London vaults, that is not at the Bank of England, not in the SPDR Gold Trust, and not in the iShares Gold Trust.

As of 3rd September 2015, the ETFS Physical Gold ETF (PHAU) held 3,271,164 troy oz of gold in London at HSBC’s vault. That’s 101.7 tonnes in PHAU, which leaves only 251 tonnes unaccounted for in the London vaults.

There is also another ETFS physical gold ETF called Gold Bullion Securities (GBS) which also holds its gold in the HSBC London vault. As of 3rd September 2015, GBS held 2,233,662 troy oz of gold. That’s 69 tonnes. Subtracting this 69 tonnes from the residual 251 tonnes above, leaves only 182 tonnes of unaccounted for gold in the London vaults.

Some of the Authorised Participants of the ETFS ETFs are Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Scotia, and UBS.

The ‘Source Physical Gold ETC (P-ETC)‘ also stores its allocated gold in the JP Morgan vault in London.  This gold is held for the trustee Deutsche Bank by the custodian JP Morgan Chase. The Authorised Participants for this Source ETC are Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Bank of America, Morgan Stanley, Nomura and Virtu Financial. According to a Source gold bar list dated 28th August 2015, the Source Physical gold ETC held 1.571 million fine ozs of gold in bars that weighed 1.574 million gross ozs, so that’s about 3,925 Good Delivery bars, which is about 49 tonnes.

Subtracting this 49 tonnes from the remaining 182 tonnes above, which are not held within the Bank of England, and which are not held by the other physically backed gold ETFs described above, leaves only 133 tonnes of unaccouted for gold in the London vaults.

Other companies store some of their customer gold in the London vaults, such as GoldMoney and BullionVault. Based on its daily update, BullionVault had 6709 kgs of gold, or 6.7 tonnes, stored in London, while GoldMoney, based on an audit from 1st December 2014, had 410 Good Delivery bars, or about 5.14 tonnes, stored in Via Mat’s (Loomis) London vault. Combined, that’s another ~14 tonnes of gold which can be substracted from the 133 tonnes above, leaving only 119 tonnes that is not  accounted for.

To put a figure such as 119 tonnes of gold into perspective, this is about the same amount as 1-2 weeks worth of gold withdrawals from the Shanghai Gold Exchange, or about 1 month’s worth of official gold imports into India.

Unallocated Musical Chairs, without any chairs

In a May 2011 presentation at the LBMA Bullion Market Forum in Shanghai, while discussing London gold vaults, former LBMA CEO Stewart Murray had a slide which read:

Investment – more than ETFs

ETFs

  • Gold Holdings have increased by ~1,800 tonnes in past 5 years, almost all held in London vaults
  • Many thousands of tonnes of ETF silver are held in London

Other holdings

  • Central banks hold large amounts of allocated gold at the Bank of England
  • Various investors hold very substantial amounts unallocated gold and silver in the London vaults

 

There are 2 interesting things about the above slide. If central banks ‘hold large amounts of allocated gold at the Bank of England”, which totalled 6,000 tonnes and then 5,625 tonnes, and more recently 5,134 tonnes, and if this is a proxy for an amount being ‘large’, then the 2nd statement with the quantum “very substantial amounts’ and especially the qualifier ‘very’, implies that the unallocated amounts represent larger amounts than the ‘allocated’ amounts, perhaps ‘very’ much larger amounts.

That 2nd statement is also a contradiction in terms. Unallocated gold is not necessarily held in vaults or held anywhere. Unallocated is just a claim against the bank that the investor holds an unallocated gold account with. There are no storage fees on an unallocated gold account in the London Gold Market precisely because one cannot charge a storage fee when there is not necessarily anything being stored.

So the ‘very substantial amounts‘ being held really means that investors have very substantial amounts of claims against the banks which offer the unallocated gold accounts, or in other words, the banks have very substantial liabilities in the form of unallocated gold obligations to the gold account holders. As to how much physical gold is on the balance sheets of the banks to cover these liabilities, if the figure of 500,000 bars in the entire set of London vaults is accurate, then there is hardly any gold in London to cover the unallocated gold accounts.

Bank of England

LBMA Member gold accounts at the Bank of England

A 2014 quarterly report of the Bank of England said that 72 central bank customers (including a smaller number of official sector financial organisations) held gold accounts with the Bank of England. That reference is on page 134 of the report, however, a small subset of the report, including page 134 can be viewed here (and is not a large file to download).

Then, in a slide from a presentation by then LBMA CEO Stewart Murray in London in 2011, one of the Powerpoint pages (page 15 of the pdf) stated that:

The Bank of England acts as gold custodian for about 100 customers, including central banks and international financial institutions, LBMA members and the UK government.”

If central bank customers with gold accounts, whose numbers would not change that much from 2011 to 2014,  represented ~72 gold accounts, that would mean that up to 28 LBMA members could have gold accounts at the Bank of England.

Is that number of LBMA member bullion banks a feasible number for maintaining a gold account at the Bank of England? Yes it is, primarily because of the gold lending market, but also due to the way the London gold clearing market works.

Bolivia’s gold and the Bullion Banks

Just as an example, the Central Bank of Bolivia’s gold that it lent to bullion banks in 1997 and that has never been returned to the Central Bank of Bolivia, has gone through the hands of at least 28 bullion banks between 1997 and the present day. These entities, some of which have merged with each other (*), and a few of which imploded, include Swiss Bank Corp*, Republic National Bank of New York*, Midland Bank (Montagu)*, Credit Suisse, SocGen, Natixis, BNP Paribas, Standard Chartered, ANZ, Scotia Mocatta, Barclays, Morgan Stanley, HSBC, Macquarie, Deutsche, Dresdner*, Bayerische Landesbank, Westdeutsche Landesbank*, JP Morgan*, Commerzbank*, Citibank, Rabobank, Morgan Guaranty* and Bayerische Vereinsbank. The IBRD (World Bank) even took on to its books the borrowed gold positions of the bullion banks during the financial crisis in 2009 because it had a higher credit rating than the investment banks after the Lehman crisis.

The lent gold of Central American banks during the 2000s, such as the gold of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua,  had been on the books of additional banks Mitsui & Co, J Aron (Goldman), Mitsubishi, AIG, and N.M. Rothschild. Bullion banks ebb and flow as to their involvement in the gold market, and some merge and go bust or get forceably rescued and shoved together, but a lot of other banks are also LBMA members that are not in the aforementioned names, such as RBC, ICBC Standard Bank, Toronto Dominion Bank, Merrill Lynch and Zurcher Kantonalbank, not to mention the other Chinese and Russian bank members of the LBMA. So overall, it is quite conceivable that 28 LBMA member bullion banks each have a gold account at the Bank of England.

How much gold did the London-based gold ETFs lose in 2013

The year 2013 was a year of huge gold outflows from the gold backed ETFs. Of the ETFs based in London, or more correctly, the ETFs with gold stored in London, the gold outflows were as follows:

The SPDR Gold Trust had an outflow of 561 tonnes of gold in 2013. It started 2013 holding 1,349 tonnes of gold, and ended 2013 with 798 tonnes. At the end of March 2013, GLD held 1,221 tonnes, at the end of Q2 it held less than 1000 tonnes (passing through the 1000 tonne barrier on 18th June 2013. By the end of Q3 2013 (actually on 2nd October 2013) GLD held 900 tonnes. Then by the end of 2013 its gold holdings dipped below 800 tonnes. During 2014, GLD lost another 80 tonnes, taking it to 709 tonnes at December month-end 2014.

In Q2 2013, GLD was hammered. Its gold holdings went from 1,221 tonnes to 1078.5 tonnes in April, a loss of 143 tonnes, then down to 1,013.5 tonnes at the end of May, another 62 tonnes loss, and by the end of June it held 969.5 tonnes, a June loss of 43.5 tonnes. Overall in Q1 2013, GLD lost 128 tonnes, then 249 tonnes in Q2 (and 379 tonnes in H1), then 100 tonnes in Q3, and another 100 tonnes in Q4 2013 (200 tonnes in H2). The near rounded 100 tonne withdrawals from GLD in both Q3 and Q4 2013 are uncanny. As if someone said “let’s take another 100 tonnes out of GLD this quarter”.

The iShares Gold Trust (IAU) lost approximately 60 tonnes of gold in 2013. Assuming the mix of IAU gold holdings in 2013 across London, New York, and Toronto was the same as it is now (i.e with 56% of the gold in London, 41% in New York, and 3% in Toronto, then IAU would have lost about 34 tonnes from London. More of the IAU gold probably flowed out of the JP Morgan’s London vault in 2013 than the other IAU storage locations, because London is the world’s main gold market for Good Delivery bars, and furthermore, that is where the gold.

ETF Securities’ PHAU lost 52 tonnes in 2013. ETS Securities GBS ETF lost 42 tonnes. The ‘Source’ Gold ETF lost 31 tonnes.

The above shows that (561 + 34 + 52 + 42 + 31) = 720 tonnes of gold was withdrawn from London gold vaults in 2013 via ETF gold redemptions.  About 880 tonnes of gold in total was withdrawn from gold backed ETFs in 2013 but some of this was from ETF’s based in Switzerland and elsewhere.

