Tag Archives: MKS

Swiss gold refinery Argor-Heraeus to be acquired by Private Equity investors

News has just emerged in the gold market that the giant Swiss precious metals refiner, Argor-Heraeus, has held discussions to be acquired, and that the likely outcome is an acquisition by a private equity group. This private equity group is believed to be London-based WRM CapInvest, part of Zurich headquartered WRM Capital. Other interested buyers are also believed to have examined a bid for Argor-Heraeus, including Japanese refining group Asahi and Swiss refining group MKS-PAMP, however, neither of these are thought to be in the running at this stage. Since this news is developing, details of the discussions and potential acquisition are still thin on the ground.

If Argor-Heraeus is acquired, it will mean that 3 of the 4 giant Swiss gold refineries will have been taken over within less than a year and a half of each other.

In July 2015, Indian headquartered Rajesh Exports, the world’s largest gold jewellery fabricator, announced the agreed acquisition of the giant Swiss gold refinery Valcambi. See BullionStar article “Swiss Gold Refineries and the sale of Valcambi” for full details. In July 2016, Japanese precious metals refiner Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo K.K , part of the Tanaka Precious Metals group, announced the agreed acquisition of Metalor Technologies, another of the large Swiss gold refineries. Retrospectively, the acquisition of Valcambi by Rajesh Exports now looks to have initiated a flurry of take-over activity in the normally low-key Swiss precious metals refining world.

While Metalor is based in Marin-Epagnier in the Canton of Neuchâtel in northwest Switzerland, the other 3 giant Swiss gold refineries, Argor-Heraeus, Valcambi and MKS-owned PAMP are all located literally within a few kilometres of each other in the Italian speaking Canton of Ticino, in southern Switzerland, near the Swiss-Italian border. Argor-Heraeus is in Mendrisio, Valcambi is in Balerna, and PAMP is in Castel San Pietro. Mendrisio is 4 kms from Balerna and 2kms from Castel San Pietro.


The Golden Triangle of Swiss gold refineries, Canton of Ticino

Argor-Heraeus is currently jointly-owned by German bank Commerzbank, German industrial and refining group Heraeus, the Austrian Mint, and Argor-Heraeus management. See BullionStar Gold University for a full profile of Argor-Heraeus.

Commerzbank owns 32.7% of Argor-Heraeus’ share capital. The Austrian Mint holds another 30% of Argor-Heraeus shares. In its annual report, Heraeus doesn’t reveal its holding in Argor-Heraeus, but with the Austrian Mint and Commerzbank owning a combined 62.7%, this means 40.2% of the shares are held by Heraeus and Argor-Heraeus management. On the Argor-Heraeus website, Heraeus is listed first on the shareholder list, which could signify that it’s the largest shareholder. This would put Heraeus’ shareholding above Commerzbank’s 32.7% stake, and mean that Argor-Heraeus management probably hold a shareholding somewhere below 7%.

A Precedent for Private Equity Ownership

Interestingly, there is a precedent of private equity ownership in the Swiss precious metals refining sector. Until Tanaka’s take-over of Metalor technologies last July, Metalor was majority owned by French private equity company Astorg Partners and Belgian private equity company Sofina, which between them held approximately 60% of Metalor’s shares. The remainer of Metalor’s shares were held by Metalor management, as well as by Martin Bisang and Daniel Schlatter. Bisang and Schlatter are connected with Swiss boutique investment bank Bellevue Group, which has in the past also acted as a strategic adviser to Metalor. Bisang had bought into Metalor in 1998 along with Swiss executives Ernst Thomke, Rolf Soiron and Giorgio Behr, and an additional group of Swiss executives bought into Metalor in 2004. These additional buyers were a secretive bunch, only known as the ‘Partners Only’, a group which was said by Swiss media at the time to have been connected to the Swiss Roche group.

