Tag Archives: gold

Estimated Chinese Gold Reserves Surpass 20,000t

My best estimate as of June 2017 with respect to total above ground gold reserves within the Chinese domestic market is 20,193 tonnes. The majority of these reserves are held by the citizenry, an estimated 16,193 tonnes; the residual 4,000 tonnes, which is a speculative yet conservative estimate, is held by the Chinese central bank the People’s Bank of China.

I’m aware I’ve been absent from writing about the Chinese gold market for a long time, so for some of you it can be burdensome to pick up where we left a few months ago. It is not feasible for me to explain the entire structure of the Chinese gold market again; my suggestion would be to follow the links provided in the text for more background info. Most knowledge is covered in previous BullionStar posts, Mechanics Of The Chinese Domestic Gold MarketChinese Cross-Border Gold Trade RulesWorkings Of The Shanghai International Gold Exchange

To substantiate my estimates on above ground gold reserves in China mainland, we’ll first discuss private gold accumulation in China through the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE), after which we’ll address official purchases by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and its proxies that operate in the international over-the-counter market.

Chinese Private Gold Accumulation

A few days ago, you could read on the BullionStar Gold Market Charts page that withdrawals from the vaults of SGE in June accounted for 156 tonnes. Year to date SGE withdrawals have reached 984 tonnes, which is 16 % shy of the record year 2015 when 1178 tonnes were withdrawn by this time. Since 2013 gold demand in China has remained extremely elevated – don’t let the World Gold Council tell you anything different – which exposes spectacular years of physical gold accumulation by the Chinese.

Monthly Gold Withdrawn From Shanghai Gold Exchange Vaults vs Gold Price In Renminbi
Exhibit 1.

The amount of SGE withdrawals provides a fairly good proxy for Chinese wholesale gold demand, although not all gold passing through the SGE adds to above ground reserves. In China, most scrap supply and disinvestment flows through the Shanghai bourse as well, next to mine output and imports. Needless to say, recycling gold within China doesn’t change the volume of above ground reserves. So, simply using SGE withdrawals won’t fly for calculating above ground reserves. What we’re interested in are net imports and mine production in the Chinese domestic gold market.

Although gold exports from the Chinese domestic market are prohibited, exports from the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ) where the Shanghai International Gold Exchange (SGEI) is located, are permitted. Before calculating Chinese net imports, let’s have a brief look at exports from the SFTZ – which reflects to what extent the SGEI is developing as a physical gold hub in Asia. As far as I can see, China’s gold bullion export from the SFTZ is still negligible. From the United Nations’ international merchandise trade statistics service COMTRADE, it shows the only countries that have imported tiny amounts from China in 2017 are the UK and India. But the amounts are so small, they carry little importance for our analysis.

There is one region that is importing significant amounts of gold from China, which is Hong Kong, though, this likely isn’t exported from the SFTZ but from the Shenzhen Free Trade Zone. The vast majority of China’s jewellery manufacturers are in Shenzhen, and for quite some years gold jewellery, ornaments, industrial and semi-manufactured parts are being exported from this Chinese fabrication base to Hong Kong. These events haven’t got anything to do with the SGEI in my opinion. Thereby, Hong Kong exports far more gold to China than vice versa.

For computing net gold export from Hong Kong to China we’ll subtract “imports into Hong Kong from China” from “exports and re-exports from Hong Kong to China” (as you know China doesn’t disclose gold trade statistics itself). Imports into Hong Kong accounted for 23 tonnes, while exports and re-exports to China accounted for 333 tonnes. Accordingly, China net imported 311 tonnes from Hong Kong in the first five months of 2017.

Hong Kong - China gold trade monthly ccc
Exhibit 2. In 2016 rumours circulated Hong Kong’s elevated gold exports relative to gold re-exports possibly hinted at fallacious trade data. This year the numbers show no sign of such activities.

If we apply the same math to Switzerland’s customs data, it shows China net imported 172 tonnes from the Swiss in the first six months of this year.

Most definitely Australia has exported gold bullion directly to China in 2017 as well, but the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has changed its methodology regarding this data somewhere in 2016 and is reluctant to share the details with me. Using my old way to compute Australia’s export directly to China results in 23 tonnes (this number is provisional and will be amended).

The UK, a large gold exporter directly to China in 2014 and 2015, hasn’t shipped any gold directly to China year to date, according to Eurostat.

Largest Gold Exporters to China
Exhibit 3. Annualised Chinese gold import for 2017 stands at 1,159 tonnes.

What’s remarkable is that Chinese true gold demand is far greater than what the World Gold Council (WGC) and GFMS are reporting as “Chinese consumer gold demand”. This is due to incomplete metrics applied by the WGC and GFMS. The immense tonnages imported by China have been waived in previous years, by the aforementioned Western consultancy firms, with dishonest arguments. (If you like to study the details regarding gold demand metrics read this.) In reality, thousands of tonnes are being imported into China and this metal is not coming back in the foreseeable future; causing a bull run on steroids if institutional interest for gold rebounds in the West. Ascending above ground reserves within China imply declining above ground reserves in the rest of the world. And the more scarce the metal in the West, the higher price when demand revives. I’ve described this phenomenon in my previous post How The West Has Been Selling Gold Into A Black Hole. In a forthcoming posts I will add more texture to my analysis.


Domestic mine production in China is not allowed to be exported, effectively all output can be added to above ground reserves. The China Gold Association (CGA) wrote on April 28, 2017, that Chinese domestic mine output in the first quarter accounted for 101 tonnes. Lacking the data for the second quarter, makes me estimate mine production from January until June by doubling 101, which is 202 tonnes. By the way, the CGA added:

Gold is a special product with the dual attribute of general commodity and currency. It is the cornerstone of important global strategic assets and the national financial reserve system. It plays an irreplaceable role in safeguarding national financial stability and economic security.

Based on data publicly available, in the first six months of 2017 China net imported at least 506 tonnes into the domestic market and mined 202 tonnes. An addition of 707 tonnes to Chinese private gold reserves.

Chinese Official Gold Purchases

I can be short on PBOC gold purchases: the Chinese central bank does not buy any gold through the SGE – its increments must be treated in addition to all visible flows – and it buys in secret not to disturb the global market. I’ve shared my analysis regarding the PBOC buying gold through proxies in the international over-the-counter (OTC) market for several years on these pages. Although, my reasoning has been confirmed countless times, it’s worth noting it was affirmed once more not long ago.

Early 2017 world renowned gold analyst Jim Rickards was in a meeting with the three heads of the precious metals trading desks of largest Chinese bullion banks. These gold dealers told Rickards that indeed the PBOC does not buy any gold through the SGE. Rickards stated in the Gold Chronicles podcast published January 17, 2017 (at 25:00) [brackets added by Koos Jansen]:

What I [J. Rickards] don’t know is about the Shanghai Gold Exchange sales, they’re pretty transparent, how much of that is private and how much of that is the government [PBOC]. And I was sort of guessing 50/50, 70/30, whatever. What they told me, and these guys are the dealers [the three heads of the precious metals trading desks], it’s 100 % private. Meaning, the government operates through completely separate channels. The government does not operate through the Shanghai Gold Exchange. … None of what’s going on on the Shanghai Gold Exchange is going to the People’s Bank Of China.

In fact, the PBOC uses Chinese banks as proxies to buy gold in countries like the UK, Switzerland and South-Africa after which the metal is transhipped to Beijing. Note, monetary gold shipments do not show up in customs reports of any country.

I haven’t come across any clues in the past months that have changed my estimate on the PBOC’s true official gold reserves. My best substantiated guess still is 4,000 tonnes (in contrast, the PBOC publicly discloses it holds about 1,840 tonnes). For more information on how and when the PBOC stacked up to 4,000 tonnes, continue reading at the BullionStar Gold University by clicking here.

Estimated Total Gold Reserves China 20,000 Tonnes

Let us put the pieces of the puzzle together. We know the PBOC doesn’t buy gold though the SGE, but prior to 2007 the Chinese gold market wasn’t fully liberalized and back then the PBOC was primary dealer in the domestic market. Any PBOC purchases prior to 2007 could have been from Chinese gold mines. What else do we know? China is said to be a gold importer since the 1990s, suggesting domestically mined gold was not exported after, say, 1994. In the next screen shot from the China Gold Market Report 2010 we can read “China has been a gold importer since the 1990s”.

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Exhibit 4. Courtesy China Gold Market Report 2010

For the sake of simplicity, we’ll calculate from 1994 onwards. Precious Metals Insights (PMI) has estimated that 2,500 tonnes of gold jewellery were held by the Chinese population in 1994. Furthermore, I have data on Chinese non-monetary gold import starting in 2001 – which started slowly but ramped up in 2010 (exhibit 2).

In 1994 PBOC official reserves accounted for 394 tonnes and Chinese domestic mine output accounted for 90 tonnes. So, our starting point in 1994 is:

2,500 (jewellery base) + 394 (official reserves) + 90 (mining) = 2,984 tonnes

From here, we can aggregate domestic mine output and net imports for every succeeding year. As stated above, my assumption is that the PBOC sourced its official gold from domestic mines prior to 2007, but shifted these acquisitions to the international market after 2007. The official gold increments in 2001 (105 tonnes) and 2003 (100 tonnes) I’ve subtracted from “aggregate domestic mine output”, the increments in 2009 (454 tonnes) and onwards I did not subtract from “aggregate domestic mine output”.

The previous calculation has resulted in the following chart:

Estimated Total Chinese Gold Reserves June 2017
Exhibit 5. Aggregate net import reflects non-monetary gold.

In the chart the green, blue and grey bars represent private gold reserves, and summed up account for an estimated 16,193 tonnes at the time of writing. The red bars reflect the PBOC’s official gold reserves – I would like to stress this number is speculative – and currently account for 4,000 tonnes. My best estimate as of June 2017 for total above ground gold reserves within the Chinese domestic market is 20,193 tonnes.

Did The Dutch Central Bank Lie About Its Gold Bar List?

Head of the Financial Markets Division of the Dutch central bank, Aerdt Houben, stated in an interview for newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad published in October 2016 that releasing a bar list of the Dutch official gold reserves “would cost hundreds of thousands of euros”. In this post we’ll expose this is virtually impossible – the costs to publish the bar list should be close to zero – and speculate about the far reaching implications of this falsehood. 


This story started a couple of years ago. As I am Dutch and concerned not only about my own financial wellbeing but of my country as well, I commenced inquiring my national central bank about the whereabouts and safety of our gold reserves in late 2013. One of my first actions was submitting the local equivalent of a Freedom Of Information Act – in Dutch WOB – to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) in order to obtain all written communication of the past decades between DNB and the Federal Reserve Bank Of New York (FRBNY). In 2013 I knew a large share of the Dutch gold was stored at the FRBNY, which I deemed to be an unnecessary risk. In a crisis situation, for example, the US government would be able to confiscate Dutch gold stored on American soil. Unfortunately, DNB responded it’s exempt from certain WOB requests under the banking law from 1998, article 3. (I thought the WOB hit a dead end, though recent developments have changed my mind regarding the legitimacy of the rejection. In a forthcoming post more on my WOB from 2013.)

Subsequently, on 21 November 2014 DNB shocked the financial world by announcing it had covertly repatriated 123 tonnes of gold from the FRBNY vaults. Did DNB question the trustworthiness of the FRBNY like myself? Most likely, as I see few other reasons for repatriating, next to losing trust in the international monetary system itself. The gold wasn’t sold in the Netherlands, as our gold reserves have remained unchanged at 612 tonnes since 2008. Apparently DNB felt safer having less gold stored at the FRBNY. Note, the FRBNY offers institutional clients to store gold free of charge, yet DNB favored to ship it home. From the FRBNY website:

The New York Fed charges account holders a handling fee for gold transactions, including when gold enters or leaves the vault or ownership transfers (moves between compartments), but otherwise does not charge fees for gold storage.

In the press release DNB stated repatriating gold “may have a positive effect on public confidence”. Suggesting the Dutch public – or central bank or government – does not have full faith in the FRBNY as a custodian.

Exhibit 1. Locations Dutch gold before and after 21 November 2014.

My focus on the Dutch gold, in a way partially mine as our official gold reserves are not owned but merely managed by DNB, was sharpened in 2015. On 26 September of that year I visited the Reinvent Money conference in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. One of the speakers was Jacob De Haan from DNB’s Economics and Research Division. In his presentation, De Haan repeatedly emphasized the importance of transparency in central banking.

De Haan DNB 2015
Exhibit 2. Slide by Jacob De Haan DNB, Reinvent Money conference 26 September 2015. Red frame added by Koos Jansen.

Through my WOB experience, however, DNB appeared to be not transparent at all. Thereby, if DNB wants to be transparent and boost public confidence, why doesn’t it publish a gold bar list? The publication of this list would provide one of the most important checks on the existence of the Dutch official gold reserves, as the list can then be cross checked with the inventory lists of gold ETFs and alike, possibly exposing multiple titles of ownership on single gold bars. And this act of transparency could be accomplished within minutes by uploading an excel sheet to the DNB website. When I approached De Haan after the conference and asked why DNB doesn’t put out a gold bar list, he offered me he would look into it. He gave me his email address and we agreed to stay in touch.

Jan de Haan dnb
Exhibit 3. 26 September 2015 at the Reinvent Money conference. On the left Jacob De Haan, on the right in the orange sweater Koos Jansen.

Many months pasted, but after countless emails and phone calls DNB finally notified me it would not publish any gold bar list. So much for transparency! The following is what DNB wrote me on 11 August 2016 as the reason not to publish:

…we do not intend to publish a gold bar list. This serves no additional monetary purpose to our aforementioned transparency policy, however it would incur administrative costs.

Administrative costs? There hardly could be administrative costs as this list should be readily available in one or more spreadsheets, I reckoned. When confronting DNB with my logic they replied on 15 August 2016:

DNB has internal gold bar lists, however the conversion of internal lists to documents for publication would create too many administrative burdens.

DNB claims to have “internal lists”, but creating “documents for publication” would create too many administrative burdens. I couldn’t believe it. The only way this excuse would hold was if DNB’s internal lists are non-digital, which then need to be either physically copied or manually inserted in spreadsheet software. However, it’s highly unlikely DNB doesn’t have a digital gold bar list in this day and age. Computers have been widely used since the eighties; that’s more than thirty years ago. One the first applications that computers supported were spreadsheet programs designed for accounting.

Roughly 65 % of the international reserves of the Netherlands are held in gold. Would DNB still keep their precious gold records on pieces of paper?

In my professional opinion the Dutch gold must be meticulously recorded in digital documents and thus publishing a bar list should cost nothing. But showing proof will strengthen my perspective. Up till now this post has been more or less a summary of my previous writings. Down below we’ll zoom in on this material, and reveal why it’s virtually impossible for DNB to gain any administrative burdens for publishing a gold bar list.

The Dutch Gold Is Fully Allocated

Let us establish the Dutch gold is fully allocated. According to the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), which sets the global gold wholesale standards, gold held in allocated accounts is [brackets added by Koos Jansen]:

Allocated Accounts: These are accounts held by dealers [/custodians] in clients’ names on which are maintained balances of uniquely identifiable bars of metal ‘allocated’ to a specific customer and segregated from other metal held in the vault. The client has full title to this metal with the dealer holding it on the client’s behalf as custodian.

Clients’ holdings will be identified in a weight list of bars showing the unique bar number, gross weight, the assay or fineness of each bar and its fine weight. 

Clearly, allocated accounts contain uniquely identifiable gold bars owned by one specific client.

DNB discloses the Dutch official gold reserves position according to the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual version 6 (BPM6). From DNB [brackets added by Koos Jansen]:

De Nederlandsche Bank [DNB] publishes the balance of payments statistics according to the sixth edition of the Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6) since October 2014.

More from DNB:

The figures for the Netherlands have been adjusted for the period since 2008.

BPM6 forces national authorities to distinguish between gold bullion and unallocated accounts, of which gold bullion can be held in allocated accounts. The German central bank wrote in June 2014 on adopting BPM6  [brackets added by Koos Jansen]:

The new rules are binding for the EU member states [which includes the Netherlands] by virtue of a Council regulation amended by the European Commission.

With regard to reserve assets, gold transactions and positions will in future be subdivided into [1] gold bullion, which includes gold bars and allocated gold accounts, and [2] gold receivables, to which no specific gold holdings are assigned [unallocated accounts].

In the next chart we can see the ratio between gold bullion and unallocated accounts of all the Eurosystem’s national central banks. The data has been sourced from the German central bank, as the BundesBank’s website has the most user friendly interface. The Netherlands is said to hold 100 % in gold bullion.

Official Gold Reserves Eurosystem May 2017
Exhibit 4. The Eurosystem’s official gold reserves. The exact accounting structure of BPM6 on unallocated accounts is beyond the scope of this post.

When asked directly, DNB replied all the Dutch official gold is indeed fully allocated. Accordingly, there should be lists from all custodians that show the uniquely identifiable gold bars owned by the Dutch state, as stipulated by LBMA guidelines.

Screen Shot 2017-07-14 at 3.25.15 PM
Exhibit 5. In red it sates, “I can inform you the Dutch gold is in physical form, ‘gold bullion’ and thus allocated. In the data you can clearly see the Dutch have no gold swaps or receivables, as this would be unallocated.” Jan Nieuwenhuijs and Koos Jansen are one and the same.

Displayed above in exhibit 1, the Dutch gold is mainly stored abroad. Since November 2014 the breakdown by location is as follows: 31 % in Amsterdam at DNB headquarters, 31 % in New York at the FRBNY, 20 % in Ottawa at the Bank Of Canada (BOC) and 18 % in London at the Bank Of England (BOE).

The BOE And FRBNY Provide Clients A Gold Bar List In Digital Format

I’ve inquired at the BOE if they furnish clients digital gold bar lists that comply with LBMA standards (more specific, with Annex H of the LBMA’s Specifications for Good Delivery Bars and Application Procedures for Listing), and if clients are allowed to physically audit their precious metals at the BOE vaults. Brendan Manning of the Public Enquiries Group responded:

Screen Shot 2017-07-15 at 11.59.37 AM
Exhibit 6.
Screen Shot 2017-07-15 at 12.00.11 PM
Exhibit 7.

We can read the BOE claims to provide clients a digital gold bar list that complies with Annex H of the LBMA’s Specifications for Good Delivery Bars and Application Procedures for Listing, and clients are permitted to inspect their gold at the BOE.

When approached with the same questions, the custodian bank in New York replied it couldn’t comment on this subject. However, there is a bar list of gold stored at the FRBNY in the public domain. For the Gold Reserve Transparency Act (2011, not enacted) the US Treasury published two gold bar lists. The first list in excel sheet format covers the US official gold stored at Fort Knox, Denver and West-Point, which aggregates to 7,715 tonnes (click to download the list). The second list in PDF format covers the US gold stored at the FRBNY, which accounts for 418 tonnes (click to download the list starting on page 128). Below is a screenshot of the FRBNY list:

Screen Shot 2017-07-22 at 9.39.58 AM
Exhibit 8. Screenshot of the US gold bar list from the FRBNY.

As shown the FRBNY list fully complies with LBMA standards: included is refinery brand, unique serial/melt number, gross weight, fineness, fine weight and year of manufacturing.

At the bottom of exhibit 8 we read the original document name is “FRBNY Schedule of Inventory of Gold Held.xlsx“. The extension of the document name “.xlsx” means the file was created by Microsoft Excel software, which is the most commonly used spreadsheet application. So, either, the FRBNY keeps its bar lists in excel sheets, or is capable of converting their data to excel format.

Kindly remember the US official gold reserves are owned by the US Treasury, not by the FRBNY. We may conclude the FRBNY is able to provides its clients, such as the US Treasury, gold bar lists in electronic format. There should be no problem whatsoever if DNB would ask the FRBNY for the Dutch gold bar list in excel format.

The Bank of Canada didn’t reply to my inquiries, but it doesn’t matter at this point. It should be clear gold custodians keep their books electronically and fully comply with LBMA standards.

I did find a hint of how the BOC operates. In 1997 Professor Duncan McDowall and his team investigated all gold dealings by the BOC from 1935 until 1956 to evaluate if some of the gold stored in Ottawa had ever been intertwined with Nazi gold. McDowall’s investigation is titled “Due Diligence: A report on the Bank of Canada’s handling of foreign gold during World War II“. One of the professor’s observations with respect to the BOC’s historical documents reads [brackets added by Koos Jansen]:

Fiduciary obligation is similarly represented in the Bank’s [BOC] written dealings with its clients: the entitlement of any client to have a written confirmation of the disposition of the assets they have placed in the care of a bank. A good example of such an obligation in the context of this report would be the regular production of account statements that provided foreign central banks [i.e. DNB] with precise month-end and year-end reckonings of their earmarked gold holdings [allocated accounts] in Ottawa. … Currency Division’s reports on the arrival and departure of gold to and from these accounts therefore provided a meticulous record of foreign clients’ dealings with the Bank.

Even the BOC’s gold books from before the war appeared to be impeccable. I assume the BOC’s current custodial gold bookkeeping is as precise and meticulous now as it was then

DNB Is Likely To Maintain A Gold Bar List in Digital Format

Which leaves us to speculate if DNB itself, as the fourth custodian, holds a digital bar list of the 190 tonnes stored in Amsterdam. Allow me to share why I think they do.