Remember that the only entities which can usually redeem gold from gold backed ETFs are the Authorised Participants (APs), which in nearly all cases are the same banks as act as custodians or sub-custodians for those ETFs, and these are also the same banks that either have vaults in London or that have vaulting facilities in London, and these banks are also in a lot of cases members of the private gold clearing company London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL) and lastly, these banks all hold gold accounts at the Bank of England.

Can ETF gold, such as GLD gold, be held in the Bank of England vaults?

Recalling that the amount of gold withdrawn from the Bank of England between 28th February 2013 and 28th February 2014 was 755 tonnes, can any of the gold that was withdrawn from the ETFs in 2013 have been the same gold that was in these the Bank of England withdrawals in 2013?

The answer is that technically, it can’t be the same gold because the ETFs are supposed to store their gold at the vault premises of the specified custodian. ETF gold can be stored at a vault of a sub-custodian, but has to be physically transferred to the vault of the custodian using “commercially reasonable efforts”.

According to the latest SPDR Gold Trust 10-K annual filing (and the 2013 version):

“Custody of the gold bullion deposited with and held by the Trust is provided by the Custodian at its London, England vaults. The Custodian will hold all of the Trust’s gold in its own vault premises except when the gold has been allocated in the vault of a subcustodian, and in such cases the Custodian has agreed that it will use commercially reasonable efforts promptly to transport the gold from the subcustodian’s vault to the Custodian’s vault, at the Custodian’s cost and risk.”

The subcustodians that the SPDR Gold Trust currently uses (and that it used during 2013) are “the Bank of England, The Bank of Nova Scotia-ScotiaMocatta, Barclays Bank PLC, Deutsche Bank AG, JPMorgan Chase Bank and UBS AG.”

These banks, along with HSBC,  but excluding Deutsche Bank, are the 5 members of London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL). (Although the GLD Sponsor might want to think about deleting Deutsche Bank from the list).

Shockingly, the GLD Prospectus also says that:

“In accordance with LBMA practices and customs, the Custodian does not have written custody agreements with the subcustodians it selects.”

The GLD prospectus goes on to explain that LBMA custodians are obliged to provide gold holder entities with details (including locational details) of the gold that they or their subcustodians hold on behalf of a relevant entity gold holder that enquires,  but this is just based on “LBMA practices and customs”. It also states:

” Under English law, unless otherwise provided in any applicable custody agreement, a custodian generally is liable to its customer for failing to take reasonable care of the customer’s gold and for failing to release the customer’s gold upon demand.”

Coming from a background of equity and bond portfolio management, I find the fact that there are no custody agreements with the GLD gold subcustodians very odd. Custodians of financial assets such as Citibank, PNC, Northern Trust, and State Street, would all insist on having custody agreements with each other when appointing sub-custodians. To organise it in any other way is crazy.

This is something that GLD institutional and hedge fund investors should enquire about with World Gold Trust Services (the SPDR Gold Trust Sponsor) when performing their next set of due diligence exercises on the GLD, just to make sure they understand how the sub-custodian arrangements work. It does look like the gold in the LBMA system is acting like one big happy pool of gold..like the 1960s London Gold Pool.

All of the GLD annual and quarterly filings for 2013 and every year state, in the ‘Results of Operations” section, that “As of [Date], Subcustodians held nil ounces of gold in their vaults on behalf of the Trust.” For example:

“As at September 30, 2013, subcustodians held nil ounces of gold in their vaults on behalf of the Trust.”

The same is true for December 31, June 30, 2013, and March 31, 2013. The annual full gold bar audit undertaken on the SPDR Gold Trust would also suggest that no GLD gold is stored at sub-custodians, including the Bank of England. For example in the full 2013 GLD gold bar audit (click the exact link here -> //www.spdrgoldshares.com/media/GLD/file/Inspectorate_Certificate_Aug30_2013.pdf), it states that the location of the audit was the “London Vaults of HSBC Bank USA National Association“:

“We performed a full count of 77,709 bars of gold, based upon the gold inventory as at 28th June 2013, between 8th July and 29th August 2013 at the Custodian’s premises”

The bars were described as “77,709 London Good Delivery, large Gold Bars”.  There is also a separate partial audit on the GLD gold bars each year. The earlier partial audit of GLD in March 2013 stated that there was a random audit of the “105,840 London Good Delivery, large Gold Bars” held by the GLD “based upon the gold inventory as at 22nd February 2013, between the 4th March and 15th March“. This audit was also specified as occurring at the “London Vaults of HSBC Bank USA National Association”.

Although I don’t think the HSBC London vault was big enough to store all the GLD gold during 2013 when it held up to 1353 tonnes, as well as storing the ETFS Securities gold and other HSBC customer gold , the GLD audits and SEC filings seem to indicate that all the GLD gold was at the HSBC London vault.

Incidentally, the ETF Securities gold ETFs which also use HSBC as custodian, specify a list of subcustodians that includes the commercial security companies Brinks, Malca Amit and Via Mat (Loomis) in addition to the LPMCL members:

“The Bank of England, The Bank of Nova Scotia (ScotiaMocatta), Deutsche Bank AG, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., UBS AG, Barclays Bank PLC, Brink’s Global Services Inc., ViaMat International and Malca-Amit Commodities Ltd.”

 As the Perth Mint’s Bron Suchecki pointed out in his personal blog in June 2014, central banks were net buyers of gold during 2013, not net sellers, so it appears that it was LBMA member banks with gold accounts at the Bank of England that were withdrawing gold bars from the Bank of England during 2013. Even the gold repatriated by the Central Bank of Venezuela in late 2011 and early 2012 appears to have been flown to Caracas from France and not from the Bank of England.

swiss

From March 2006 until February 2011, the amount of gold stored in custody at the Bank of England’s gold vaults rose by 2,065 tonnes (See Bron Suchecki’s table at the previous link). It then dipped by 68 tonnes from March 2011 to February 2012 before rising by another 722 tonnes from March 2012 to February 2013. That was a net 2,719 tonnes increase from March 2006 to February 2013. What percentage of this increase in custody gold holdings at the Bank of England was delivered by central bank customers and what percentage was delivered by LBMA bullion bank customers is unclear.

Then, as mentioned above, 755 tonnes of gold was withdrawn from the Bank of England between March 2013 and February 2014, and 355 tonnes withdrawn from March 2014 to February 2015.

If the ~720 tonnes of gold withdrawn from the gold backed London-based ETFs is not the same gold as was withdrawn from the Bank of England, then this means that (720 tonnes  + 755 tonnes) = 1475 tonnes of London Good Delivery bars came out of the London market in 2013.

Which is very interesting, because the UK exported approximately 1,400 tonnes of gold to Switzerland during 2013 (Eurostat – HS Code 7108.1200 “Unwrought Gold” – Source www.sharelynx.com).

Reuters also highlighted these 2013 exports in February 2014 when it quoted research from investment bank Macquarie from Eurostat:

“Australian bank Macquarie, citing trade data from EU statistics agency Eurostat, said the UK exported 1,739 tonnes of gold in 2013, with the vast majority sent to Switzerland.”

There is a possibility, as Bron Suchecki mentioned, that some of the Authorised Participants (APs) of the gold ETFs, which have gold accounts at the Bank of England, redeemed ETF shares for gold held at the London vaults of JP Morgan and HSBC, and that HSBC or JP Morgan transferred gold from their own accounts at the Bank of England to the gold accounts of the APs at the Bank of England, who then withdrew it.

But with over 1,400 tonnes of gold withdrawn from the London gold market in 2013 (since 1400 tonnes of gold was transported from the UK to Switzerland), this suggests that the gold that went to Switzerland in 2013 was in the form of Good Delivery bars from both the London based gold ETFs vaults (HSBC and JP Morgan), and from the Bank of England vaults.

As I will highlight in a forthcoming article (which will follow on from the recent “Moving the goalposts….The LBMA’s shifting stance on gold refinery production statistics“, a lot of this London gold exported to Switzerland from the UK in 2013 was sent to the large Swiss gold refineries to be transformed into very pure (9999 fine) smaller bars for the Asian market.

If the calculations above are correct about the 500,000 Good Delivery bars in the London vaults whittling down to about 130 tonnes of gold that’s not accounted for by ETFs and other known gold holders, and that’s not accounted for by the Bank of England vault holdings, then there is surely very little available and unencumbered gold right now in the London Gold Market.

This would explain however the following very recent information from the Financial Times on 2nd September 2015 when it said:

“The cost of borrowing physical gold in London has risen sharply in recent weeks. That has been driven by dealers needing gold to deliver to refineries in Switzerland before it is melted down and sent to places such as India, according to market participants.”

“‘[The rise] does indicate that there is physical tightness in the market for gold for immediate delivery’, said John Butler, analyst at Mitsubishi.”

And it begs the question, why do the dealers need to borrow, and who are they borrowing from. And if the gold is being borrowed and sent to Swiss refineries, and then shipped onward to India (and China), then when will the gold lenders get their gold back?

 

Moving the goalposts….The LBMA’s shifting stance on gold refinery production statistics

On Friday 31st July 2015, I released an article discussing the sale of Swiss gold refiner Valcambi to Indian jewellery company Rajesh Exports. In my report, in a section about Valcambi’s annual gold refining capacity, I made passing reference to 2013 gold refining production statistics that had been published by the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) on 1st May 2015. These same gold refinery production statistics had also been quoted by the LBMA as recently as July 2015 in the news section of Issue 78 of its ‘Alchemist’ magazine, (published on 21st July 2015, just a week before my article).