Likewise, when Valcambi was sold to Rajesh Exports in July 2015, the then owners of Valcambi were a combination of US gold mining company Newmont (with an approximate 60% shareholding) and a group of shy Swiss private investors (who held the remaining shares) the largest of which were Emilio Camponovo and the Camponovo family. Technically, you could call these Swiss private investors direct private equity investors, or equivalent.

Even the PAMP refinery, which is owned by the Geneva based MKS-PAMP group, could be described as private equity, or at least concentrated privately-owned equity, since the group is controlled by the founding Shakarchi family. Note that MKS-PAMP has a parent company MKS PAMP Group BV based in Amsterdam, but this appears to be purely for corporate structure reasons.


The Sellers – Heraeus, Commerzbank and Austrian Mint

Since Argor-Heraeus has multiple owners, any sale would in theory be more complex than if the refinery only had a single owner. Looking quickly at the current owners, Commerzbank in its bullion banking marketing literature usually draws attention to the fact that its partial owner of a gold refinery, and uses this as a selling point by trumpeting the fact that it has direct connections to the physical gold world. Selling Argor would probably be a negative for Commerzbank, however, it may need the cash given that german banking is in a crisis at the moment. The Austrian Mint is owned by the Austrian central bank (OeNB), which in turn is owned by the Austrian State. Any sale of the Austrian Mint’s shares in Argor would be a one-off profit boost to the OeNB. In 2015, the Austrian Mint sold a stake it held in Casinos Austria (yes, a casino company), so maybe the Mint has a new-found strategy to jettison its non-core investments. Although presumably the Mint gets preferential precious metal supply from Argor, or one would think that it does.

Heraeus also has close relationships with Argor-Heraeus, for example, in the production of various precious metals products, so a sale by Heraeus of its stake in Argor could in theory affect these synergistic relationships. All of these shareholders also receive a substantial annual cash dividend from Argor-Heraeus which is a nice to have to say the least. Selling their stakes would obviously be a loss of their cash dividends. I personally was surprised that Argor-Heraeus would be up for sale, since it definitely has what looks like a very stable, secure and content set of shareholders. As per BullionDesk coverage of this potential deal, Commerzbank and Heraeus have yet to respond or comment on the potential sale of Argor-Heraeus.

Interested Parties in an Argor Bid

Presuming that the private equity company WRM CapInvest, as well as Asahi Refining, and MKS-PAMP all looked at potentially acquiring Argor-Heraeus (and that’s the word in the gold market right now), let’s have a quick look at these players.

The current Asahi Refining group, headed by Asahi Holdings, owns precious metals refinery operations in 5 locations worldwide, namely Tokyo, Salt lake City, Utah (US), Brampton, Ontario (Canada), Mexico City, and Santiago (Chile). Some readers will be familiar with Asahi’s takeover of the US and Canadian gold and silver refining operations of Johnson Matthey, which was completed in March 2015.  If Asahi had emerged as the favourite suitor to acquire Argor-Heraeus, it would mean that 2 Japanese headquartered precious metals refiners, Tanaka and Asahi, would both own a Swiss precious metals refinery, namely Metalor and Argor-Heraeus. Market sources indicate that Asahi’s bid value for Argor-Heraeus wasn’t as high as the bid tabled by the favoured private equity group bidder. Argor-Heraeus also operates a precious metals processing plant in Santiago in Chile, which could feasibly provide synergies to Asahi, since Asahi runs a refining operation in Santiago.

Its interesting that MKS-PAMP has been mentioned as a possible acquirer of Argor-Heraeus. As mentioned, the PAMP precious metals refinery is literally ‘down the road’ from the Argor-Heraeus refinery, i.e. 2 kms down the road. PAMP is a prestigious global brand in precious metals refining and bar production, and so is Argor-Heraeus. But would the resulting consolidation in the Swiss precious metals refining industry make sense, and how would this affect the PAMP and Argor-Heraeus brands. That’s a difficult question to answer, and only PAMP could accurately answer that at this time. Market sources say that MKS PAMP was shy in revealing its full financials, data that would presumably be necessary if it put in a bid for Argor-Heraeus.

