Tag Archives: IMF

IMF Gold Sales – Where ‘Transparency’ means ‘Secrecy’

Welcome to the twilight zone of IMF gold sales, where transparency really means secrecy, where on-market is off-market, and where IMF gold sales documents remain indefinitely “classified” and out of public view due to the “sensitivity of the subject matter”.

Off and On Market

Between October 2009 and December 2010, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claims to have sold a total of 403.3 tonnes of gold at market prices using a combination of ‘off-market’ sales and ‘on-market’ sales. ‘Off-market’ gold sales are gold sales to either central banks or other official sector gold holders that are executed directly between the parties, facilitated by an intermediary. For now, we will park the definition of ‘on-market’ gold sales, since as you will see below, IMF ‘on-market’ gold sales in reality are nothing like the wording used to describe them. In total, this 403.3 tonnes of gold was purportedly sold so as to boost IMF financing arrangements as well as to facilitate IMF concessional lending to the world’s poorest countries. As per its Articles of Agreement, IMF gold sales have to be executed at market prices.

Critically, the IMF claimed on numerous occasions before, during and after this 15-month sales period that its gold sales process would be ‘Transparent. In fact, the concept of transparency was wheeled out by the IMF so often in reference to these gold sales, that it became something of a mantra. As we will see below, there was and is nothing transparent about the IMF’s gold sales process, but most importantly, the IMF blocked and continues to block access to crucial IMF board documents and papers that would provide some level of transparency about these gold sales.

Strauss-Kahn – Yes, that guy

On 18 September 2009, the IMF announced that its Executive Board had approved the sale of 403.3 metric tonnes of gold. Prior to these sales, the IMF officially claimed to hold 3217.3 tonnes of gold. Commenting on the gold sales announcement, notable party attendee and then IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn stated:

“These sales will be conducted in a responsible and transparent manner that avoids disruption of the gold market.”

The same IMF announcement on 18 September 2009 also stated that:

“As one of the elements of transparency, the Fund will inform markets before any on-market sales commence. In addition, the Fund will report regularly to the public on the progress with the gold sales.”

DSK has left the building
DSK has left the building

On 2 November 2009, the IMF announced the first transaction in its gold sales process, claiming that it had sold 200 tonnes of gold to the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in what it called an ‘off-market’ transaction. This transaction was said to have been executed over 10 trading days between Monday 19 November to Friday 30 November with sales transactions priced each day at market prices prevailing on that day. On average, the 200 tonne sales transaction would amount to 20 tonnes per day over a 10 day trading period.

Note that the Reserve Bank of India revealed in 2013 that this 200 tonne gold purchase had merely been a book entry transfer, and that the purchased gold was accessible for use in a US Dollar – Gold swap, thereby suggesting that the IMF-RBI transaction was executed for gold held at the Bank of England in London, which is the only major trading center for gold-USD swaps. As a Hindu Business Line article stated in August 2013:

“According to RBI sources, the gold that India bought never came into the country as the transaction was only a book entry. The gold was purchased for $6.7 billion, in cash.”

“The Reserve Bank of India bought 200 tonnes of gold for $1,045 an ounce from the IMF four years ago. The Government can swap it for US dollars,” said [LBMA Chairman David] Gornall.”

Two weeks after the Indian purchase announcement in November 2009, another but far smaller off-market sale was announced by the IMF on 16 November 2009, this time a sale of 2 tonnes of gold to the Bank of Mauritius (the Mauritian central bank), said to have been executed on 11 November 2009. Another two weeks after this, on 25 November 2009, the IMF announced a third official sector sales transaction, this time a sale of 10 tonnes of gold to the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.

Overall, these 3 sales transactions, to the Reserve Bank of India, Bank of Mauritius and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, totalled 212 tonnes of gold, and brought the IMF’s remaining official gold holdings down to 3005.3 tonnes at the end of 2009, leaving 191.3 tonnes of the 403.3 tonnes remaining to sell. All 3 of the above announcements by the IMF were accompanied by the following statement:

“The Fund will inform markets before any on-market sales commence, and will report regularly to the public on progress with the gold sales.”

For nearly 3 months from late November 2009, there were no other developments with the IMF’s  gold sales until 17 February 2010, at which point the IMF announced that it was to begin the ‘on-market’ portion of its gold sales program. At this stage you might be wondering what the IMF’s on-market gold sales consisted of, which ‘market’ it referred to, how were the sales marketed, who the buyers were, and who executed the sales transactions. You would not be alone in wondering about these and many other related questions.

The IMF’s press releases of 17 February 2010, titled ‘IMF to Begin On-Market Sales of Gold’ was bereft of information and merely stated that the IMF would “shortly initiate the on-market phase of its gold sales program” following “the approach adopted successfully by the central banks participating in the Central Bank Gold Agreement“, and that the sales would be “conducted in a phased manner over time”. The third Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA) ran from September 2009 to September 2014. These CBGA’s, which have been running since September 1999, ostensibly claim to support and not disrupt the gold market but in reality have, in their entirety, been highly secretive operations where vast amounts of central bank and official sector gold is channeled via the BIS to unspecified buyers in the bullion banks or central bank space, with the operations having all the hallmarks of gold price stabilization operations, and/or official sector gold redistribution between the world’s developed and emerging market central banks.

The February 2010 announcement also made the misleading claim that “the IMF will continue to provide regular updates on progress with the gold sales through its normal reporting channels”. These regular updates have never happened.

An article titled “IMF ‘On-Market’ Gold Sales Move Ahead” in the ‘IMF Survey Magazine’, also dated 17 February 2010 reiterated this spurious transparency claim:

Transparent approach

The IMF publicly announced each official sale shortly after the transaction was concluded. A high degree of transparency will continue during the sales of gold on the market, in order to assure markets that the sales are being conducted in a responsible manner.”

However, following this February 2010 lip service to transparency, there were no direct updates from the IMF exclusively about the on-market gold sales, even after the entire gold sales program had completed in December 2010.

One further IMF ‘off-market’ gold sale transaction was announced on 9 September 2010. This was a sale of 10 tonnes of gold to Bangladesh Bank (the Bangladeshi central bank) with the transaction said to have been executed on 7 September 2010. Adding this 10 tonnes to the previous 212 tonnes of off-market sales meant that 222 tonnes of the 403.3 tonne total was sold to central banks, with the remaining 181.3 tonnes sold via ‘on-market’ transactions. The Bangladesh announcement was notable in that it also revealed that “as of end July 2010, a further 88.3 metric tons had been sold under the on-market sales announced in February 2010″. The addition of Bangladesh to the off-market buyer list that already consisted of India, Sri Lanka and Mauritius also resulted in the quite bizarre situation where the only off-market buyers of IMF comprised 4 countries that have extremely close historical, political, cultural and economic connections with each other. Three of these countries, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, are represented at the IMF by the same Executive Director, who  from November 2009 was Arvind Virmani, so their buying decisions were most likely coordinated through Virmani and probably through the Reserve Bank of India as well.

On 21 December 2010, the IMF issued a press release titled ‘IMF Concludes Gold Sales’ which stated:

“The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced today the conclusion of the limited sales program covering 403.3 metric tons of gold that was approved by the Executive Board in September 2009.”

“The gold sales were conducted under modalities to safeguard against disruption of the gold market. All gold sales were at market prices, including direct sales to official holders.”

‘Modalities’ in this context just means the attributes of the sales including the approach to the gold sales, i.e. the sales strategy. This brief announcement on 21 December 2010 was again bereft of any factual information such as which market was used for the ‘on-market’ gold sales, the identity of executing brokers, the identity of counterparties, transaction dates, settlement dates / deferred settlement dates, method of sale, information on whether bullion was actually transferred between parties, publication of weight lists, and other standard sales transaction details. Contrast this secrecy to the 1976 -1980 IMF gold sales which were conducted by a very public series auction, and which were covered in minute details by the financial publications of the time.

As usual with its treatment of official sector gold transactions, the World Gold Council’s Gold Demand Trends report, in this case its Q4 2010 report, was absolutely useless as a source of information about the IMF gold sales beyond regurgitating the press release details, and there was no discussion on how the gold was sold, who the agent was, who the buyers were etc etc.

Lip Service to Transparency

When the IMF’s ‘on-market’ sales of 191.3 tonnes of gold commenced in February – March 2010, there were attempts from various quarters to try to ascertain actual details of the sales process. Canadian investment head Eric Sprott even expressed interest in purchasing the entire 191.3 tonnes on behalf of the then newly IPO’d Sprott Physical Gold ETF. However, Sprott’s attempts to purchase the gold were refused by the IMF, and related media queries attempting to clarify the actual sales process following the IMF’s blockade of Sprott were rebuffed by the IMF.

A Business Insider article from 6 April 2010, written by Vince Veneziani and titled “Sorry Eric Sprott, There’s No Way You’re Buying Gold From The IMF”, lays out the background to this bizarre stone-walling and lack of cooperation by the IMF. Business Insider spoke to Alistair Thomson, the then external relations officer at the IMF (now Deputy Chief of Internal Communications, IMF), and asked Thomson why Sprott could not purchase the gold that was supposedly available in the ‘on-market’ sales. Thomson’s reply is summarised below:

“The IMF is only selling gold though a qualified agent. There is only one of these agents at the moment and due to the nature of the gold market, they won’t reveal who or what that agent is.”

“Sprott can’t buy the gold directly because they do not deal with institutional clients like hedge funds, pension funds, etc. The only buyers can be central bankers and sovereign nations, that sort of thing.”

The IMF board agreed months ago how they wanted to approach the sale of the gold. Sprott is welcome to buy from central banks who have bought from the IMF, but not from the IMF directly.”

While this initial response from the IMF’s Alistair Thomson contradicted the entire expectation of the global gold market which had been earlier led to believe that the ‘on-market’ gold sales were just that, sales of gold to the market, on the market, Thomson’s reply did reveal that the IMF’s ‘on-market’ gold sales appeared to be merely an exercise in using an agent, most likely the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) gold trading desk, to transfer IMF gold to a central bank or central banks that wished to remain anonymous, and not go through the publicity of the ‘off-market’ transfer process.