The reference in my article to 2013 LBMA gold refiner production statistics discussed the unprecedented 6,601 tonnes of gold that was refined in 2013 by gold refineries on the LBMA’s Good Delivery List. My reference to this 6,601 tonnes on 31st July, including a short table of LBMA data, was as follows:

“Rajesh Exports just revealed in its press release that over the last 3 years, Valcambi has refined an annual average of 945 tonnes of gold and 325 tonnes of silver (2835 tonnes of gold and 975 tonnes of silver over 3 years). Presumably the last 3 years that Rajesh mentions refers to the last 3 calendar years of 2012-2014.

The London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) doesn’t reveal annual production data of its refinery members on an individual level, however, the LBMA recently published high level totals of the refined gold production of its accredited refiners (LBMA Good Delivery List) over the years 2006 to 2013. What was striking about the data was that total refined gold production of its refinery members reached 6,601 tonnes in 2013, which was 42% higher than total refined gold production in 2012, and also more than double global mine production of 3,016 tonnes of gold in 2013. See table below from LBMA publication:

Total annual refined gold and silver production by LBMA refiners 2006-2013 (tonnes)

Refinery output 2006-2013

So with Valcambi being the largest gold refinery in the world, it would be realistic to suggest that its annual average of 945 tonnes of refined gold output over the last 3 years probably hides the higher refined gold production that it too experienced in 2013 versus 2012.”

In the first quoted paragraph, above the table, I had hyperlinked the word ‘publication’ to a LBMA source document URL which pointed to a pdf document named ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf’.

The ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf’ file was a 4 page document titled “A guide to The London Bullion Market Association”, with the refinery production statistics appearing on page 3 under a page title “The LBMA Good Delivery List”. The file ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20120501.pdf’ was created on 2015-05-01 at 10:09:50 using the applications Adobe InDesign CS 5.5 (7.5) and Abode PDF Library 9.9.

In the refinery section of the LBMA Brochure Final 20120501.pdf’ document, the LBMA’s commentary first explained what the Good Delivery ‘List’ refers to, as well as listing the number of gold and silver refineries on the List, and then proceeded to comment on the ‘Total refined gold production of the refiners on the Listin 2013, which it stated was 6,601 tonnes. The LBMA commentary also highlighted that this 6,601 tonnes of refined gold production by the refiners on the List was ‘more than double‘ 2013 world mine production of 3,061 tonnes.

The ‘List’ specified 72 refineries which refined gold, and 83 refineries which refined silver. It also showed that 16 refineries which refined gold were in Europe, 43 in Asia, 11 in the Americas, and 1 each in Africa and Oceania. So the 6,601 tonnes of gold statistic for 2013 represented 72 refineries on the Good Delivery List which refined gold. And the LBMA made clear in its commentary that refiners on the Good Delivery List represent 85%-90% of world gold production:

original - GDL List

From Page 3 of 'LBMA Brochure Final 20120501.pdf'
From Page 3 of ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20120501.pdf’

As mentioned above, the LBMA also printed the same 2013 gold refining figure of 6,601 tonnes in Issue 78 of its magazine, ‘Alchemist’, which was published on 21st July 2015. Alchemist is published in both hard copy magazine format and on-line. In the ‘LBMA News’ section of Issue 78, viewable here and here(Alch78LBMANews), the LBMA Chief Executive, Ruth Crowell, provided a news update on the Association’s Physical Committee, stating:

Total refined gold production represented by the accredited refiners on the LBMA’s Good Delivery List was 6,601 tonnes in 2013, more than double mine production of 3,061 tonnes. For silver, refined production by listed refiners was 24,570 tonnes, marginally below the 25,494 tonnes of mine production in the same year.”

 [The full issue of Issue 78 of The Alchemist can be viewed here (large file)]

According to the LBMA, the ‘Physical Committee is made up of industry experts from the physical bullion market“, therefore this physical committee is well aware of the 6,601 tonnes of gold refinery production figure in 2013, not least because it’s printed in the committee’s news section in the latest edition of the Alchemist.

The explosion in gold refining activity in 2013, and the huge throughput of Good Delivery bars being transformed into smaller higher fineness bars for the Asian gold market was without doubt one of the biggest stories in the gold world during 2013. I had cited the 6,601 tonnes figure to help support a calculation about Valcambi refining capacity, and my reference wasn’t really central to the main topic of my Valcambi article. But it was a topic that I was planning to re-visit, and I tweeted about it on 4th June when I first read the LBMA report that contained the 6,601 tonnes data:

 

All of the above seems logical and easy to understand. It was therefore surprising to notice that on Wednesday 5th August 2015, three business days after my Valcambi articles was published, the LBMA substantially amended the gold refinery figures in the file ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘, and dramatically lowered the 2013 refined gold production figure from 6,601 tonnes to 4,600 tonnes, while substantially altering the wording and meaning of the paragraph commenting on the refined tonnage. The document content was amended and re-saved with the same file name LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘, and left in the same web directory. So anyone viewing the LBMA document for the first time would not know that the gold refining figures in the report had been altered and substantially reduced. The file directory in question is here, and contains the altered report:

http://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/market/gdl/LBMA%20Brochure%20Final%2020150501.pdf

(The ‘%20’ instances are just space delimiters within the URL)

Luckily, the original version of ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘ from 1st May 2015 can be viewed here -> LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.

Let’s look at what was changed between the two versions. Here is the exact updated LBMA text and data table after the Wednesday 5th August changes, including the matrix displaying the number of gold and silver refineries on the ‘List’. The number of refineries remained unchanged. However, notice the 2013 gold refining figure became 4,600 tonnes:

GDL List in updated version - no change

Page 3 of the 5th August changed version of 'LBMA Brochure Final 20120501.pdf'
Page 3: changed version of ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20120501.pdf’ 5th Aug

If you compare the original and altered versions of this LBMA report, you will see substantial differences. Here is a description of the changes, which I have highlighted using italics, underline and bold in various places, and the LBMA’s text is indented:

a) For gold, the LBMA reduced the 2013 total refinery production figure from 6,601 tonnes to 4,600 tonnes, a reduction of 2,000 tonnes of gold. To put the sheer magnitude of 2,000 tonnes of gold into perspective, 2,000 tonnes of gold is nearly twice as much gold as the Swiss National Bank (SNB) officially reports that it holds. [The SNB claims to have 1,040 tonnes of gold].

The LBMA added that words ‘estimated to be‘ in front of the 4,600 tonnes figure, and the words ‘owing to recycling of scrap material‘ were added after the figure. The ‘more than double‘ reference to the 6,601 tonnes of gold being more than double world mine production, was deleted and replaced by the word ‘above‘. The words ‘source Thomson Reuters GFMS‘ were added in brackets at the end of the sentence. The wording of “total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was retained and not altered.

“Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was estimated to be 4,600 tonnes in 2013, owing to recycling of scrap material, above world mine production of 3,061 tonnes (source Thomson Reuters GFMS).”

b) For silver, the 2013 total refinery production figure of 24,570 tonnes was increased to 29,984 tonnes, an increase of 5,500 tonnes. The words ‘estimated to be‘ were also added in front of the 29,984 tonnes figure. Unlike gold, no wording was added about recycling of scrap material. Since the LBMA upped the 2013 silver total so much, it was now far above mine production, so the previous words ‘marginally below‘ were replaced by the word ‘above‘.  Again, the words ‘source: Thomson Reuters GFMS‘ were added in brackets at the end of the sentence.

For silver[,] refined production by listed refiners in 2013 was estimated to be 29,984 tonnes, above the 25,981 tonnes of mine production in 2013 (source: Thomson Reuters GFMS).

c) The altered text still retained all of the references to the Good delivery refiner ‘List’, and still stated that the figures in the table were for ‘estimated annual refined gold and silver production by the refiners on the List’.

“The Gold refined by refiners on the List make up about 85-90% of world production. Total estimated annual refined gold and silver production by the refiners on the List are shown in the table below (tonnes).”

 d) The years 2006 and 2007 were removed entirely from the table in the changed version from 5th August, with the revised version only covering the years 2008 – 2013 and not 2006 – 2013 as per the original.

As the number of gold refiners in the ‘List’ above remained the same in this altered version as in the original version, there can be no doubt that this refers to the same group of gold refiners which had combined production output of 6,601 tonnes of gold in 2013 yet also, simultaneously (and impossibly) according to this altered version of the report, had a combined 4,600 tonnes of gold production output in 2013.

Total refined gold production of the refiners on the List

Question: How does the LBMA know that “Total refined gold production of the refiners on the List” was 6,601 tonnes in 2013?

Answer: Because the Good Delivery refiners provide annual refinery production figures to the LBMA. It’s as simple as that.

Every refiner on the LBMA’s Good Delivery list is required to provide production data to the LBMA on an annual basis. This information is required by the LBMA as part of its obligatory Pro-Active Monitoring (PAM) programme of Good Delivery refiners. The PAM programme is defined by the LBMA as follows:

“The PAM programme reviews the assaying competence of refiners on a three-yearly basis. In addition, it checks that they continue to meet the minimum requirements for refined production and tangible net worth on an annual basis.”