The fact DNB repatriated 123 tonnes in November 2014 from New York, shows they’ve revived their affinity with gold. Few central banks have brought their gold home in recent years, which clearly makes DNB a physical gold advocate. No matter how you look at it, this can’t be denied.

While repatriating DNB took the opportunity to upgrade its vault room at the Frederiksplein in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Have a look at the DNB gold vault shelving system prior to November 2014 in the picture below:

DNB gold 2013
Exhibit 11. DNB gold vault prior to November 2014.

Now have a look at the new shelving system at the Frederiksplein. This next picture was taken after November 2014:

DNB gold vault
Exhibit 12. DNB gold vault after November 2014.

Obviously, DNB made the structures more robust by switching from wooden shelves to what looks to be iron. DNB consulted the BOE for a new shelving system as the BOE has an identical system since many years prior to 2014. Have a look at a photo from the BOE’s gold vault below:

BOE gold vault
Exhibit 13. BOE gold vault prior to November 2014.


  • DNB repatriated 123 tonnes, worth roughly 22 billion euros, from the FRBNY somewhere in the months prior to November 2014, exposing a deep and renewed affinity with gold.
  • DNB must have received a digital list from New York with the bars transported, as we know the FRBNY keeps its records in an electronic configuration.
  • While repatriating DNB consulted with the BOE for a robust shelving system in order to upgrade the vault room in Amsterdam, which reaffirms DNB’s careful attention for the gold they store.

Judging from the actions above I dare to say DNB had meticulously, and thus electronically, inventoried the 67 tonnes already stored in Amsterdam before November 2014, or registered this metal when the batch from New York arrived. So very likely all gold stored in Amsterdam is properly recorded in digital format.

A summary of the previous three chapters before we continue:

  1. All the Dutch official gold reserves are held in allocated accounts and thus there are bar lists available, which comply with LBMA standards, from all custodians.
  2. We may conclude all custodians save and distribute their bar lists electronically.

Het Financieele Dagblad

Meanwhile, I was interviewed by Het Fiancieele Dagblad, the Dutch version of the Financial Times, on 27 September 2016 for a weekend special on gold. In the interview I told two FD journalists about my views on gold and my curious encounters with DNB. The next day one of the journalists wrote me he would interview Aerdt Houben, Head of DNB’s Financial Markets Division, for the same gold special and invited me to share what I would ask Houben in his seat. I wrote back I would inquire about the gold bar list and if DNB had ever physically audited all the Dutch gold, among other topics.

In Het Financieele Dagblad (FD) from 28 October 2016 the interview with Houben reads:

FD: Some people are worried the Dutch gold might be gone.

Houben: To a certain degree the people should have trust in us. We are transparent about how much gold we hold and the locations.

FD: Are there any reports and bar lists on this, if so: why aren’t those public?

Houben: The content of the reports is also being checked by our accountants for our annual report. But the gold bar lists that would costs hundreds of thousands of euros. Because many people would have to check the contents and the many updates that are required.

In part Houben said the same as DNB mailed me months before, while specifying the administrative burdens would be several hundreds of thousands of euros. By now we know this is a fallacy.

Regarding the “reports” as mentioned in the FD: according to Houben these “reports” (whatever they are) are checked by DNB’s accountants for the annual report and presumably should proof the existence of the Dutch gold. However, in DNB’s annual report 2016 there is no mentioning of such gold related “reports”, or any gold auditing for that matter. What are these “reports”? And in case these are audit reports, why aren’t those public?

Let’s address the arguments for DNB’s excuse in the FD: “because many people would have to check the contents and the many updates that are required” . This is nonsense. For a proper audit, indeed, the bar lists would have to be checked against the physical inventory at the BOE, FRBNY, BOC and DNB. But, if the Dutch gold is audited by now, what additional checks would have to be done for publishing the bar list? Neither are any “updates” required as everything has been allocated since 2008. All DNB’s justifications have fallen apart.

I asked DNB in November 2016 by email, what exactly are the “reports” mentioned in the FD special, and why can’t DNB publish the gold bar list as provided by the BOE (the one custodian openly stating to provide clients a bar list)? DNB replied [brackets added by Koos Jansen]:

Screen Shot 2017-07-21 at 8.53.48 PM
Exhibit 14.

In the red frame it reads:

In response to your messages I can inform you DNB has internal overviews of her gold possessions. These are being checked by external accountants [presumably this means the Dutch gold is audited]. As stated previously, DNB considers publishing a gold bar list to serve no monetary purpose. Thereby, creating a bar list for publication would be costly regarding the different formats delivered by our custodians. This means we will not respect your request for obtaining the gold bar list.

I presume DNB tries to communicate the gold has been audited, but how does one audit gold without a gold bar list that complies with LBMA standards? Only when cross checking bars with an inventory list that discloses all physical characteristics of the bars can audits be performed competently. Bar lists that comply with LBMA standards are indispensable for a physical audit.

Relying on audit documents (“reports“?) drafted by custodians is forgery. A physical audit has to be executed by a third party (not the owner and not the custodian). Common practise in the gold industry is to count 100 % and weigh 2 % of all bars at least once a year for an audit (source Bureau Veritas).

I don’t believe it would take DNB any effort to convert the different list formats by its custodians. It’s all digital and can be converted into one file within seconds. (Though publishing the bar list in different formats is fine too.)

By and by, publishing a gold bar list does serve a monetary purpose as it confirms how much monetary gold as nation truly holds. Without public bar lists countries can more easily create false data.

Sadly, in the email dated 5 January 2017 (exhibit 14) DNB told me it won’t reply to me anymore with respect to their bar list.

In the Tweet above it reads in Dutch:

Secrets. In the past a central bank was proud of it. Nobody was allowed to know how much gold we had and where it was stored. But the age of central banks cherishing their image of a closed fortress is long gone. Openness is our new policy.


The question is, who’s not telling the truth here? That would be DNB, for sure, and possibly also the BOE and FRBNY.

Just to be clear, the amount of gold leased out by DNB is nil. In 2012 the Dutch Minister Of Finance, De Jager, declared in congress DNB had ceased all gold leasing activities by 2008.

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Exhibit 15. Kamervragen 2012. In red, De Jager states, “No. DNB has notified me it ceased lending gold in 2008.”
Gold Bullion vs Unallocated Accounts The Netherlands
Exhibit 16. Gold bullion vs unallocated accounts for the Netherlands. Since January 2013 the Dutch state holds solely gold bullion.

Again, all the Dutch gold is allocated, and yet DNB declared in a newspaper the bar list can’t be published because it would cost “hundreds of thousands of euros - this has appeared to be an embarrassing statement and truly blows DNB’s credibility. If DNB doesn’t wish to disclose its bar list, for whatever reason, it would have done wise not to comment at all on this issue.

But why all the nonsense? Time to speculate. We’ll run through a few scenarios:

Scenario 1) Publishing a bar list might limit DNB’s future flexibility to intervene in financial markets. Currently, DNB hasn’t got any gold leased out. But if the bar list would be published, my central bank would be obstructed in future covert leasing activities.

Suppose, the gold price spikes in five months from now. DNB, or multiple central banks in concert, decide to lease out monetary gold in order to calm the physical market. When the leases would be undone several years later, surely the bars returned will not be the ones lend out. Following this scenario, when a bar list is published now it would be inaccurate in a few years time; showing bars that are long gone, and can show up on private gold ETF inventory lists.

If readers question wether central bankers are capable of ‘not telling the truth’, consider what DNB’s Governor said in an interview early 2012 when asked if he would repatriate any gold from the FRBNY. His answer was firm: “No”. However, shortly after, DNB started to prepare repatriating by reinforcing its headquarters. A new security barrier was constructed around the compound. DNB confirmed to me this was done to prevent any trucks from crashing the building. Likely, the Governor ‘did not tell the truth’ in the interview for strategic reasons.

Scenario 2) It’s possible the BOE claims to provide its clients gold bar lists and auditing rights, but in reality it doesn’t. Meaning, DNB doesn’t have a bar list from the BOE that complies with LBMA standards, which forces them to come up with excuses whenever confronted. This scenario could mean custodial gold at the BOE (and FRBNY) has been embezzled.

In 2016 economist Guillermo Barba pressured the Banco de México to publish a gold bar list of the Mexican gold stored at the BOE. In February 2017 Banco de México delivered Barba a list, but it didn’t satisfy LBMA standards by far. Surely this was done on purpose, because how the list was distributed can never have been how the BOE keeps it. So prior to distribution parts of the list were edited. Barba pressured Banxico once more and received a new list in March 2017 (click here to download the list). But neither did the new list satisfy LBMA standards! The column in the list that reads “serial number“, doesn’t disclose the serial numbers physically inscribed on the bars, which makes them uniquely identifiable, but shows the BOE’s internal numbering. In my opinion Barba was fooled twice by Banxico. Or Banxico was fooled twice by the BOE.

In July 2014 the Australian central bank (RBA) published its bar list of gold stored at the BOE due to intense efforts by gold blogger Bullion Baron. But alas, the RBA gold bar list does not disclose unique serial numbers (click here to download).

My colleague Ronan Manly tried to obtain a gold bar list from the Irish central bank (CBI); gold stored at the BOE. The CBI’s first response was:

The record concerned does not exist or cannot be found after all reasonable steps to ascertain its whereabouts have been taken, …

Your request was referred to two divisions within the Central Bank of Ireland, … Both divisions have confirmed that they do not hold any such records which fall within the scope of this part of your request. Accordingly, this part of your request is refused.

Eventually, after the BOE tried to block the request from CBI, Manly was duped with this file. All it really contains is a bar total and the total in fine ounces:

Screen Shot 2017-07-22 at 1.31.01 PM
Exhibit 17. Central bank of Ireland’s gold account at the BOE.

As far as I know, there has never been a serial number of a gold bar stored at the BOE released in the public domain. It can be the BOE is routinely deceiving its clients by distributing incomplete bar lists.

In the past, the central bank of Austria (OeNB) has failed to audit its gold at the BOE. The Austrian Court of Audit (Der Rechnungshof) wrote in a report in 2015 [brackets added by Koos Jansen]:

… the gold depository contract with the depository in England [BOE] contained deficiencies. With respect to the gold reserves stored abroad, internal auditing measures were lacking.

The OeNB had no appropriate concept to perform audits of its gold reserves. …

Was the OeNB blocked entrance from BOE vaults in 2015?

There is proof FRBNY clients have not been able to audit their gold in New York, at least not in 2007. The German Bundes Rechnungshof released a report in 2012 on the safety of the German gold abroad. Although the report is heavily redacted, on page 10 we read German auditors were not allowed entrance in the FRBNY gold vault to inspect their precious metals, nor were any other clients:

A possibility for the owners to physically record the holdings of their gold is not provided in the terms and conditions. According to the FRBNY, it’s a long-term practice not to allow the owners to inspect their assets in the interest of a safe working and control process. It has confirmed to the Bundesbank that these conditions for gold custody also apply to all other clients that store gold at the FRBNY.

In response to repeated requests from the internal auditors of the Bundesbank, their representatives were given the opportunity to enter the vault system in June 2007 to get an impression of the safety precautions. However, the employees were not given access to the vault compartments, but only to an entrance hall. An examination of gold was therefore not possible.

[Four redacted paragraphs follow]

Clearly the Germans were blocked from auditing their metal, and for decades all FRBNY clients had suffered the same fate.

Not surprisingly, after the developments between the OeNB, BOE, Bundesbank and FRBNY both European central banks decided to repatriate significant shares of their gold stored overseas. And both repatriate over the course of multiple years, which accentuates the friction between the custodians and their clients.

Exhibit 18. Why OeNB hasn’t repatriated 140 tonnes of gold from the UK within a few months is a mystery.

Maybe DNB has experienced the same obstructions in New York as the Germans and hence decided to repatriate.

Scenario 3) DNB just doesn’t feel like publishing a gold bar list.

Who’s to say what the truth is? If readers can think of an additional scenario please comment below.

My final conclusion is that DNB is lying about its gold bar list, which is worrisome as it shouldn’t be necessary, or things behind the scenes are more convoluted and DNB is being lied to by its custodians, which is even more worrisome.

In short, producing a bar list that complies with LBMA standards should be child’s play. And only proper lists can grant us the safety of all the official gold reserves stored at the BOE and FRBNY. As of March 2017 the BOE and FRBNY stored an aggregated 10,821 tonnes of gold, of which the majority is monetary gold.

The Bundesbank, OeNB and DNB all claim their gold is audited by now, but none of them has ever released an audit report. The German central bank wrote me it doesn’t publish its audit reports “since Deutsche Bundesbank and its partners have agreed to maintain confidentiality with regard to the audits”. More secrecy and central bank collusion, no surprises there.

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Exhibit 19. Email by BuBa’s press division.

Until central bankers are fully transparent about their gold dealings we can have but mere distrust in them.

US Mint Releases New Fort Knox “Audit Documentation”. The First Critical Observations.

In response to a FOIA request the US Mint has finally released reports drafted from 1993 through 2008 related to the physical audits of the US official gold reserves. However, the documents released are incomplete and reveal the audit procedures have not been executed proficiently. Moreover, because the Mint could not honor its promises in full the costs ($3,144.96 US dollars) of the FOIA request have been refunded.

Thanks to my readers that donated to the crowdfunding campaign I’ve been able to force the US Mint through a Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request to hand over documents related to the physical audits of the US official gold reserves stored at the Mint; also referred to as Deep Storage gold. Although the PDF-package digitally sent to me is redacted, incomplete, includes pages copied twice and materials I didn’t ask for, it’s the closest thing that I’ve ever seen to physical audit documentation of gold at Fort Knox and the other Mint depositories drafted in between 1993 and 2008.

What is worrying is that the reports now in my possession reveal the audit procedures have not competently been executed. Combine that with the fact the documents are incomplete and redacted, and the result is suspicion of fraud. In this blog post we’ll have a first critical look at the reports and the problems to be found within.

This post is a sequel to A First Glance At US Official Gold Reserves Audits, Second Thoughts On US Official Gold Reserves Audits, US Government Lost 7 Fort Knox Gold Audit ReportsThe Power Of The Gold Community: Crowdfunding For FOIA Request Fort Knox Audit Documents Completes Within 24 Hours, Dear US Mint, We Gave You The FOIA Funds, Now Give Us The Fort Knox Audit Documents! Also related are Where Did The Gold In Fort Knox Come From? and Former US Mint Director Clueless On Gold In Fort Knox.

US Government Tight-Lipped About Fort Knox Audits

For starters, allow me to expand on what I think happened at the Mint’s headquarter on the 8th floor at 801 9th Street NW Washington DC, before these documents were sent to me.

It should be clear that the US Treasury (owner of the gold), US Mint (main custodian), Federal Reserve Bank Of New York (second custodian), and the Office Inspector General of the US Treasury (head auditor), are reluctant to disclose information about the audits of the gold at the four largest depositories that store over 8,000 fine metric tonnes. Consider that the most seasoned gold analysts aren’t even aware this gold is audited.

About a year ago we read in the introduction of an interview with world-renowned gold commentators Jim Rickards, “unlike many today, Jim Rickards believes the gold is indeed in Fort Knox but has not been audited to avoid drawing attention to it and to downplay its role”. More recently, on 11 February 2017 the Financial Times wrote, “much of the world’s excavated gold is thought to be in Fort Knox, but nobody can be sure, since the US government will not allow the auditors in”.  No, auditing Fort Knox is not a topic only the mainstream media are confused about. Gold advocates are in the dark as well.

US official gold reserves
Exhibit 0. Source. Overview of the four main depositories that store the US official gold reserves: Denver, Fort Knox, West point and the Federal Reserve Bank Of New York. Where the working stock is exactly located is not known (likely Washington DC, Philadelphia and West Point; perhaps also Denver and San Francisco). The Deep Storage gold is the metal in 42 sealed compartments spread over Denver, Fort Knox and West Point.

What nobody knows is that according the US government 100 per cent of the Deep Storage gold has been audited in between 1974 and 2008 (page 4). This period can be divided in two chapters: the first runs from 1974 until 1986 when the Committee for Continuing Audit of the U.S. Government-owned Gold verified the majority of the Deep Storage metal. The second chapter covers 1993 until 2008 when the residual was examined under the supervision of the Office Inspector General of the US Treasury. In my previous posts on this subject we focused on the first chapter, what is written below skims the surface of the second. As promised, eventually I will publish a full in-depth analysis of all chapters (there are additional chapters in the fifties, from 1986-1993, in 2009, 2010 and 2011).

Over the years my inquiries at the US government though regular channels have produced little intelligence about the physical audits of the Deep Storage gold. Some departments cooperated at first, but eventually they stopped replying emails or just hang up the phone while I was talking. The second layer of defense was raised when I started submitting FOIAs. Instead of honoring my requests they tried to delay and dodge most appeals. Clearly, the US government prefers not to answer my questions than to flaunt with the audit results.

However, in 2016 I embraced the motivation to push through and find out how many gold bars were counted, weighed and assayed in between 1993 and 2008, when allegedly the last series of physical audits was conducted. Not surprisingly, zero US government departments could provide me the information I was looking for, but through certain FOIAs I obtained leads to submit new FOIAs, and so on 12 Augustus 2016 I demanded, inter alia, the “memoranda submitted by the US Mint Director’s representative regarding audits of the Mint Schedule of Custodial Gold and Silver Reserves to the Chief Financial Officer drafted from 1993 through 2008”. The Mint replied this request would costs me $3,144.96 dollars because it would take 40 hours to search the respective documents, 8 hours for review, and additional costs would be incurred to duplicate 1,200 pages. I thought this was hogwash – 1,200 pages seemed out of proportion for such memoranda, how hard can it be to find a few pages and how did they know it were going to be 1,200 pages if they had to search 40 hours for it – but decided to start a crowdfunding campaign to collect the money.

Within 24 hours the campaign was completed and late August 2016 I sent the Mint a check, in the hopes to receive the documents a.s.a.p.. After the Mint pretended the check was missing for a few weeks, they communicated on 28 September 2016 the funds had arrived and they were working to get the requested documents out to me (exhibit 1).

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Exhibit 1. Screenshot email form the US Mint (Jones, Lateau). My FOIA request was originally dated from 1 August 2016, but was revised on 12 August 2016. Jan Nieuwenhuijs is my real name.

Months past but nothing happened. I sent several emails and called the Mint three times, but time and time again I was maintained with false excuses. Then, finally, on 23 December 2016 the Mint delivered the documents I paid for. Sort of. Instead of 1,200 pages I received 223 redacted pages that contained 68 pages of reports I didn’t ask for and 21 pages that were copied twice. Effectively, I got 134 pages related to my FOIA request.

When I confronted the Mint I paid $3,144.96 dollars for a meager 134 pages they agreed the costs had been estimated to high and a refund was reasonable. Actually, they told me they never cashed the check. So, quickly I told my bank to cancel the check and ordered my crowdfunding platform to refund all my donors.

As of now all donors to my crowdfunding campaign should have received their money back (if not, please write me an email, see below for my address). From the bottom of my heart I would like to thank everyone for the loan that made this operation possible1!

For me a slight doubt remained if the Mint had tried to fend me off by asking a disproportionate amount of money for a few pages that I assume are alphabetically archived, or that they handled my case in all honesty. A skeptical mind would think the former. To find out I read the internal emails of the Mint employees that handled my FOIA. Those are not directly publicly available, but I was told a trick by more experienced FOIA scholars that reached out to me after I published my previous blog posts on this subject, to ask the Mint for internal emails through, what else, a Freedom Of Information Act request (exhibit 2).

FOIA mint emails gold
Exhibit 2. FOIA asking to obtain email correspondence written or received by Mint employees that was related to my case.

And it worked! On 10 January 2017 I received all (I hope) emails from the Mint I was looking for. Including one wherein Audit Liaison at the United States Mint Tom Noziglia makes an estimate for the costs of my FOIA request of 12 August 2016. Read below (exhibit 3).

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Exhibit 3. Email by Noziglia to Saunders-Mitchell, Grimsby and Fletcher.

At first sight it seems Noziglia and his office stick to prudent protocols. But possibly this email is a veil, meant to deceive me if I would ever read it. Actually, yes, I think it’s a cloak and I’ll share my theory.

Let’s study Noziglia’s LinkedIn page:

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Exhibit 4. Screen shot LinkedIn page Tom Noziglia. Note, we can read he’s a schooled psychologist that was unemployed from 1985 until 2012 after which he started as auditor at the US Mint. I count 5 typos on this page, which suggests Noziglia is not the most meticulous auditor.

We can read from Noziglia, “as Audit Liaison at the US Mint, I [Noziglia] am responsible for the coordination of all external audit initiatives … I have extensive experience in precious metal inventory, … I … coordinate the execution of the annual OIG [Office Inspector General] Joint Seal Inspection of the Custodial Gold at the US Mint”. This page tells us Noziglia is one of the auditors of the US official gold reserves. So, the email above (exhibit 3) was written by the auditor who was involved in the procedures of which I requested the documentation. Noziglia must have known my inquiry could be simply honored by sending just a few pages of documentation, as he was a co-author of the documents in question.