Although, as per usual, the servile and useless mainstream media failed to pick up on this story, the IMF’s unsatisfactory and contradictory response was deftly dissected by Chris Powell of GATA in a dispatch, also dated 6 April 2010. After discussing the IMF’s initial reply with Eric Sprott and GATA, Business Insider’s Vince Veneziani then went back to IMF spokesman Alistair Thomson with a series of reasonable and totally legitimate questions about the ‘on-market’ gold sales process.

Veneziani’s questions to the IMF are documented in his follow-up Business Insider article titled “Five Questions About Gold The IMF Refuses To Answer”, dated 27 April 2010. These questions included:

  • What are the incentives for the IMF not to sell gold on the open market or to investors, be it institutional or retail?
  • Did gold physically change hands with the banks you have sold to so far or was the transaction basically bookkeeping stuff (the IMF still holds the physical gold in this case)?
  • Are there available records on the actual serial numbers of bullion? How is the gold at the IMF tracked and accounted for?
  • Does IMF support a need for total transparency in the sale of gold despite the effects it could have on various markets?

Shockingly, Alistair Thomson, supposedly the IMF press officer responsible for answering the public’s queries about IMF finances (including gold sales), arrogantly and ignorantly refused to answer any of the questions, replying:

“I looked through your message; we don’t have anything more for you on this.”

Another example of the world of IMF transparency, where black is white and white is black, and where press officers who have formerly worked in presstitute financial media organisations such as Thomson Reuters fit in nicely to the IMF’s culture of aloofness, status quo protection, and lack of accountability to the public.

International Monetary Fund

Monthly Report on Sales of Gold on the Market

Fast forward to July 2015. While searching for documents in the IMF online archives related to these gold sales, I found 3 documents dated 2010, titled “Monthly Report on Sales of Gold on the Market“. Specifically, the 3 documents are as follows (click on links to open):

Each of these 3 documents is defined by the IMF as a Staff Memorandum (SM), which are classified as ‘Executive Board Documents’ under its disclosure policy. The IMF Executive Board consists of 24 directors in addition to the IMF Managing Director, who was in 2009 the aforementioned Dominique Strauss-Kahn. According to the IMF’s Executive Board synopsis web page, the board “carries out its work largely on the basis of papers prepared by IMF management and staff.

IMF SB March 2010

The most interesting observation about these 3 documents, apart from their contents which we’ll see below, is the fact that only 3 of these documents are accessible in the IMF archives, i.e. the documents only run up to May 2010, and do not include similar documents covering the remainder of the ‘on-market’ sales period (i.e. May – December 2010). Therefore there are 7 additional monthly reports missing from the archives. That there are additional documents that have not been published was confirmed to me by IMF Archives staff – see below.

Each of the 3 reports is only 3 pages long, and each report follows a similar format. The first report spans February – March 2010, specifically from 18 February 2010 to 17 March 2010, and covers the following:

summarizes developments in the first month of the on-market sales, covering market developments, quantities sold and average prices realized, and a comparison with widely used benchmarks, i.e., the average of London gold market fixings

‘Market developments’ refers to a brief summary in graphical chart of the London fixing prices in US Dollars over the period in question. Quantities sold and the currency composition of sales are notable:

Sales Volume and Proceeds: A total of 515,976.638 troy ounces (16.05 metric tons) of gold was sold during the period February 18 to March 17. These sales generated proceeds of SDR 376.13 million (US$576.04 million), based on the Fund’s representative exchange rates prevailing on the day of each sale transaction.

Currency Composition of Proceeds: Sales were conducted in the four currencies included in the SDR valuation basket …., with the intention of broadly reflecting the relative quota shares of these currencies over the course of the sales program.

The 4 currencies in which the sales were conducted during the first month were USD, EUR, GBP and JPY. See table 1 in the document for more information. Perhaps the most revealing point in each document is the confirmation of the use of an agent and specifically an arrangement that the sales prices included a premium paid by the agent:

Sales Prices compared with Benchmarks: The sales were implemented as specified in the agreement with the agent. Sales were conducted at prices incorporating a premium paid by the agent over the London gold fixing, and for sales settled in currencies other than the U.S. dollar, the sales price also reflects market exchange rates at the time of the London gold fixings (10:30 am and 3:00 pm GMT), net of a cost margin.

The use of a premium over the London fixing price is very revealing because this selling strategy, where the agent paid a premium over the average London gold fixing price, is identical to the sales arrangement which the Swiss National Bank (SNB) agreed with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) when the BIS acted as sales agent for SNB gold sales over the period May 2000 to March 2001.

As Philipp Hildebrand, ex-governor of the SNB, revealed in 2005 when discussing the SNB gold sales strategy that had been used in 2000-2001:

“At the outset, the SNB decided to use the BIS as its selling agent. Between May 2000 and March 2001, the BIS sold 220 tonnes on behalf of the SNB. For the first 120 tonnes, the SNB paid the BIS a fixed commission while the performance risk resided with the SNB. For the next 100 tonnes, the BIS agreed to pay the average price of the AM and PM London gold fixing plus a small fixed premium.

My conclusion is therefore that the IMF also used the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland  as selling agent for its ‘on-market’ gold sales over the period February to December 2010, with the sales benchmarked to average London fixing prices in the London Gold Market.

The pertinent details for the IMF’s March – April sales document are as follows:

“A total of 516,010.977 troy ounces (16.05 metric tons) of gold was sold during the period March 18 to April 16.” 

“Sales were conducted in three of the four currencies included in the SDR valuation basket” i.e. USD, EUR and JPY”

The relevant details from the April – May sales document are as follows:

“A total of 490,194.747 troy ounces (15.25 metric tons) of gold was sold during the period April 19 to May 18, 2010; no sales were conducted during the last two business days in April, owing to end of financial year audit considerations.”

“Sales were conducted in three of the four currencies included in the SDR valuation basket” i.e. USD, GBP and JPY

Purely a Pricing Exercise?

The entire ‘on-market’ gold sales program of 181.3 tonnes may well have been just a pricing exercise by the Bank for International Settlements gold trading desk to determine the market prices at which to execute the transfers, with the gold transferring ownership after the event as book entry transfers at the Bank of England in the same manner as was applied to the Indian ‘off-market’ purchase of 200 tonnes.

Taking the sales quantities in the 3 published monthly reports, and incorporating quarterly IMF gold holdings time series data from the World Gold Council, it’s possible to calculate how much gold was ‘sold’ each single day over the entire ‘on-market’ gold sales program. As it turns out, for much of the program’s duration, identical quantities of gold were sold each and every day.  The ‘on-market’ program commenced on 18 February 2010. Between 18 February and 17 March, which was a period of 20 trading days in the London gold market, the agent sold  515,976.638 troy ounces (16.05 metric tons) of gold. Between 18 March and 16 April, which was also a trading period of 20 trading days (even after factoring in 2 Easter bank holidays), the agent sold a practically identical quantity of 516,010.977 troy ounces (also 16.05 metric tons). This is a daily sales rate of 25,800 ozs or 0.8025 tonnes per trading day over these 40 trading days.

During the period from 19 April to 18 May 2010, which was 19 trading days excluding the 3rd May UK bank holiday and excluding the last 2 trading days of April on which the IMF program didn’t trade, the agent sold 490,194.747 troy ounces (15.25 metric tons) of gold, which again is…wait for it… 0.8025 tonnes and 25,800 ozs per day (0.8025  * 19 = 15.2475 tonnes & 25,800 * 19 = 490,200 ozs).

Following the combined Indian, Mauritian, and Sri Lankan ‘off-market’ purchases of 212 tonnes during Q4 2009, the IMF’s gold holdings stood at 3,005.32 tonnes at the end of 2009. Based on World Gold Council (WGC) quarterly data of world official gold reserves, the IMF’s gold holdings then decreased as follows during 2010:

– 24.08 MT (Q1) – 47.34 MT (Q2) – 67.66 MT (Q3) – 52.2 MT (Q4) =  – 191.28 metric tonnes (MT)

…resulting in total remaining gold holdings of  2,814.04 tonnes at the end of 2010, an IMF gold holdings figure which remains unchanged to this day.

These WGC figures tally with the IMF monthly report figures. For example, the IMF says that 16.05 tonnes was sold up to and including 17 March, and with another 10 trading days in March 2010, a further 8.205 tonnes (0.8025 daily sales * 10) was sold by the end of March, giving total Q1 sales of 16.05 + 8.025 = 24.075 tonnes, which is identical to the WGC quarterly change figure. The IMF was active on 59 trading days in Q2 during which it sold 47.34 tonnes, which…wait for it…was an average of 0.8024 tonnes per day (47.34 / 59 = 0.8024).

Therefore, over Q1 and Q2 2010 (i.e. between February and the end of June 2010), the ‘on-market’ sales program sold 71.42 tonnes at a consistent ~ 0.8025 tonnes daily rate. This would suggest an algorithmic program trade which offered identical quantities each and every day, or more likely just priced these quantities so as to arrive at a sales consideration amount so that the IMF would receive ‘market prices’ for its gold. Recall that IMF gold has to be sold at market prices according to the Fund’s Articles of Agreement.

Given that 88.3 tonnes had been sold ‘on-market’ by the end of July 2010 as the IMF revealed in its Bangladesh announcement, we can infer that 16.88 tonnes was sold ‘on-market’ during July 2010. This 16.88 tonne sale in July was actually at a slightly lower pace than previous months since there were 22 trading days in July 2010, however the figure was chosen due to the following: With 191.3 tonnes on sale at the outset of the ‘on-market’ program, and 71.42 tonnes sold by the end of June, this left 119.88 tonnes to sell at the end of June. Whoever was choosing the monthly sales quantities wanted to finish July with a round figure of 103 tonnes, and so chose 16.88 tonnes to sell in July (i.e. 119.88 – 16.88 = 103 tonnes). Subtracting the 10 tonnes that Bangladesh bought in September 2010 (which would have been also factored in at that time) left a round 93 tonnes (2.999 million ozs) to sell as of the beginning of August.