Argor-Heraeus opened a new refining headquarters in Mendrisio in 2013 which doubled its former refining capacity. According to its 2014 corporate responsibility report, the new Argor-Heraeus refinery has an annual refining capacity for gold of between 350 and 400 tonnes. The PAMP refinery has an annual refining capacity of 450 tonnes of gold, and an annual silver refining capacity of over 600 tonnes.  A merged PAMP and Argor-Heraeus would have an annual refining capacity for gold of about 900 tonnes. Their neighbour Valcambi has an annual refining capacity for gold of 1600 tonnes. A combined PAMP and Argor-Heraeus would therefore start to approach the production capacity of Valcambi. Each of Valcambi and a combined PAMP ~ Argor would also have a refining presence in India also, since PAMP has an Indian refining joint-venture with MMTC, and Valcambi, owned by Rajesh Exports, has refining operations in India. Argor-Heraeus is also one of only five refinery members of the London Bullion Market Associations (LBMA) good delivery referee panel. PAMP is also on this panel, as is Metalor and Tanaka. This panel assists the LBMA is maintaining quality standards of refinery members worldwide. Argor-Heraeus is also a full member of the LBMA, one of the few refineries to be a full LBMA member.

Finally, turning to the private equity company WRM CapInvest, which is said by sources in the gold market to be the preferred bidder for Argor-Heraeus, what is known about this company? According to its website,  WRM CapInvest is a division of the WRM Capital group of companies. The WRM Group was founded by Raffaele Mincione, who is Italian, but who resides in Switzerland. WRM Group seems to have started as a private wealth management / family office type company but has expanded into private equity.

WRM CapInvest is based in Berkeley Square in Mayfair in London, Mayfair being a very popular location for hedge funds and private equity funds to locate in. WRM CapInvest was incorporated in the UK in March 2012 as Capital Investment Advisors Ltd, but changed name to WRM CapInvest on 11 May 2016. The original single director of WRM CapInvest was Massimo Cattizone, also an Italian. Massimo Cattizone and Raffaele Minicone were listed as shareholders, with Minicone holdings 80% of the WRM CapInvest shares and Cattizone holding 20% of the shares. In July 2013, Leonidas Klemos (Italian), and Michele Cerqua (Italian) were appointed as directors of WRM CapInvest, and Massimo Cattizone ceased to be a director. Between May 2014 and March 2015, Roberto Agostini (Italian) was also a director. In July 2015, Raffaele Minicone was appointed as a director. In February 2016, Leonidas Klemos ceased to be a director. By April 2016, Raffaele Minicone was listed as owning the entire share capital of WRM CapInvest. The current directors are therefore Raffaele Minicone and Michele Cerqua. The reason for listing the above is to highlight that all the directors of WRM CapInvest since it was incorporated have been Italian, and there is a Swiss connection since Raffaele Minicone is based in Switzerland, and the WRM Group is headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland.

Therefore, the fact that Argor-Heraeus is based in the Italian speaking Swiss Canton of Ticino, right beside the Italian border, and that CapInvest is operated by an Italian team, owned by an Italian, and part of a Swiss based group is probably of relevance to a potential acquisition of Argor by CapInvest. Additionally, Knight Frank, a large commercial real estate agent, mentioned on its website in a 2013 article that “CapInvest, which is also backed by private Italian investors, purchased 60 Sloane Avenue for US$206m.”

So the question is, assuming CapInvest acquires Argor-Heraeus, is it acquiring the company on behalf of CapInvest, or on behalf of some other Italian or Swiss investors, or Italian Swiss, or Swiss Italians? And if an acquisition is on behalf of other investors, who are these investors? Could the private investors who were involved in Metalor (such as Martin Bisang and his circle of business acquaintances), or the private investors that were involved in Valcambi (such as Emilio Camponovo and friends) be re-entering the Swiss refining industry with an acquisition of Argor-Heraeus. They would definitely be some of the best placed people around that understand how the precious metals refining industry works, given their experience. Or possibly the Argor-Heraeus management and other local business people in Ticino are moving to take ownership of Argor through a private equity route?