Firstly, with the benefit of hindsight we know Noziglia was lying in his email because by now I have the documents that count only 134 pages, and he was the coordinator of the annual inspections of custodial gold at the Mint. He must have known there were no “1,200 pages in 80 boxes” and so his $2640.00 dollar estimate is a hoax. I think Noziglia wrote the email expecting I would NOT pay the ludicrous amount of dollars, but possibly DID submit a new FOIA to view the Mint’s internal emails. Chances are slim someone could pay $3,144.96 dollars right? But I’m not the first who submits an additional FOIA to obtain internal emails. Hundreds of people went before me, this is a well-known trick for FOIA pundits, and many public servants in the US must be aware of this hazard. Hence I reckon public servants consciously write emails to colleagues, as if these will be publicly released some day. I’ve come to understand submitting and answering FOIAs is nothing but a cat and mouse game.

Second, the Mint never cashed the check. If they really thought they would have to search 40 hours, why not cash the check immediately and get busy? I guess they knew very well there was no searching required.

Third, in case Noziglia had never seen a “memoranda submitted by the US Mint Director’s representative regarding audits of the Mint Schedule of Custodial Gold and Silver Reserves to the Chief Financial Officer”, which is not likely but let’s give him the benefit of the doubt, he could have viewed the most recent version at his office that wasn’t sent to the National Archives (NARA) yet. By doing so he would have learned very effectively these annual memoranda count only a few pages.

Fourth, Noziglia states in his email (exhibit 3) he’s not sure if he will find the documents at all. But this is impossible because he’s a dedicated Mint auditor so he must know what documents the Mint sends to NARA every year. In addition, there was no need for Noziglia to “order off site” boxes, because he simply could have commanded NARA staff to deliver specific documents – this is common practice.

Fifth, in the CC of Noziglia’s email is Kenyatta Fletcher, who is the Chief of the Accounting Division of the Mint. If, which is a big if, Noziglia didn’t know what I was looking for, Fletcher would’ve known these documents wouldn’t count 1,200 pages. But still I was charged a laughable $3,144.96 dollars.

Sixth, Noziglia’s estimate is $2.640.00 dollars, but I have no emails that clarify why $504.96 dollars were added for a total of $3,144.96 dollars I was charged. This indicates, Mint staff communicated in person or through phone calls to finalize my request, and so could have done likewise to handle it in general. Concluding, Noziglia’s email doesn’t paint the full picture of the internel communication.

Seventh, please read what Noziglia’s colleague Grimsby replied to him after 4 minutes.

Exhibit 5. Email by Grimsby to Noziglia.

“Great email”? Why would Grimsby praise Noziglia for his email? If Grimsby would have written,I agree”, I can understand. But, great email? Perhaps Grimsby meant to write, “great calculation that makes no sense, but is likely deceive an ignorant FOIA requester if he would ever read it!”? It sure looks like it.

My guess is that Noziglia, Grimsby and Saunders-Mitchell met in the hallway in the afternoon of 15 August 2016 and agreed for Noziglia to write a phony email that arrives at an amount of dollars aimed to scare me off. In the email below you can read Noziglia suggested to Grimsby to discuss in person in the afternoon of 15 August 2016 the estimate for the costs.

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Exhibit 5.2. Email by Noziglia to Grimsby 15 August 2016.

So far we’re confirmed, again, that the US gold is held in secrecy. No surprises there. Moving on to the content of the documents.

Audit Documents Released Are Incomplete    

When one walks into a US Mint repository the main barrier will be the door to the vault room. In the case of Fort Knox this a 20-tonne door of which no one person is entrusted with the combination. Once inside the vault room the gold is stored in segregated compartments that are sealed since at least the fifties.

The official narrative is that by 2008 the load of all 42 compartments had been physically audited. Every compartment had been opened, the gold inside counted, weighed and assayed, after which the gold was stacked in an adjacent compartment in the vault room (in several documents it’s described this is the way the gold is physically audited). Subsequently the target compartment door was closed and placed under Official Joint Seal, if during the verification no discrepancies had been found with the Mint’s bullion ledger. In most years until 2008 one or two compartments were opened for a physical bar examination, while the other compartments were merely inspected for any tampering of the Official Joint Seal (OJS). The purpose of joint seals is to avoid the necessity of verifying all assets in each annual audit.

Official Joint Seal protocol drafted in 1975.
Exhibit 6. Official Joint Seal protocol drafted in 1975.

Thus the audits of the Deep Storage gold consist of two conventions: gold verifications, which are the physical audits of gold bars inside the compartments. And OJS inspections, which are checks of the seals placed on the compartment doors. The superintendent in the audit procedures is the Office Inspector General of the US Treasury, in short, the OIG.

When reading the audit documents delivered to me (the Memoranda hereafter) the distinction between gold verifications and OJS inspections is clear. Let me show you an example of Fort Knox. The first screen shots below are from a gold verification at Fort Knox in March 1998.

Gold verification at Fort Knox March 1998, page 1.
Exhibit 7.1. Gold verification at Fort Knox March 1998, page 1.
Gold verification at Fort Knox March 1998, page 2.
Exhibit 7.2. Gold verification at Fort Knox March 1998, page 2.
Gold verification at Fort Knox March 1998, page 3.
Exhibit 7.3. Gold verification at Fort Knox March 1998, page 3. 

The following screen shots are from the OJS inspection at Fort Knox in June 1998. We conclude gold verifications and OJS inspections are performed separately and thus are reported as such.

OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 1.
Exhibit 8.1. OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 1.
OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 2.
Exhibit 8.2. OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 2.
OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 3.
Exhibit 8.3. OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 3.
OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 4.
Exhibit 8.4. OJS inspection at Fort Knox June 1998, page 4.

Click here and here to download all Memoranda sent to me by the US Mint.

After I had organized the documents and imported all data in spreadsheets I noted the 134 pages exclude 27 OJS inspection reports and at least 3 gold verification reports. I’ve asked the Mint to deliver the missing Memoranda, although I’m not expecting them to ever comply.

The fact 30 Memoranda are missing is of course highly problematic. Bear in mind, I offered the Mint $3,144.96 dollars to produce these documents.

Overview gold verification and OJS inspection reports Deep Storage gold
Exhibit 9. Overview gold verification and OJS inspection reports Deep Storage gold. Note, throughout time the Memoranda format changed, so in some years one Memorandum included both gold verification and OJS inspection paragraphs.

In case you’re wondering how I know what gold verifications reports I’m missing, this is because references are made to these physical audits in succeeding gold verification reports. Fort OJS inspection reports, those should be done every year.

Below is an example of an Official Joint Seal. I obtained nearly all OJS copies from a separated FOIA request at the OIG.

OJS Fort Knox compartment 29
Exhibit 10. OJS Fort Knox compartment 29. 

Fort Knox Compartment 31 Was Opened In 1996 For Dubious Reasons

There are a couple of disturbing lines written in the Fort Knox OJS inspection report of 1996. Although for an OJS inspection seals should only be examined for tampering, on 12 August 1996 at the Fort Knox OJS inspection two representatives of the General Accounting Office (GAO) showed up in the vault room and decided to select “a single joint sealed compartment for opening and inspection”.

Fort Knox OJS inspection report 1996.
Exhibit 10. Fort Knox OJS inspection report 1996.

Unfortunately the report doesn’t say what was in the vault compartment; how many bars and fine troy ounces (FTO) it contained. Based purely on this document it would impossible to decipher what the GAO exactly did. However, by combining the info in the 1996 OJS inspection report with documentation obtained through a FOIA requests at the OIG, we do know what happened.

Have another look at exhibit 10. We can read Fort Knox compartment 29 was sealed in 1998. But the content, 19,800 gold bars weighing 6,470,624.049 FTOs before assays samples were taken, was sourced from compartment 31 that was sealed on 12 August 1996. Was compartment 31 the one opened by the GAO in 1996? Yes, without a doubt.

By examining all OJS copies – such as demonstrated in exhibit 10 – it shows there was no other vault segment freshly sealed on 12 August 1996 other than compartment 31. Moreover, the 1996 OJS inspection report mentions only one joint sealed compartment was breached. Therefore we know the GAO representatives opened Fort Knox compartment 31 comprising 19,800 gold bars weighing 6,470,624.049 FTOs on 12 August 1996.

Furthermore, in the 1995 OJS inspection report we read there was one compartment – the number is redacted – that contained 19,800 gold bars weighing 6,470,624.049 FTOs. And in 1995, 1996 and 1997 there were no gold verifications at Fort Knox as far as I know, other than the GAO incident. Have a look below at a screenshot from the 1995 Fort Knox OJS inspection report.

Fort Knox OJS report 1995.
Exhibit 11. Fort Knox OJS report 1995.

What happened is that on 12 August 1996 compartment 31 was opened by the GAO to “check a few bars”, but then two years later in 1998 the same gold was verified by the OIG; all the gold inside taken out of compartment 31, counted, weighed and assayed, to be stored across the hall in compartment 29. This is suspicious. I quote, “the purpose of joint seals is to avoid the necessity of verifying all assets in each annual audit”.

I do not possess the official rules for US Mint OJS inspection and gold verification for the year 1996 (“MD 8H-1”), but based on the rules that prevailed in 1975, what the GAO did on 12 August 1996 was not done. Read with me.

Methods of verifications
Exhibit 12. Source.

My interpretation of the quote above is that if a compartment was opened all assets within should have been verified by the auditors, not just a few bars. If these rules still applied in 1996, what happened in Fort Knox compartment 31 was fraud. Unfortunately, but perhaps no coincidence, the GAO is exempt from FOIAs. On their website we read, “the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act”. (In July 7, 2004, the US GAO’s legal name was changed from the General Accounting Office to the Government Accountability Office.) I’ve submitted a FOIA at the Mint to obtain MD 8H-3 but it bounced. Currently I’m trying the OIG to provide these rules.

How come the GAO could open a compartment? The OIG stated under oath in 2011, “since 1993, when we assumed responsibility for the audit, my office has continued to directly observe the inventory and test the gold” (page 4). If the OIG is responsible how come the GAO could break a seal?

Let’s contemplate this: if the “random checks” the GAO performed in 1996 in compartment 31 formed an adequate gold verification, why did the OIG re-audit the exact same gold in 1998? And what was the intention of the GAO in 1996? The GAO couldn’t fully audit compartment 31, because they were present at Fort Knox only for one day (12 August), and no single person or flock of auditors can verify 19,800 large gold bars in one day. The fact these 19,800 gold bars were re-audited in 1998 underlines what the GAO did in 1996 was inappropriate at best.

One theory is that the gold in compartment 31 was prepared in 1996 to be physically audited down the road. Remember what the Fort Knox gold verification report of 1998 stated (exhibit 7.2)? In 1998 the OIG, “selected predetermined individual bars to be drilled for assay”. Possibly, the OIG selected the exact bars in 1998 that were put in in 1996. If this is true the names and autographs of the perpetrators of this crime are on the seal of compartment 29 (exhibit 10).

My succeeding post on this subject will expose that many other Deep Storage compartments at the Mint have been opened for dubious reasons as well. Which could be the reason the Mint didn’t provide us ALL the OJS inspection reports from Denver and West Point from 1993 through 2003 (exhibit 9).

Weighing Sample Size Remarkably Low

We need to discuss the sample size of the gold verifications. In 1998 at Fort Knox 19,800 gold bars were inspected but only 105 of them were weighed and assayed (exhibit 7.2). That’s not much in my humble opinion. In any case, I expected a higher sample size.

In the 1953 audit at Fort Knox (download report here) in total 88,000 bars weighing 48,506,985 FTOs were counted for verification. About 10 % of those were weighed.

During the Continuing Audits from 1974 through 1986 it seems 2 % of the gold counted was weighed. A huge decline from 1953.

Audit report Fort Knox 1981
Exhibit 13. Audit report Fort Knox 1981.

Although gold bars tested to be out of tolerance during a Fort Knox audit in 1977 at a sample size of 2 %, by 1998 the sample size had been further debased to 0.53 %. I’m not a professional auditor (if you are one please contact me), but common sense suggests that when irregularities are found the sample size should be increased, not decreased.

To make matters worse, in 1999 at West Point the sample size was 0.52 %, and again, a melt appeared to be out of tolerance.

Gold verification report West Point 1999.
Exhibit 14. Gold verification report West Point 1999.

Was the sample size increased after 1999? Not really. At Fort Knox in July 2000 the samples size was 0.65 % (93 bars weighed of 14,262 bars counted). But wait until I show you what numbnuts were entrusted handling the scale for the audits of the world’s greatest gold hoard. 

Scale Didn’t Work, Repeatedly

Let’s study the 2004 physical audit at West Point. Please read:

Exhibit 15.1. Gold verification report West Point 2006.
Exhibit 15.1. Gold verification report West Point 2004.
Exhibit 15.2. Gold verification report West Point 2006.
Exhibit 15.2. Gold verification report West Point 2004.

When all parties tried to reconcile the weight of samples on 22 and 23 July 2004, they found out, “the scale was reading at ounces rather than fine troy ounces”, because, “a setting on the scale had not been properly changed”. Allegedly this is what caused alternative readings in the books of the Director of the Mint’s Representative and the OIG’s Representative. And presumably because nobody could figure out how to use the scale correctly they decided to postpone re-weighing the samples until 24 August 2004. This failure of how to use a scale is a colossal disaster for the credibility of the Deep Storage audit procedures.

In 2004 a mere 71 bars were weighed and assayed, but it appeared that none of the auditors present knew how to rightly use the scale. The Memoranda mentions they found out the scale wasn’t properly functioning when weighing the assay samples, but what about the weighing of the actual bars? What about the weighing of every Deep Storage gold bar under the supervision of the OIG from 1993 until 2008? We have no guarantee this has ever been executed competently.

To repeat, the official explanation for this blunder reads, “the scale was reading at ounces rather than fine troy ounces”, because, “a setting on the scale had not been properly changed”.

First, in my mind there can be no imaginable circumstances in which setting of the scale should have been changed. The scale should read troy ounces to as many decimals all day long. That’s it. Why change the settings?

Second, they say, “the scale was reading at ounces rather than fine troy ounces”, but scales don’t read fine troy ounces so this statement is fake. A scale reads troy ounces, or digital ones can be set to reading grams; it cannot smell what is the purity of the gold and thus display fine troy ounces. That’s what the assay test is for.

In 2008 at West Point a similar disaster happened. Read with me:

Exhibit 16.1. Gold verification report West Point 2008.
Exhibit 16.1. Gold verification report West Point 2008.
Exhibit 16.2. Gold verification report West Point 2008.
Exhibit 16.2. Gold verification report West Point 2008.

The auditors couldn’t clearly read the decimal point. After assay samples were drilled to be taken out, the auditors weighed the same amount of gold granules to replace the samples, in order for the Deep Storage FTOs to remain flat in 2008. But the assay lab, White Sands Missile Range, which is a division of the US Army, found out from the paper work that the weight of the assay samples didn’t match the weight of the granules. And so West Point compartment 10-H had to be re-opened on 22 September 2008 to put an exact 10.346 ounces of gold in, instead of 1.0346 ounces.

What a catastrophe! Be aware that before weighing the granules the auditors weighed 86 gold bars and the assay samples. How do we know they properly weighed the assay samples and the totals of the 86 bars? The short answer is, we don’t.

Thereby, anybody with a sense for gold can see the difference between 10 ounces and 1 ounce of yellow metal.


From the examples above it should be clear that the Deep Storage gold has not been audited by professionals, but the precious metals have been verified by imbeciles. Clearly the scale was repeatedly handled by amateurs, which throws a wrench at the integrity of the entire US official gold reserves auditing project. I’m not at all surprised the US Mint has tried everything to keep the records of the auditors out from the pubic domain. Fortunately most of it will be out in the open eventually. The citizenry of the world deserves to know everything there is about the Deep Storage gold.

Let’s finish with one more comment from the West Point 2006 audit report.

Exhibit 17.1. Gold verification report West Point 2006.
Exhibit 17.1. Gold verification report West Point 2006.

The auditors couldn’t figure how to use the drill to take assay samples (how about pointing the tip to a bar and press the button). They also were oblivious how to calculate fine troy ounces. We must wonder if these people would be capable of tying their own shoelaces. In any case, the fact the US government chose to assign very inexperienced people widely opens the possibility that the audits are a complete hoax.

More will follow…


1. The next list consists of all heros that supported the crowdfunding campaign (mostly Turdites!):

  • @freegoldkiwi
  • A P Marchessini
  • A Turdite
  • André De Wit
  • Andre Page
  • Another Turdite
  • Antoine Schonewille
  • Arkesh Kumar
  • Aron van der Hijden
  • Ben Bernanke
  • Brent Johnson
  • Brian D’Aoust
  • Bullion Baron
  • Cash Only
  • Chad Douma
  • Christian Bergman
  • Christopher Fisher
  • Clifton Poole
  • David Woy
  • David Caron
  • David Corwin
  • Dennis Travers
  • Dr. Dietmar Siebholz
  • ernest williams
  • Fergus Winchester
  • frank cogh
  • G. Roelofs
  • Gold Matters
  • Hans de Vries
  • Henry Young
  • James Hanson
  • James Jackson
  • Jeff Laytham
  • Jeffrey Schnabel
  • jon heitner
  • Kevin Ward
  • kurt hilger
  • Kyle Campbell
  • Lamenting Laverne
  • Leslie Caplan
  • Marc Hayes
  • Marc Ward
  • martin vitrup
  • Matthew Kaiser
  • Matthew Yates
  • Maurice Baxter
  • Micros TFMR
  • Mike Adams
  • miltiade karlos
  • MR S B Griffiths
  • Neil Bottomley
  • Nicholas Lessenevitch
  • Nigel Gittoes
  • nuggety TFMR
  • Percy Stamler
  • Peter Hafkemeyer
  • Philip Roose-Francis
  • Philippe Page
  • Pravit Phongsopa
  • rainer schwarz
  • Randall Louis
  • Random Bastard Turdite
  • Robert Morrison
  • Robert Palardy
  • Ron Koyich
  • Ronald Bendz
  • Ronald Griess
  • Rupert White
  • Russell Wilcoxon
  • Rusty Richards
  • Stephen Griffiths
  • Steve Oleary
  • surfitndearth TFMR
  • Thang Trinh
  • Thomas Nichols
  • Tim Camacho
  • Turd Ferguson
  • vernon shupe
  • Wei-Chih Chen
  • Werner Mueller
  • William Harvey
  • Yusrin Shukri Haji Yakop

China Net Imported 1,300t Of Gold In 2016

For 2016 international merchandise trade statistics point out China has net imported roughly 1,300 tonnes of gold, down 17 % from 2015. The importance of measuring gold imports into the Chinese domestic gold market – which are prohibited from being exported – is to come to the best understanding on the division of above ground reserves in and outside the Chinese domestic market. 

Kindly be advised to have read my posts the Mechanics Of The Chinese Domestic Gold Market. If segments in this post are unclear please click the links provided.

The last bits of data are coming in from the countries that export gold to China, with which we can compute the total the Chinese have imported in 2016. There are four main gold exporters to China, which are Hong Kong, Switzerland, the UK and Australia (it’s not publicly disclosed how much South Africa exports directly to China ). Let’s start discussing the largest gold exporter to China.

Hong Kong

Since 2011 when the gold price slowly started to decline and China embarked importing gold at large, Hong Kong has been the main conduit to the mainland. According to data by the Hong Kong Census And Statistics Department (HKCSD) the special administrative region net exported 771 tonnes of gold to China in 2016, ranking first once again. Net exports were down 10 % compared to 2015.

Hong kOng China gold trade yearly

As I mentioned in November 2016 there were rumors that part of the bullion exports from Hong Kong to China were fake – over-invoiced to move capital out of the mainland – which overstated the flow of gold into China. Let’s investigate if the data by the HKCSD can substantiate this rumor. The net amount of bullion going from Hong Kong to China is the residual of exports (materials lastly fabricated in Hong Kong) plus re-exports (materials not altered in any way, shape or form but merely re-distributed by Hong Kong) minus imports (materials imported into Hong Kong from China through processing trade). If one is to engage in over-invoicing exports from Hong Kong are more suitable than re-exports, because the origin of exports are harder to track. For re-exports the origin of the material must be recognized by the HKCSD, which makes any illegal scheme more difficult to conceal.

Hong Kong China gold monthly

Notable is that from February through August 2016 there was an increase of gold exports relative to re-exports from Hong Kong to China (see dark green bars in the chart above). Usually the shipments from Hong Kong to China are re-exports, so the increase in exports was remarkable. But the HKCSD data is no hard evidence any transfers were overstated.

In another example: if we look at the composition of Hong Kong’s export and re-export to the UK in 2016, we can see something similar, the majority were exports.

Hong Kong UK gold trade

I doubt Hong Kong’s flow of gold to the UK has been overstated; UK residents have no motive to surreptitiously move capital abroad. And if the data on Hong Kong’s shipments to the UK are accurate, why can’t the data on Hong Kong’s shipments to China be accurate? Thereby, the Chinese customs department is not retarded. I’m quite sure the Chinese customs department is aware of over-invoicing schemes and as a consequence it can strictly monitor cross-border gold flows. My conclusion is that net shipments from Hong Kong to China in 2016 have likely been close to 771 tonnes. If I do ever find hard evidence it was less I will report accordingly.


Most likely Hong Kong’s position as the largest gold exporter to China will slowly fade in the coming years, as the State Council is stimulating gold freight to go directly to Chinese cities (hoping the Shanghai International Gold Exchange will eventually overtake Hong Kong’s role as the primary gold hub in the region). Consequently, gold exports to China are increasingly bypassing Hong Kong.