The Q3 2010 sales of 67.66 tonnes comprised the 10 tonne ‘off-market’ sale to Bangladesh on 7 September and 57.66 tonnes of on-market sales. Given 16.88 tonnes sold in on-market sales in July, there was therefore 40.78 tonnes sold over August – September, or an average of 20.39 tonnes in each of August and September (which represented a combined 43 trading days). Overall, there were 65 trading days in Q3 and 58 trading days in Q4 (assuming that the sales wrapped up on 21 December as per the IMF announcement). From the beginning of August to the 21 December, a period of 101 trading days, the IMF sold the remaining 93 tonnes, which would be a daily sales pace of 0.93 tonnes per day.

So overall, the IMF’s 403.3 tonnes of gold sales between November 2009 and December 2010 consisted of 222 tonnes sold ‘off-market’ to India, Bangladesh, Sri lanka, and Mauritius, 88.3 tonnes sold ‘on-market’ between February and July 2010, and 93 tonnes sold ‘on-market’ between August and December 2010′.

Given that the IMF’s 4 gold depositories are the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank of England in London, the Banque de France in Paris and the Reserve Bank of India in Nagpur India, and given that the IMF gold in New York is mostly in the form of US Assay Office melts, and the gold in Nagpur is a hodgepodge of mostly low quality old gold (read non-good delivery gold), then it would be logical for the IMF to sell some of its good delivery gold which is stored in London (which, until at least the late 1970s, was predominantly held in the form of Rand Refinery 400 oz gold bars), or even in Paris, since the Banque de France has been engaged in an ongoing program of upgrading the old US Assay office gold bars in its custody to good delivery bars.

As the Banque de France’s Alexandre Gautier commented in his 2013 speech to the LBMA annual conference in Rome:

“Our bars are not all LGD [London Good Delivery quality], but we have an ongoing improvement programme.”

This Banque de France gold bar upgrading program was also confirmed in February 2011 in a National Geographic Magazine article which stated:

“Buyers don’t want the beat-up American gold. In a nearby room pallets of it are being packed up and shipped to an undisclosed location, where the bars will be melted down and recast in prettier forms.”

Magic 7

Top Secret Foot Notes

There are 2 interesting footnotes on page 1 or each of the 3 above documents. The first footnote states that ‘The Executive Board was briefed on the plans for on-market sales prior to the announcement’, the announcement in question being the IMF’s 17 February 2010 announcement IMF to Begin On-Market Sales of Gold.

The second footnote, which is a footnote to a sales process and sales performance summary, refers to 2 further IMF papers as follows: “Modalities for Limited Sales of Gold by the Fund (SM/09/243, 9/4/09) and DEC/14425-(09/97), 9/18/09“.

Footnotes IMF SM gold sales on market
Footnote ‘2’ of IMF ‘monthly gold sales’ documents, February – May 2010

As mentioned above, SM are Staff Memorandums which are classed under Executive Board Documents. DEC series document are ‘Text of Board Decisions’ (hence the DEC) and these documents are also deemed to be Executive Board Documents. After searching for both of these documents (SM/09/243 and DEC/14425-(09/97)) in the IMF archives, it became apparent that they were not there, i.e. they were not returned and not retrievable under IMF archive search results.

This was surprisingly since the IMF claims to have what it calls its “IMF Open Archives Policy”, part of which is Article IX, Section 5, which is the “Review of the Fund’s Transparency Policy—Archives Policy“. This policy, prepared by the IMF Legal Department includes the following:

Access will be given as follows:

  • 2. (i) Executive Board documents that are over 3 years old

(ii) Minutes of Executive Board meetings that are over 5 years old;

(iv) Other documentary materials maintained in Fund archives over 20 years old.

  • 3. Access to Fund documents specified in paragraph 2 above that are classified as “Secret” or “Strictly Confidential” as of the date of this Decision will be granted only upon the Managing Director’s consent to their declassification. It is understood that this consent will be granted in all instances but those for which, despite the passage of time, it is determined that the material remains highly confidential or sensitive.

Given that the 2 above gold sales documents, as well as 7 other monthly reports about ‘on-market’ gold sales were missing from the archives, but all the while the IMF claimed its on-market gold sales to be “Transparent”, the next logical step was to contact the IMF Archives people and seek explanations. What follows below is the correspondence I had with the IMF Archives staff. The IMF Archives staff were very helpful and their responses were merely communicating what they had found in their systems or had been told ‘from above’. My questions and emails are in blue text. The IMF replies are in red text. My first set of queries were about the SM/09/243 and DEC/14425 documents:

02 August 2015: My first question

Hello Archives,

I’m looking for IMF document SM/09/243 “Modalities for Limited Sales of Gold by the Fund” (Sept 4th 2009) in the IMF Archives catalog (http://archivescatalog.imf.org/search.aspx). However, SM/09/243 does not appear to be in the online Archives.
 
But, for example SM/09/242 and SM/09/244 are both retrievable in the searchable archives, but not SM/09/243.
 
Can you clarify where SM/09/243 is?
 
02 August 2015: My second question
Hello Archives,

 
Could you clarify how to search for and retrieve a document in the IMF online Archives that has reference “DEC/14425-(09/97)”
 
This document is dated 9/18/09.  I cannot find it using any of the search parameters.
 

3 August: IMF Archives reply

Thank you for contacting the IMF Archives. Both documents you are referring to in your recent communication, SM/09/243 and DEC/14425, are not available to the public. Please visit our website to consult on IMF Policy on Access to the Archives.

3 August: me

Can you clarify why these documents are not available to the public? i.e. have they received a certain classification?

4 August: IMF Archives

You are absolutely right, despite the time rule, these two documents are still closed because of the information security classification.  We hope it answers your question.

4 August: me

Thanks for answer. Would you happen to know when (and if) these files will be available…..assuming it’s not a 20 year rule or anything like that.

5 August: IMF Archives

Could you please provide some background information about your affiliation and the need to obtain these documents.  Classified documents undergo declassification process when such a request is submitted.  It can be a lengthy process up to one year.

5 August: me

I was interested in these specific documents because I am researching IMF gold sales for various articles and reports that I’m planning to write.

6 Aug: IMF

Thank you for providing additional information regarding your inquiry.  Please send us a formal request for the declassification of these two documents specifying your need to have access to them.  We will follow through on your behalf and get back to you with a response.

Before I had replied with a formal request, the IMF archives people contacted me again on 12 August 2015 as follows:

12 Aug: IMF

While waiting for your official request we made preliminary inquiries regarding the requested documents. The decision communicated back to us is not to declassify these documents because of the sensitivity of the subject matter.

In the meantime, we want to make sure you have checked publicly available documents on the same topic accessible from the IMF.org: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09310.htm

12 August: me

Thank you for the clarification. That’s surprising about the classification given that the IMF on-market gold sales were supposed to be transparent.

Was there any information fed back to Archives on why the ‘subject matter’ is deemed sensitive?

14 Aug: IMF Archives

“Thank you for your follow-up email.  Unfortunately, these particular documents are still deemed classified and no further explanation has been communicated to the Archives.

My next set of questions to IMF Archives in August 2015 addressed the 7 missing monthly gold sales reports that should have covered May – December 2010. Since there is a 3 year rule or maybe at max a 5 year rule under the IMF’s Transparency Policy (Archive Policy), I thought that maybe the May/June, June/July, and July/August 2010 files might be due for  automatic release under the 5 year rule by the end of August 2015.

22 August 2015: Me:

“I have a question about documents which appear in the online Archive after the 5 year schedule.

Is there a scheduled update or similar which puts newly available documents in the Archive when the 5 years has elapsed?

For example, I see some documents in the Archive from June 2010, but not July/August 2010. Is there an automated process that runs, but that hasn’t yet run for July/August 2010, that puts the latest documents into the publicly available Archive?”

24 August: IMF

“Thank you for your inquiry.  The review and declassification of eligible documents that meet the time rule is done by batches. Therefore, publication does not happen in real time.  It is a process that takes time and might cause a delay.  We will let you know when July and August documents are posted.”

2 October 2015: me

“Do you know when documents from June 2010 onwards will be added to the IMF online archive? I still don’t see any yet.

Is there a batch of declassifications for June 2010 / July 2010 / August 2010 happening soon?”

2 October: IMF

“Thank you for contacting the IMF Archives. Unfortunately, we are unable to speculate about the documents website availability and provide a more specific timeframe than the one already communicated in the attached correspondence. As already promised, we will let you know when July and August documents are posted.”

Then about 30 minutes later  (on 2 October 2015) the IMF sent me another email:

2 October: IMF

“Dear Mr. Manly,

I ran a sample search of Executive Board minutes available via IMF Archives catalog and was able to find minutes issued in June and July 2010. Is there a specific document you are looking for which you are unable to find?

Sincerely”

2 October: Me

“I was searching for the next months’ reports in the below series, report name “Monthly Report on Sales of Gold on the Market” – see screenshot attached.

The current search retrieval brings back 3 reports spanning February- May 2010, but nothing after May 2010. Report names in the retrieved search results are:

SM/10/69
SM/10/102
SM/10/139”

I was wondering if a couple of months in this series after May 2010 are available now?”

5 October: IMF

The reports after May 2010 haven’t been declassified for public access because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, and therefore they are not available for retrieval.

We apologize for any inconvenience this may cause.”

5 October: Me

“Thanks for the reply. Out of interest, why were the reports from February to May 2010 declassified, since surely the June-December 2010 monthly reports are identical to the first three months in that they are also just providing monthly updates on the same batch of gold ~180 tonnes of gold which was being sold over the 10 month period?”

7 October: IMF

“Dear Mr. Manly,

This series of reports is under review at the moment, and according to security classification they are currently closed.

Sincerely,

IMF Archives”

And there you have it folks. This is IMF transparency. As per the IMF Archive disclosure policy, only Christine Lagarde, current IMF Managing Director, has the authority to consent to the declassification of classified Executive Board documents.