Another potential connection is UBS. Swiss investment bank UBS previously owned the Argor-Heraeus refinery, and only exited its shareholding in 1999, so it’s also possible that a UBS connection could pop up in a Argor-Heraeus acquisition deal. This has a precedent since when Valcambi was acquired by Rajesh Exports in 2015, Credit Suisse, which itself used to own Valcambi (and which Valcambi executives had close ties to), provided strategic corporate finance advice on the Valcambi acquisition and also actually partially funded the Rajesh acquisition.

Whatever the outcome of these developments with Argor-Heraeus, further details should emerge sooner rather than later. So, as they say, watch this space.

Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price – New Kid on the Block

Exactly 19 months to the day after the International Board of the Shanghai Gold Exchange (SGE) held its first full trading session on 19 September 2014, the Shanghai Gold Exchange launched the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price auction on 19 April 2016. In China, the number 19 is very auspicious since it consists of lucky number 1, which means origin or beginning, and lucky number 9 meaning everlasting, eternity, or longevity.

In another example of calculated Chinese planning, the SGE first announced plans to launch its own gold fixing auction on 11 March 2015. This was the week immediately prior to the launch of the LBMA Gold Price auction on 20 March 2015, an event which occurred without any Chinese banks being present in the initial participant list. This lack of Chinese banks as initial participants in the LBMA Gold Price auctions was despite the Chinese banks having made it clear in October 2014 that they wanted to be present in the London auction on launch day:

“It’s been very welcome to see that quite a few banks in China are very interested in taking part. They said they definitely wanted to be there on day one for gold” [Ruth Crowell, LBMA CEO, October 2014 interview with MetalBulletin quoted here]

Two Chinese banks eventually joined the LBMA Gold Price auction, Bank of China on 22 June 2015, and China Construction Bank on 30 October 2015, with Industrial and Commercial Bank of China(ICBC) tee’d up to join the LBMA Gold Price auction next month on 16 May 2016. However, sources in the gold market have indicated that the Chinese banks, and others, had difficulty establishing the necessary credit lines with the incumbent bullion banks that are a LBMA perquisite for being a direct participant in the LBMA auction. This need for bilateral credit lines between auction participants is not something that the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price suffers from, since it is using a central clearing model, something that the LBMA have paid lip-service to but that has never materialised (nor will it if the LBMA has its way).

SGE bar

The Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price – Details

The Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price, which I’ll abbreviate to SGE Gold Fix, is a twice daily auction held on SGE business days at 10:15 am and 2:15 pm (Beijing Time). All time zones in China are officially the same time zone (and run on Beijing Time), with Shanghai Time equivalent to Beijing Time.

The SGE Gold Fix auctions use the exchange code SHAU, and run on the electronic SGE trading platform using a ‘centralised pricing trading’ auction model. The auction is for physically-delivered 1 kg lots of 99.99% purity gold or higher, quoted in RMB per gram, with a tick size of RMB 0.01. Delivery is in the form of 1kg standard gold ingots of fineness 999.9 or higher at SGE certified vaults. For the SGE Gold Fix, standard gold is either gold from an SGE approved refinery, or gold from a LBMA approved refinery. Settlement / Delivery is two days after trade date i.e. T + 2.

At this juncture it is important to emphasise that the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price is a centrally cleared auction on the largest physical gold exchange in the world, that delivers real physical gold bars at any of the SGE’s 55 certified vaults. Shanghai Gold Exchange uses 55 certified vaults across 36 Chinese cities for gold storage. Unlike the LBMA Gold Price auction which just settles and clears its trades as unallocated gold that merely exists as a book-keeping entry in the database tables of the LPMCL’s AURUM system.