This production data was supplied to the LBMA on a three-yearly basis until 2011, but the rules were changed in 2011 to an annual basis. From ‘Alchemist’ issue 65, December 2011:

“Some important changes in the Rules have been agreed recently. The first is that refiners will have to provide data on their tangible net worth and production on an annual, rather than a three-yearly, basis.”

In the LBMA’s most recent Good Delivery Rules from March 2015, ‘Section 10 Pro-Active Monitoring’ states that:

All current Good Delivery refiners are also required to submit their production and audited financial data on an annual basis to the Executive. “

Annex A of the same document, clarifies the compliance date and states:

“With effect from 1st January, 2012, all current Good Delivery refiners are required to submit their refined production and audited financial data on an annual basis to the Executive.”

Additionally, refiners applying to be accepted on the LBMA’s Good Delivery list need to submit a three year operating history with three years of production figures as part of the application. Annex A (Application Form), addressing what to include with an application, states that required documents include:

  • Figures for the last three years’ annual production of refined * gold/silver in tonnes.
  • Estimate of next two years’ annual production of refined * gold/silver in tonnes.

The asterick (*) states that ‘refined’ refers to “metal which has gone through a refining process, such as electrolysis, Miller Process or Aqua Regia refining“. These processes would apply to Good Delivery bars that were being converted into 9999 fineness kilobars for the Asian gold market.

Therefore, the LBMA knows exactly, down to the exact tonne, the figure for “total refined gold production of the refiners on the List” in 2013.

In issue 74 of the LBMA’s ‘Alchemist’ published in June 2014, when the LBMA’s Physical Committee was providing a news update on ‘Pro-active Monitoring’, and reviewing the 2011 refinery production statistics which had just been finalised at that time, the Committee highlighted the following:

A number of issues arising from proactive monitoring of refiners on the list have also been discussed….Two very interesting numbers arising from this work are the figures for total refined production represented by the accredited refiners. Although it takes time to complete this data collection, the figures for 2011 are now complete. The total for gold is 4,695.8 tonnes and for silver is 28,395.5 tonnes, in both cases significantly above the respective world mine production of 2,838.1 tonnes and 23,545 tonnes.

It appeared that the writer of that paragraph thought that the two refining numbers were interesting enough to be comment worthy because the numbers were ‘significantly above‘ the world mine production figures.

The LBMA also administers a ‘Responsible Gold Audit Programme’ for gold refiners on its Good Delivery List. The audit seeks to determine whether a refiner complies with the LBMA’s ‘Responsible Gold Guidance’. The actual audits are carried out by independent auditors that have been approved by the LBMA, but the audit results are passed back to the LBMA. For example, in February 2014, the LBMA issued a press release announcing  that 4 refiners had successfully passed the audit. The announcement mentioned that:

the audit reviewed the refiners’ production over a 12 month period. The LBMA received a large volume of reports in late 2013, and will continue to report in the coming weeks as each batch is reviewed.”

Therefore, the audits are another way in which the LBMA keeps track of the refiners production, in addition to the reporting coming in from the Pro-active Monitoring programme. Either way, the LBMA knows the refinery production statistics of the Good Delivery refiners and does not need to get estimates from GFMS or any other body.

kilobars

Thomson Reuters GFMS

Given the above, then why the sudden need by the LBMA on 5th August 2015 to include a reference to  “source Thomson Reuters GFMS“? By including the reference to “owing to recycling of scrap material”, it is clear that the intention was to solely relate the 4,600 tonnes of gold quoted to just two sources, namely, gold mining and gold scrap recycling. Furthermore, why had the figure suddenly become an ‘estimate’ and who was responsible for the estimate? There is no need for estimates of refinery production when every refinery on the Good Delivery ‘Lists’ provides the exact real production figures to the LBMA.

Additionally, what was the reason for suddenly throwing a perfectly logical paragraph out the window which had referred to gold refinery production statistics for 2013 collected by the LBMA, and replace it with an estimate about gold mining and scrap recycling from a company, GFMS, which does not specialise in collecting gold refinery production statistics?

What is GFMS?

GFMS was a metals analysis consultancy firm, that was acquired by Thomson Reuters in August 2011. GFMS was formerly known as Gold Fields Mineral Services. The group within Thomson Reuters is now known as Thomson Reuters GFMS. GFMS gathers supply and demand figures for gold and other precious metals, and publishes an annual gold survey and related update reports.

GFMS’s supply data for gold mine production and gold scrap is not the same metric as gold refinery production output, and is not even close to being the same metric, especially in 2013 when there were huge amounts of Good Delivery gold bars re-smelted and re-cast into smaller gold bars in Switzerland and other places for onward shipment to Asia.

‘LBMA Overview Brochure.pdf’

The LBMA also makes reference to annual gold and silver refinery figures in another document on its website, in a file named ‘LBMA Overview Brochure.pdf‘. This document is located in a ‘presspack’ directory, presumably for use by the LBMA’s Fleet Street press contacts. This document has, in its various iterations, included a paragraph with identical phraseology  about refinery production statistics i.e. ‘Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List‘, and has also included a similar table of gold and silver production statistics of LBMA accredited refineries.

On Saturday 1st August, the version of this other file, the ‘LBMA Overview Brochure.pdf‘ document on the LBMA web site, had also been altered with some very strange temporary alterations inserted for 2013 gold and silver refinery production statistics. All of the annual refinery figures in the entire table had been blanked out of the table with the shorthand ‘n/a‘ substituted in each row. The text had also been changed, and 4,848 tonnes had been inserted as the gold refineries’ production figure for 2013, and 30,934 tonnes for silver, with the word ‘above‘ added before world mine production for both metals. The overwritten figures and text appeared in a  slightly scrawled text font (see below). GFMS was not mentioned in this file. The file, on 1st August, in its web directory (http://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/downloads/presspack/) rendered in a web browser as follows, when this image was recorded:

31st July 4848

 Why 4,848 tonnes?

So, where did this 4,848 tonnes figure for gold, and 30,934 tonnes for silver come from? These numbers are another entirely different set of figures for 2013, a third set if you will. To answer where these numbers came from, we need to turn to a presentation given by Stewart Murray, former LBMA CEO, at the LBMA’s Assaying and Refining Conference held in London between 8th – 10th March 2015. In a presentation titled ” The LBMA Good Delivery List, Recent and Future Changes“, on 9th March, Murray utilised slides which, on page 9 showed the following:

Murray slide 9 assaying and refining pres refinery prod stats

Notice, that for 2013, the figures are 4,848 tonnes for gold, and 30,934 tonnes for silver. This dataset also only goes from 2008 to 2013.

GFMS also makes another appearance in this slide, with a GFMS combined mine production and recycled scrap figure for 2013 being quoted as 4,302 tonnes for gold, and 31,460 tonnes for silver, respectively.

The next slide in that presentation, slide 10, even gives a regional breakdown of the 4,848 tonnes and 30,934 tonnes figures, attributing 1,790 tonnes of gold refining to Europe in 2013. Keep these figures in mind as we go through this maze of numbers.

Murray slide 10 regional refinery breakdown

Slide 6 of the same presentation showed a line graph of the Good Delivery gold refiners that were referred to in the production figures in slide 9. You can see that the numbers of refiners in each line as at 2014 equate to the numbers of gold refiners in the ‘List’ of the original ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘ file, i.e. 16 gold refiners in Europe, 43 in Asia, 11 in the Americas, 1 in Australia (which was Oceania in the List – the Perth Mint), and 1 in Africa (Rand Refinery). So again, there can be no doubt that they are the same refiners being referred to here that had a production output of 6,601 tonnes of gold in 2013, and at the same time 4,848 tonnes. So the same refiners have been at work in 3 parallel universes during 2013, or so it may seem.

GD gold refiners graph murray

By Wednesday 5th August, the ‘LBMA Overview Brochure.pdf‘ file had also been updated and re-saved, and contained the exact same commentary text and the exact same table of refinery production output figures as the altered ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘, i.e. the 4,848 tonnes figure was gone and was replaced by 4,600 tonnes, and the file was re-saved by the LBMA with the same file name, and left in the same file directory that it had been in, i.e.

 

Again, a first time viewer would not know by looking at the report that the gold and silver refinery production figures had been altered and the text edited.

What do the document properties of the re-saved ‘LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘ and ‘LBMA Overview Brochure.pdf files, saved on Wednesday 5th August tell us?

LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘ was saved at 15:49:48 on 5th August by author name Aelred Connelly. Then 29 seconds later at 15:50:17 on 5th august,  file LBMA Brochure Final 20150501.pdf‘ was also saved by author name Aelred Connelly. Aelred Connelly is the LBMA’s Public Relations Officer, ex Bank of England for more than 25 years, where he was a gold bullion analyst and a relationship manager for the Bank’s central bank and government customers.

brochure final 20150501 connelly 5th aug

overview brochure connelly 5th Aug

So, what is going on here?

Could it be that the LBMA’s original figure of 6,601 tonnes of refinery gold production in 2013 should not have been published for some reason, and needed to be quickly changed, for example, that the publication of this metric breached refiner confidentiality, or that it just made the GFMS supply numbers look way out of line with reality?

Previous LBMA documents discussing refined gold production

There are a number of other slightly older LBMA reports, brochures and other documents which discussed and recorded Good Delivery refinery annual production statistics. The interesting aspect of these other files, apart from the numbers, is that the syntax and wording is identical to the version from 1st May 2015 which I had quoted and which disappeared by 5th August. Furthermore, none of the older versions match (in style) the new versions that use ‘estimates’ and that refer to Thomson Reuters GFMS.