Sensitivity of Subject Matter – China and Bullion Banks

The above IMF responses speak for themselves, but in summary, here we have an organization which claims to be transparent and which claims to have run a transparent ‘on-market’ gold sales program in 2010, but still after more than 6 years it is keeping a large number of documents about the very same gold sales classified and inaccessible to the public due to the ‘sensitivity of the subject matter’. What could be so sensitive in the contents of these documents that the IMF has to keep them classified? Matters of national security? Matters of international security? And why such extremely high level security for an asset that was recently described by the august Wall Street Journal as a ‘Pet Rock’?

The secrecy of keeping these documents classified could hardly be because of sensitivity over the way in which the sales were executed by the agent, since this was already revealed in the February – May reports that are published, and which looks like a normal enough gold sales program by the Bank for International Settlements on behalf of the IMF? Could it be to do with the identities of the counterparties, i.e. the buyer(s) of the gold? I think that is the most likely reason.

Two counterparties that spring to mind that might request anonymity in the ridiculously named ‘on-market’ sales process would be a) the Chinese State / Peoples Bank of China, and b) a group of bullion banks that were involved in gold swaps with the BIS in 2009/2010.

Chinese discretion – Market Speculation and Volatility

Bearing in mind another one of the IMF’s mantras during the 2009-2010 gold sales processes that it wanted to “avoid disruption of the gold market”, and the Chinese State’s natural surreptitiousness, the following information reported by China Daily on 24 February 2010 (which was the first week of ‘on-market’ sales) is worth considering. The article, titled ‘China unlikely to buy gold from the IMF‘, stated the following:

“Contrary to much speculation China may not buy the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) remaining 191.3 tons of gold which is up for sale as it does not want to upset the market, a top industry official told China Daily yesterday.

It is not feasible for China to buy the IMF bullion, as any purchase or even intent to do so would trigger market speculation and volatility,” said the official from the China Gold Association, on condition of anonymity.”

To me, these comments from the ‘anonymous’ China Gold Association official are a clear indication that if China was the buyer of the remaining 181.3 tonnes (ie. 191.3 tonnes – 10 tonnes for Bangladesh), then China certainly would have conducted the purchase in secrecy, as ‘it does not want to upset the market’, and any purchase or even intent to do so would trigger market speculation and volatility”

In the same China Daily article, there was also a comment reported from Asian Development Bank economist Zhuang Jian, who was in favor of China buying the IMF gold, as he thought that “buying IMF gold would not only help China diversify its foreign exchange reserves but also strengthen the yuan as an international currency”, and that China would “have a bigger say in the IMF through the gold purchasing deal”.

Zhuang Jian also stated that “China can start with small purchases on the international market like the 191.3 tons of IMF gold. In the short-term, the market will see volatility, but in the long-term the prices will return to normal”.

BIS Swaps and Bullion Bank Bailouts

In late June 2010, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published its annual report to year-end March 2009. This report revealed that the BIS had, during its financial year, taken on gold swaps for 349 tonnes. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) initially reported in early July 2010 that these swaps were with central banks, however the BIS clarified to the WSJ that the gold swaps were in fact with commercial banks. The Financial Times then reported in late July 2010 that “Three big banks – HSBC, Société Générale and BNP Paribas – were among more than 10 based in Europe that swapped gold with the Bank for International Settlements.” Notice that two of the named banks are French banks.

Since the BIS refuses to explain anything material about these swaps, which was most likely a gold market fire-fighting exercise, the details remain murky. But the theory that best explains what actually happened was advanced by the late Adrian Douglas of GATA in early July 2010. Douglas proposed that bullion bank gold bailout tripartite transactions actually created the BIS gold swaps. Since IMF gold is stored at both the Bank of England vaults in London and at the Banque de France vaults in Paris, IMF ‘on-market’ gold held in Paris or London would be very easy to transfer to a group of bullion banks who all hold gold accounts at the Bank of England and, it now appears, also hold gold accounts at the Banque de France.

In May 2012, George Milling-Stanley, formerly of the World Gold Council, provided some insight to the publication Central Banking about the role of the Banque de France in being able to mobilize gold. Milling-Stanley said:

“Gold stored at the Bank of England vaults … can easily be mobilised into the market via trading strategies, or posted as collateral for a currency loan”

‘Of the Banque de France, Milling-Stanley says it has ‘recently become more active in this space [mobilising gold into the market], acting primarily as an interface between the Bank for International Settlements in Basel [BIS] and commercial banks requiring dollar liquidity. These commercial banks are primarily located in Europe, especially in France’.”

It’s interesting that two of the three banks named by the Financial Times as being involved in the BIS gold swaps are French, and that Milling-Stanley mentioned that most of the commercial banks that interfaced with the BIS are French banks. Given that the then Managing Director of the IMF, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, is French, as is his successor Christine Lagarde, could some of the ‘on market’ IMF gold sales been a case of the French controlled IMF bailing out French bullion banks such as SocGen and BNP Paribas?

Applied to the IMF gold sales, and under a tripartite transaction, as I interpret it, the following transactions would occur:

IMF gold is transferred by book entry to a set of bullion banks who then transfer the title of this gold to the BIS. The BIS transfers US dollars to the bullion banks who then either transfer this currency to the IMF, or owe a cash obligation to the IMF. The sold gold is recorded in the name of the BIS but actually remains where it is custodied at the London or Paris IMF Gold Depositories, i.e. at the Bank of England or Banque de France vaults.

In this scenario, the IMF gold could have been transferred to bullion banks and further transferred to the BIS during 2009, with the ‘on-market’ pricing exercise carried out during 2010. With the BIS as gold sales agent, the entire set of transactions would be even more convenient since the BIS gold trading desk would be able to oversee the gold swaps and the gold sales.

So, in my opinion, the IMF ‘on-market’ gold on offer was either a) bought by the Chinese State, or b) was used in a gold market fire-fighting exercise to bail out a group of bullion banks, or c) a combination of the two.

Modalities of Gold Sales

As to why the IMF paper “Modalities for Limited Sales of Gold by the Fund” (Sept 4th 2009) SM/09/243″ is under lock and key and can only be declassified by the IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, the conclusion is that it too must contain references to something that the IMF are extremely worried about allowing into the public domain. For the simple reason is that a similarly named IMF paper from 25 June 1999, titled “Modalities for Gold Sales by the Fund” (EBS/99/110)” is accessible in the IMF Archives, and while revealing in a number of respects, it hardly contains ‘sensitive material’. This paper was prepared when the IMF had been thinking about conducting gold sales back in 1999 which never materialized, except in the form of an accounting trick to sell to and simultaneously buy back a quantity of gold to and from Mexico and Brazil. This 1999 paper “Modalities for Gold Sales by the Fund” is very interesting though for a lot of reasons as it sketches out the limitations on IMF gold sales, the approaches to the sales that were considered by the IMF at that time, and it’s also is full of pious claims that the gold sales process should be ‘transparent’, such as the following:

“it will be critical to ensure transparency and accountability of the Fund’s gold operations through clear procedures for selecting potential buyers and determining prices, and through public disclosure of the results of the sales after they have taken place. The need for transparency and evenhandedness, which is essential for an international financial institution, argues for providing as much information as possible to the public.”

On the actual approaches to gold sales, the 1999 Modalities paper introduces the topic as follows:

“This paper considers four main modalities for the sale of gold by the Fund: (i) direct sales to another official holder of gold; (ii) placements into the market through a private intermediary or a group of intermediaries, such as bullion banks; (iii) placements into the market through the intermediation of a central bank with experience in gold sales or the BIS; and (iv) direct sales to the market through public auctions, as was the case with the gold sales by the Fund between 1976 and 1980″

 On the topic of publication of sales results, the 1999 paper states:

Publication of results: In all cases, the Fund would make public at regular, say monthly, intervals the quantity sold and the prices obtained, as well as, depending on the modality decided by the Board, the names of the buyers. In the case of a forward sales strategy involving an intermediary, the Fund would make public the quantities and delivery dates of the forward sales. It would be for consideration whether the Fund would announce the names of the intermediaries selected by the Fund to sell the gold, if that modality would be chosen”

On the topic of limitations to IMF gold sales, the 1999 paper says:

“Under the Articles, the Fund is only authorized to sell gold; that is, to transfer ownership over gold on the basis of prices in the market, taking into account reasonable transactions costs. The Articles prescribe the objective of avoiding the management of the price, or the establishment of a fixed price, in the gold market (Article V, Section 12 (a)). This implies that the Fund “must seek to follow and not set a direction for prices in the gold market.“

Under the Articles, the Fund cannot engage in gold leasing or gold lending operations, enter into gold swaps, or participate in the market for gold options or other transactions that do not involve the transfer of ownership over gold.”

A second shorter 1999 IMF paper on the modalities of gold sales, titled “Concluding Remarks by the Chairman Modalities of Gold Sales by the Fund, Executive Board Meeting 99/75, July 9, 1999, BUFF/99/81″ gave some indication on which approach (modality) the Executive Board were leaning to at that time to execute gold sales:

“Directors generally expressed the view that private placements of gold, either through a group of private institutions or through the intermediation of central banks or the BIS, had many advantages in terms of flexibility, both in terms of timing as well as in the discretion that the Fund’s agents could employ in the techniques that they could use to channel gold into the market.

And from the discussion, using the services of the BIS (or another central bank) appeared to be most favorable option:

“Directors further noted that there would be considerable practical difficulties in the choice of the institution or group of institutions through which the sales of gold could be conducted, even though these would be limited-but not entirely eliminated-by choosing a central bank or the BIS.

IMF Comedians

In conclusion, for sheer comedy reading,  there is a tonne of material in the IMF’s latest ‘transparency’ smoke and mirrors claims, dated 24 March 2016, which contains such comedy gems as:

Greater openness and clarity by the IMF about its own policies and the advice it provides to its member countries contributes to a better understanding of the IMF’s own role and operations, building traction for the Fund’s policy advice and making it easier to hold the institution accountable. Outside scrutiny should also support the quality of surveillance and IMF-supported programs.”