The objective of the SGE Gold Fix auction is to arrive at a ‘Benchmark Price’, which is a price at which supply and demand reach a balance, while allowing a certain imbalance (less than 400 kgs) to remain. The overall auction concept is therefore similar to the LBMA Gold Price auctions in London. However, there are many features unique to the Shanghai auction. The SGE Gold Fix involves a ‘Reference Price’ which is used as the auction’s initial opening price. This reference price is derived from prices entered into the trading system by two specific groups of auction members during a 5 minute pre-auction window period called the ‘Reference Price Submission Window’ which runs from 10:09 am – 10:14 am for the morning auction and from 2:09 pm – 2:14 pm for the afternoon auction.

These two sets of members are ‘Fixing Members’ and ‘Reference Price Members’. All of the Fixing members are financial institutions. The Reference Price members include gold mining companies and gold jewellery companies. The logic of obtaining opening reference prices from both fixing members and reference price members is that the SGE feels it will minimise price manipulation and price collusion since the reference prices submitted include a broader set of entities (i.e. include non-financial entities). This is a clever ‘checks and balances’ approach that is lacking in the LBMA Gold Price auction.

The Members

At launch, there are 12 Fixing Members and 6 Reference Price Members. The 12 Fixing Members are all banks, 10 of which are pure Chinese banks. These 10 Chinese banks are the Big 4 state-controlled banks in the Chinese Gold Market, namely Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and Agricultural Bank of China, followed by Bank of Communications, and also Industrial Bank, Ping An Bank, Bank of Shanghai, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and China Minsheng Bank.

The final Fixing members are local entities of 2 foreign banks, namely Standard Chartered Bank (China) and Australia and New Zealand Bank (China) (ANZ). Both Standard Chartered and ANZ hold gold import licenses into China, as does HSBC, however, there is no indication as of yet of HSBC becoming a Fixing Member. This is despite a report in January that China would penalise in some way a foreign bank with a gold import license if it did not join the SGE Gold Fix. Two of the 12 domestic bank holding gold import licenses, Everbright and China Merchants Bank, are also absent from the SGE Gold Fix member list. Perhaps in time, they, along with HSBC will sign up.

The 6 Reference Price members are Chow Tai Fook, one of Hong Kong’s largest jewellery companies and which also has a huge Chinese retail presence, China National Gold Group Corporation (China Gold), the largest of the Chinese gold mining companies, Shangdong Gold Group, another large Chinese gold miner, Shanghai Lao Feng Xiang, a large and well-known Chinese jewellery company, Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd, the RMB clearing bank in Hong Kong, and the SGE’s appointed settlement bank for the CGSE-SGE Gold Connect betwen the SGE and CGSE in the Hong Kong Gold Market, and MKS (Switzerland), the Swiss gold trading group that owns the PAMP gold refinery and also owns New York based MTB.

The above is just an initial list of participants that have joined so far. The SGE maintains that any qualified entity can join up in either the Fixing of Reference Price member categories. SGE stipulates that Fixing Member applicants are required to be financially-viable financial institutions that are either active on the SGE or active in the global gold market, while Reference Price applicants can meet one of a number of criteria such as “be a leading producer or consumer in the gold industry” or “be involved in the production, processing, trading, or investment of physical gold“.

SGE Benchmark

The Auction Mechanism

The Fixing members and Reference Price members submit initial reference prices. As to whether all members must submit a reference price is a moot point. Article 12.2 and 12.3 of the Rules for the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price Trading state that the Fixing and Reference Price members “must provide market reference price at the designated time before the start of centralized pricing-trading“, however, the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price White Paper (April 2016) describes a hierarchy of contingencies in deriving the reference price, two of which cover situations where less than 50% of members make a reference price submission.