The previous syntax also seemed totally adequate for use by regulatory agencies such as the US SEC, and the UK Treasury’s Fair and Efficient Markets Review.

A file here refers to 2009 refinery figures. The same statistics were quoted in version created on 19th April 2012, for use in a LBMA meeting with the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) on 18th April 2012:

“Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was more than 4,000 tonnes in 2009, well above world mine production of 2,611 tonnes. For silver, refined production by listed refiners of 22,800 tonnes was marginally greater than the 22,342 tonnes of mine production in the same year.”

Then there is another version that was saved as 23rd May 2014 but refers to 2011. It was also used in January 2015, in a letter from the LBMA to the Fair & Effective Markets Review, Bank of England:

“Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was 4,695.8 tonnes in 2011, well above world mine production of 2,838.1. For silver, refined production by listed refiners of 28,395.5 tonnes was greater than the 23,545 tonnes of mine production in the same year.”

Another newer version  on 12th August 2015

There is also an even newer version of a file specifying “total refined gold production by the refiners on the List” now uploaded on the LBMA web site. This latest document, called “A guide to The London Bullion Market Association August 2015“,  is from 12th August 2015.

“Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was estimated to be 4,579 tonnes in 2013, owing to recycling of scrap material, above world mine production of 3,061 tonnes (source: Thomson Reuters GFMS). For silver, refined production by listed refiners in 2013 was estimated to be 28,013 tonnes, above the 25,981 tonnes of mine production in 2013 (source: Thomson Reuters GFMS). The Gold refined by refiners on the List make up about 85-90% of world production. Total estimated annual refined gold and silver production by the refiners on the List are shown in the table below (tonnes).”

In this version, a refinery in China (Daye Nonferrous Metals Company) was accredited to the Good Delivery List for gold in June 2015, and so it was moved from the silver only category to the gold and silver category on the List. Why the 2013 gold production figure was then reduced again from 4600 tonnes to 4579 tonnes is unclear,  and even more mysterious is why the 2013 silver production figure became 28,103 tonnes,when in the two report versions from 5th August LBMA , the 2013 silver production total had been 29,984 tonnes. That’s a reduction of 1,871 tonnes of silver between 2 LBMA reports that were published a week apart.

Table: Comparisons – LBMA refinery production (1st May vs 5th August vs 9th March)

lbma data comparison table

It is not just 2013 where the refinery production statistics deviate significantly for both gold and silver. For gold, the altered figures were applied to 2012, 2011 and 2010 also. For 2009 and 2008, the revised data is actually higher for gold than the 1st May 2015 published version. The differences in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and indeed, 2008 and 2009 require explanations also.

For silver, the altered figure for 2013 is, as mentioned earlier, more than 5000 tonnes higher in the newer version. This article has focused on gold. I have not looked at the silver angle. Other people may wish to explore the silver angle.

The figures in the newer LBMA documents of 5th August are very close to the figures used by Stewart Murray in his 9th March presentation, except for 2013 in gold and silver, and in silver in 2012. There is still however, a 248 tonne difference between the 4,848 tonnes 2013 gold production figure quoted by Murray on 9th March, and the lower 2013 gold figure of 4,600 tonnes added into the LBMA documents on 5th March.

Conclusion

There are 2,300 tonnes of 2013 gold refining output in excess of combined mine production and scrap recycling being signalled within the  6,601 tonnes figure that was removed from the LBMA’s reports on 5th August 2015.

Could it be that this 6,601 tonne figure included refinery throughput for the huge number of London Good Delivery gold bars extracted from gold ETFs and LBMA and Bank of England vaults and converted into smaller gold bars in 2013, mainly using LBMA Good Delivery Swiss gold refineries? And that maybe this 6,601 tonne figure stood out as a statistical outlier for 2013 which no one wanted to talk about?

The objectives of HM Treasury’s Fair and Efficient Markets Review (FEMR) include transparency and openness. It would appear that altering already published gold refinery statistics, especially for 2013, seems not to be in the spirit of these FEMR objectives.

Part 2 of this analysis of the LBMA’s 2013 gold refinery statistics looks behind the 6,601 tonne number at the phenomenon of Good Delivery bars being processed through the Swiss gold refineries in 2013, the gold withdrawals from the London-based gold ETFs, and the huge shipments of gold from the UK to Switzerland in 2013. Part 2 also examines the 2013 withdrawal of gold from the Bank of England, and how GFMS and the World Gold Council tried to, or tried not to, explain the non-stop processing of Good Delivery gold bars into smaller finer kilobars during 2013.

Swiss Gold Refineries and the sale of Valcambi

The normally low-key Swiss gold refining market has been thrown into the spotlight with the announcement that private company Valcambi, the world’s largest gold refinery, is being acquired by Indian group Rajesh Exports Ltd (REL), the world’s largest gold jewellery manufacturer.

This acquisition is worth analysing for a number of reasons, namely will the Valcambi-Rajesh transaction impact marginal gold supply out of Switzerland and elsewhere, and how will the transaction, if at all, increase the likelihood of other large gold refineries becoming future acquisition targets?

Mesaric Mehta

Telegraphed Transaction

The announcement of the Valcambi acquisition should not come as a surprise because it was telegraphed in early July by the Economic Times of India. In its article, the Economic Times revealed that Rajesh Exports was in discussions to acquire a large stake in a Swiss gold refinery, and although the identity of the acquiree was not confirmed at that time, the Times said that Rajesh had “sounded out Valcambi…on a possible transaction”.

Since both Rajesh and majority Valcambi shareholder Newmont Mining declined to comment at the time (with Rajesh citing stock exchange rules), the Times and its industry sources were left to speculate that two of the other three large Swiss refineries, Argor-Heraeus or Metalor, might instead be targets, as opposed to Valcambi. Notably, the 4th large Swiss gold refinery, PAMP, was not mentioned in the Economic Times report.

The Times report would suggest that Rajesh Exports took the initiative in searching for a leading precious metals refinery to purchase. However, now that the acquisition has been announced, Rajesh Exports states that it was the Valcambi shareholders who initiated the search for a buyer. In its press release Rajesh states that:

the owners of Valcambi conducted a global search for divesting Valcambi, after an extensive search selected Rajesh Exports to acquire Valcambi.

That the search was prolonged was confirmed by India’s Business Standard, which also highlighted that Rajesh Exports was simultaneously on the look-out for a suitor:

Valcambi shareholders were looking for a buyer for quite some time. We (Rajesh) were also looking to deploy our cash at a safe place, which could generate a fair amount of business interest and help us grow. So, both of us came together and the transaction was concluded.”

But the transaction looks predominantly to have been a strategically planned sale of Valcambi by its holding company European Gold Refineries (i.e. its owners Newmont Mining and a private Swiss investor group), with what looks like input and advice from investment bank Credit Suisse.

A Quick Recap on Valcambi

Before discussing the Valcambi acquisition, its important to understand the Valcambi shareholding structure and the various parties involved with the refinery over its 54 year history.

Balerna based Valcambi was originally incorporated in the southern Swiss Canton of Ticino as Valori & Cambi SA on 15 May 1961, and changed name to Valcambi SA on 30 June 1967. The founders of the original Valori & Cambi, like its successor, seem to have wanted to maintain low profiles, because other than the fact that it was founded by ‘5 Swiss businessmen/entrepreneurs from Mendrisio”, there is little in the public record to identify who these 5 individuals were, since the online company register records don’t so back that far.

In 1967, Credit Suisse bought 50% of the Valcambi refinery, followed by the purchase of another 30% stake in 1968. The final 20% shareholding was purchased in 1980, giving Credit Suisse 100% control of Valcambi from 1980 up to December 2003. In that era, it was not unusual for a large Swiss bank to own a gold refinery, and the other 2 large Swiss banks of the day, UBS and SBC, also owned their own gold refineries (UBS owned Argor and SBC owned Metalor).

In December 2003, some of the same founders of Valcambi (from 1961) joined up with Newmont Mining and established a company called European Gold Refineries SA (EGR), which was 50% owned by Newmont and 50% owned by a group of Swiss investors (whose identities are not easily discernible). EGR then simultaneously bought 100% of Valcambi SA from Credit Suisse, and at the same time acquired a 66.65% shareholding in a company called Finorafa SA, which was a large gold distribution and financier business into the Italian jewellery market.

In their 2003 funding of EGR, Newmont and the Swiss private investor group each put up CHF 15 million in equal combinations of equity and debt.

In early July 2007, Mitsubishi International Corporation (MIC) of Japan bought a 6.55% shareholdings in EGR, with an option to buy a further 26.78% stake by 15 August 2007 (i.e. over 33% in total). Mitsubishi failed to take up its option in August 2007 to buy a larger shareholding in ERG, so this left Newmont and the Swiss investor group each with a shareholding of 46.725%, since their 50% stakes were each reduced by half of the Mitsubishi International Corporation of 6.55%, i.e. reduced by 3.275% each.

Newmont then bought another 15,960 shares in EGR from some of the private investors in April 2008, which increased its stake from 46.725 to 56.67%. This left the Swiss investor group and Mitsubishi holding a combined 43.33%. By this time ERG owned 100% of Finorafa SA as well as 100% of Valcambi, but Finorafa SA was by that time inactive.