“The IMF’s efforts to improve the understanding of its operations and engage more broadly with the public has been pursued along four broad lines: (i) transparency of surveillance and IMF-supported programs, (ii) transparency of its financial operations; (iii) external and internal review and evaluation; and (iv) external communications.”

The IMF’s approach to transparency is based on the overarching principle that it will strive to disclose documents and information on a timely basis unless strong and specific reasons argue against such disclosure.” 

Again, what could these “strong and specific reasons” arguing “against such disclosure” be for the 2010 IMF gold sales?

By now you will begin to see that the IMF’s interpretation of transparency on gold sales diverges massively from any generally accepted interpretation of transparency. The IMF appears to think that merely confirming that a gold sale took place or will take place is the epitome of transparency, when it would more accurately be described as obfuscation and a disdain for actual communication with the public. IMF transparency is anything but transparent.

Perhaps the usually useless mainstream financial media may finally sit up and next time they bump into the IMF’s Ms Lagarde at a press conference, ask her why the IMF continues to block access to its 2010 gold sales documents, which remain classified due to, in the IMF’s own words, “the sensitivity of the subject matter”. Here’s hoping.

Central bank gold at the Bank of England

In a recent article, “How many Good Delivery gold bars are in all the London Vaults?….including the Bank of England vaults“, I considered how much gold is actually in the London Gold Market, and highlighted how the amount of gold stored in the London wholesale market has fallen noticeably in recent years.

That article highlighted that the amount of gold stored in custody at the Bank of England (BoE) fell by 350 tonnes during the year to 28 February 2015, after also falling by 755 tonnes during the year to end of February 2014. Therefore, by 28 February 2015, there was, according to the BoE’s own statement, £140 billion or 5134.37 tonnes of gold in custody of the BoE, or in other words ~ 410,720 Good Delivery gold bars.

The article also reviewed snapshots of the total amount of gold stored in the London vaults at various recent points in time.

Firstly, a reference on the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) web site for a date sometime before 2013 stated that there had been 9,000 tonnes of gold (i.e. 720,000 Good Delivery bars) stored in London with two-thirds of this amount, or 6,000 tonnes, stored in the Bank of England (about 482,000 bars), and 3,000 tonnes stored in London ex Bank of England vaults (238,000 bars). (Nick Laird of Sharelynx subsequently pointed out to me that the earliest reference to this 9,000 tonne figure was from a LBMA presentation from November 2011.)

Secondly, by early 2014, the LBMA web site stated that there were only 7,500 tonnes of gold in all London vaults, i.e. ~600,000 bars, and of this total, three-quarters or 5,625 tonnes were at in Bank of England, ~ 450,000 bars, and only one-quarter or 1,875 tonnes was stored at LBMA London gold vaults excluding the Bank of England’s gold vaults.

So, the entire London market including the Bank of England had lost 1,500 tonnes (120,000 bars) between 2011 and early 2014, with 375 tonnes less in the BoE and 1,125 tonnes less in the London market outside the BoE.

Finally, on 15 June 2015, the LBMA stated that “There are ~500,000 bars in the London vaults, worth a total of ~US$237 billion”. This ~ 500,000 bars equates to 6,256 tonnes. (On 15th June 2015, the morning LBMA Gold Price was set at $1178.25, which would make $237 billion worth of gold equal to 201.145 million ounces, which is 6,256 tonnes).

Therefore, another ~1,250 tonnes of gold (approximately 100,000 Good Delivery bars) departed from the London gold vaults compared to the early 2014 quotation of  7,500 tonnes of gold in the London vaults.

So overall, between the 9,000 tonnes quotation in 2011, and the 6,256 tonnes 2015 quotation, some 2,750 tonnes (~ 220,000 Good Delivery bars) disappeared from the London gold vaults. With 6,256 tonnes of gold stored in the entire London vault network in 2015, and with 5,134 tonnes of this at the Bank of England, that would leave 1,122 tonnes of gold in London outside the Bank of England vaults.

To reiterate, “the London gold vaults“, in addition to the Bank of England gold vaults, refer to the storage vaults of JP Morgan and HSBC Bank in the City of London, the vaults of Brinks, Malca Amit and Via Mat (Loomis) located near London Heathrow Airport, the vault of G4S in Park Royal, and the Barclays vault managed by Brinks.

Because the Bank of England reveals in its annual report each year the value of gold it has stored in custody for its customers (central banks, international official sector institutions, and LBMA member banks), then it is possible to compare 3 years of gold tonnage figures, namely the years 2011, 2014 and 2015, and then show within each year how much of this gold is stored at the Bank of England, and how much is stored in London but outside the Bank of England vaults.

Nick Laird of www.sharelynx.com / www.goldchartsrus.com has done exactly this in the following sets of fantastic charts which he has created to graphically capture the above London gold trends, and a lot more besides. These charts are just a subset of a suite of inter-related gold charts that Nick has created to address this critical subject in the London Gold Market.

LBMA and BoE Holdings AU 01

Although the Bank of England is not a LBMA member, the Bank of England gold vaults are a critical part of the LBMA gold vaulting and gold clearing system, and LBMA bullion banks maintain gold accounts with the Bank of England which facilitate, among other things, gold lending and gold swaps transactions with central banks. Hence the above and below charts are titled “LBMA Vaulted Gold in London”.

LBMA and BoE Holdings AU 02

My “How many Good Delivery gold bars are in all the London Vaults” article had also quantified that nearly all of this ~1,122 tonnes consists of gold from physical gold-backed ETFs which store their gold in the London vaults. (previously rounded up to 1,125 tonnes for ease of calculation).

I had included 5 gold ETFs in my previous analysis namely, SPDR Gold Trust (GLD), Shares Gold Trust (IAU), ETF Securities – ETFS Physical Gold ETF (PHAU & PHGP), ETF Securities – Gold Bullion Securities (GBS & GBSS), and Source Physical Gold ETC (P-ETC), and also some smaller holdings at BullionVault and GoldMoney. In total these ETFs and other holdings accounted for just over 1,000 tonnes of gold in the London market.

However, I had missed a few other gold ETFs which also store their gold in the London vaults. Nick Laird, whose Sharelynx website maintains up-to-date gold ETF data and gold holdings, took the initiative to fill in the missing ETF blanks and Nick re-calculated the more comprehensive ETF holdings figures for London, which worked out at an exact 1,116 tonnes of gold, astonishingly close to the implied figure represented by the 1,122 tonnes outside the Bank of England vaults.

The additional gold backed ETFs also included in Nick Laird’s wider catchment were Deutsche Bank db Physical Gold ETC and associated Deutsche ETFs, ABSA gold ETF (of South Africa), Merk Gold ETF, and some smaller holdings from Betashares and Standard Bank. The following chart from Sharelynx shows the full data for physically backed gold ETFs storing their gold in London:

LBMA vaults ETF gold in London AU 06

 

We then discussed an approach, in conjunction with Koos Jansen and Bron Suchecki, to identify known central bank gold stored in the Bank of England vaults by tallying up this storage data on a country level basis. So, for example, assuming 5,134 tonnes of gold stored at the Bank of England in early 2015, the aim would be to try to account for as much of this gold as possible using central bank sources.

As mentioned in the ‘How many gold bars‘ article, the Bank of England stated in 2014 that 72 central banks (including a few official sector financial organisations) held gold accounts with the Bank. It is not known if any of these gold accounts are inactive or whether any of these accounts have zero gold holdings. The LBMA stated in 2011 that “The Bank of England acts as gold custodian for about 100 customers, including central banks and international financial institutions, LBMA members and the UK government”. Therefore there could also be more than 25 LBMA member commercial banks with gold accounts at the Bank of England.

Some of the Bank of England 5,134 tonne total would therefore be gold held in LBMA member bank gold accounts at the Bank of England, for which data is not public. Likewise, a lot of central banks do not reveal where their gold is stored, let alone how much is stored in specific vaults such as at the Bank of England and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

However, many central banks have more recently begun to provide some information on where they say their official reserve gold is stored. Other central banks have always been to some extent transparent. Overall, a variety of sources, where possible, can be used to source locational data regarding central bank gold storage locations. There will continue to be gaps however, since some central banks remain non-cooperative, even when asked directly about where they stored their gold.

Tallying this type of central bank gold storage data will probably be a work in progress. However, there has to be a cut-off point for doing a first pass through the data, and this is a first pass. As a group, the European central banks have been especially forthcoming with gold storage data, compared to even 3-4 years ago (except for Spain). For other central banks, I looked in various places such as their financial accounts, and I contacted some of them by email with varying degrees of success.  About half of the 72 central banks on the Bank of England’s list were identified, again, with varying degrees of accuracy.

The following fantastic chart by Nick Laird captures an overview of this Bank of England gold storage data. Essentially the chart shows that the banks listed hold, or have stated that they hold, the respective quantity listed, and in total the named banks could account for x tonnes gold stored at the bank of England. This is labelled ‘Known Gold‘. Given ‘Known Gold’, this leaves the residual as ‘Unknown Gold‘.

Bank of England vaulted gold AU 03

The remainder of this article explains the logic and the sources behind each country, and why that country appears on the list. When a central bank claims to have stored gold at the Bank of England, or the evidence suggests that, it does not necessarily mean that the gold in question is held in custody in a gold set aside account or that it is allocated in identifiable bars, or even that it is actually there. Many central banks engage in gold lending, or have done so in the last 15-20 years, and have at times, or permanently, transferred control of that gold to LBMA bullion banks.

Until all central banks come clean about what form their gold holdings are in, which will never happen, then the amount of central bank gold that’s encumbered by bullion banks or under claims, liens, loan agreements etc will not be apparent.

SWEDEN

Sweden holds 125.7 tonnes of gold, and 48.8%, or 61.4 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

Swedish Riksbank - distribution of gold reserves
Swedish Riksbank – distribution of gold reserves

 

FINLAND

Finland holds 49.035 tonnes of gold, and 51%, or 25 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

Bank of Finland - Distribution of gold reserves
Bank of Finland – distribution of gold reserves

 

GERMANY

Germany holds 3,384 tonnes of gold, and 12.9%, or 438 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England. The Bundesbank’s ongoing repatriation of gold from New York and Paris does not alter the amount of Bundesbank gold held at the Bank of England.