In December 2016 we got a preview of what is about to come: Switzerland net exported an astonishing 158 tonnes directly to China, up 418 % from November 2016, up 168 % from December 2015, and 106 tonnes more than what Hong Kong did.

China Switzerland Hong Kong China gold import export

It will take more time before Hong Kong’s role as supplier to China is fully over though. In the past years a significant part of gold exports to China has been used to quench Chinese jewelry demand. The core of the Chinese jewelry manufacturing industry is located in Shenzhen, which is right across the border from Hong Kong. But as far as I know there aren’t many flights going directly from Switzerland, Australia or the UK to Shenzhen yet. Hong Kong on the other is well connected; so in the near future Hong Kong’s airport is more convenient to supply gold from abroad to Chinese jewelry manufacturers.

Screen Shot 2017-02-13 at 12.50.56 pm

In total the Swiss net exported 442 tonnes directly to China mainland in 2016, up 53 % from 288 tonnes in 2015.

The United Kingdom

Direct gold shipments from the UK to China have been tepid in 2016. Only 15 tonnes have been net exported to the mainland over this time horizon. Noteworthy though, in December 2016 the UK exported 172 tonnes to Switzerland, which in turn moved 158 tonnes to China – as I mentioned in the previous chapter. So although the UK didn’t directly export metal to China in December, it sure was the main supplier.    

Uk gold china switzerland

The gold price and the UK net flow remain correlated.


Not all data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) has been released for 2016, but from what we have Australia seems to have exported less to China than in 2015. From January through September direct shipments amalgamated to 53 tonnes, while Australia directly net exported 78 tonnes to China over the same months in 2015. (ABS has notified me they changed the way how they disclose gold export data, but they failed to clarify the details. Until I get more information I will stick to my own formula to compute Australia’s direct export to China, which was confirmed to be accurate by ABS early 2016.)

It can be Australia’s direct exports where strong in last three months of 2016 as the price of gold went down over this period and the Chinese increase gold purchases on a declining gold price.

Final Notes

Combining gold trade data by Hong Kong, Switzerland, the UK and Australia, reveals China has imported at least 1,281 tonnes in 2016. Though this figure excludes Australia’s exports for October, November and December, so I’m estimating total Chinese gold import will reach roughly 1,300 tonnes.

Largest Gold Exporters to China

According to the data at my disposal there have been practically zero tonnes of gold imported from China by other nations across the globe than the ones discussed above. Signalling there is very little gold being exported from the Shanghai International Gold Exchange (SGEI) located in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. Possibly foreign central banks buy gold on the SGEI and ship it home as monetary gold which doesn’t show up in any customs reports. However, in the history of the SGE/SGEI a mere 3 tonnes has been traded in 12.5 Kg bars, all the rest was in smaller bars, mainly 1 Kg. And I assume central banks would prefer large bars. All in all I think that up till now the SGEI has mainly been used by Chinese banks to import gold from the Shanghai Free Trade Zone into the domestic market.

Weekly Volume 12 Kg Bars Traded On SGE

Total gold supply in China in 2016 was at least 1,753 tonnes (domestic mine output was 453 tonnes plus 1,300 tonnes import) while the China Gold Association discloses consumer demand at 975 tonnes. Meaning, Chinese institutional demand was at least 778 tonnes ( 1,753 minus 975), depending on the amount of scrap supply and disinvestment.

A few weeks ago I estimated Chinese gold import 2016 would aggregate to 1,300 tonnes, to which I calculated 5,000 tonnes of gold have been moved into the Chinese domestic market from 2007 through 2016 on top op the imports to satisfy Chinese consumer demand. In my post The West Has Been Selling Gold Into A Black Hole I explain how I think this will strengthen a forthcoming gold bull market.


Last but not least: SGE withdrawals for January 2017 came in at 184 tonnes, down 18 % from January 2016.

Shanghai Gold Exchange SGE withdrawals January 2017

That’s all folks!

How The West Has Been Selling Gold Into A Black Hole

Kindly be advised to have read my posts The Mechanics Of The Chinese Domestic Gold Market and The Great Physical Gold Supply & Demand Illusion before continuing.

In December 2016 Chinese wholesale gold demand, measured by withdrawals from the vaults of the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE), accounted for 196 tonnes, down 9 % from November. December was still a strong month for SGE withdrawals due to the fact the gold price trended lower before briefly spiking at the end of the month, and the Chinese prefer to buy gold when the price declines (see exhibit 1).

In total Chinese wholesale gold demand reached an astonishing 1,970 tonnes in 2016. But will these huge tonnages bought by China ever have an impact on the gold price? I think it will.

Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 2.

As in previous years, SGE withdrawals were mostly supplied through imports, in 2016 at approximately 1,300 tonnes. And as in previous years, SGE withdrawals were roughly twice the size of Chinese consumer gold demand. The latter is published by all “leading” consultancy firms, such as the World Gold Council and Thomson Reuters GFMS. Because these firms have systematically underreported and eclipsed Chinese gold demand since 2007, a significant share of the financial industry is unaware China has imported 5,000 tonnes in the past years, which is not allowed to be exported. My hypothesis is that this 5,000 tonnes decline in above ground gold reserves outside of the Chinese domestic market will make gold rally stronger in a future bull market than it did in previous bull markets. To the extent many investors are uninformed about the shrinking volume of troy ounces available outside of China, their ignorance will boost any price rally coming.

In this post I would like to share my thoughts on how the gold price is correlated to trade in above ground reserves, and how China has slashed these reserves to the tune of 5,000 tonnes, which will significantly impact the next leg up in gold.

Correlated: The Gold Price And UK Gold Trade

Since many decades large investors in the West set the price of gold. Ever since, the heart of the Western gold wholesale market has been London in the United Kingdom. There is thus a correlation between the gold price and the volume of gold net imported or exported by the UK.

In Asia, on the other hand, gold market participants are more price sensitive, implying they buy low and sell high (the opposite of Western investors). I’ve described this trend frequently on these pages, but the same can be read in books by gold author Timothy Green. In The Prospect For Gold from 1987 Green states:

Exhibit 3. Thank you Nick Laird from Goldchartsrus.com for the book tip!

Before we discuss the connection between Western supply and demand trends to developments in the Chinese gold market of the past decade, let me first recapitulate that global physical gold supply and demand is far in excess of the statistics the World Gold Council and GFMS publish. Below is a chart that shows the quarterly averages of all physical supply and demand categories as disclosed by the World Gold Council from Q1 2002 until Q4 2015. These numbers are more or less the same as figures by GFMS.

Exhibit 4.

We can see that over the course of 13 years, the majority of supply consisted of mine output (73%) and the majority of demand consisted of jewelry consumption (64%).

(Note, the categories official sector, net producer hedging and ETFs can be either supply or demand and volumes can greatly vary per quarter. Though, only in 1 of 52 quarters examined has ETF demand been greater than jewelry consumption (Q1 2009). In all other quarters official sector, net producer hedging and ETFs supply or demand has not been greater than mine output or jewelry consumption.)

If the data by the World Gold Council regarding physical gold supply and demand would be exhaustive, mine output and jewelry consumption should have a positive correlation to each other and the price of gold. But they don’t. Have a look at the next chart.

Exhibit 5.1.

During the bull market from 2002 until 2011 jewelry consumption decreased and it hardly ever transcended mine output. In turn, mine output gradually ascended over this time horizon while the gold price increased six fold! Are the forces between jewelry demand and mine supply driving the medium/long term price of gold? No, clearly not. This shows the data by the World Gold Council is incomplete.

(I should add that mine output does have a correlation to the gold price in the very long term as it can take more than ten years to setup a gold mining project. See the next chart.)

Exhibit 5.2.

In contrast to the data by the World Gold Council, we can observe a strong correlation between the medium/long term gold price and institutional supply and demand flowing through London. View the chart below.

Exhibit 6.

Strangely, institutional supply and demand are categories not included in the World Gold Council’s data – or in any other precious metals consultancy firm’s data that I’m aware of.

Because in the UK there are no refineries, no gold mines and local consumption demand and scrap supply is immaterial, all gold that is visibly (non-monetary) imported and exported must either relate to ETF holdings stored in London, or Western institutional supply and demand. When we compute the ratio between both, ETF flows compound to roughly 35 % of the UK’s net flow (import minus export) and as a consequence approximately 65 % is Western institutional supply and demand. Effectively the majority of the UK’s net flow is Western institutional supply and demand.

Hereby, consider that all supply and demand categories disclosed by the World Gold Council more or less equal each other (exhibit 4), so for the sake of simplicity we‘ll state that total mine output + scrap supply versus jewelry consumption + bar and coin + industrial demand meets outside the UK and doesn’t set the medium/long term price of gold.

The UK’s net flow, on the other hand, is highly correlated to the medium/long term price of gold. Note how nearly every month the change in net flow corresponds with the direction of the gold price (exhibit 6). Less granular, from the moment my data starts in 2005 the UK has been a net importer until 2012 on a rising price of gold. From 2013 until 2015 the UK was a net exporter on a declining price of gold. And in the first quarter of 2016, when the gold price saw its strongest move up since 1986, the UK was a net importer. Coincidence? I think not.

We can conclude that Western institutional supply and demand in above ground gold reserves is driving the medium/long term price of gold. As it’s likely the price of gold could not have gone up from 2002 until 2011 if there had been no UK net imports, and it’s likely the price of gold could not have gone down from 2013 until 2015 if there had been no UK net exports. (Short term the gold price is pushed around in the paper markets.)

We can think of Western institutional supply and demand (the UK net flow) like this: the majority of the gold gross imported into the UK is demand from above ground reserves outside the UK, and the majority of the gold gross exported from the UK is supply to above ground reserves outside the UK. When the UK is a net importer that means there is a net pull on above ground reserves outside the UK, which corresponds to a rising gold price. When the UK is a net exporter the inverse is true.

Here it becomes apparent that the amount of above ground bullion is essential for future price developments.

The Chinese Black Hole

Let’s turn to China. In the introduction I stated China is importing a lot more gold than is known in the financial industry because most investors base their knowledge on data by the World Gold Council. More precise, China has imported 5,000 tonnes from 2007 until 2016 in addition to what the World Gold Council has portrayed through their demand statistics.

Let’s get our minds around this through some charts. As an example, I’ve drawn a chart showing Chinese gold supply and demand for 2015 (last year I have complete data of).

Exhibit 7.

We don’t know every exact data point for China, but we do know GFMS demand (purple) and apparent supply, consisting of domestic mine output (green), scrap supply (yellow) and net import (blue). From here on we’ll use GFMS data, as GFMS publishes scrap supply numbers for China and the World Gold Council doesn’t.

According to GFMS Chinese consumer gold demand in 2015 was 867 tonnes. To meet demand GFMS presents 450 tonnes was domestically mined and scrap supply accounted for 225 tonnes. Indirectly GFMS states China net imported 192 tonnes to complete the supply and demand balance in the Chinese domestic market (exhibit 7). For the additional 1,383 tonnes imported GFMS has floated all sorts of excuses, which I‘ve debunked here and here.

The bottom line is, in addition to the 192 tonnes GFMS reports as imported in 2015 to meet consumer demand, China imported 1,383 tonnes to meet institutional demand and all this metal is not allowed to be exported.

If we repeat the same exercise for every years since 2007, the aggregated net imports by China that have not been included in the statistics by GFMS account for 5,000 tonnes. See the next chart.

Exhibit 8.


You can see now, China has enormously diminished above ground reserves outside of the Chinese domestic market without all investors around the world being fully aware. In my humble opinion this will make the price of gold go up turbo charged next time the West shows interest in the metal.

In The Prospect For Gold Green states:

Exhibit 9.

“Selling gold is not a one way street”, wrote Green in 1987. But guess what. Since a few years – from the moment China became an elephant player in the physical market – selling gold is a one way street! Western sell-offs are transhipped to China but do not return. The global gold game has changed.

Exhibit 10.

The consequence is that there are less above ground reserves outside of China for Western investors to buy in a forthcoming bull market, which will elevate the dollar bid per unit gold – in other words the gold price measured in US dollars per troy ounce.

Courtesy BBC.

Keep in mind, this phenomenon (China importing vast quantities in addition to Chinese consumer gold demand as disclosed by GFMS) has greatly materialized in 2013, when gold entered a bear market after an 11-year run up. In the previous bull market (2002-2012) above ground reserves outside of China had not been slashed yet. So the ramifications of this phenomenon will only be felt during the next leg up.

Is there any proof to substantiate my hypothesis? I think so. Early 2016 there was some renewed interest in yellow metal from large Western investors. When the price of gold started to climb it went practically vertical ending the first quarter of 2016 up 16.7 %, the strongest quarter since 1986. Coincidence? I think not. It went up strong as it did because there were fewer ounces in above ground reserves available.


A study on how much above ground reserves there are outside China will be saved for a future blog post.

China’s Gold Market Opens Up To Boost RMB Internationalization

Last week the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) launched a new English website to offer international customers more information and tools on trading gold in renminbi through its subsidiary in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone the Shanghai International Gold Exchange (SGEI). BullionStar took the opportunity to translate a speech by a Teng Wei, Deputy General Manager of the SGEI, named “How China’s Gold Market Can Help The RMB Achieve International Status” that was held at the Renminbi World summit in Beijing on the 29th and 30th of November 2016. In the speech Teng Wei outlined his vision for the SGEI going forward regarding renmibi (RMB) internationalization, connecting the onshore and offshore renminbi market and increasing gold market share.

My comment before you read the translation:

1) In the financial blogosphere the general perception is that the SGEI has been a failure since it was launched in September 2014. This analysis is based on the assumption that the trading volume of the most popular SGEI contract (1 Kg 9999 – iAu99.99) has been tepid for two years now. But this analysis neglects two important elements.

First, iA99.99 can be traded competitively “on Exchange”, but also in the OTC market. The OTC possibility is hardly known by commentators in the English world, though the related volumes are significant. Have a look at the next chart in which I’ve plotted iAu99.99’s weekly trading volume “on Exchange” and in the OTC market. Clearly iAu99.999 is traded mainly in the OTC market.


Second, international customers of the SGEI can not only trade the SGEI gold contracts, but they can also trade SGE (domestic) gold contracts. Logically, as at present liquidity on the SGE is much higher than on the SGEI, many international customer that seek to trade gold in renminbi, and don’t need to export the metal, will choose to trade SGE gold contracts.

When observing total trading of all SGE(I) gold contracts, there is a clear rise in volume since the SGEI was launched.


Up till now international customers are mainly trading SGE contracts. The significant rise in trading volume of all SGE(I) contracts since September 2014 is due to the inception of the International Board (SGEI). In the second week of November 806 tonnes was traded on the SGE(I), the highest amount ever.

So the launch of the SGEI has not been a failure in my opinion – it has elevated gold trading in (offshore) renminbi.

For more information please read my post The Workings Of The Shanghai International Gold Exchange or have a look at the graph below.

International customers can trade domestic contracts but are not allowed to withdraw the metal from the vaults (and export).

2) Teng Wei mentions that in 2015 gold demand in China and India was 985 and 849 tonnes respectively. In the case of China this refers only to consumer demand, not institutional demand. Chinese consumer and institutional demand in 2015 combined was well north of 2,000 tonnes.

For more information please read my post Spectacular Chinese Gold Demand 2015 Fully Denied By GFMS And Mainstream Media.

3) A gold exchange doesn’t flourish overnight. The SGE was launched in 2002; in that year its total trading volume was 22 tonnes and withdrawals accounted for 16 tonnes. Ten years later total trading volume was 3,175 tonnes and withdrawals accounted for 1,138 tonnes. In 2015 total trading volume was 17,033 tonnes and withdrawals accounted for 2,582 tonnes. The development of the SGE, becoming the largest physical gold exchange globally, took time and it can be no different for the SGEI.

Document Translation [brackets added]:

Teng Wei: China’s Gold Market Opens Up To Boost RMB Internationalization

29-11-2016 Sina Finance

The 2016 RMB summit was held in Beijing on the 29th and 30th of November. Deputy General Manager of the Shanghai International Gold Exchange Center Teng Wei participated in the forum and discussion on “How China’s Gold Market Can Help the RMB Achieve International Status”. He expressed that using Shanghai’s free trade zone status, investors can open trading accounts denominated in RMB and participate in trading directly through the Exchange’s international board [SGEI] that allows access to most of the precious metal products that are traded in China. The international board has developed relatively well since establishment with active participation from international members and steadily increasing trading volume.

Gold on the international board is quoted and settled in RMB, which effectively connects the RMB onshore market and offshore market. This will extend the scope of RMB usage across borders and provide a new channel for inward capital flows. It is a move that is beneficial to expand the RMB usage to steadily promote internationalization of the RMB.

The actual speech:

Ladies and gentlemen, good afternoon, I am Teng Wei from the Shanghai International Gold Exchange. I am delighted to participate in this forum organized by the Asian Bankers Association to have a chance to speak and interact with everyone about opening China’s gold market to the world and how that can help the internationalization of the RMB.

This afternoon, I would like to touch upon on three topics. The first topic is the new pattern of the internationalization of the RMB and the global gold market. China’s gold market was established in 2002 with the launch of the Shanghai Gold Exchange. If anyone is familiar with the history of China’s gold market, you will know that before the year 2002 the Chinese gold market was entirely ran by the People’s Bank of China, including the process of purchasing, allocating and storing of gold. There wasn’t a single unified market where all participants could trade at the same time. Since the year 2002, with approval of the State Council, the People’s Bank Of China developed gold spot trading on the Shanghai Gold Exchange, as well as gold futures trading and over-the-counter trading via commercial banks, etc, which formed the basis for a multi-level diversified gold market system.

While the Chinese gold market was developing rapidly, the pattern of the global gold market was also having a dramatic change. As time passed, the international gold spot market was heavily concentrated in London and the international gold futures market has been concentrated in New York. However, in recent years, with the rise of gold demand in China, India and other Eastern nations, and with the exit of European and American banks from the precious metals market, it’s clear that Western gold is moving to the East. In 2015 gold demand in China and India was at 985 tons and 849 tons respectively. These figures alone account for 45% of global [consumer] gold demand. With gold demand from other markets dipping to various levels, China is not only the world’s largest gold producer and importer of gold, but has also become the world’s largest gold consumer.

Just now, I mentioned that the two main centers for gold trading are London and New York, and the current situation is Western gold flowing to the East. Everyone, have a look at some statistics that I have here, showing that just China and India alone make up over 45% of global gold demand. This was last year’s data.

Since the year 2005, when the RMB exchange rate was reformed, international investors’ willingness to trade in RMB denominated assets has also increased. This has objectively enhanced the Chinese gold market’s international status and garnered attention. In recent years, the RMB exchange rate is expected to have some changes.

The Shanghai Gold Exchange provides the important infrastructure for China’s gold market. ECB officials have mentioned that an important part of promoting the internationalization of the RMB is having a good financial market infrastructure. The exchange is also an important “all-in-one” foundation for gold transactions, clearing, delivery and storage. It serves with the commitment to provide gold investors with efficient and convenient market services. It has been 14 years since establishment of the exchange in the year 2002 and development has been rapid with annual trading volumes increasing 40% on average.

At the end of 2015 there were over 8.6 million individual accounts, over 10,000 institutional accounts and the total gold trading volume for the year reached 17,000 tonnes. The exchange was ranked as one of the largest and we firmly grasped an important opportunity for the internationalization of the RMB with the profound changes happening in the gold market. At the same time, we want to build a harmonious ecological gold market that sets a new path for the global gold market and achieve the status of being a global gold power from a large gold holding nation.

For the second point, I would like to explain how opening up China’s gold market externally to the world can help the internationalization of the RMB. To further promote and innovate China’s gold market, on 18th September 2014, the Shanghai Gold Exchange set up an international board [SGEI], open directly to foreign investors. This move has effectively connected China’s domestic gold market and the international gold market. Using Shanghai’s free trade zone, investors can open trading accounts denominated in RMB and participate in trading directly through the exchange’s international board that allows access to most of the precious metal products that are traded in China. The international board has developed relatively well since establishment with active participation from international members and steadily increasing trading volume.

As of now, the exchange has 67 international members, including most of the world-renowned gold suppliers and traders like Mr Thomas McMahon, who is also our Exchange’s member. At the end of the third quarter of 2016, the international board had recorded a total of 7,837 tonnes of gold traded, with a turnover valued at nearly 200 billion RMB. The Shanghai International Gold Exchange is the test pilot and pioneer for opening up China’s gold market to the world. It is significantly important for further increasing the capacity, expansion and international influence of China’s gold market. In addition, the international board uses RMB for settlements, producing an effective convergence of the RMB offshore and onshore markets, expanding the cross-border use of the RMB and providing a new channel for return of funds. All these points steadily promote the internationalization of the RMB and serve as a useful exploration.

For RMB denominated gold products to gain popularity outside of China, we think the prerequisite is to provide a fair offering for global gold market transactions, with reliable gold benchmark pricing in RMB, using the Shanghai Gold Exchange benchmark pricing mechanism [Shanghai Fix] for our trading platforms. The weight of the gold traded is 1 kilogram, with a fineness of no less than 99.99%. Using a price inquiry method and market volume, a balance is reached to form the benchmark price of gold measured in RMB. The price announcements will be released externally each trading day at 10:15 and 14:15.