The White Paper calculation methodology (algorithm) is as follows:

If > 50% of members submit a reference price, SGE calculates an arithmetic mean after disregarding the highest and lowest submitted price.

If < 50% of members submit a reference price, the SGE calculates an average (arithmetic mean) of all trades in the Au9999 spot gold contract that have been executed on the SGE during the timeframe for submitting reference prices.

If no trades were executed in the AU9999 during that time, the SGE takes the Shanghai Gold Reference Price from the previous trading session as the initial price. [this would be the previous afternoon benchmark price if applied to the morning pre-auction etc]

The Au9999 is the SGE busiest spot gold contractBased on this three-pronged approach, it would seem that the members are not all obliged to submit a reference price, otherwise the 50% threshold would never arise unless due to communication outages or similar. The only logical interpretation of the two documents is that if a member turns up to the auction (or logs in to the trading platform), then they are obliged to submit a reference price. If they don’t turn up, then there is no obligation. Notwithstanding this grey area, after the reference price is calculated the SGE then publishes the opening price.

Some readers will recall that ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) uses a ‘human’ chairperson to come up with the opening price in the LBMA Gold Price auction using a number of price sources that ICE Benchmark Administration will not divulge. Nor will ICE Benchmark Administration divulge the identities of the panel of chairpersons that it employs to chair the daily LBMA Gold Price auctions. Frankly, this is a disgrace and a scandal, and shows that the Chinese auction methodology is far more transparent that its London counterpart. My hunch is that there are names involved as chairpersons in the current LBMA Gold Price auction that were also involved in the former London Gold Market Fixing Limited company which operated the London Gold Fixing auctions. Otherwise, why keep the identities a secret. No mainstream financial journalists in London will touch this particular story, although they are all aware of it. See BullionStar blog “Six months on ICE – The LBMA Gold Price” for further details about the lack of transparency in the administration of the LBMA Gold Price auction.

Once the opening price of the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price is established using the calculated reference price, the auction begins, and participants and their clients submit their buy or sell orders and transaction volumes etc. The auction consists of a first round and possible subsequent rounds if supply and demand don’t reach a balance. There are two distinct time periods in each round, a ‘market tendering‘ session and a ‘supplementary tendering‘ session. The market tendering part is just the normal part of the round where all participants and their clients submit orders. The supplementary tendering session in each round only applies to the Fixing members, and allows them to submit supplementary orders against the remaining imbalanced quantity so as to try to reduce the imbalance to less than 400 kgs and so speed up the auction, because if the imbalance is shrunk to under 400 kgs, there is no need for an additional round(s).

The first round  consists of  a 1 minute market tendering session + a supplementary tendering session of 10 seconds. If the price is not balanced after the first round, the SGE trading system will adjust the price upwards or downwards depending on buy and sell orders, and then a new round begins. Any and all subsequent rounds consist of 30 seconds duration of a market tendering session + 10 seconds of a supplementary tendering session.

Once the imbalance is less than 400 kgs, it is shared out among the Fixing members. The price is then said to be balanced and the SGE then publishes the benchmark price. The ‘Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price’ now has its own web page on the SGE website here, with daily price lookup, daily, monthly and annual charting (which will make sense when the auction has been running for a while), and Trading Rules, Contract Spec and Q & A (to be uploaded, but some of which are already detailed in the Rules and White Paper linked above).

SGE Surveillance Committee

The SGE has also created an Oversight Committee to monitor and oversee the auction’s functioning. This Committee currently comprises 11 representatives from 9 organisations. Although the names of the representatives have not yet been published, the names of their organisations have. The SGE will have 3 representatives, and the 8 other entities will each have 1 representative. The list is as follows

  1. SGE  3
  2. ICBC  1
  3. Bank of China  1
  4. Standard Chartered Bank (China)  1
  5. ANZ Bank (China)  1
  6. China Gold Coin Corporation  1
  7. Baird Mint  1
  8. China Gold Association  1
  9. World Gold Council  1

Of the list of 11, seven reps come from pure Chinese entities, with the remaining four from two foreign banks, the World Gold Council and ‘Baird Mint’. All represented entities have connections with the SGE except it seems Baird.