Then in mid-November 2008, Mitsubishi had a change of mind and sold its 6.55% stake back to Newmont and the Swiss private investor group. These resold shares seem to have been split fairly equally between Newmont and the private investor group, bringing Newmont’s stake up to 60% By 2009, Finorafa, although owned by EGR, was in liquidation.

For the Valcambi transaction, Rajesh Exports has actually bought European Gold Refineries SA (EGR), which has full ownership of Valcambi SA. To purchase EGR, Rajesh established a Swiss company called Global Gold Refineries AG, which happens to be registered in the Canton of Lucerne (See company register here).

In turn, Global Gold Refineries AG is 95% owned by REL Singapore Pte Ltd, and 5% owned by Rajesh Exports Ltd India (and REL Singapore is fully owned by Rajesh Exports India). See here for the corporate structure of Valcambi and the holding companies. According to Rajesh, REL Singapore was set up primarily to execute international acquisitions and to source gold from mines.

Valcambi plant

Who were the Swiss Investor Group?

Note that since the acquisition of Valcambi by Rajesh Exports, there are now only 2 directors listed under the Valcambi Board of Directors, namely Valcambi CEO Michael Mesaric, who is staying on as CEO, and new chairman Federico Domenghini. Domenghini is also listed as the only director of the holding company Global Gold Refineries (see above). Interestingly, Michael Mesaric worked in senior roles at Credit Suisse between 1990 and 2002 before joining Valcambi, and is the first of our Credit Suisse connections.

The penultimate board of directors of Valcambi before the acquisition consisted of 6 individuals, 5 of who have now left the board. This penultimate list of directors can be seen here.

Although the full details of the Swiss investors behind Valcambi appear to be hard to find, some potentially relevant facts can be gleaned from the commercial register of the Canton of Ticino and also from the most recent pre-acquisition list of Valcambi board of directors. In addition, Rajesh mentioned one of the main private investors in its stock exchange press release (see below).

European Gold Refineries SA (EGR) was incorporated in Ticino in December 2003. Since 2003, the members of the board of EGR have been a selection of Newmont appointee directors, a selection of Mitsubishi appointees (for a short period), and a handful of other appointees. It is this third group of directors which may provide clues as to who the ‘Swiss private investors’ are, or at least who represents them.

Looking at EGR’s extract from the commercial register, in reverse date order, the most recent directors of EGR representing Newmont Mining (up until late July 2015) were Thomas Mahoney (chairman), Andrew Strelein, and David Farley. In addition, Carlo Camponovo, Luciano Martelli, and Michael Mesaric were listed as directors. Given that Mesaric is the CEO, this leaves Carlo Camponovo and Luciano Martelli as potential representatives of the Swiss investors, because logically, the Swiss private investors would need representatives on the board.

Going back further, ex-directors of Valcambi include Frank Hanagarne, Darren Morcombe, and Pierre Lassonde, all of Newmont, and Haydar Odok and Toshiro Sakai of Mitsubishi. After that we are left with 3 other directors, namely, Davide Camponovo, Emilio Camponovo, and Marco Cavuoto.

From the recent Valcambi board of directors profiles, Luciano Martelli works at Aurofin SA, and is also a director of Aurofin SA. Martelli has in the past also worked at Credit Suisse. Aurofin is a precious metals trading and financing company that was established in 1969 by Emilio Camponovo. Emilio Camponovo is still chairman of Aurofin.

Carlo Camponovo’s Valcambi profile states that he also worked at Credit Suisse from 1993 to 1997, and then worked at Finorafa SA, which is the second company that EGR owned from 2003 until it was liquidated in 2009. Marco Cavuoto was also a director of Finorafa until 2008.

The main reason for illustrating the above is to show the connections between Valcambi, Aurofin, Finorafa, and tangentially Credit Suisse, and also the Camponovo connections. Furthermore, it illustrates the low-key approach that Valcambi seems to have had in specifically naming its private shareholders.

The Valcambi web site even states that “In Switzerland and beyond: our firm deliberately keeps a low profile but has over the years become a key player in the precious metals refining industry” and to prove the point, the quotation is attributed to an unnamed ‘board member’!

Ironically, in the acquisition press release, Rajesh Exports dropped the low-key approach and provided some additional information about the Valcambi shareholders when it mentioned “Mr. Emilio Camponovo” as “the founder and current major share holder of Valcambi“. This suggests that the Camponovos were in the driving seat for the Valcambi sale alongside Newmont (and possibly Credit Suisse as navigator).

The Deal

Since Valcambi SA and European Gold Refineries SA are both private companies, there is little financial information available about either company. This has even stumped some of Newmont’s sell side analysts on Wall Street, who in their coverage of the sale admit that since Valcambi is a private company, they don’t have much visibility into Newmont’s disposal of Valcambi beyond knowing the net proceeds of the deal.

The Economic Times article on 1 July appears to have had very knowledgeable sources in India since it accurately foresaw that the deal was an all-cash deal for $400 million, 70% of which would be financed from Rajesh’s resources, and the other 30% from “overseas borrowings”.

This was highly prescient, since the announced acquisition turned out to be an all cash deal for $400 million, and Rajesh Exports confirmed at its press conference on 27 July that 30% – 35% of the consideration will be financed by long-term debt (provided by Credit Suisse, no less).

The Rajesh Exports press release states that over the last 3 years, Valcambi booked revenues of US$ 38 billion per annum, and earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) of US$ 33 million. These revenues look astronomical but they represent the annual average precious metals flows through the refinery being booked at market values (i.e. 945 tonnes of gold and 325 tonnes of silver per annum at market values).

Newmont (the 60% shareholder) will receive net proceeds from the sale of US$119 million. That could mean $200 million net proceeds to the entire shareholder base. Although its unclear as to exactly how much (in net proceeds) the private investor group received. Given that Rajesh is paying $400 million for Valcambi, Rajesh is also taking over or paying down some of the debt of EGR or Valcambi, or else Valcmabi has a quantum of cash on its balance sheet, or both.

Now that the deal has been announced, Newmont has pitched the sale of its stake as a disposal of a non-core asset which it claims will help pay down its debt and focus on its core business. So, being the largest shareholder of Valcambi, and actively wanting to dispose of non-core assets, this reinforces the view that Newmont was the primary driver of the entire ‘global search’ for a buyer of Valcambi.

As mentioned above, Credit Suisse has a long history of involvement with the Valcambi refinery, having fully owned Valcambi from 1980 to 2003. Credit Suisse’s involvement in the new deal also points to ongoing or rekindled relationship with the Swiss private shareholders and Newmont, since it sold the refinery to them in late 2003.

Until 2008, Newmont managed the Valcambi asset through its Merchant Banking group. This group, among other things, took care of “merger and acquisition analysis and negotiations”. Although Newmont’s Merchant Banking group was phased out in 2008, skilled corporate finance individuals at Newmont undoubtedly lent a hand to in the Valcambi disposal project.

Theoretically, Rajesh Exports could have just bought Newmont’s stake in Valcambi and become the new majority shareholder alongside the existing private investors. The fact that they didn’t go down this route could either mean that Rajesh wanted full corporate control, or that the investor group wanted to redeem its investment, or both.

Valcambi SA campus

Ramifications of the Valcambi Sale

The sale of the Valcambi refinery now raises questions as to whether its customer base and the mix of destinations for its gold exports from Switzerland will change, and what impact, if any, will the acquisition have on the ability of other countries to acquire Valcambi refined gold.

Rajesh Exports was an existing customer of Valcambi before the acquisition, and probably quite a large Valcambi customer.

In a 2011 presentation, Rajesh Exports stated that:

Top Suppliers include Australian Gold Refinery, ANZ Bank and Valcambi Refinery who constitute 90% of total supply of Raw gold to REL

So Valcambi was already an important supplied to Rajesh. Although Rajesh Exports only consumed about 170 tonnes of gold over its financial year 2014-2015, Rajesh Mehta, chairman of the group stated in his press release that:

The acquisition is also of national importance for India, as India is the largest consumer of gold in the world, it would be a step in the right direction by an Indian company to own a world-class asset like Valcambi. On a theoretical basis Valcambi is capable of supplying the entire gold requirement of India.

Gross gold imports (excluding smuggling) into India totals about 750-800 tonnes per annum at the moment. In its 2013 Sustainability Report  Valcambi states that its refinery has an annual capacity for gold refining of 1600 tonnes, and a total annual ‘precious metals’ refining capacity of 2000 tonnes. This is what Rajesh Mehta is referring to ‘in theory’ above.

Will Valcambi start supplying all of its output to India? Most probably no. Could this mean that Valcambi will start supplying more of its output to India? Probably yes. Even if it does though, Valcambi still has a lot of spare refinery capacity.

Rajesh Exports seems to have done the Valcambi acquisition for multiple reasons and not just to secure a source of refined gold supply. Rajesh claims that it wants to become a fully integrated major global gold player. (See above link to presentation where Rajesh even had a ‘Mission 2016′ plan to be a ‘fully integrated jewellery company’ by 2016).

Rajesh also had spare cash which it needed to invest in what it referred to as a safe place (i.e. “We were looking to deploy our cash in a safe place” – See Business Standard quote above). And Switzerland remains a universally known ‘safe place’ to deploy cash.