At present, the Shanghai gold benchmark price is being used by domestic gold producers and suppliers for hedging and settlements. More and more commercial banks are also using the Shanghai gold benchmark price for gold leasing and financing as the standard. More and more products linked to the Shanghai gold benchmark will be made available.

Other than domestic usage, the Shanghai gold benchmark price is also being actively studied more and more by external markets regarding its application. In October, the exchange signed an agreement with Dubai for the right to use the Shanghai gold benchmark price and authorization was given for the Dubai gold exchange to use the Shanghai gold benchmark price as the standard for offshore RMB denominated futures. The signing of this agreement marks the use of the Shanghai gold benchmark price in international financial markets for the first time. This greatly helps to elevate the international influence of the exchange in global markets and improves the image and reputation of the RMB abroad.

For the third point, I would like to share with everyone how the Shanghai Gold Exchange acts as an important infrastructure for internationalization in three steps. As the forerunner for opening domestic markets and innovation, the Shanghai Gold Exchange cannot forget its historical mission. We are determined to take the international and market-oriented strategy.

Overall, for the internationalization process, we have three steps to take. The first step is to be open and inclusive, actively inviting foreign investors to come in. Just now, we have introduced our international board after the establishment of the Exchange and we will continue to increase publicity efforts. In accordance to high standards and multifaceted principles, we will continue to increase and expand international membership of the Exchange. Accordingly, we have carried out a variety of promotional activities in major financial hubs and countries and regions along the new Silk Road to allow more international market participants to hear the sound coming from the Chinese gold market. The exchange also takes the opportunity to actively learn from the experience of advanced international markets in the optimization of various trading systems and innovation of all kinds of trading products.

For the second step, since we have invited guests inwards, we also have to step outwards. Through cooperation and win-win situations, the gold Exchange can be promoted and step out of China. The Shanghai gold benchmark price has now taken a first step with the Dubai Gold Exchange agreement. This can be considered an ice-breaking move and serve as a cooperation model for other overseas markets and improve the recognition, branding and acceptance of the Shanghai gold benchmark price. Taking this as an opportunity, the Shanghai Exchange, together with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME, COMEX), the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the Malaysian Stock Exchange and a number of foreign exchange markets explored on long-term cooperation mechanisms that will allow foreign investors to directly participate in our gold market, in RMB denominated gold trading, standard gold settlement, and many other aspects and modes of cooperation that will increase the Shanghai Gold Exchange’s international market influence.

The third step is to realize RMB internationalization and increase global transaction on the exchange through integration and upgrades. As the international financial markets continue to merge and develop, market boundaries are increasingly blurred and we believe that market fragmentation will be removed gradually. In recent years, we can all notice that there are more and more mergers and acquisitions among major exchanges in the world. We hope to learn from the experiences of such joint stock mergers and acquisitions between global exchanges and explore the different modes of industry integration with overseas exchanges. By offering a wide range of local and overseas products through an open platform [SGEI], we hope to create a world class exchange group. The journey of the internationalization of the Shanghai Gold Exchange will epitomize the opening of China’s financial markets to the outside world and play an important part in the internationalization of the RMB. With Shanghai becoming the third most important market in the world after London and New York, the Chinese gold market will make a great contribution to the internationalization of the RMB. Thank you everyone.

NOVEMBER: Gold Price Down, Chinese Demand Strong Despite Import Curbs

From the moment Donald J. Trump got elected as the next President of the United States, on November 8, 2016, the price of gold tumbled 8 % in the remainder of the month – from $1,282 USD/oz to $1,178 USD/oz. Usually these cascades in the gold price go hand in hand with physical sell-offs in the West and strong demand Asia. It appears November has been no exception. The volume of physical gold withdrawn from vaults of the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) in November accounted for 215 tonnes, the highest amount in ten months. Year to date SGE withdrawals have reached 1,774 tonnes. 

There have been rumours in the gold space about the People’s Bank Of China (the PBOC) curbing gold import into the Chinese domestic market in response to capital flight. Although my sources have confirmed these rumours, Chinese gold import in November was still very strong at an estimated 140 tonnes. I don’t expect the PBOC will halt gold import all together.

Exhibit 1. Chart by Nick Laird from Goldchartsrus.com. The international gold price in USD/oz (yellow), the SGE gold price in USD/oz (red), the SGE premium over the international price in percentages (blue, left axis) and the SGE premium over the international price in USD/oz (black, right axis).

The first mention of the rumour was by Reuters on November 25. By then the premium on physical gold trading at the SGE, which more or less reflects the strength of local demand versus international supply, had reached 2 % (from ~ 0.2 % on November 1). Reuters wrote:

“While we don’t have the exact numbers, we hear that they (Chinese government) have limited the number of importers,” said Dick Poon, general manager at Heraeus Precious Metals in Hong Kong.

In a previous blog post I stated the quote from Poon was not likely to be accurate, because there are 15 banks that have PBOC approval to import gold, but for every shipment a new License must be requested at the central bank. This protocol is referred to as “one batch one License”. Bullion cannot cross the Chinese border without a License. From the PBOC:

There shall be one Import … License of the People’s Bank of China for Gold … for each batch … and the License shall be used within 40 work days since the issuing date.

If the PBOC desires to curb gold import it can simply hand out less Licenses to approved banks, instead of deleting banks from the approved list. The former has happened as far as I can see. The next mention was by the Financial Times on November 30 [brackets added]:

Some banks with licences [approval] have recently had difficulty obtaining approval [Licenses] to import gold, they said — a move tied to China’s attempts to stop a weakening renminbi by tightening outflows of dollars, the banks added. 

Although the Financial Times exchanged the terms “approval” and “License”, this is what I thought that was happening: banks are obtaining less import Licenses from the PBOC, which is obstructing supply, pushing up the SGE premium.

Either way the PBOC effort has not severely impacted the volume of Chinese gold demand as SGE withdrawals set a ten-month record at 215 tonnes in November, up 40 % from October. Premium or no premium the Chinese still ‘accumulate on the dips’. Additionally, mainlanders buy gold in Hong Kong where jewelry is cheaper as it doesn’t enjoy VAT. From Live Trading News we read:

“Gold sellers in Hong Kong, where mainland Chinese often buy gold, report an increase in purchases, …” according to published reports. “Some of the buying is also because of the Lunar New Year period next month, a time when buying normally picks up.”

Exhibit 2. Monthly SGE withdrawals versus the SGE gold price in yuan per gram.

How much of SGE withdrawals were supplied by import? Let’s make an educated guess. In the first nine months of 2016 SGE withdrawals accounted for 1,407 tonnes and China net imported 908 tonnes over this period, implying 65 % of SGE withdrawals was imported. If we use the past months as a reference China imported 140 tonnes of gold in November (=0.65*215). Year to date (-November) China has imported and estimated 1,147 tonnes.

An other possibility would be that elevated SGE withdrawals in November were supplied by scrap and disinvestment from within China (domestic mine output is fairly constant at 38 tonnes per month). Though this is not very plausible because the renminbi gold price went down in November (red line in exhibit 1). Normally scrap supply increases on a rising gold price. And hence, I assume the majority of SGE withdrawals in November were supplied by imports.

There have been concerns in the gold community with respect to a full stop on Chinese gold import. In my humble opinion the PBOC will not completely block imports for a number of reasons:

  1. Despite the rumours of obstructed imports SGE withdrawals were strong in November.
  2. The PBOC hasn’t released an official statement to curb imports.
  3. The PBOC has just spent decades to develop the Chinese gold market in order to strengthen the Chinese economy and internationalize the renminbi. Why cancel the project for problems that can be solved differently?
  4. Curbing gold imports would improve China’s current account. But China has a current account surplusthe capital account is in deficit. Why doesn’t the Chinese government tighten the capital account? In Q3 2016 China’s capital flow was minus 71 billion US dollars. In the same quarter gold import was valued at an estimated 13 billion US dollars. The problem is in the capital account.
Exhibit 3. China current account. Courtesy Trading Economics.
Exhibit 4. China capital flows. Courtesy Trading Economics.
  1. SGE premiums started to rise on November 8 exactly when the gold price went down (which SGE premiums often do when the price goes down, exhibit 5). So are these elevated premiums of late fully caused by curbed imports, or simply strong demand? It’s probably a mix of both; in any case there is no full stop on imports. What probably happened is that imports exploded when the price tanked after November 8. As a result the PBOC decided to block shipments.

In the next chart we can see SGE premiums move inversely to the price of gold. When the price of gold goes down the Chinese ramp up purchases and SGE premiums rise.

Exhibit 5. End of Day SGE premiums versus gold price.

The PBOC has added zero ounces of gold to its monetary reserves in November. It’s total monetary gold reserves currently account for 1,843 tonnes.

Gold In London & Hong Kong Is Used To Settle COMEX Futures

Physical gold located in Hong Kong and London is used to settle COMEX gold futures contracts through “Exchange For Physical” trading in the over-the-counter market.

This post is a sequel to Understanding GOFO And The Gold Wholesale Market and COMEX Gold Futures Can Be Settled Directly With Eligible Inventory – in which Exchange For Physical (EFP) trading is explained and how it can increase or decrease open interest at the COMEX. If you’re new to this subject it’s advised to first read my previous posts.

Most gold analysts surmise COMEX 100-ounce gold futures contracts (GC) can only be physically settled through taking and making delivery. This is technically true when excluding the possibility of EFP trading in GC through the over-the-counter (OTC) market. While on Exchange trading in GC is “executed openly and competitively”, trading GC in the OTC realm (and thus the price of the gold, its form and location) is a “privately negotiated transaction” between buyer and seller. The COMEX is a subsidiary of CME Group, which offers its clients OTC trading on a platform called ClearPort.

Because the COMEX in New York is the most liquid gold futures exchange globally – offering precious metals futures denominated in the world most used currency the US dollar, gold industry participants use GC for a variety of reasons, including hedging metal held outside the contract’s deliverable geography. Subsequently, the contracts can be physically “settled” anywhere at any price through EFP.

In EFP two parties sign a futures contract (short and long) and simultaneously execute a reverse spot transaction (buy and sell). One side sells short the futures contract and buys spot gold (the spot leg is referred to as the related position by CME), while the other buys long the futures contract and sells the related position. EFP trading can increase the open interest, decrease the open interest, or not change it, depending on the existing positions held by both parties before they enter into an EFP transaction. When EFP decreases the open interest the phrase “settle positions” is applicable. Another way of saying it would be “offsetting positions” or “netting out positions”.

Let us have a look at a real life example. The next picture was sent to me by data wrangler and gold specialist Nick Laird (website Goldchartsrus.com). It’s taken from the book The Prospect for Gold: The View to the Year 2000 by Timothy Green. In the excerpt the author describes how the Russians sold their gold in Switzerland during the eighties.

Exhibit 1.

This example matches my previous one regarding EFP (hedging metal held outside the contract’s deliverable geography). Any bullion bank, miner or refinery can sell short on COMEX and when the gold needs to be physically “settled”, for example in Switzerland, the short position can be unwound through EFP. The only requirement is that “the quantity of the related position component … must be approximately equivalent to the quantity of the Exchange component” – meaning the spot leg must be more or less 100-ounces of gold, which is the underlying asset of GC. In this example the GC short holder connects through CME ClearPort to Exchange For Physical. In the EFP transaction he will buy long a futures contract and simultaneously sell spot. His long and short will then be netted out while he sells spot the physical in Switzerland. Effectively, a COMEX short has been physically settled outside the contract’s deliverable geography. Naturally, a long position can also be unwound in Switzerland, which is then the other side of the trade.

EFP Moves Kilobars Through CME’s Hong Kong Vaults

In March 2015 CME launched a Gold Kilo Futures contract (GCK) physically deliverable in Hong Kong, but ever since implementation there has been poor participation in this instrument. From the start GCK trading volume has been close to nothing and deliveries rarely occur. Notwithstanding, there are massive volumes of kilobar gold flowing through the CME approved warehouse in Hong Kong owned by Brink’s, Inc.. On average 3.9 tonnes per day are withdrawn from this vault, but sometimes daily withdrawals are as high as 20 tonnes.

Exhibit 2. CME Kilobar delivery volume is so low it’s not visible.

Because volume and delivery for GCK on Exchange is so low, the withdraws must be explained by OTC trades. A CME representative actaully confirmed this to me; the physical movement through the Hong Kong vaults is caused by EFP transactions.

But if we look at the GCK volume page we can never observe any EFP trades being disclosed. In contrast, EFP volume of GC is substantial. Can it be gold kilobars in CME’s approved warehouses in Hong Kong are used to settle the 100-ounce futures contracts? Yes.

The underlying asset of GC is “either one (1) 100 troy ounce bar, or three (3) one (1) kilo bars, … with a weight tolerance of 5% either higher or lower, … [assaying] to a minimum of 995 fineness”, the underlying asset of GCK is “one kilogram bar (32.15 troy ounces) … [and] shall assay to a minimum .9999 fineness”. It’s thus within the indicated confinements on EFP trading that the 100-ounce gold futures contract is physically settled with three kilobars in Hong Kong.

My theory is that kilobars bought by bullion banks in the West, for example at Swiss refineries, to be consigned to China are hedged on the COMEX and once the gold arrives is Hong Kong the shorts are unwound through EFP. From there the gold is transported by armored truck to Shanghai Gold Exchange designated warehouses in Shenzhen by Brink’s that has a cross-border logistics license from the Chinese government. Supportive to my theory, see exhibit 3 below. Notice the strong correlation between “gold import into Hong Kong versus kilobars received in CME’s vaults” and “re-export from Hong Kong versus kilobars withdrawn from CME’s vaults”.

Exhibit 3.

The correlation points out most gold moving through Hong Kong, which is headed for China, is in kilobar form and moves through CME’s vaults. And because most of this throughput is EFP related, I assume the kilobars are used to settle COMEX futures.

It’s hard to test if my theory is accurate because EFP transactions are executed in the OTC realm and little information is available. Possibly, al throughput in Hong Kong is EFP related but doesn’t impact the GS open interest. If anyone has a different theory please comment below.

London Gold Offsets COMEX Futures

We’ve established gold in Switzerland and Hong Kong is used to “settle” gold futures. But there is also proof gold in London is used to phase out positions on the COMEX. When researching this topic I reached out to William Purpura who is, inter alia, Chairman at Northport Commodities, member of the COMEX Governors Committee, and previously traded on the COMEX floor from 1982 to 2007. I asked Purpura for an example of how EFPs are used. He replied [brackets added by me]:

Most of it [EFP] is done by bullion banks. … It’s mainly for netting out. Lot’s of times London versus New York. You see lots of EFPs posted around 8am in New York on COMEX.

There it is, “London versus New York”, and, “netting out”. From this quote we learn loco London gold is used to execute EFPs to wash out New York futures positions. One can argue the related position in London is “unallocated” – I’m not sure. In the latest formulation by CME on EFP (Market Regulation Advisory Notice RA1311-5R) it’s stated:

Where the related position component … is a physical transaction … the transaction should be submitted for clearing as an EFP transaction type.

Often in wholesale gold market parlance physical is also used for “unallocated gold”, which is not exactly physical in my opinion.

I’m sure there are many more methods than I’ve mentioned to use EFP, or any other privately negotiated transaction (PNT) available on ClearPort, that influences the open interest at the COMEX. One thing is for sure, conventional delivery is not the only way to terminate futures positions. In the gold futures rulebook this is explicitly noted by CME Group. The excerpt below is about terminating a gold futures contracts [brackets added by me].

113102.E. Termination of Trading

No trades in Gold futures deliverable in the current month shall be made after the third last business day of that month. Any contracts remaining open after the last trade date must be either:

(A) Settled by delivery which shall take place on any business day beginning on the first business day of the delivery month or any subsequent business day of the delivery month, but no later than the last business day of the delivery month.

(B) Liquidated by means of a bona fide Exchange for Related Position [/EFP] … .

This is important for our comprhension of the global paper and physical gold market. COMEX gold futures delivery statistics are not all there is to it.

H/t Ronan Manly, Bron Suchecki, Nick Laird from Goldchartsrus.com

Q1 – Q3 2016 China Net Gold Import Hits 905 Tonnes

Withdrawals from the vaults of the Shanghai Gold Exchange, which can be used as a proxy for Chinese wholesale gold demand, reached 1,406 tonnes in the first three quarters of 2016. Supply that went through the central bourse consisted of at least 905 tonnes imported gold, roughly 335 tonnes of domestic mine output, and 166 tonnes in scrap supply and other flows recycled through the exchange.

Core Supply & Demand Data Chinese Gold Market Q1-Q3 2016

Chinese gold demand is still going strong this year, albeit less than in 2015. The most likely reason for somewhat lower demand has been the strength in the price of gold in the first three quarters of this year, to which the Chinese reacted by subduing purchases. From 1 January until 30 September 2016, the gold price went up 24 % in US dollars per troy ounce, from $1,061.5 to $1,318.1; measured in renminbi the price went up 28 % over the same period.

Now I have proven the gold on Chinese commercial bank balance sheets has little to do with physical gold ownership of these banks, but mainly reflects back-to back leases and swaps, we can be positive that data on withdrawals from the vaults of the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) roughly equals Chinese wholesale demand. For now that is, as future developments can always alter our metrics.

Below is a chart showing withdrawals from the vaults of the SGE and the price of gold in yuan per gram. The most significant trends of recent years are still in effect; in the short term, when the gold price is falling Chinese demand increases (2013 and 2015), when the gold price is rising Chinese demand declines (2016). This trend is supported by SGE premiums that have an inverse correlation with the price of gold, when the price of gold declines, SGE premiums escalate and vice versa – I will show charts below. Furthermore, in the long term we can observe consistent growth in Chinese gold demand due to the opening up and development of the domestic market.

Exhibit 1. SGE withdrawals versus the gold price in yuan per gram.

SGE withdrawals in the first three quarters of 2016 accounted for 1,406 tonnes – still impressive – down 29 % from 1,986 tonnes in 2015, which was a record year. Annualized SGE withdrawals are set to hit 1,877 tonnes in 2016.

Notable, “known net import” by China is relatively strong compared to SGE withdrawals in 2016. Total net import in the first three quarters of this year has aggregated to 905 tonnes – annualized 1,206 tonnes – or 64 % of SGE withdrawals, versus an import/withdrawals ratio of 53 % in 2015. As mine supply to the SGE is fairly constant, recycled gold through the SGE must be lower this year than last year. As a rule of thumb, we use the equation:

SGE withdrawals = domestic mine output + import + recycled

For Q1-Q3 2016 that gives:

1,406 tonnes = 335 tonnes + 905 tonnes + 166 tonnes

The largest net exporter to China is still Hong Kong, having transhipped 608 tonnes to the mainland from January until September 2016, up 5 % compared to 2015. The volume Hong Kong exports to the mainland has been quite constant since 2014, while in 2013 China’s special administrative region was a substantial larger supplier.

(There have been rumors that Hong Kong ’s export to China is overstated in the official data by the Hong Kong Census & Statistics Department, caused by fake exports. In the chart below you can see that the share of exports relative to re-exports from Hong Kong to China this year has increased from previous years. Potentially this signals fake exports, as it’s easier to over invoice an export than re-export, though I haven’t found hard evidence for this scheme. When I do I will report accordingly.)

Exhibit 2. Hong Kong cross-border gold trade with China mainland. Any potential “export scheme” can have nothing to do with “round-tripping” as Hong Kong’s gross import from China is very low.
Exhibit 3. Monthly Hong Kong cross-border gold trade with China mainland. The exports/re-exports ratio has fallen since July. 

The second largest exporter to China is Switzerland, having supplied a net 229 tonnes so far this year, which is 22 % more than last year. Clearly, direct shipments from Switzerland to China have replaced shipments via Hong Kong.

Direct net exports by the UK to China mainland have collapsed by 92 % this year compared to 2015, from 210 tonnes to a mere 18 tonnes. The reason being, the UK has been the largest net importer globally this year, which is related to the strength in the gold price early this year. UK net gold trade is a proxy for Western institutional supply and demand.

Exhibit 4. Monthly UK net gold flow and GLD inventory change versus the gold price in US dollars per troy ounce. Note, the strong correlation between the price and UK net flows.

Australia’s direct export to China is down this year as well (in the first eight months, data for September has not yet been released). I’ve computed the data as described in my post Australia Customs Department Confirms BullionStar’s Analysis On Gold Export To China. Following this method, the land of down under has sent 50 tonnes of gold directly to China during the first eight months of this year, down 23 % from 65 tonnes in 2015.

Despite press releases suggesting Russian gold enterprises are strengthening ties with the SGE, I have identified only one shipment of 30 Kg by the Russian Federation directly to China in 2016. In 2013 the Russians directly net exported 50 Kg to China.

Exhibit 5. Gold export Russia to China.

Data on gold export from South Africa to China is not publicly available.  

Exhibit 6. Chinese monthly gold supply and demand data.
Exhibit 7. Chinese gold supply and demand data for Q1-Q3 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016.

In exhibit 7 we can see that, although the level of SGE withdrawals in 2016 is lower than in 2013, 2014 and 2015, net imports are higher than in 2014. It’s very difficult to know the exact explanation for relative high imports this year. Though, in my opinion, it’s connected to increased Chinese ETF demand, which grew by 34 tonnes and is all required to be stored in SGE vaultsand less gold being recycled through the SGE.