The Oversight Committee’s remit is to monitor trading, clearing, delivery, in terms with SGE rules, analyse trading behaviour, examine conflicts of interest etc.

Central Clearing

The SGE uses central clearing of the trades executed in the SGE Gold Fix auctions and so there is no credit risk between participants. Under central clearing, the exchange becomes the counterparty to all buyers and sellers. This also avoids the need for participants to maintain bilateral credit arrangements with each other, and so easily allows the number of auction participants to grow, even exponentially. The lack of central clearing in the LBMA Gold Price auction is a huge barrier to entry for non-bullion bank participants and has been kept as such by the LBMA, even though ICE offers central clearing and has been well able to implement a centrally cleared model from Day 1 in March 2015. See ICE Executive Summary which summarises the winning ICE bid for the LBMA Gold Price wherein ICE discusses “moving to a centrally cleared model“.

The Purpose of the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price

The Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price is but one more step in the growth and deregulation of the Chinese gold industry, and the internationalisation and extended use of the RMB. Much of this scene was set back in 2000 at the China Gold Economic Forum. It’s also a natural step for a country that is the largest gold producer, gold consumer and gold importer on earth. The SGE Gold Fix also provides China with a real role in global gold price discovery and creates the first proper transparent RMB denominated gold price benchmark, calculated within a centralised trading auction setting on an exchange.

An RMB gold price benchmark aids risk management and hedging in the domestic gold sector, and can also now be used within Chinese gold-backed derivative products, a function which the SGE has explicitly mentioned. So expect financial products to appear that use the Shanghai Gold Benchmark Price as a reference or valuation price. In China, where gold is correctly recognised as the ultimate money, there is also the prestige of having an internationally known global gold price benchmark, that will, in SGE’s words “enhance China’s voice in the global gold pricing market”.

In its White Paper, the SGE states that “the relationship between Shanghai Gold and Loco London Gold is non-competitive”, and it lists a number of reasons why this, on paper, is so, such as the London auction is for the OTC trading of 400 oz bars of 99.5 purity quoted in USD, while the Shanghai auction is Exchange-based trading for 1 kg bars of 99.99 purity quoted in RMB. While this is true, these are only ‘contract spec’ differences, and having a PBoC controlled gold benchmark that is not in London and not under the control of LPMCL clearing banks and the Bank of England is a much bigger change than purely differing contract specs.

The Chinese play a long patient game and more often than not just go ahead and do things / make things instead of just talking about doing things. The SGE and the PBoC have now set up another part of the infrastructure that can in time play a critical role in the global gold market as the Renminbi begins to internationalise. Whenever the Chinese Government and PBoC move to allow gold to be officially exported, this will really boost the new kid on the block benchmark.

I would not think that the Chinese will want to make waves with this Shanghai benchmark in the near future that would explicitly jeopardise their relationships with the London Gold Market. The fact that the luminaries of the global gold world were at the SGE Gold Fix launch ceremony and the China Gold Market Summit Forum on 19 April, much like they were at the launch of the SGE International Board in September 2014, attests to the fact that large players such as the World Gold Council, LBMA, MKS, ANZ and Standard Chartered are very much in a cooperative relationship with the SGE, the China Gold Association and the large Chinese banks. As the Chinese Gold Market continues to evolve, my view is that the Shanghai Gold Price Benchmark will naturally move into the ascendancy, and that its physical gold price discovery influence will subtly begin to show up the London Gold Market’s trading weaknesses (i.e. small % of physical traded), or alternatively, the Chinese will at some stage call time-out when ready, and allow the Shanghai Gold Price Benchmark to really shift up a gear to generate physical gold prices that will disconnect from the COMEX and LBMA pass the parcel shenanigans.