Deutsche Bundesbank - distribution of gold reserves
Deutsche Bundesbank – distribution of gold reserves

 

Austria

Austria hold 280 tonnes of gold, and 80%, or 224 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) - distribution of gold reserves
Oesterreichische Nationalbank (OeNB) – distribution of gold reserves

 

 Switzerland

Switzerland holds 1,040 tonnes of gold, and approximately 20%, or 208 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

Swiss National Bank - distribution of gold reserves
Swiss National Bank – distribution of gold reserves

 

Portugal

Portugal holds 382.5 tonnes of gold (annual report 2014), and 48.7%, or 186.3 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

Banco de Portugal - distribution of gold reserves
Banco de Portugal – distribution of gold reserves

 

Denmark

The following commentary about Denmark’s gold contains some key points on understanding how to identify which countries store gold at the Bank of England.

As of August 2015, Danmarks Nationalbank (the Danish central bank) holds 65.5 tonnes of gold.

In August 2015, the Nationalbank said that:

“Most of Danmarks Nationalbank’s gold is stored at the Bank of England, where it has been since it was moved for safety reasons during the Cold War. In March 2014, Danmarks Nationalbank inspected its stock of gold in the Bank of England.”

However, an earlier Nationalbank publication in 1999 said that 94%, or 62.7 tonnes was stored at the Bank of England.

Danmarks Nationalbank - location of gold reserves
Danmarks Nationalbank – location of gold reserves

Therefore, the assumption here is that 62.7 tonnes of Danish gold is stored at the Bank of England.

Note the Danmarks Nationalbank’s assertion that in order for gold to be lent it has to be moved to the London, since London is the centre of the gold lending market.

In 1999 “Almost 99 per cent, or 93 per cent of the Nationalbank’s total gold stock, had been lent.” The same 1999 Danish central bank article also said that:

Denmark gold lending BoE

I have underlined the above sentence since it’s of critical importance to understanding that in gold lending, central bank gold lent to LBMA bullion banks at the Bank of England does not necessarily move out of the Bank of England vaults. Lent gold may or may not move out the door, depending on what the borrower plans to do with the borrowed gold.

It also means that the total gold in custody figure that the Bank of England reveals each year (for example £140 billion in February 2015), consists of:

a) central bank gold stored at the Bank of England

b) bullion bank gold stored at the Bank of England

c) central bank gold that has been lent or swapped with bullion banks (gold deposits and gold swaps) and that has not been moved out of the Bank of England vaults. This category of gold is still in custody at the Bank of England. The central bank claims to still own it, the bullion bank has control over it, and the Bank of England still counts it as being in its custody.

Netherlands

The Netherlands holds 612.5 tonnes of gold, and 18%, or 110 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) - distribution of gold reserves
De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) – distribution of gold reserves

 

United Kingdom

The UK gold reserves are held by HM Treasury within the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA). EEA gold reserves totals 310.3 tonnes, and all 310.3 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

UK HMT EEA

Notice that the UK gold reserves includes holdings of gold coin, as well as gold bars.

 

Ireland

Ireland hold 6 tonnes of gold in its official reserves, a small amount of which is in the form of gold coins, but nearly all of which is in the form of gold bars stored at the Bank of England.

CB 1 Ireland

Recently, I submitted a Freedom of information (FOI) request to the Central Bank of Ireland requesting information such as a weight list of Ireland’s gold stored at the Bank of England. After the FOI request was refused and the Central Bank of Ireland claimed there was no weight list, I appealed the refusal and was provided with a SWIFT ‘account statement’ from 2010 that the Bank of England had provided to the Central Bank of Ireland. See below:

Central Bank of Ireland - gold bars at the Bank of England
Central Bank of Ireland – gold bars at the Bank of England

This statement shows that as of 31 December 2010, the Central Bank of Ireland held 453 gold bars at the Bank of England with a total fine ounce content of 182,555.914 ounces, which equates to an average gold content of 402.993 fine ounces per bar. It also equates to 5.678 tonnes, which rounded up is 5.7 tonnes of gold stored at the Bank of England.

The fact that no weight list could be tracked down is highly suspicious, as is the fact that Ireland had in earlier years engaged in gold lending, so did not, at various times in the 2000s have all of its gold allocated in the Bank of England. How a central bank can claim to hold gold bars but at the same time cannot request a weight list of those same bars is illogical and suggests there is a lot more that the Central Bank of Ireland will not reveal.

 

Belgium

Belgium holds 227 tonnes of gold, most of which is stored at the Bank of England with smaller amounts held with the Bank of Canada and with the Bank for International Settlements. Banque Nationale de Belgique (aka Nationale Bank van België (NBB)) does not publish an exact breakdown of the percentage stored at each location, however, in March 2013 in the Belgian Parliament, the deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance gave the following response in answer to a question about the Belgian gold reserves:

Most of the gold reserves of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) is indeed held with the Bank of England. A much smaller amount held with the Bank of Canada and the Bank for International Settlements. A very limited amount stored in the National Bank of Belgium.

Furthermore, there were a series of reports in late 2014 and early 2015 that would suggest that Belgium stores 200 tonnes of its gold at the Bank of England. Firstly, in December 2014, VTM-nieuws in Belgium reported that the NBB governor Luc Coene had said that the NBB was investigating repatriating all of its gold. See Koos Jansen article here.

On 4 February 2015, Belgian newspaper Het Nieuwsblad said that Belgium would repatriate 200 tonnes of gold from the Bank of England, but the next day on 5 February 2015, another Belgian newspaper De Tijd reported that NBB Luc Coene denied the repatriation report, and quoted him as saying:

There are other and more effective ways to verify if the gold in London is really ours. We have an audit committee that inspects the Belgian gold in the UK regularly”.

See another Koos Jansen article on the Belgian gold here.  However, Luc Coene did not deny the figure of 200 tonnes of Belgian gold stored in London.

Therefore, the assumption here, backed up by evidence, is that Belgium stores 200 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.

 

Australia

Australia holds approximately 80 tonnes of gold in its official reserves, with 1 tonne on loan, and 99.9% of gold holdings stored at the Bank of England. See 2014 annual report, page 33.  According to a weight list of its gold held at the Bank of England, released via an FOIA request in 2014, Australia stores approximately 78.8 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.

Reserve Bank of Australia

 

 South Korea

South Korea (Bank of Korea) holds 104.4 tonnes of gold, 100% of which, or 104.4 tonnes is stored at the Bank of England. The Bank confirmed this to me in an email on 11 September 2015. See email here ->

Bank of Korea (BOK) - location of gold reserves
Bank of Korea (BOK) – location of gold reserves

 

International Monetary Fund

The IMF currently claims to hold 2,814 tonnes of gold after apparently selling 403.3 tonnes over 2009 and 2010 (222 tonnes in ‘off-market transactions and 181.3 tonnes in ‘on-market transactions’). Prior to 2009, IMF gold holdings had been 3,217 tonnes, and had been essentially static at this figure since 1980 [In 1999 IMF undertook some accounting related gold sale transactions which where merely sale and buyback bookkeeping transactions].

Although the IMF no longer provide a breakdown of how much of its gold is stored in each location where it stores gold, the amount of gold held by the IMF at the Bank of England can be calculated by retracing IMF transactions from a time when the IMF did provide such details. In January 1976, the IMF held 898 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England in London, 3,341 tonnes at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 389 tonnes at the Banque de France in Paris, and 144 tonnes at the Reserve Bank of India in Nagpur, India. Therefore, of the IMF’s total 4,772 tonnes holdings at that time, 70% was stored in New York, 19% in London, 8% in Paris and 3% in India. See here and here.

In the late 1970s, the IMF sold 50 million ounces of gold via two methods, namely, 25 million ounces by ‘public’ auctions, and 25 million ounces by distributions to member countries.

In the four-year period between mid-1976 and mid-1980, the IMF sold 25 million ounces of gold to the commercial sector via 45 auctions. Thirty five of these auctions delivered gold at the FRBNY, 7 of these auctions delivered gold at the Bank of England, and 3 of the auctions delivered gold at the Banque de France.

Of the 7 auctions that delivered the IMF’s gold at the Bank of England, these auctions in total delivered 3.74 million ounces [Dec-76: 780,000 ozs, Aug-77: 525,000 ozs, Nov-77: 525,000 ozs, May-78: 525,000 ozs, Oct-78: 470,000 ozs, Mar-79: 470,000, and Dec 79:444,000 ozs], which is 116 tonnes. See IMF annual report 1980.

The IMF also sold 25 million ozs of gold to its member countries within four tranches over the 3 year period from January 1977 to early 1980. These sales, which were also called gold ‘distributions’ or ‘restitutions’ and covered between 112 and 127 member countries across the tranches, were initially quite complicated in the way they were structured since they involved IMF rules around quotas which necessitated the gold being transferred to creditor countries of the IMF and then transferred to the purchasing countries. In the later sales in 1979 and 1980 countries could purchase directly from the IMF.

Countries could choose where to receive their purchased gold, i.e. London, New York, Paris or Nagpur, however, the US, UK, France and India, which had the largest IMF quotas and hence the largest gold distributions, all had to receive their gold at the respective IMF depository in their own country. I don’t have the distribution figures to hand at the moment for the 25 million ozs sold to countries, but about 18 countries took delivery from the Banque de France in Paris, with the rest choosing delivery from New York and London.

Therefore an assumption is needed on the amount of gold the IMF ‘distributed’ to member countries from its Bank of England holdings between 1977 and 1980. Of the 25 million ounces distributed, the US received 5.734 million ozs, the UK received 2.396 million ozs (75 tonnes), France received 1.284 million ozs, and India received 805,000 ozs. Subtracting all of these from 25 million ozs leaves 14.78 million ozs which was distributed to the other ~120 countries. Since the IMF held 70% of its holdings at the FRBNY in 1976, 19% at the Bank of England and 8% at the Banque de France, apportioning these three weights to the remaining 14.78 million ozs would result in 10.76 million ozs (332 tonnes) being sold from the FRBNY, 2.867 million ozs (89 tonnes) from the Bank of England and 1.24 million ozs (38.5 tonnes) from the Banque de France.