Rajesh already owns some gold mines, and a refinery, as well as gold manufacturing plants, wholesalers and a retailer network of jewellery showrooms which it plans to expand. The Valcambi acquisition allows Rajesh to move back along the gold supply chain. It also presumably will lead to cost savings on acquiring refinery output.

One of the less tangible benefits will be increased information flow about the gold market, both to Rajesh and to Valcambi. Another benefit to Rajesh will be refinery knowledge and skills transfer. Although headquartered in Bangalore in the state of Karnataka in the southwest of India, Rajesh Exports currently has a gold refinery in Uttarakhand in the north of India. This refinery has a gold output of 200 tonnes per annum. Rajesh plans to upgrade this refinery and turn it a subsidiary of Valcambi and then apply for LBMA gold and silver accreditation for  the refinery.

One of the main reasons why Valcambi (and its competitors PAMP and Argor-Hereaus)  set up in southern Switzerland near the Italian border was that Italy used to be the world’s largest jewellery manufacturer, consuming vast amounts of refined gold as is occurring in present day India. So in some ways, the acquisition of Valcambi by Rajesh Exports Ltd, as the world’s largest gold jewellery manufacturer, is just taking the supply chain logic a step further and going back to the traditional source of the Italian jewellery manufacturers (i.e. Ticino).

All of the above suggest that the acquisition will not end up diverting huge volumes of Valcambi output to India to such an extent that it would impact other customers’ reliance on Valcambi.

Additionally, Valcambi’s CEO, Michael Mesaric said of the deal that “the coming together of REL and Valcambi would ensure that Valcambi improves on it’s global share of gold business, by opening up new markets in India, Middle East and China.” Although Valcambi never broke down its gold exports by destination, about 80% of total Swiss gold exports in 2014 already went to Asia, with India, Hong Kong and China being the top 3 destinations. So what Mesaric is referring to appears to be more of the same, albeit even higher reliance on the existing top export markets.

Furthermore, Valcambi shareholders would not have agreed to the sale to Rajesh if it jeopardised its existing global customer base. Newmont has reiterated its support and will continue to use Valcambi “under the new ownership structure” since it has “long-term contracts with Valcambi for refining the gold produced” from a number of it mines.

In its 2013 sustainability report, Valcambi states that its clients are:

“some of the largest mining companies in the world, premium luxury watch manufacturers,the largest international banks, governments, central banks and scrap dealers”

The report also revealed that on a geographic basis,  Valcambi’s ‘business turnover’ was 33% in Europe, 36% in Europe (non EU), 15% in  North/South America, 9% in Africa, 4% in Asia, and 3% in Oceania.

Given that the gold exports trade statistics out of Switzerland do not align with the regions of this business turnover data, these figures (which would also include mining company and bullion bank business) must represent where Valcambi books its sales to and/or where the actual clients are based, rather than the ultimately destinations of the refined gold and silver output that are exported from Switzerland,. For example, a London-based bullion bank client of Valcambi that wanted gold refined in Balerna and sent to China would probably be accounted for by Valcambi as a European client, and the China destination of the gold would not get captured in the revenue records.

Valcambi’s refining capacity

Even if Rajesh Exports requires a higher share of the Valcambi refinery output, there is still plenty of spare refinery capacity in the Balerna facility.

Valcambi’s 2013 sustainability report also said that the refinery had an actual ‘product throughput’ of ‘3.8 tons bars and coins per day’ of gold and ‘1.8 tons bars and grain per day’ of silver. Assuming a 5 day week (250 day work year), that would be 950 tonnes of gold throughput and 450 tonnes of silver per annum.

Rajesh Exports just revealed in its press release that over the last 3 years, Valcambi has refined an annual average of 945 tonnes of gold and 325 tonnes of silver (2835 tonnes of gold and 975 tonnes of silver over 3 years). Presumably the last 3 years that Rajesh mentions refers to the last 3 calendar years of 2012-2014.

The London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) doesn’t reveal annual production data of its refinery members on an individual level, however, the LBMA recently published high level totals of the refined gold production of its accredited refiners (LBMA Good Delivery List) over the years 2006 to 2013. What was striking about the data was that total refined gold production of its refinery members reached 6,601 tonnes in 2013, which was 42% higher than total refined gold production in 2012, and also more than double global mine production of 3,016 tonnes of gold in 2013. See table below from LBMA publication:

Total annual refined gold and silver production by LBMA refiners 2006-2013 (tonnes)

Refinery output 2006-2013

So with Valcambi being the largest gold refinery in the world, it would be realistic to suggest that its annual average of 945 tonnes of refined gold output over the last 3 years probably hides the higher refined gold production that it too experienced in 2013 versus 2012. Unfortunately, there is no LBMA 2014 data. Doing a quick hypothetical calculation of Valcambi’s annual gold output over 2012-2014 where 2013 production was 42% higher than 2012, and 2012 production equaled 2014 production, then Valcambi would have refined 828 tonnes of gold in both 2012 and 2014, and a massive 1179 tonnes in 2013. This however would still be below the refinery’s gold output capacity of 1400 tonnes per annum.

So, whichever way you look at it, on average, the Valcambi refinery is not yet running at full capacity for gold, it probably hasn’t ever reached full capacity (even in 2013), and it still has plenty of spare capacity. So even if Rajesh Exports ramps up gold flow from Valcambi to India, other export destinations such as China, South East Asia and the Middle East needn’t suffer as long as mining and bullion bank clients of the refinery can provide metal to make use of the reserve refining capacity.

The other Swiss Gold Refineries

Does the sale of Valcambi foreshadow the sale of any of the other large Swiss gold refineries or increase the likelihood of a similar transaction? I’d say no, but to answer these questions, you may find it helpful to look at the shareholder structure of Valcambi’s competitors in Switzerland, and then decide.

Apart from Valcambi, there are 3 other large gold refineries in Switzerland and 2 smaller refineries. Valcambi’s 3 big competitors are PAMP, Metalor and Argor-Heraeus.

The refineries owned by PAMP and Argor-Heraeus are also located in the south of the Canton of Ticino, literally within walking distance from Valcambi, in what’s known as the golden triangle of gold refineries in the southern tip of Switzerland. As mentioned above, these refineries were established in this area in order to be as near as possible to Milan and the Italian gold industry. Looking at the map below you will see the municipalities of Mendrisio (Argor-Heraeus), Balerna (Valcambi), and Castel San Pietro (PAMP). Balerna is only 4kms from Mendrisio, and 2kms from Castel San Pietro. Notice also the Swiss – Italian border at the bottom of the map south of Chiasso.

Along with Metalor, which is in Marin-Epagnier in the Canton of Neuchâtel in north-west Switzerland, these Big 4 refineries refine the bulk of Switzerland’s (and the world’s) gold. Valcambi, PAMP, Argor-Heraeus and Metalor are all Associates of the LBMA, and PAMP, Argor-Heraeus and Metalor are three of the five refiners on the LBMA’s refiner referee list which helps maintain the LBMA’s Good Delivery System for gold and silver.

Mendrisio 2

Two other smaller companies refine gold in Switzerland in addition to the Big 4. These two companies, also in the Canton of Neuchâtel and located quite close to Metalor, are PX Précinox in La Chaux-de-Fonds, and Cendres + Metaux in Biel. Together they arguably form another golden triangle of refineries, close to the Swiss gold watch industry and incidentally close to the headquarters of the Swiss National Bank in Bern (home of the SNB’s gold vaults and where the BIS’s also stores gold).

Neuchatel

The good delivery bars of Valcambi, PAMP, Argor-Heraeus, Metalor and PX Précinox are on the LBMA’s current Good Delivery list for gold, while the bars of Cendres + Metaux are on the LBMA’s former Good Delivery list for gold (transferred to the former list in April 2015).

Because PX Précinox and Cendres + Metaux are smaller than the Big 4, the analysis below only focuses on Metalor, PAMP and Argor Hereaus, all three of which are privately held Swiss companies.

Metalor

Metalor here refers to Metalor Technologies International SA. Currently the Metalor group is majority owned by French private equity company Astorg Partners SA (www.astorg-partners.com) headquartered in Paris. The remainder of the shares are owned by Swiss individuals and by Metalor management.

The Metalor group is not just a refinery group. It has two others divisions, Advanced Coatings (for electronics and jewellery) and Electrotechnics (silver conductivity electrical contacts used in electrical applications). The refinery division has 4 refineries worldwide, in Neuchatel Switzerland, in the US (North Attleboro, which is south of Boston and is the headquarters of the refining division), in Hong Kong, and in Singapore. The 2012 Metalor annual report states that the group’s refining capacity of fine gold was 650 tonnes per annum in the Swiss, US and Hong Kong refineries. The Singapore refinery was opened in 2013, and since this has a refinery capacity of 150 tonnes,  that boosts the total refinery capacity to about 800 tonnes per annum now.

Metalor is the oldest of the Swiss gold refineries and was under the ownership of Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) from 1918 until 1998. In 1998 a group of Swiss private investors comprising Ernst Thomke, Martin Bisang, Rolf Soiron and Giorgio Behr acquired the majority of shares from UBS. UBS still retained a minority shareholding following this transaction. Thomke then became Metalor chairman until April 2004, after which Bisang was appointed chairman.