Since 2014, when the Shanghai International Gold Exchange (SGEI) was erected, there is a possibility “SGE withdrawals” are inflated by withdrawals from vaults in the Shanghai Free Trade Zone; gold that is allowed to be exported abroad – the free trade zone is not part of the domestic market. But as far as I know any activity on the SGEI lacks foreign enterprises that buy gold to withdraw and export. A couple of months ago a source at a large Chinese bank told me the SGEI is mainly used by Chinese banks to import gold into Chinese domestic market. In addition, I haven’t bumped into any large importers from China. Occasionally India imports a few hundred Kg, but that’s it.

The emblematic difference between “Chinese gold demand as disclosed by GFMS” and SGE withdrawals – displayed in exhibit 7 – is due to GFMS’ incomplete metrics. For decades this consultancy firm has been denying the existence of institutional supply and demand in above ground gold, which is far more important to price formation than retail sales and mine supply, the predominant flows published by GFMS. The essence of this swindle can be read in my blog post The Great Physical Gold Supply & Demand Illusion. I also have a few more blog posts in the pipeline that discuss GFMS’ most recent gold supply and demand data.

All supply and demand data presented above excludes purchases by the People’s Bank of China, which sources physical gold in the international OTC market. 

SGE Premiums November Highest Since 2013

I expect November to be a very strong month for SGE withdrawals. Mentioned in the introduction segment of this post, there is a trend in Chinese wholesale gold demand in relation to the gold price. Whenever, the gold price is climbing, Chinese demand is subdued, accompanied by low SGE premiums; when the gold price is decreasing, SGE withdrawals and premiums in China shoot up. The relationship between the gold price and SGE withdrawals can be viewed in exhibit 1. Below in exhibit 8 & 9, readers can see the relationship between “SGE end of day prices and premiums”.

Exhibit 8. SGE end of day prices and premiums.
Exhibit 9. SGE end of day prices and premiums, including moving averages which make the inverse correlation more visible.

Note, the gold price on the SGE and the premium have an inverse correlation.

I already mentioned that SGE withdrawals in the first nine months of 2016 have been subdued due to a rally in the gold price. However, high premiums at the SGE in November forecast elevated withdrawals for the month. Since Trump got elected on November 9, and price of gold started tumbling, SGE premiums have broken a three-year record. This signals strong demand.

In the next chart from Goldchartsrus.com we can see the premium on the SGE’s most traded physical contract Au99.99 has risen since November 9 and reached 3 % by 24 November. Levels not seen since 2013 (exhibit 8).

Exhibit 10. Intraday SGE premium (Au99.99 versus XAUUSD)

Although the relationship between the gold price and SGE premiums has been in place for years, Reuters reports the high premiums in November are caused by worries on import restrictions. From Reuters:

Gold premiums in top consumer China jumped to the highest in nearly three years this week on worries over a supply shortage that traders said were due to Beijing’s efforts to restrict import licenses.

“While we don’t have the exact numbers, we hear that they (Chinese government) have limited the number of importers,” said Dick Poon, general manager at Heraeus Precious Metals in Hong Kong.

To me this statement doesn’t make sense. At this moment that are 15 banks approved by the PBOC to import gold. Limiting the number of importers would cause less importers to import more gold in order to balance the domestic market (supply gold from abroad when necessary). In the Measures for the Import and Export of Gold and Gold Products drafted by the PBOC in March 2015 it states:

… An applicant for the import … of gold … shall have corporate status, … it is a financial institution member or a market maker on a gold exchange [SGE] approved by the State Council.

… The main market players with the qualifications for the import … of gold shall assume the liability of balancing the supply and demand of material objects on the domestic gold market. Gold to be imported … shall be registered at a spot gold exchange [SGE] approved by the State Council where the first trade shall be completed.

The Chinese government could lower imports by distributing less “import licences” to approved banks. As, every approved bank still needs to submit for a license for every gold import batch. Logically, lowering imports would be done by the PBOC through handing out less licences.

From the PBOC:

There shall be one Import … License of the People’s Bank of China for … Gold Products for each batch … and the License shall be used within 40 work days since the issuing date.

If the PBOC wanted to lower imports, it would simply hand out less licences. No need to “limit the number of importers”.

Either way, I expect SGE withdrawals to be strong for November.

Dear US Mint, We Gave You The FOIA Funds, Now Give Us The Fort Knox Audit Documents!

Interim research update.

As readers might have seen on these pages, since 2014 I’ve been investigating the inventory audits of the US official gold reserves, which should proof the existence of the metal that embodies the credibility of the world reserve currency. My first article showed the official narrative: all the bars of in total 8,134 tonnes of gold spread over depositories at Fort Knox, West Point, Denver and New York, have been carefully counted, weighed, assayed and inventoried in between 1974 and 2008.

In subsequent posts I’ve exposed there is a vast array of problems to be found with the physical audits. Through several Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) request, I had obtained information that severely damaged the integrity of the official narrative. Example given, one of my FOIAs that requested the audit reports drafted in between 1974 and 1986, when 7,504 tonnes was audited, revealed the US government had “lost” nearly all documents.

Start of the alleged Fort Knox inventory audits 1974.

To get to the bottom of this I filed countless new FOIAs in the past months at the legal owner of the gold, the US Treasury, the custodian, the US Mint, and the head auditor, the Office Inspector General of the Treasury, in order to obtain every single piece of documentation I could think of that is related to these audits. Pretty soon, by putting all pieces of new information together I realized I was entangled in a conundrum of giant proportions as many documents contradicted each other. Eventually I submitted a request for a publicly unknown report, which I read about in a document I had obtained by another FOIA. I asked the Mint for “the [US Mint] Director’s Representative … written report to the [US Mint] Chief Financial Officer (CFO) notifying the CFO of the completion of the verificationfor the years in between 1993 and 2008. Surprisingly, the US Mint wrote me my request would cost $3,144.96 dollars!

This amount of money is ridiculous. First of all, the documents should be readily available. Perhaps any digitalization costs would incur a few hundred dollars at most. Second, the Mint wrote the estimate of $3,144.96 dollars “includes 40 hours of … search time”. But how can it take 40 hours to find a few pieces of paper? It also wrote, my request would include an estimated 1,200 pages of documentation. But how do they know there are 1,200 pages if they first have to search 40 hours for it?

In any case, I decided to start a crowdfunding campaign last August to collect the money. After I tweeted about the campaign it quickly went viral. The news was spread on websites such as TFMetalsGoldMoneyGATA and GoldChartsRus – among others – and within a few hours the funding was completed, which shows to the power of our gold community.

After I received the money from the crowdfunding website I asked the US Mint for a bank account number to wire the funds. But the Mint replied I could only pay by check! Check? I was born in 1981, I have never seen a check in my life. Was this another way to obstruct my investigation? Most likely. It’s impossible the US Mint does not have a bank account, and every account has a number. I still can’t see why they don’t accept wired money.

But I had no option to go to a branch of my bank located in my area. When I walked in explained and the situation, the gentleman that helped me told me he never handled a check neither. This gentleman was replaced by an older one. There was a slight possibility he could create a check for me, but he had to look into it somewhat. Two hours later I walked out of his office carrying a promise the dollars would be transferred within a week.

the-us-mint-logo-fenceA few days later the funds had been subtracted from my bank account, and I asked the US Mint for the first time (that was 11 September) if the check had arrived, but they replied it hadn’t. For weeks, mysteriously the check was “missing”. Only when I emailed the Mint with the email address of my local bank employee included, to have my bank and the Mint work it out together, the Mint confirmed on 28 September 2016 the funds had been received:

We have received your check and are now working to get the requested documents out to you.

That was 28 September, it’s now 15 November! I still haven’t received the documents from the US Mint. Naturally, I have sent more emails to ask what’s the status of my request, but no reply until now.

Or the Mint will have to confirm at some point they can’t deliver to me the paper work – maybe they got “second thoughts”. In that case they have to wire back the funds and I will have all funds send back to everybody that donated. Or they will honor my request in the coming weeks and I will include the findings in a very very long read I’ve been working on.

So, that’s all I know at this stage. Please have a little more patience. Thanks again everybody that donated. Either way, I will publish an article to reveal the results of all my FOIA and the many “problems” I found in the official narrative.

Gold Is Going To Play A Role In A New Monetary System. Interview Koos Jansen by ‘Dutch Financial Times’

In the Netherlands we have a financial newspaper that prints on pink paper and is named “Het Financieel Dagblad”. Basically it’s the Dutch equivalent of the Financial Times. A few weeks ago I was interviewed by two of their reporters, Joost van Kuppeveld and Lenneke Arts. Today the interview was published as part of a series of interviews with gold experts, among others, with myself and Aerdt Houben, Director Financial Markets at the Dutch central bank (DNB). Perhaps not surprisingly I disagree with several statements of Houben in his interview, to which I would like to respond in a forthcoming post. For now, you can read my interview below. In case readers didn’t know my real name is Jan Nieuwenhuijs, and Koos Jansen is my Internet alias. Het Financieel Dagblad preferred to disclose my real name.

Original source at Financieel Dagblad, published 29 October 2016. Translated by Koos Jansen.

Gold Is Going To Play A Role In A New Monetary System

Jan Nieuwenhuijs

Profession: Precious metals analyst at BullionStar.com

Owns gold since 2010

“The whole world is now in the same boat. Everywhere there are low interest rates and on all continents money is printed. Only the United States has paused printing for the moment.

There are many flaws in fiat money. You can print it without limitations, which is politically too tempting. Fiat money printing was used to save the financial system in 2008, but since then nothing has changed. Banks are not split. In a next crisis it’s going to end badly with paper money. There will be significant inflation.

Gold is a hard currency. It can’t be printed – like fiat money. It is divisible and it does not perish. It retains its purchasing power in the long term. If it’s in the center of the monetary system, it will also be more stable in terms of purchasing power in the short and medium term. That has to do with economic principles; it is a commodity.koos-jansen-fd-2016-smaller In that respect I feel safe by keeping a portion of my savings in physical gold. I am protected from economic shocks. If the euro falls gold rises, and so my purchasing power is maintained.

Something has to happen in the international monetary system. It cannot stay centred around the dollar. Since 1971 – when the dollar was detached from gold – the United States has an exorbitant privilege. Most trade in the world is settled in dollars. Therefore, there is a huge demand for dollars in the world, and the US can simply print these dollars.

In the new system gold is going  play a role. Look at the developments in Europe. The Netherlands and Germany get their gold back from America. Austria and Belgium are also repatriating. Russia and China buy a lot of gold. The Chinese have too many dollars in foreign exchange reserves and are therefore at the mercy of the whims of US policy. The transition to a new system will be gradual. No one wants a new shock.

With my blog I try to fill the gap between mainstream media, who do not understand gold, and conspiracy theorists. I always try to seek the truth. Because if we get a new financial crisis, we must know the truth. The Dutch central bank shouldn’t state it holds 600 tonnes if it can’t show us the audit reports and gold bar list. That’s why I’m pushing for the audit reports and gold bars list to be publicly released, but those requests find a lot of resistance at my national bank. While you would think they can be fully transparent. What’s there to hide?”

The Great Physical Gold Supply & Demand Illusion

Gold supply and demand data published by all primary consultancy firms is incomplete and misleading. The data falsely presents gold to be more of a commodity than a currency, having caused deep misconceptions with respect to the metal’s trading characteristics and price formation.

Numerous consultancy firms around the world, for example Thomson Reuters GFMS, Metals Focus, the World Gold Council and CPM Group, provide physical gold supply and demand statistics, accompanied by an analysis of these statistics in relation to the price of gold. As part of their analysis the firms present supply and demand balances that show how much gold is sold and bought globally, subdivided in several categories. It’s widely assumed these balances cover total physical supply and demand, which is incorrect as the most important category is excluded. The firms though, prefer not to share the subtle truth or their business models would be severely damaged.

The supply and demand balances by the firms portray gold to be more of a commodity than a currency, as the gist of the balances reflect how much metal is produced versus consumed – put differently, the firms mainly focus on how much gold is mined versus how much is sold in newly fabricated products. However, in reality gold is everlasting and cannot be consumed (used up), all that has ever been mined is still above ground carefully preserved in the form of bars, coins, jewelry, artifacts and industrial products. Partly because of this property the free market has chosen gold to be money thousands of years ago, and as money the majority of gold trade is conducted in above ground reserves. Indisputably, total gold supply and demand is far in excess of mine production and retail demand.

As most individual investors, fund managers, journalists, academics and precious metals analysts consider the balances by the firms to be complete, the global misconception regarding gold supply and demand is one of epic proportions. Physical gold is a profound anchor in our global financial system and thus it’s of utmost importance we understand the fine details of its trading characteristics. 

Supply & Demand Metrics By The Firms

The firms can argue that the difference between what they present as supply and demand (S&D), as opposed to what I deem to be a more unadulterated approach of S&D is due to contrasting metrics. Accordingly, we’ll discuss their metrics to reveal their infirmity. In a nutshell, the firms only count the physical gold S&D flows that are easy to measure, while leaving out the most important part: institutional supply and demand. 

Although the firms all have slightly different methodologies to measure S&D, from comparisons the numbers appear to be quite similar. For our further investigation we’ll spotlight the metrics and models by GFMS. The reason being, GFMS has been the only firm that was willing to share a full description of their methodology for publication – to be viewed here. Metals Focus (MF) provided a partial methodology, the World Gold Council and CPM Group declined to comment.

Let’s have a look at GFMS its S&D categories. On the supply side is included:

  • Mine supply (newly mined gold)
  • Scrap supply (gold sourced from old fabricated products)

On the demand side is include:

  • Jewelry demand (gold content used in newly manufactured jewelry products bought locally at retail level, adjusted by jewelry exported and imported).
  • Industrial demand (the volume of gold used in industrial applications, for example bonding wire, products used in semiconductors/electronics and dental alloys).
  • Retail bar investment (the net volume of bars that are purchased by individual investors through retail channels).
  • Coin investment (a combination of published data from mints and also a proprietary survey conducted by GFMS detailing where coins are sold).

The above four demand categories summed up are often referred to as “consumer demand” by the firms.

Furthermore GFMS includes:

  • Net hedging (change in physical market impact of mining companies’ gold loans, forwards, and options positions)
  • Net official sector (total central bank selling or buying)
  • ETF inventory build (change in ETF inventory)
  • Exchange inventory build (change in exchange inventory)

The last four categories can be either supply or demand. In example, when central banks (the official sector) in total are net sellers this will be listed as a negative demand figure, as is shown in the S&D balance by GFMS below from 2006 until 2009, when central banks in total are net buyers this will be listed as a positive demand figure, as is shown in the balance from 2010 until 2015. For a clear overview of the GFMS S&D balance please have a look at all line items below.

Exhibit 1. Courtesy GFMS. Global gold S&D balance as disclosed in the Gold Survey 2016.

According to GFMS Supply consists of Mine production, Scrap and Net Hedging. In turn, Demand consists of Jewelry, Industrial Fabrication, Retail Investment, and Net Official Sector. After balancing Supply and Demand this results in a Physical Surplus/Deficit. Then, ETF Inventory Build and Exchange Inventory Build are added/subtracted from the Physical Surplus/Deficit to come to a Net Balance.

GFMS likes to pretend their balance is complete and occasionally articulates any surplus or deficit arising from it is positively correlated to the price of gold, which is anything but true, as I will demonstrate step by step.  

The Firms Exclude Majority Gold Supply & Demand

Most important what’s excluded from the balance is what we’ll refer to as institutional supply and demand, which can be defined as trade in bullion among high net worth individuals and institutions. Usually the bullion in question comes in 400-ounce (12.5 Kg) London Good Delivery (GD) bars having a fineness of no less than 995, or smaller 1 Kg bars having a fineness of no less than 9999. In addition, bullion bars can weigh 100-ounce or 3 Kg, among other less popular sizes, generally having a fineness of no less than 995. Bullion can be traded without changing in weight or fineness, but it can be refined and/or recast for transactions as well, in example from GD bars into 1 Kg bars. In some cases institutional supply and demand involves cross-border trade, when bullion is sold in country A to a buyer in country B, in other cases the bullion changes ownership without moving across borders.

Provided are two exemplifications of institutional S&D:

  • An (institutional) investor orders 400 Kg of gold in its allocated account at a bullion bank in Switzerland – which would be purchased in the Swiss wholesale market most likely in GD bars. This type of S&D will not be recorded by GFMS.
  • A Chinese (institutional) investor buys 100 Kg of gold directly at the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE), the Chinese wholesale market, in 1 Kg 9999 bars and withdraws the metal from the vaults. Neither this transaction will be registered by GFMS – or any other firm.

These examples show the S&D balances by GFMS are incomplete.

For illustrational purposes, below is a chart based on all S&D numbers by GFMS from 2013, supplemented by my conservative estimate of institutional S&D. Including institutional transactions total S&D in 2013 must have reached well over 6,600 tonnes.

Exhibit 2. Global gold S&D 2013 by GFMS, including conservative estimate institutional S&D.

GFMS Covers The Tracks With Help From The LBMA

Although GFMS intermittently admits their number are incomplete (they have to), at the same time they’ve been battling for years to eclipse apparent institutional S&D for its audience. Dauntless tactics were needed when in 2013 institutional demand in China reached roughly 1,000 tonnes and over 500 tonnes in Hong Kong. Institutional demand in the East was predominantly sourced through GD bars from the London Bullion Market, which were refined into 1 Kg 9999 bars that are more popular in Asia. For the cover up GFMS went to great lengths to refute the volumes of gold withdrawn from SGE vaults, and accordingly have the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) adjust statistics on total refined gold by its member refineries. Remarkably, the LBMA cooperated. Allow me to share my analysis in detail.

In 2013 something unusual happened in the global gold market as Chinese institutional demand exploded for the first time in history. Hundreds of tonnes of institutional supply from London in the form of GD bars were mainly shipped to Switzerland to be refined in 1 Kg 9999 bars, subsequently to be exported via Hong Kong to meet institutional demand in China. From customs data by the UK, Switzerland and Hong Kong the institutional S&D trail was clearly visible. From 2013 until 2015 there was even a strong correlation between the UK’s net gold export and SGE withdrawals. Demonstrated in the chart below.

Exhibit 3. Correlation between UK net gold export and SGE withdrawals.

Because of the mechanics of the gold market in China, Chinese institutional demand roughly equals the difference between the amount of gold withdrawn from SGE designated vaults (exhibit 4, red bars) and Chinese consumer demand (exhibit 4, purple bars). In the exhibit 4 below you can see this difference that brought GFMS in a quandary, especially since 2013. For more information on the workings of the Chinese gold market and the size of Chinese institutional demand please refer to my post Spectacular Chinese Gold Demand Fully Denied By GFMS And Mainstream Media.

Exhibit 4. Chinese wholesale demand (SGE withdrawals), versus GFMS consumer demand versus apparent supply.

Stunningly, since 2013 GFMS has tried to convince its readers through numerous arguments why SGE withdrawals crossed 2,000 tonnes for three years in a row, while Chinese consumer demand reached roughly half of this. Yet the arguments have failed miserably to explain the difference – they rationalize only a fraction, read this post for more information.

And GFMS did more to eclipse apparent institutional S&D. They colluded with the LBMA.

To be clear, I cannot exactly measure global institutional S&D. However, let me make an estimate of apparent institutional demand for 2013. Notable, in 2013 a flood of gold crossed the globe from West to East. Chinese institutional demand accounted for 914 tonnes and Hong Kong net imported 579 tonnes – the latter we’ll use as a proxy for additional Asian institutional demand, as Hong Kong is the predominant gold trading hub in the region. 

In total apparent institutional demand in 2013 accounted for (914 + 579) 1,493 tonnes. If we add all other demand categories by GFMS shown in exhibit 1, total demand in 2013 was at least 6,619 tonnes. Be aware, this excludes non-apparent institutional demand.

Exhibit 5. Global gold demand 2013 by GFMS, including apparent institutional demand.

Because nearly all wholesale gold demand in Hong Kong and China is for 1 Kg 9999 bars, the global refining industry was working overtime in 2013, mainly to refine institutional and ETF supply in GD bars coming from London. In December 2013 I interviewed Alex Stanczyk of the Physical Gold Fund who just before had spoken to the head of a Swiss refinery. At the time Stanczyk told me [brackets added by me]:

They put on three shifts, they’re working 24 hours a day and originally he [the head of the refinery] thought that would wind down at some point. Well, they’ve been doing it all year [2013]. Every time he thinks it’s going to slow down, he gets more orders, more orders, more orders. They have expanded the plant to where it almost doubles their capacity. 70 % of their kilobar fabrication is going to China, at apace of 10 tonnes a week. That’s from one refinery, now remember there are 4 of these big ones [refineries] in Switzerland.

As a consequence, statistics on “total refined gold production” in 2013 by “LBMA accredited gold refiners who are on the Good Delivery List”, which the four large refineries in Switzerland are part off, capture the immense flows of institutional S&D – next to annual mine output and scrap refining. On May 1, 2015, the LBMA disclosed total refined gold production by its members at 6,601 tonnes for 2013 in a document titled A guide to The London Bullion Market Association. It’s no coincidence this number is very close to my estimate on total demand (6,619 tonnes), as apparent institutional demand in Asia was all refined from GD into 1 Kg bars.