Adding this 89 tonnes to the 75 tonnes received by the UK would be 164 tonnes distributed from the Bank of England IMF gold holdings. Add to this the 116 tonnes of London stored IMF gold sold in the auctions equals 280 tonnes. Subtracting this 280 tonnes from the IMF’s London holdings of 898 tonnes in January 1976 leaves 618 tonnes.

In 2009 the IMF said that it had sold 200 tonnes of gold to India, 2 tonnes to Mauritius, 10 tonnes to Sri Lanka,and then 10 tonnes to Bangladesh in 2010. The Bangladesh figures reflect its 10 tonne purchase. However, at the moment, there has been no exact confirmation that the 200 tonnes that India bought is in London. It probably is in London, but leaving this amount under the IMF holdings instead of in India’s holdings makes no difference. Subtracting the Bangladesh sale of 10 tonnes, and rounding down slightly, there are 600 tonnes of IMF gold (excluding the 2009 India 200 tonnes sale) stored at the Bank of England.

The IMF sales of gold to Sri Lanka and  Mauritius in 2009 of a combined total of 12 tonnes probably came out of the IMF’s London holdings also. The IMF’s sale of 181.3 tonnes of gold in 2010 via ‘on-market transactions’ may also have come out of the IMF’s London stored gold. These ‘on-market transactions” look to have used the BIS as pricing agent, and the IMF have gone to great lengths to hide the full details of these sales from public view. More about that in a future article.

 

India

The Reserve Bank of India holds 557.75 tonnes of gold. Of this total, a combined 265.49 tonnes are stored (outside India) at the Bank of England and with the Bank for International Settlements. In 2009 India purchased 200 tonnes of gold from the IMF via an ‘off-market transaction‘. A slide from this presentation sums up this information.

The questions then are, is the 200 tonne purchase from the IMF stored at the Bank of England, and how much of the earlier 65.49 tonnes is stored at the Bank of England.

Reserve Bank of India - gold held outside India
Reserve Bank of India – gold held outside India
A 2013 article in the Indian Business Standard which was reprinted from “Reserve Bank of India history series. Volume 4, 1981-1997, Part A”, explains that in 1991, the Reserve Bank of India entered 2 separate gold loan deals, one deal with UBS in Switzerland (which required 18.36 tonnes of RBI gold to be sent to Switzerland) and the other deal with the Bank of England and Bank of Japan (where 46.91 tonnes was required to be sent to the Bank of England). Together those 2 transactions equals 65.27 tonnes which is 0.222 tonnes short of the 65.49 total.
After the gold loan deals expired, it looks like 18.36 tonnes of Indian gold were left in Switzerland and transferred to safekeeping or deposit with the BIS, and 46.91 tonnes of Indian gold was left at the Bank of England.
Regarding India’s purchase of 200 tonnes of gold in 2009, the IMF only has gold 4 depositories, namely, the Bank of England, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Banque de France, and the Reserve Bank of India in Nagpur, India. Given that the Indian gold stored abroad is “with the Bank of England and the Bank for International Settlements“, then for the 200 tonnes of IMF gold to end up being classified as ‘with’ the BIS, it would have to have either been transferred internally at one of the IMF depositories to a BIS account, or transferred via a location swap or a physical shipment to a BIS gold account at the vaults of the Swiss National Bank in Berne.
For now, the 200 tonnes of gold sold by the IMF to India in 2009 is reflected in the IMF holdings and not the India holdings. It does not make a difference to the calculations, since the 200 tonnes is still at the Bank of England.
Bulgaria
Bulgaria has 40.1 tonnes of official gold reserves. The latest BNB annual report states that 513,000 ozs are in standard gold form, and 775,000 ozs are in gold deposits.
Bulgaria CB
In 2014, about 60% of Bulgaria’s gold was in gold deposits. These deposits are ‘stored’ in the Bank of England. Therefore approximately 24 tonnes of Bulgaria’s gold is at the Bank of England.

Bulgaria 2

 

Bank for International Settlements

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), headquartered in Basle, Switzerland does not have run any gold vaults of its own. However, the BIS is a big player in the global central bank gold market, and it offers its central bank clientele gold safekeeping (and settlement) services using central bank vaults in London, New York and Berne. These services are possible because the BIS maintains gold accounts at the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Swiss National Bank in Berne. BIS gold accounts can act like omnibus accounts in that many central banks can hold gold in sub-accounts under a BIS gold account at each of these institutions in London, New York and Berne.

Gold can then be transferred around locations using gold swaps where one of the counterparties to the gold swap is the BIS.

BIS gold services to the global central bank market
BIS gold services to the global central bank market

The BIS is involved with gold in 3 main categories.

a) the BIS holds gold in custody for customers, off of the BIS balance sheet

b) the BIS has its own gold holdings which are classified as its gold investment portfolio, and which are on its balance sheet

c) the BIS accepts gold deposits from central banks. These gold deposits appear as a liability on the BIS balance sheet. Then the BIS turns around and places these gold liabilities in the market under its own name. These placing are also in the form of gold deposits and gold loans with other institutions including commercial banks. These ‘assets’ are then classified on the BIS balance sheet as BIS’ “gold banking” assets.

a) In its latest annual report, as of the end of March 2015, the BIS stated that it holds 443 tonnes of gold under earmark for its central bank customers on a custody basis. This gold is not on the BIS balance sheet. i.e. it is ‘off-balance sheet’ gold held by the BIS.

Bank for International Settlements - Off-Balance sheet gold in custody for customers
Bank for International Settlements – Off-Balance sheet gold in custody for customers
b) The BIS also holds 108 tonnes of its own gold (on balance sheet within an investment portfolio). This BIS gold is either kept in custody or transferred to bullion banks as gold deposits. The BIS does not provide granular data in its annual report as to how much of its own gold is ever put into gold deposits.
BIS 108
c) As of 31 March 2015, the BIS had 510 tonnes of gold assets on its balance sheet. Of this total, 108 tonnes was the BIS’ own gold, leaving 403 tonnes as banking assets (i.e. customer gold . Of this same 510 tonnes total, 55 tonnes were classified as gold loans, so 457 tonnes were not gold loans. If all 55 tonnes of gold loans were from customer gold, this would leave 348 tonnes of customer backed gold banking assets. On the same date (31 March 2015), the BIS held 356 tonnes of gold deposits from customers (sight deposits and short-term deposits) on the liability side of its balance sheet which originate entirely from central banks depositing gold with the BIS in sight and term deposits.
The question then is how to reflect BIS gold storage holdings at the Bank of England. While most if not all gold deposit transactions between central banks/BIS and bullion banks take place in London, the data is not readily published.
It was therefore decided, in the spirit of being conservative, to make an assumption on the BIS gold, and only use BIS customer custody gold and BIS own gold as inputs, and because BIS has gold accounts with 3 vaults (London, NY and Berne), to then just divide by 3 and say that one-third of BIS own gold and one-third of BIS ‘central bank custody gold’ is in London This would be 183.66 tonnes, i.e. (108+443)/3.
Therefore, this model states that 183.66 tonnes of BIS gold is stored in the Bank of England. This is probably being very conservative, especially given that no on-balance gold deposited by BIS customers is reflected in this figure.

 

Venezuela

Venezuela holds 361 tonnes of gold. All the Venezuelan gold is held in Caracas in Venezuela at the Banco Central de Venezuela except 50 tonnes are still stored at the Bank of England for transactions such as the gold swap with Citibank. See my article “Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 2: From Repatriation to Reactivation“.

 

Bangladesh

Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank of Bangladesh) holds 14 tonnes of gold, and 84.2%, or 11.8 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.

Bangladesh Bank - distribution of gold reserves
Bangladesh Bank – distribution of gold reserves

In September 2010, the IMF sold 10 tonnes of gold to Bangladesh Bank, bringing total gold holdings up from 3.5 tonnes to 13.5 tonnes. The fact that this gold is stored at the Bank of England shows that the IMF sold this gold from its holdings that were stored at the Bank of England. (Note, Bangladesh has recently added some small amounts of domestic confiscated gold to its reserves).

 

Mexico

Mexico’s central bank, Banco de Mexico (Banxico) currently hold 122.1 tonnes of gold.  At the end of 2012, Mexican official gold reserves totalled 4,034,802 ounces (125 tonnes), of which only 194,539 ounces (6 tonnes) was in Mexico, and 119 tonnes abroad.

According to a response from Banxico to Mexican economist Guillermo Barba, 99% of Mexico’s gold stored abroad is at Bank of England. So that  is 117.8 tonnes of Mexico’s gold stored at the Bank of England.

With Banxico now holding 122 tonnes according to the World Gold Council, and not 125 tonnes, the assumption is that the 3 tonne reduction came from domestic holdings.

Banxico - location of gold reserves
Banxico – location of gold reserves

 

Poland

Poland holds 102.9 tonnes of gold in its reserves. Poland’s central bank (Narodowi Bank Polski (NBP)) published a guide to Poland’s gold in 2014 in which it confirmed that nearly all of its gold is at the Bank of England. See pages 86-90 of the guide.

“How much gold did Poland possess before 1998? Approximately 746,463 ounces, of which almost 721 thousand was invested in deposits in commercial banks. In turn, the gold kept in the country was mainly coins, gold bars and various types of gold “scrap” bought by NBP.” (page 86)

Before 1998, only 25,463 ozs of NBP gold was kept in Poland, and 721,000 ozs (22.43 tonnes) was deposited with bullion banks. Poland then bought 80 tonnes of gold in 1998, bringing its gold reserves up to nearly 103 tonnes. The purchase was done as follows:

“…we used the services of a bank which constantly carries out similar transactions. Next, we made a location swap and the whole of NBP’s foreign gold reserves were deposited onto our account in the Bank of England.” (page 88)

It is likely that the NBP is referring to the BIS as the bank which purchased the gold on behalf of Poland, and then transferred it from one of the BIS gold accounts at the Bank of England to the NBP gold account at the Bank of England.