Metalor then raised additional capital from another group of Swiss private investors who operated through a British Virgin Islands company called ‘Partners Only’. Zurich business magazine Bilanz speculated as to the identities of these ‘Partners Only’ investors in an article published in 2005, and another published in 2009. These articles list a number of well-known Swiss investors connected to Roche.

In September 2009, Metalor announced that in July 2009, a majority of the private investor shareholders had sold their shareholdings to Astorg Partners SA in an equity funded transaction. The press releases stated that two of the largest investors would invest their proceeds back in with the Astorg transaction, and that Metalor’s management including Scott Morrison, the Metalor CEO, would also become long-term shareholders. One of these 2 ‘largest shareholders’ who stayed on was Martin Bisang (see above). (Metalor press release and Astorg Partners Press Release).

Swiss newspaper NZZ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung) confirmed in 2010 that Belgium headquartered private equity company Sofina had co-invested alongside Astorg Partners, and together they had acquired almost 60% of the shares, which left the remainder of the shares owned by Metalor management as well as Martin Bisang and Daniel Schlatter. Both Bisang and Schlatter are connected to Bellevue Group, a boutique bank in Zurich, owning 20% and 5% of Bellevue shares, respectively. Bellevue actually acted as co-lead financial advisor to Metalor in its sale to Astorg which lists the transaction as spanning 2008-2009. Astorg lists its Metalor investment as being part of its Astorg IV fund.

The board of Metalor now includes Joël Lacourte, Managing Partner of Astorg Partners, Sophie Pochard,  Jean-Hubert Vial,  and Benjamin Dierickx, all of Astorg Partners, Martin Bisang and Daniel Schlatter of Bellevue Holding AG, and Metalor CEO Scott Morrison. See Neuchâtel company register extract and Bloomberg.

Of the 2008-2009 sale, Martin Bisang has said previously that “it was extremely difficult to find a buyer” for Metalor. This in some ways was because the Lehman induced financial crisis of 2008/2009 impacted transactional values at that time. However, Astorg was looking for acquisition targets in Switzerland at  that time, which obviously helped the sale.

Metalor CEO in 2009 Philippe Royer, said that Astorg was a “long-term majority shareholder”. While this is true, private equity companies in most cases eventually want to crystalise their investments, and so its hard to put an exact time-frame on a PE company’s definition of ‘long term’. Maybe 10 years+. The same may be true of the remaining private investors including from Bellevue. A hostile acquirer looking to purchase just the Metalor refineries would have to take on board the other divisions and navigate the complexity of the company. In a similar way a friendly acquirer in the jewellery or investment gold sectors might be put off by the industrial divisions of the group.

Verdict: No change at Metalor in the medium-term.

 

Argor-Heraeus

The Argor-Hereaeus group, located a few minutes drive from Valcambi and PAMP in southern Ticino, has an “annual refining capacity of 450 tonnes for both gold and silver” according to a 2013 company report.

As well as refining, the group produces a range of bars and coins and high precision products for the watch and jewellery sectors.

The current shareholding structure of Argor-Heraeus is quite diverse and consists of parties from three contiguous central European countries, namely, German engineering conglomerate Heraeus, German bank Commerzbank, The Austrian Mint, as well as Argor-Heraeus management. The fragmented shareholder base evolved as follows:

The company, as Argor SA, was established in 1951. Swiss bank Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) acquired an 80% stake in 1960, and full ownership in 1973. In 1986, Heraeus of Germany purchased a 25% stake from UBS and entered a joint venture with UBS. In 1999 UBS departed leaving Heraeus and the company management with 100% of the shares. Then in April 1999, Commerzbank took a 35% stake, which resulted in Heraeus having 35%, Commerzbank having 35% and Argor-Heraeus management having 30%.

In 2002, the Austrian Mint (owned by the Austrian central bank) acquired a 24.3% interest, which left then Heraeus with 26.5%, Commerzbank with 26.5% and management were said to have 22.7%.

According to the 2013 annual report of the Austrian Mint, it now claims to own 28.6% of the shares of Argor-Heraeus, with an equity value of CHF 122.4 million (and a profit share for 2013 of CHF 19.5 million). According to the 2014 Commerzbank annual report, Commerzbank now owns 31.2% of Argor Heraeus shares with an equity value of CHF 152.7 million (and a 2014 profit share of CHF 22.7 million). In its latest annual report, Heraeus does not reveal its holding in Argor-Heraeus, but if the Austrian Mint and Commerzbank won a combined 59.8%, then that leaves 40.2% for Heraeus and Argor-Heraeus management.

On the website, Heraeus is listed at the top of the shareholder list, so this may indicate that Heraeus has the largest shareholding, which would be above 31%. This would leave management with the remainder.

A complex and diverse shareholder base means a diverse board of directors, and from the Argor-Heraeus SA company registry filing, the board of directors includes, as expected, a cross-section of directors from Commerzbank, the Austrian Mint, and Heraeus, including Gerhard Starsich, CEO and board member of the Austrian Mint, Hans-Jürgen Deutsch of Heraeus Precious Metals, and David Burns, head of commodities at Commerzbank.

All three parties often refer to the strategic benefits of being a shareholder in the Argor-Heraeus refinery so, it seems that the existing formula, whatever it is, is working well.

For example, Commerzbank states that it has a “long-standing cooperation with the refinery Argor-Heraeus S.A. allows us to combine well-founded experience in physical metals with strong expertise in structuring“. Likewise, the Austrian Mint refers to using Argor-Heraeus as a source of refined metal supply, presumably on preferred terms. All parties also presumably get access to information flow about the Swiss gold refining industry and gold demand and supply trends in and out of Switzerland, which is helpful.

In its 2013 annual report, the Austrian Mint said that Argor-Heraeus achieved “large increases in sales and profits in comparison to the preceding year”, so the refinery appears to be a good investment for the various parties also.

It therefore doesn’t seem likely that any of the 3 external shareholders would need to, or want to, dispose of their shareholdings. An acquirer would have to navigate negotiations with a central bank (Austria), a large German bullion bank, and a large German conglomerate, in addition to the Argor-Heraeus management.

Verdict: No change in Argor-Heraeus ownership over the foreseeable future

 

PAMP (Produits Artistiques Métaux Précieux)

PAMP SA of Castel San Pietro in Ticino, a neighbour of Valcambi and Argor-Heraeus, operates two precious metals refineries, one in Ticino and the other as a joint venture with MMTC in Delhi in India. PAMP SA is fully owned by MKS (Switzerland) Finance SA of Geneva.

Together the two refineries have an annual capacity for  550+ tonnes of gold, and 1200+ tonnes of silver. According to its website, “PAMP handles over 400-metric-tonnes of gold per year”, therefore there is still spare capacity.

MKS, a private company founded in 1979, is actually headquartered in the Netherlands, and has 16 offices around the world. MKS could be described as a physical precious metals refining and distribution company, and also a precious metals trading and financing company. The main office is in Geneva. MKS also owns precious metals bar and coin wholesaler Manfra, Tordella & Brooke (MTB) in New York which will be familiar to some readers as an approved Comex depository for gold. MKS Finance SA is also an Associate of the LBMA.

According to its company registry filing in the Canton of Geneva, the board of MKS (Switzerland) SA includes chairman Marwan Shakarchi, vice-chairman Karma Shakarchi-Liess, Venkata Gopalakrishnan, Hans Isler, Jean-Pierre Roth, and Stanley Walter.

The PAMP SA company filing from Ticino can be seen here.

In India, the PAMP refinery, India’s largest gold and silver refinery, is a joint venture established in 2008 with MMTC, and is known as MMTC-PAMP. MMTC is a ‘Government of India Undertaking’ or Central Public Sector Enterprise (CPSE), and is a huge trading company and the biggest precious metals importer in India. A few of MMTC’s directors are Indian Government appointees and the company’s website even uses a government web site domain (http://mmtclimited.gov.in/).

According to its profile:

“MMTC is the largest importer of gold and silver in the Indian sub-continent, handling about 174 MT of gold and 1165 MT of silver during 2011-12. MMTC supplies gold on loan and outright basis to the exporter, bullion dealers and jewellery manufacturers on all India basis.”

MMTC also has its own nationwide retail jewellery showroom network. From an Indian prespective, it’s not surprising that Rajesh Exports would have steered clear of looking to acquire PAMP because of PAMP’s existing relationships with MMTC. Recall that PAMP was not mentioned by the sources quoted by the Economic Times of India as a potential Swiss refinery target, while Valcambi, Metalor and Argor-Heraeus were mentioned. MMTC-PAMP, is the only precious metals refiner in India currently on the LBMA’s good delivery list.

An acquisition of PAMP SA of Switzerland would probably have to  be a full acquisition of the entire MKS Finance group becasue PAMP and MKS are closely integrated across a lot of their respective functions. Since MKS seems to be thriving independently, its doubtful if they’d be interested in being taken over. Perhaps they’d be more open to collaboration. Negotiating with one owner as opposed to multiple owners  in an acquisition scenario would undoubtedly be easier though.

It’s still unclear though as to how the exact shareholdings of MKS and PAMP are structured. MKS states that it’s a family-owned business and that would mean either exclusive or majority ownership by the founding Shakarchi family. It probably has some management ownership also. But being a private company, its hard to determine if MKS has, or does not have, a set of external private investors.

Verdict: PAMP and MKS will probably remain independent but watch this space