Here’s exhibit 2 from another angle.

Exhibit 6. Global gold S&D by GFMS, including apparent institutional S&D, versus total refined gold production 2013.

In the table below we can see the LBMA refining statistics for 2013 at 6,601 tonnes.

Exhibit 7. Courtesy LBMA. Screenshot from A guide to The London Bullion Market Association captured by Ronan Manly in May 2015.

After this publication GFMS was trapped; these refining statistics revealed a significant share of the institutional S&D flows they had been trying to conceal. What happened next – I assume – was that GFMS kindly asked the LBMA to adjust downward their refining statistics. First and painstakingly exposed by my colleague Ronan Manly in multiple in-depth posts, the LBMA kneeled and altered its refining statistics to keep the charade in the gold market going.

On August 5, 2015, the LBMA had edited the aforementioned document, now showing 4,600 tonnes in total refined gold production. (Click here to view the original LBMA document from the BullionStar server, and here to view the altered version from the BullionStar server.) Have a look.

Exhibit 8. Courtesy LBMA. Altered document on refining statistics by the LBMA August 2015.

In the altered version it says:

Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was estimated to be 4,600 tonnes in 2013, owing to recycling of scrap material, above world mine production of 3,061 tonnes (source Thomson Reuters GFMS).

A few important notes:

  • In the altered version the LBMA mentions “an estimate” for “total refined gold production”, while it doesn’t need to make an estimate as all LBMA accredited gold refiners who are on the Good Delivery List are required to provide exact data to its parent body. The exact data was disclosed in the first version of A guide to The London Bullion Market Association, and it stated, “total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was 6,601 tonnes”.
  • In the altered version the LBMA states the refining statistics were sourced from Thomson Reuters GFMS, but the LBMA doesn’t need GFMS for these statistics. The fact they mention GFMS, though, suggests a coordinated cover up of institutional S&D. Not only the firms, also the LBMA publishes incomplete and misleading data.
  • The altered version stated refining production totaled 4,600 tonnes, which is a round number and obviously quickly made up. A few weeks after the numbers were adjusted, the LBMA adjusted the numbers again, this time into 4,579 tonnes (click here to view from the BullionStar server). Clearly, on several occasions there has been consultation with the LBMA to get the statistics in line with GFMS.
  • In the original document the LBMA states, “Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was 6,601 tonnes in 2013, more than double world mine production of 3,061 tonnes”, while in the altered version they state, “Total refined gold production by the refiners on the List was estimated to be 4,600 tonnes in 2013, owing to recycling of scrap material, above world mine production of 3,061 tonnes”. Notable, GFMS prefers to have total supply focused around mine and scrap production, instead of including institutional supply.
  • The original refining statistics (6,601 tonnes) are still disclosed in the LBMA magazine The Alchemist (#78 on page 24), to be viewed from the LBMA server here.
  • The fine details about how often and when the LBMA changed its refining statistics can be read in Ronan Manly’s outstanding post Moving the goalposts….The LBMA’s shifting stance on gold refinery production statistics.

And so nothing is spared in trying to uphold the illusion of the GFMS S&D balance to be complete. In another example GFMS excluded gold purchases by the central bank of China from its S&D balance. In June 2015 the People’s Bank Of China (PBOC) increased its official gold reserves by 604 tonnes, from 1,054 tonnes to 1,658 tonnes. During that quarter (Q2 2015) all other central banks worldwide were net buyers at 45 tonnes. Thus, in total the Official Sector was a net buyer at 649 tonnes. Now, let’s have a look at GFMS’ S&D balance for Q2 2015:

Exhibit 9. Courtesy GFMS. Global gold S&D balance as disclosed in the Gold Survey 2015 Q2. 

Net Official Sector purchases are disclosed ay 45 tonnes. GFMS decided not to include the 604 tonnes increment by the PBOC simply because it didn’t fit their balance model. A 604 tonnes increment in would have set the “net balance” at -480 tonnes. Readers would have questioned the balance from this outlier, and so GFMS decided not to include the tonnage.

According to my sources PBOC purchases were sourced from institutional supply (from abroad and not through the SGE), which is a supply category not disclosed by GFMS and therefore the tonnage was a problem. (Note, GFMS disclosed the PBOC increment in text, but not in their balance.) For more information read my post PBOC Gold Purchases: Separating Facts from Speculation.

Gold Is More A Currency Than A Commodity

The biggest flaw of the balance model by GFMS is that it depicts gold to be more of a commodity than a currency. It’s focused on mine output and gold recovered from old fabricated products on the supply side, versus retail sales of newly fabricated products on the demand side. In parlance of the firms, how much is produced (supply) versus consumed (demand). Official sector, ETF and exchange inventory changes are then added to the balance. This commodity S&D balance approach by GFMS has caused deeply rooted misconceptions about the essence of gold and its price formation.

The price of a perishable commodity is mainly determined by how much is annually produced versus how much is consumed (used up). However, gold is everlasting, it cannot be used up and its exchange value is mainly based on its monetary applications, from being a currency, or money if you will. Logically the best part of its trading is conducted in above ground reserves. From my perspective the impact of global mine supply, which increases above ground stocks by roughly 1.5 % annually, and retail sales have less to do with gold’s price formation than is widely assumed.

Back to GFMS. Have a look at the picture below that shows their S&D flows for 2015. 

Exhibit 10. Courtesy GFMS. The global S&D flows for 2015.

GFMS pretends total supply is mine production plus some scrap, which is then met by jewelry demand in addition to retail investment, industrial fabrication and official sector purchases. The way they present it is misleading. These S&D flows are incomplete; they suggest gold is traded like any other commodity. But what about institutional S&D in above ground bullion? Trades that define gold as an international currency.

Let’s do another comparison; this time between what GFMS calls Identifiable Investment demand, consisting of…

  • Retail bar & coin
  • ETF demand

…versus my what I deem to be a more unadulterated approach of investment demand, consisting of…

  • Retail bar & coin
  • ETF demand
  • Institutional demand

According to my estimates, in 2015 apparent Chinese institutional demand accounted for roughly 1,400 tonnes (exhibit 4). In the Gold Survey 2016 GFMS states on page 15 [brackets added by me]:

Total [global] Identifiable Investment, … posted a modest 5 % increase in 2015, to reach 990 tonnes.

That’s quite a tonnage between global Identifiable Investment by GFMS at 990 tonnes and apparent Chinese institutional demand at 1,400 tonnes. We should also take into account non-apparent institutional demand, gold that changes hands in trading hubs like Switzerland. Unfortunately we can’t always measure institutional S&D, but that doesn’t justify denying its subsistence.

Have a look at the chart below that shows the large discrepancy. In the next chapter we’ll specifically discuss the significance of investment demand in relation to the price of gold.

Exhibit 11. Global Gold Investment Demand 2015.

My point being: what many gold market participants and observers think is total supply and demand is just the tip of the iceberg. This truly is a staggering misconception created by the firms.

The global gold market. H/t Dan Popescu.

When observing the GFMS balance in exhibit 1 its incompleteness is self-evident. At the bottom we can see the line item “net balance”, which reflects the difference between total supply and total demand. According to GFMS, if the “net balance” is a positive figure there was a surplus in the global gold market, and if “net balance” is a negative figure the market has been in deficit. In the real world this figure is irrelevant. Gold supply and demand are by definition always equal. One cannot sell gold without a buyer, and one cannot buy gold without a seller. Furthermore the gold market is deep and liquid. So how come there is a difference between total supply and total demand in the GFMS balance? As I’ve demonstrated before, because GFMS doesn’t include institutional S&D that in reality makes up for the difference and far beyond. In all its simplicity the “net balance” item reveals their data is incomplete.

Let’s have another stab at this. How can “net balance” exist in the real world, for example in 2009? According to GFMS the gold market had a 394 tonnes surplus in 2009. But how? Were miners left with 394 tonnes they couldn’t sell? Or some supranational entity decided to soak up the surplus to balance the market? Naturally, this is not what happens. Total supply and total demand are always equal, but GFMS doesn’t record all trades.

Moreover, in my opinion the words “surplus” and “deficit” do not apply to gold. There can be no deficit in gold; there will always be supply. At the right price that is. Sometimes Keynesian economists claim there is not enough gold in the world for it to serve as the global reserve currency. Austrian economists then respond by saying that there will always be enough gold at the right price. I agree with the Austrians and their argument also validates why there can be no deficit in gold.  

There is more proof the “net balance” item presented by GFMS is meaningless. Although according to GFMS the market had a 394 tonnes “surplus” in 2009 the price went up by 25 % during that year. This makes no economic sense. A surplus suggests a declining price, not the other way around. Tellingly, S&D forces presented in GFMS balances are often negatively correlated to the gold price, as was the case in 2005, 2006, 2009, 2010 and 2014 (exhibit 1). In conclusion, GFMS S&D balances are not only incomplete, the resulting “net balance” items are misleading with respect to the price. Below are a few charts that demonstrate this conclusion.

If we plot “net balance” versus the end of year price of gold we can see the correlation is often negative. Have a look below. Green “net balance” chart bars show a positive correlation to the gold price, red chart bars show a negative correlation (note, the left axis is inverted for a more clear overview between any “deficit/surplus” and the price of gold). As you can see nearly half of the “net balance” chart bars are negatively correlated to the price of gold.

Exhibit 12. GFMS’ gold market “net balance” versus the gold price. We can quarrel if the “net balance” in 2014 was positively or negatively correlated to the price. I say the correlation was negative as the gold price in 2014 remained flat in US dollars but was up in all other major currencies, in contrast to the “surplus” presented by GFMS.

Mind you, although the “net balance” item is often negatively correlated to the gold price, in the Gold Survey 2016 GFMS states on page 9:

In terms of the Net Balance, 2015 marked the third year in which the gold market remained in surplus, and therefore it is not surprising that the bear market continued.     

And on page 14:

The forecast reduction in global mine output and a gradual recovery in demand will see the physical surplus narrow in 2016, providing support to the gold price and laying the foundation for better prospects.  

GFMS likes to pretend any “surplus” or “deficit” arising from their balance is correlated to the price, but the facts reveal this is not true.

Let us plot the “physical surplus/deficit” line item by GFMS (exhibit 1) versus the gold price. This results in even more negative correlations.

Exhibit 13. GFMS gold market “physical surplus/deficit” versus gold price.

This exercise reveals that a positive correlation between either a “surplus” or “deficit” arising from a GFMS balance and the price of gold is just a coincidence. No surprise when one is aware their S&D data is incomplete.

Remarkably, the last chart was also published in the Gold Survey 2016, but GFMS chose not to invert the left axis and doesn’t disclose what we see is a surplus or deficit. As a result the largest surpluses (2006, 2007, 2009, 2010) seem to correlate with a rising price, though in reality they did the opposite. Compare the chart below with the one above.

Exhibit 14. Courtesy GFMS.

GFMS also publishes S&D balances for silver (a monetary metal that is comparable to gold). For silver the presented correlations by GFMS between a “surplus” or “deficit” in relation to the price are even weaker.

Exhibit 15. GFMS silver market “net balance” versus silver price, as disclosed in the Silver Survey 2016.
Exhibit 16. GFMS silver market “physical surplus/deficit” versus silver price, as disclosed in the Silver Survey 2016.

According to GFMS the silver market is always in deficit, but the price goes up and down. Obviously GFMS neglects to measure institutional S&D for silver. 


In my opinion, when Gold Fields Mineral Services (GFMS) was erected many decades ago they made a mistake to adopt a commodity S&D balance approach. Surely with the best intentions they gather intelligence and retrieve data from the market. But we must be aware this is not the full picture. The most significant data is not disclosed by GFMS.

When it comes to what drives the price of gold GFMS and I agree it’s determined by gold’s role as a currency in the global economy. When reading the chapter PRICE AND MARKET OUTLOOK in the Gold Survey 2016, GFMS shares its insights with respect to the gold price. Factors mentioned are:

  • Turmoil in global stock markets
  • A Chinese hard landing
  • Geopolitical tensions in the Middle-East
  • Central bank stimulus (QE)
  • Global economic weakness
  • Interest rates policy by central banks
  • Low risk asset / safe haven demand

So if these factors drive the gold price, in what S&D category would this materialize? Would (large) investors buy and sell jewelry? Or bullion bars? I think the latter. According to my analysis the price of gold is largely determined by institutional demand, and to a lesser extent ETF and retail bar & coin demand.

Let’s do an exercise to see what physical gold S&D trends correlate to the price. The majority of supply on the GFMS balance consists of mine output and the majority of demand on the GFMS balance consists of jewelry consumption. But if we plot these volumes versus the price of gold in a chart, there is no push and pull correlation*. For example, when the gold price surged from 2002 until 2011 jewelry consumption was not rising. Neither was it outpacing mine supply. The opposite happened, to be seen in the graph below. This is because jewelry demand is price sensitive – when the price goes up jewelry demand goes down, and vice versa. Jewelry demand is not driving the price of gold.

Exhibit 17. GFMS retail demand, versus mine and scrap supply versus the gold price.

I also added retail bar & coin demand. Interesting to see is that retail bar & coin demand is on one hand a price driver, moving up and down in sync with the gold price, on the other hand it can be price sensitive having brief spikes when the price of gold declines.

The best correlation between physical S&D in relation to the gold price can be seen in institutional and ETF S&D. One of the largest gold trading hubs in the West is the UK, home of the London Bullion Market that also vaults the largest ETF named GLD. The UK has no domestic mine production, no refineries and national gold demand is neglectable in the greater scheme of things. Therefore, by measuring the net flow of the UK (import minus export) we can get a sense of Western institutional and ETF demand and supply. For example, if the UK is a net importer – import demand being greater than export supply – that signals a net pull on above ground stocks. Approximately one third of the UK’s net flow corresponds to ETF inventory changes, the other two thirds reflect pure institutional S&D.

Exhibit 18. UK net flow versus the gold price.
Exhibit 19. UK net flow, GLD inventory change, gross import and gross export versus the gold price.

In the charts above we can observe a remarkable solid correlation between the UK’s net flow and the gold price. The UK is a net importer on a rising price and net exporters on declining price. The shown correlation can’t be a coincidence, though there’s no guarantee it will prevail in the future.

The two charts above show the (medium/long term) gold price is mostly determined by institutional supply and demand in above ground reserves. Effectively, GFMS is hiding the most important part of global physical gold flows.

When I asked an analyst at one of the leading firms why his company doesn’t measure institutional S&D he told me candidly, “because it’s extremely difficult to accurately estimate it”. And it is. As I wrote previously, I can’t exactly measure global institutional S&D either. However, very often publicly available information gives us a valuable peek at it, and it shows to be more relevant to the gold price than what the firms keep staring at. Not knowing exactly what institutional S&D accounts for doesn’t mean GFMS shouldn’t pay attention to it.

But the firms keep trying to uphold the illusion the data they’ve been selling for decades is complete. For if they would plainly confess it was incomplete, future business could be severely damaged.

What I blame these firms is that they’ve created a meme that the gold market is as large as annual mine supply. This has caused all sorts of misconceptions. Often I read analyses based on a comparison between quantitative demand and mine output. Such analyses are likely to jump erroneous conclusions.

H/t Ronan Manly, Bron Suchecki, Nick Laird from Goldchartsrus.com


Simplified overview gold flows 2015:


How Constant Is Gold’s Purchasing Power?

An often-perceived analysis in the gold community is that gold is the constant in our global economy. But is this true? Yes and no. Allow me to share my observations. Although gold has an exceptionally constant nature, and we have yet to see another currency that can compete with gold’s constant nature, the reality is, that there is no exact constant in economics. In any market all goods, assets, currencies, etc. continuously fluctuate in value relative to each other due to ever changing supply and demand dynamics. Having said that, in this post we’ll examine gold’s constant nature by measuring its purchasing power in the short (weeks) medium (years) and long term (decades). Additionally, we’ll compare our findings to fiat’s nature.

We will find that when gold is officially recognized as the center of a monetary system – throughout history there have been several forms of gold standards – gold is approximately constant in the short, medium and long term. Since the gold standard has been abandoned, the metal has become less constant in the short and medium term, but has remained impressively constant in the long term. 

In turn, fiat can have periods of being constant in the short term, but will always lose value in the medium term and evaporate in the long term. Thereby, due to fiat’s fragile nature and the current stress in global finance, there are also risks fiat can significantly devalue overnight. Hence, gold is highly suitable to secure one’s purchasing power.

When examining the value of gold we have to measure it in terms of goods and services. In this day and age one might forget the end goal of any participant in the economy is goods and services. All else traded in our vast financial system is merely a means to an end. All sorts of money, but also stocks, bonds, credit default swaps, options, futures, etc., have no use-value for humans as we can’t eat, drink or wear them. Only goods and services we can truly use (for more information regarding use-value please read my post The Concept Of Money.) Therefor, to measure the stability of gold’s value we have to compute the amount of goods and services gold can buy.

For the sake of simplicity, we’ll use publicly available Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Wholesale Price Index (WPI) data to measure the value of goods and services.

Gold’s Purchasing Power In The Short And Medium Term

On occasion we can read gold commentators stating that when the price of gold rises or falls in the short term, it’s actually fiat that is falling or rising. As, according to this analysis gold is the constant. Let’s test if this analysis is accurate. In the week from January 4 until January 9, 2016, the price of gold in British pounds surged 5.9 % from £23,096 pound per Kg to £24,469 per Kg. We can be quite sure that the price of goods and services in the UK remained flat during this period. As a consequence, in this example gold could buy 5.9 % more goods and services at the end of the week, whilst sterling could buy exactly the same amount of goods and services all week long. So, in this particular example, what was more constant? It was sterling. The reason is that currently the international monetary standard is fiat.

Graph created with BullionStar Charts.

Moving on to the medium term. In the chart below I’ve plotted the purchasing power index of gold versus the British pound, based on CPI data and the gold price, from July 2010 until June 2016.


Over this period we can observe that the British pound was more constant than gold in the short term, but it’s purchasing power has been declining in the medium term due to the inherent inflationary policies by the central bank of the UK. Gold’s purchasing power has been volatile in the short and medium term, but in this case has remained its purchasing power over the shown period. Though, it should be clear that if I would’ve adjusted the period gold’s purchasing power could’ve shown an increase or decrease.

Gold’s Purchasing Power in the Long Term

To get the best understanding of his subject, let us zoom out and have a look at gold and the pound’s purchasing power since 1500. The following chart is conceived by Nick Laird from GCRU, based on data collected by himself and Roy Jastram. The chart is perhaps more difficult to interpret than the previous one. To be clear, we can see 3 index lines:

  • The red line reflects gold’s purchasing power index (1930 = 100)
  • The blue line reflects the price of gold index, denominated in British pounds (1930 =100). Note, until 1914 the blue line was mostly straight which shows fixed parities between sterling and gold.
  • The green line reflects the wholesale (/goods) price index, denominated in British pounds (1930 = 100)

As you can see, if the price of gold (blue) transcends wholesale prices (green), as a consequence gold’s purchasing power (red) is escalated – and vice versa.

Courtesy Nick Laird, from GCRU. Note the scale is logarithmic.

Clearly the red line has remained roughly flat, around 100, for hundreds of years! This shows gold’s remarkable constant nature. Note, since the gold standard has been gradually dismantled (1914) gold’s purchasing power became more volatile but remained robust in the long term.

Furthermore, we can see that prior to 1914 wholesale prices were also fairly constant but this is due to the fact sterling was tied to gold during this era. Since the gold standard was abandoned step-by-step from 1914 onwards, the blue and the green line have skyrocketed, evaporating the purchasing power of sterling. Since 1971 the British pound has lost over 93 % of its purchasing power – in 1975 inflation topped 20 %.

We can conclude, while there is no exact constant in economics, the stability of gold’s purchasing power is unprecedented. Not only on a gold standard the metal shows it’s constant nature, but also off the gold standard gold’s purchasing power is remarkably constant, albeit more volatile in the short term.

For the future, if the current fiat international monetary system will breach its limits and has to be re-anchored to gold, I expect gold to become more constant in both the short and medium term when providing a center pillar in finance.

China’s Rising Gold ETF Market: A Hybrid

In 2013 we’ve witnessed the inception of the Chinese gold ETF market. At first demand for the gold ETFs was neglectable, as investors mostly preferred to buy the physical gold directly at the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) or buy jewelry or investment bars through retail channels. This year, however, there has been a major shift in gold ETF demand in China.

The physical holdings of Chinese gold ETFs have surged five-fold from 7 tonnes at the end of January, to 35 tonnes at end of August. The Huaán Yifu Gold ETF, which was holding 23 tonnes in August, entered the global top 15 list.    

Exhibit 1. All physical holdings of Chinese gold ETFs are stored within SGE designated vaults.

The interest in China’s nascent gold ETF market was even mentioned by the World Gold Council in a recent Gold Demand Trends report. In this post, we’ll add some texture to China’s gold ETF market; how are the gold ETFs constructed and how can they be compared to the largest Western gold ETF, the SPDR Gold Trust. At this moment the market share of Chinese gold ETFs is still small – within China as well as globally, but knowledge about the workings of these ETFs will be valuable when they acquire significant market share in the future.

Kindly note, all mechanics and examples presented in this post are simplified.

What Is A Gold ETF?

ETF is short for Exchange Traded Fund. ETFs trade like stocks and its price usually tracks an underlying asset or index. Like stocks, ETFs have a primary market and a secondary market. The secondary market is the stock exchange where most ETF investors trade. What makes ETFs special is the primary market where ETF shares are created and redeemed. Let us use the SPDR Gold Trust (symbol: GLD) to illustrate how the primary market works. Mainly through the creation and redemption process of shares, the GLD share price tracks the gold price.

Primary GLD market participants include (from the prospectus):

  • The Sponsor (World Gold Trust Services, LLC, which oversees the performance of the Trustee and the Custodian)
  • The Trustee (BNY Mellon Asset Servicing, which is responsible for the day-to-day administration of GLD)
  • The Custodian (HSBC Bank plc, which holds the gold bars in custody, there can be sub custodians)
  • The Authorised Participants (the institutions which are authorised to create and redeem GLD shares, at this moment the Authorised Participants are Barclays Capital, Inc., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, Goldman Sachs & Co., Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P., HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., P. Morgan Securities Inc., Merrill Lynch Professional Clearing Corp., Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, RBC Capital Markets, LLC, Scotia Capital (USA) Inc., UBS Securities LLC and Virtu Financial BD LLC).

GLD is traded on the New York Stock Exchange Arca (NYSE Arca)

Exhibit 2. The (simplified) process of creation and redemption of GLD shares by an Authorised Participant through the Trustee.

If an Authorised Participant (AP) wants to create GLD shares, it needs to deposit gold into the account of the Trust and subsequently the Trustee will provide the AP with GLD shares. The creation application must be made in multiples of 100,000 shares (a block of 100,000 shares is called a basket). Since every GLD share represents approximately 0.1 ounce of gold, in order to create 100,000 GLD shares the AP needs to deposit 10,000 ounces of gold into the account of the Trust. (In reality, 1 GLD share actually represents a little less than 0.1 ounce of gold, the reason for this will be explained later on in this post.)

The redemption process works the other way round. If an AP wants to redeem GLD shares, it deposits 100,000 GLD shares at the Trust and subsequently the AP receives 10,000 ounces of gold.

The purpose of APs creating and redeeming GLD shares is usually arbitrage. As previously mentioned the gold equivalent of 1 GLD share is roughly 0.1 ounce, nevertheless GLD shares and actual gold are traded in two different markets. As a consequence, the price of 1 GLD share can differ from the price of 0.1 ounce of gold. If the price of GLD and the price of gold diverge, this is where arbitrage comes into play for the APs. Accordingly, the arbitrage by APs through creation and redemption of shares contributes to GLD’s price tracking the gold price.

Suppose (simplified), the price of 1 GLD share is $110 – caused by supply and demand for GLD shares at the NYSE Arca – while the price of 0.1 ounce of gold is $100 in the gold market. An AP can grasp this opportunity by buying (or first leasing) 10,000 ounces of gold to deposit in the GLD Trust account after which the Trustee will create 100,000 GLD shares for the AP. The new shares created are then sold by the AP on the stock market, which will cause the price of GLD to go down. The arbitrage opportunity will be used by APs until it’s closed.

If the price of GLD shares is lower than the price of gold, the arbitrage opportunity works the other way around, APs can buy shares, redeem them for gold at the Trustee and sell the gold.

In the aforementioned example trade when the AP (via the Trustee) created 100,000 GLD shares his investment was $10,000,000 (10,000 ounces at $100 per 0.1 ounce). The AP’s revenue was $11,000,000 (100,000 GLD shares worth $110 a piece). The AP’s profit in this exercise was $1,000,000.

($110-$100)*100,000 = $1,000,000

As readers can see from the example, the holdings of GLD were increased by 10,000 ounces of gold. Almost every day the holdings of GLD vary and the change is often caused by arbitrage of APs.

One theory is, when demand for GLD shares is strong (usually by Western investors) and the share price is trending higher than the price of the gold equivalent, the APs jump the arbitrage, create shares and GLD inventory swells. Then, if growth in GLD inventory correlates to a surging gold price (which can be observed in exhibit 3 below) we can speculate the gold bull market in part has been caused by Western investment demand in GLD.

Exhibit 3.

Now we have established the workings of the largest Western gold ETF, we will have a look at how the Chinese gold ETFs are constructed, and compare them to GLD.

China’s Gold ETF Market

Below are the 4 Chinese gold ETFs currently in existence that we’ll discuss.

  1. - Bosera Gold Exchange Open-Ended Securities Investment Fund
  2. - Guotai Gold Exchange Open-Ended Securities Investment Fund
  3. - Huaán Yifu Gold Exchange Open-Ended Securities Investment Fund
  4. - Efund Gold Exchange Open-Ended Securities Investment Fund

In China every gold ETF share represents approximately 0.01 gram of gold. By creating or redeeming gold ETF shares (Chinese) APs receive or deliver a basket of 300,000 shares, which equals to 3Kg of gold. This threshold is much lower than that of GLD, of which a basket equals to 310Kg of gold. The gold acceptable for Chinese ETFs are the spot (physical and spot deferred) gold contracts listed on theSGE – for example Au99.99. Therefore, all the physical holdings of China’s gold ETFs are stored within SGE designated vaults.

Moreover, there is a range of features that make China’s gold ETFs quite different from GLD.

1. Chinese Gold ETF Shares Can Also Be Created Or Redeemed Through Cash

Unlike GLD, which only allows the use of gold to create shares, and only allows the use of shares to redeem gold, China’s gold ETFs also allow shares to be created and redeemed through cash in the primary market. An AP can present cash to the Fund Manager who handles the creation and redemption process for a Chinese gold ETF. The Fund Manager is comparable to the Trustee of GLD. Thereby, through an AP individual investors can create or redeem gold ETF shares with cash as well.

Suppose, a Chinese investor wants to arbitrage the difference between the price of a gold ETF and the price of gold. In this example the price of the gold ETF is higher than the price of gold, so the investor want use cash to create shares to sell on the stock market. The investor can present cash to an AP who in turn will create shares via the Fund Manager. The amount of cash used in this transaction to create shares is equal to the cash value of the spot gold contracts that are needed to create the shares without the use of cash.

Vice versa, in case an investor wants to arbitrage the price of a gold ETF when it’s lower than the price of gold, the investor can present shares to an AP to redeem for cash.

Exhibit 4. Creation and redemption process of Chinese gold ETF shares through cash.

In China the APs can be securities firms and commercial banks. The securities firms are often not SGE members. Therefor, the number of APs that support gold ETF shares creation and redemption through cash is often larger than the number of those that support shares creation and redemption through spot gold contracts. For example, in the case of Efund Gold ETF, the fund has authorised 13 securities firms (APs) to process creation and redemption through cash, but only 2 banks (APs) to process creation and redemption through spot gold contracts (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Bank of Communications).

2. The Flexibility Of The Fund Manager

The Trustee of GLD doesn’t have much flexibility in managing the assets. Its duty is mainly processing the creation and redemption orders of GLD shares. Therefore, the gold holdings of GLD are mainly allocated gold and according to the prospectus [brackets added by me]:

Gold held in the Trust [GLD]’s allocated account is the property of the Trust and is not traded, leased or loaned under any circumstances.

In China, the Fund Managers of the gold ETFs have more flexibility. The gold contracts that China’s gold ETFs hold include not only spot physical contracts like Au99.99 and Au99.95, but can also be spot deferred contracts like Au (T+D), and notable all these “spot contracts” may be leased (sometimes swapped) within the SGE system. Additionally, every Chinese gold ETF can invest 10% of its fund assets (5 % of net fund assets in case of Efund Gold ETF) in “other financial instruments” allowed by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).

For example, the excerpt below is from the Efund Gold ETF’s prospectus [brackets added by me]:

The investment scope of the Fund [Efund Gold ETF] is liquid financial instruments, including gold physical contracts (including spot physical contracts, spot deferred contracts, etc), bonds, asset-backed securities, bond repos, bank deposits, money market instruments, and other financial instruments which laws, regulations or the CSRC allow the Fund to invest in the future (but these have to satisfy the relevant rules of the CSRC).

If laws, regulations or regulatory institutions allow the Fund to invest in other instruments (including but not restricted to gold derivatives like forwards, futures, options and swaps), after necessary procedures, the Fund Manager will include them into the investment scope.

The portfolio percentage: The fund asset invested in gold spot contracts is not lower than 95% of the net asset value of the Fund.

All the 4 gold ETFs in China can participate in gold leasing. Some can participate in gold swaps and some can pledge the gold to borrow money.

The excerpt below is from the Huaán Yifu Gold ETF Prospectus:

The Fund can do gold lease and pledge gold to borrow money.

Effectively the Fund Manager of the Huaán Yifu Gold ETF can make money by, for example, leasing the fund’s assets.

The excerpt below is From the Guotai Gold ETF Prospectus:

The Fund can do gold lease, gold swap and invest in gold spot deferred contracts, etc, in order to lower the operating expenses and lower tracking error. The Fund does margin trade only for the purpose of risk management and enhancement of the efficiency of the asset allocation.

As a result, the Fund Managers of Chinese gold ETFs have significant flexibility in handling the fund assets. Please remember that all gold leasing, swapping, etc. has to be done within the SGE system and the gold cannot leave the SGE designated vaults.

From the CSRC’s website [brackets added by me]:

Article 4. Gold ETFs may not deposit physical gold into the [SGE] vault or withdraw physical gold from the [SGE] vault. Margin trade is only for the purpose of risk management and enhancement of the efficiency of the asset allocation. 

Exhibit 5. The bottom row shows the minimum percentages the Gold ETFs must invest in “spot contracts”, though some of this gold can be involved in leasing.

3. NAV Per Share Recalculation

Since the inception of GLD in 2004 its share gold equivalent is steadily declining lower than 0.1 ounce of gold. That’s because the Sponsor, Trustee and Custodian don’t provide services for free. They need to earn money and their earnings must come from the Net Asset Value (NAV) of the ETF. In other words, the gold in the Trust is gradually sold to pay for operational expenses. From the GLD prospectus:

The amount of gold represented by the Shares will continue to be reduced during the life of the Trust due to the sales of gold necessary to pay the Trust’s expenses irrespective of whether the trading price of the Shares rises or falls in response to changes in the price of gold.

Each outstanding Share represents a fractional, undivided interest in the gold held by the Trust. The Trust does not generate any income and regularly sells gold to pay for its ongoing expenses. Therefore, the amount of gold represented by each Share has gradually declined over time. This is also true with respect to Shares that are issued in exchange for additional deposits of gold into the Trust, as the amount of gold required to create Shares proportionately reflects the amount of gold represented by the Shares outstanding at the time of creation. Assuming a constant gold price, the trading price of the Shares is expected to gradually decline relative to the price of gold as the amount of gold represented by the Shares gradually declines.

On November 18, 2004, 1 GLD share exactly equaled 0.1 ounces of gold, but by now (September 2016) 1 GLD share equals 0.09542 ounces of gold, a decline of almost 5 % over the course of 12 years. This explains why currently the amount of ounces needed by an AP to create a basket of shares has become less than 10,000 ounces, and continues to decline.

In China’s gold ETF market, although the gold represented by the ETF instruments also decline as with GLD, the share values are periodically re-adjusted to ensure the NAV per share remains (roughly) 0.01 gram of gold.

For example, from the Bosera Gold ETF prospectus:

Fund share re-calculation means the fund manager based on the necessity of the operation of the fund, under the premise that the total NAV is unchanged, adjusts the total fund shares outstanding and NAV per share. 

There is nothing complicated about the re-calculation. There are simply periodic adjustments when the Fund Manager sets the value of the shares (in yuan) higher because the gold content equivalent is elevated, from below 0.01 gram to 0.01 gram, whereby the Fund Manger “adjusts the total fund shares outstanding” downward.

4. Linked Funds

In China, every gold ETF is accompanied by a Linked Fund. The Linked Fund mainly invests in the Target Gold ETF as can be seen in the list below. The Linked Fund is usually a common open-ended mutual fund. While 90 % of the assets under management of the Linked Fund must be invested in its Target Gold ETF, the Fund Manager still has some room for managing the remaining 10%.

Exhibit 6.

For example, from the Bosera Gold ETF-linked Fund’s prospectus:

The Fund mainly invests in Bosera Gold Exchange Open-Ended Securities Investment Fund, gold contracts listed on the Shanghai Gold Exchange, gold futures contracts listed on the Shanghai Futures Exchange, bonds and other financial instruments which the CSRC allows the fund to invest, like securities lending and borrowing, gold lease, etc.

For more clarity I’ve drawn a graph to illustrate the ratios of investment allocation by the Guotai Gold ETF and the Guotai Gold ETF-linked Fund.

Exhibit 7.

Although, at this stage it’s not completely clear to me what would be the benefit for investors to invest in the Linked Fund, as opposed to the Target Gold ETF.

 5. Voting Rights

GLD holders only have limited voting rights. The excerpt below is from the GLD prospectus,

Under the Trust Indenture, Shareholders have no voting rights, except in the following limited circumstances: (i) shareholders holding at least 66.66% of the Shares outstanding may vote to remove the Trustee; (ii) the Trustee may terminate the Trust upon the agreement of Shareholders owning at least 66.66% of the outstanding Shares; and (iii) certain amendments to the Trust Indenture require 51% or unanimous consent of the Shareholders.

In China’s gold ETFs shareholders have more voting rights and can vote to decide on a lot of important issues. The excerpt below is from the prospectus of Bosera Gold ETF:

In one of the following circumstances, based on the consent of the fund manager, the fund custodian or the fund shareholders who hold 10% (including 10%) of the fund shares outstanding, it is mandatory to hold fund shareholders’ meeting:

1. Termination of the fund contract;

2. Change of the operation of the fund;

3. Increase of the remuneration of the fund manager or the fund custodian, but excluding the circumstances in which the increase of the remuneration is mandatory by the requirements of laws or regulations;

4. Replacement of the fund manager or fund custodian;

5. Amendment of the fund category;

6. Amendment of the fund investment target, scope or strategy (excluding the circumstances in which laws, regulations or the CSRC have other relevant requirements);

7. Amendment of fund share holders’ meeting proceedings, voting methods and voting procedures;

8. Termination of listing but excluding circumstances in which the fund no longer satisfies listing requirements and the listing is terminated by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange;

9. Merger of the fund with other fund(s);

10. Other items that have material influence on the rights and responsibilities of the parties to the fund contract and necessitate the fund share holders’ meeting to amend the fund contract;

11. Other items that are required by laws, regulations, the fund contract or the requirements of the CSRC to hold the fund share holders’ meeting.

Even the Linked Fund shareholders of China’s Gold ETFs can participate in voting:

The fund shareholders of the linked fund of this fund can attend or send representatives to attend the fund shareholders’ meeting and participate in voting, based on the share holding of the linked fund. The equivalent number of fund shares with voting rights and correspondent votes are: the product of the total shares of this fund held by the linked fund multiplied by the linked fund shares held by the respective link fund share holder as a percentage of the total linked fund shares outstanding. The result of the calculation is rounded to the nearest whole number.

Ironically, to me there seems to be more democracy and openness in China’s gold ETFs than in GLD. On the other hand, Chinese gold ETFs have a fundamentally different foundation, a hybrid design I would say.

China’s gold ETF market was erected in 2013 and is still evolving. In the future, there may be more complex gold ETF related financial structures that have a big impact on China’s overall gold market. I shall follow it closely.


The main sources used for this article are the prospectuses from the Bosera Gold ETF, Guotai Gold ETF, Huaán Yifu Gold ETF and Efund Gold ETF, and the prospectuses of the Linked Funds of these Gold ETFs, Bosera Gold ETF-linked fund, Guotai Gold ETF-linked fund, Huaán Yifu Gold ETF-linked fund and Efund Gold ETF-linked fund)

Dutch Central Bank Refuses To Publish Gold Bar List For Dubious Reasons

My hunt for the gold bar list of the Dutch official gold reserves started in 2015. On September 26 of that year I visited a conference in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, called Reinvent Money. One of the speakers was Jacob De Haan from the Dutch central bank (DNB) Economics and Research Division – you can watch his presentation by clicking here.

In his presentation De Haan repeatedly talked about the importance of transparency in central banking. These statements raised my eyebrows, as I submitted a FOIA request at DNB in 2013 to ask for all correspondence between DNB and other central banks in the past 45 years with respect to its monetary gold, which was not honored. From my experience DNB was anything but transparent.

De Haan DNB 2015
Slide  is from Jacob De Haan (DNB) at the Reinvent Money conference September 26, 2015. Red frame added by me.

After the presentation I approached De Haan and asked him, if transparency is so important to DNB, why has it never published its gold bar list? An act of transparency that could be accomplished within minutes. De Haan offered me he would look into that. He gave me his email address and we agreed to stay in touch. 

Jan de Haan dnb
September 26, 2015, at the Reinvent Money conference. On the left is Jacob De Haan, on the right in the orange sweater is me.

The next day I send De Haan an extensive email explicating my request at DNB to publish the gold bar list of the Dutch gold in excel sheet format. I wrote him it wouldn’t take DNB any effort, as I assumed the bar list was readily available.

De Haan never replied to my email, so I called his office in December 2015 to ask what the status was of my request. De Haan’s secretary answered my inquiry was not rejected but still being processed.

Weeks passed but I didn’t get any reply from De Haan.

On February 24, 2016, I decided to call DNB’s press department to ask about my inquiry. DNB’s spokesman, Martijn Pols, told me over the phone the subject was still being discussed internally, he even confirmed De Haan was involved in the decision making. DNB was considering releasing the document while carefully weighing al pros and cons, he said.

In the conversation Pols stated DNB was aware the German central bank (the Deutsche Bundesbank) released a bar list in October 2015 and there was a wish in Amsterdam to mutually harmonize this policy. I added that if DNB would go ahead with the publication their action would only be credible if the Dutch bar list would be complete (disclosing refinery brands, refinery bar numbers and year of manufacturing), in contrast to the incomplete list the Germans had published. Pols was aware of the format the Germans had chosen and took note of my comment. An ensuing question from my side what was holding back DNB in releasing the list could not be clearly answered.

Months passed without any news from DNB. On August 8, 2016 I decided to call Pols again for a status update. He said he would reply over email. A few days later I received an email from DNB Head of Commutations J.W. Stal.

His email to me, translated from Dutch to English, reads:

Dear Mr Jansen,

…. We can share the following information with respect to our gold reserves.

DNB is transparent about the amount (weight) and the value of our gold assets. This information can be found in our annual reports. Thereby, several media have visited the gold vault and video recordings have also been made. However, we do not intend to publish a gold bar list. This serves no additional monetary purpose to our aforementioned transparency policy, however it would incur administrative costs

If you have any further question please contacts us.

Kind regards,

J.W. Stal

Of course, in this day and age any gold bar list from a central banks should be readily available in excel sheet format, and releasing a sheet would not incur any administrative costs.

My response to Stal translated:

Dear Mr Stal,

If the sole reason not to publish the gold bar list is that such an action would incur administrative costs I must conclude DNB doesn’t have the list readily available. Or is my conclusion erroneous? Does DNB have a complete gold bar list readily available or not?

If not, this is worrying because the gold bar list forms one of the most important checks on the existence of the Dutch official gold reserves, which provide essential stability to our economy.

Is the list in your possession or not?

Kind regards,

Koos Jansen

Stal replied:

Dear Mr Jansen,

In response to your email of August 11, 2016, to De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB), we can inform you as follows on our gold reserves and the related gold bar list. DNB has internal gold bar lists, however the conversion of internal lists to documents for publication would create too many administrative burdens.

We maintain our previous email, in which we stated publishing a gold bar list serves no monetary purpose other than transparency. And as previously noted, there are other ways for DNB to transparently communicate about our gold stocks.

We trust to have informed you sufficiently.

Kind regards,

J.W. Stal 

If DNB has its gold bar list properly (digitally) archived there should be no administrative cost whatsoever for publication. The argument presented by Stal makes absolutely no sense to me. If one owns over 600 tonnes of gold, why not have the physical assets accurately inventoried? 

What could possibly be the problem to release the bar list of the Dutch gold located in Amsterdam, New York, Ottawa and London?


I would like to remind you that DNB is the only Western central bank that in recent years has successfully repatriated a significant amount of gold (122.5 tonnes) from the Federal Reserve Bank Of New York through a covertly executed operation. This underlines DNB is fully aware of the importance of its gold reserves in our current fragile financial climate. I think DNB does have the bar list readily available, but it chooses not to publish it for political reasons – think, tensions between its custodians in New York and London.

DNB claims to be transparent but in reality it’s not.

If you click this link you can see the most recent video recording made inside the DNB vault at the Frederiksplein in Amsterdam on April 26, 2016. The gold you see in the video aggregates to 189.9 tonnes and includes the 122.5 tonnes repatriated from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in November 2014. Note, the gold at the Frederiksplein has been relocated to a different compartment inside the vault room after November 2014, due to the increased volume by the repatriation.

elianne DNB gold
Courtesy RTLZ. DNB vault room, Frederiksplein in Amsterdam on April 26, 2016.

A few noteworthy comments from the DNB employee in the video:

Gold is the ultimate insurance and anchor in monetary systems.

If there will ever be any financial instability we can use the gold to build a new monetary system and offer trust to the public.