So that is 102.9 tonnes stored at the Bank of England.

Note also that, the Polish central bank explains that “It can be assumed that the gold that has been placed on the market at any time is precisely the gold that is held by the central banks in London“. In other words, central banks that have places gold on deposit (lent it) have done so with gold that they have stored in the Bank of England. See the following screenshot:

Narodowi Bank Polski - location of gold reserves
Narodowi Bank Polski – location of gold reserves

Note 6.1 on page 136 of the 2013 NBP annual report states:

“Gold and gold receivables The item comprises gold stored at NBP and deposited in a foreign bank account. As at 31 December 2013, NBP held 3,308.9 thousand ounces of gold (102.9 tonnes).

The annual report is a large file and slow to downlaod so its probably not worth downlaoding it http://www.nbp.pl/en/publikacje/r_roczny/rocznik2013_en.pdf

This statement about the “gold stored at NBP and deposited in a foreign bank account” has been in a few of the recent NBP annual reports. In April 2013, before the NBP had published the guide to its gold, I asked the NBP by email, based on the statement, to  clarify if the gold held abroad is held in custody, for example at the Bank of England or FRBNY or held in time deposits with commercial banks?”

The NBP responded: “Narodowy Bank Polski does not make gold time deposits with commercial banks”.

This may be true if the NBP is using sight deposits, but the 2013 answer, like so many other central banks currently, avoided providing any real information to the question.

Given that nearly all NBP’s 102.9 tonnes of gold was in the Bank of England when the 80 tonnes purchase was made in 1998, the assumption here is that still is the case, and that for simplicity, 100 tonnes of Poland’s gold is at the Bank of England.

 

Romania

Romania has 103.7 tonnes of gold in its official reserves.

National Bank of Romania - distribution of gold reserves
National Bank of Romania – distribution of gold reserves

In percentage terms, as at 31 December 2014, 27% of Romania’s gold was in ‘standard form’ which presumably means Good Delivery Bars (400 oz bars), 14% in gold coins, and 59% in ‘Deposits’ abroad. (59% of 103.7 tonnes is 61.2 tonnes)

Looking at earlier financial accounts, and going back to 2005/2004, the Romanian central bank held gold deposits with bullion banks, and gold deposits at the Bank of England, and the percentage of he gold in each of the 3 categories was very similar to 2014, specifically, in 2005 it was 32% in gold bullion in standard form, 13% in gold coins,and 55% in gold deposits.

Note the gold deposits with Bank of Nova Scotia and Fortis Bank Bruxelles in 2005 and additionally with the same two banks and with Barclays and Morgan Stanley NY in 2004.

National Bank of Romania 2005

Since the percentage breakdown between Romania’s bullion bank deposits (59%), standard bars (27%) and coins (14%) hasn’t varied much since 2005, and was at a similar mix over various years that I checked such as 2011 and 2014, the conclusion is that Romania has had more than  50% of its gold on constant deposit since at least 2004 (i.e. the original allocated gold is long gone).

The 2005 annual report also states that there were 61 tonnes of Romanian gold stored at the Bank of England. Since Romania had just under 105 tonnes of gold in 2005, this 61 tonnes was referring to the gold deposits, which central banks, as illustrated in numerous other examples, continue to count as their gold even though it has been lent to bullion banks.

Romania therefore had or has 61 tonnes of gold stored at the bank of England.

Note also the reference to central vault, which probably refers to a vault in Bucharest.

 

Philippines

The Philippines hold 225 tonnes of gold in its official reserves. In November 2000, when the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) held 225 tonnes of gold, it explained in a press release titled ‘Shipment of Gold Reserves‘ that it ended up storing 95% of its gold at the Bank of England due to the use of location swaps with a counterparty (probably the BIS) that took delivery of BSP gold, and transferred gold to the BSP account at the Bank of England.

Bangko Sentral Philippines - 95% gold at Bank of England
Bangko Sentral Philippines – 95% gold at Bank of England

Since 2000, the BSP gold reserves have risen, fallen, and risen again and now total 195 tonnes. Assuming the ‘95% of its gold’ storage arrangement is still in place, then the Philippines has 95% of 195 tonnes, or 185 tonnes stored at the Bank of England.

 

Greece

Greece claims to hold 112.6 tonnes of gold. In 2013, the Greek finance ministry on behalf of the Greek central bank stated that half of Greece’s gold reserves were ‘under custody’ of the Bank of Greece, and the other half was ‘under custody’ of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), the Bank of England and (very vaguely) Switzerland. Who actually controls Greece’s gold reserves at this point in time is anybody’s guess.

Bank of Greece, locations of Greece's gold reserves
Bank of Greece, locations of Greece’s gold reserves

See my article from February 2015, titled “Spotlight on Greece’s Gold Reserves and Grexit” which explores Greece’s official gold reserves.

Given that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was listed by the Greek MinFin as a foreign gold storage location ahead of the Bank of England, the assumption here is that of the 50% of Greece’s gold held abroad, the FRBNY holds more of this portion than the Bank of England. And so the assumption is that the Bank of England holds 40% of the foreign half, i.e. 20% of the total of Greece’s gold, with the FRBNY holding 50% of the foreign half. Taking 112 tonnes of gold as Greece’s total gold holding, 40% of this is 22.4 tonnes stored at the Bank of England. (Note, Greek gold reserves keep increasing incrementally each month by small amounts. As I am not sure what these increases relates to, a recent rounded figure of 112 tonnes has been chosen).

 

Italy

The Banca d’Italia holds 2.451.8 tonnes of gold. Although in 2014, the Banca d’Italia released a document in which it confirmed that some of this gold is held at the Bank of England, there is no evidence to suggest that Italy’s gold in London amounts to more than a few tonnes left over from 1960s transactions.

Bank of England gold set-aside ledgers show that in 1969 there were less than 1000 ‘Good Delivery’ gold bars in the Banca d’Italia gold account at the Bank of England, weighing less than 400,000 ozs in total. This is equal to about 12 tonnes. Most of the Italian gold at the Bank of England was flown back to Rome (and Milan) in the 1960s.

Since there is no public documentation that Banca d’Italia has ever engaged in gold lending (as far as I am aware), then there would be no need for Italy to keep a lot of gold at the Bank of England. Nearly all of Italy’s foreign held gold (over 1,200 tonnes) looks to be in New York (assuming it hasn’t been swapped or used as loan collateral). Italy could have engaged in non-public gold transactions from the Bank of England using gold location swaps from the FRBNY, or from Rome, but there is no evidence of this.

So, this model assumes 12 tonnes of Italian gold is stored at the Bank of England.

 

Brazil

Brazil hold 67.2 tonnes of gold reserves. In 2012, Banco Central do Brasil told me by email that all of its gold reserves were in the form of ‘fixed term gold deposits at commercial banks only’. Since the gold would be required to be stored at the Bank of England for these gold deposit transactions to take place, Brazil therefore holds 67.2 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England. See email below:

Banco Central do Brasil - gold deposits
Banco Central do Brasil – gold deposits
Ecuador
Banco Central del Ecuador conducted a 3 year gold swap with Goldman Sachs in June 2014 where it swapped 466,000 ozs for US dollar cash This swapped amount of gold has been factored into the World Gold Council data for Ecuador, and the Ecuadorian reserves dropped by 14.5 tonnes in Q2 2014. from 23.28 tonnes to 11.78 tonnes. This swapped amount of 14.5 tonnes is most probably stored at the Bank of England, since Goldman Sachs proposed a similar deal with Venezuela in 2014 where the gold was required to be at the Bank of England for the swap to be initiated.
Bolivia
Bolivia Central de Bolivia holds 42.5 tonnes of gold, all of which is permanently on deposit with bullion banks. The Bolivian Central Bank is very transparent in explaining where its gold is ‘invested’. Hence, it has (until recently) even provided in its financial accounts, the names of the bullion banks which happened to hold its ‘gold deposits’ and the amounts held by each bank.
Banco Central de Bolivia
Banco Central de Bolivia
A recent Banco Central de Bolivia report for 2014 is less revealing and only shows the country distribution of the gold deposits, with 39% in the UK and the rest in France. While this probably refers to the headquarters of the actual bullion banks in question, i.e. Natixis is French etc, it could mean the gold is being attributed to the Bank of England and the Banque de France, so, a conservative approach here is to attribute 39% of 42.5 tonnes to the Bank of England, i.e. 16.6 tonnes stored at the Bank of England.
Banco Central de Bolivia
Banco Central de Bolivia
Peru
Peru holds 34.7 tonnes of gold in its official reserves.
At the end of December 2013, Banco Central de Reserva del Peru held 552,191 ounces (17 tonnes) of gold coins which were stored in the Bank’s own vault, and 562,651 troy ounces of “good delivery” gold bars (17.5 tonnes) which were stored in banks abroad, of which 249,702 ounces were in custody and 312,949 ounces in the form of short-term interest bearing deposits. See 2013 annual report.
Since the gold bars are all ‘good delivery’ bars (which is not the case at the FRBNY), and since Peru has still recently been engaging in gold lending, then the evidence suggests that 17.5 tonnes of Peru’s gold is stored at the Bank of England.
Peru CB
Latvia

Latvia hold 6.62 tonnes of gold in its official reserves after joining the Euro on 1 January 2014 and after transferring just over 1 tonne of gold to the European Central Bank (ECB). All of Latvia’s gold is stored at the Bank of England, therefore Latvia stores 6.62 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.

Before this transfer of gold to the ECB, Latvia had 248,706 ozs of gold, and it transferred 35,322 ozs to ECB, leaving 213,384 ozs.

Latvia CB

The latest annual report of the central bank of Latvia explains this transfer to the ECB.

Central Bank of Latvia - gold transfer to the ECB, 2014
Central Bank of Latvia – gold transfer to the ECB, 2014
European Central Bank
The ECB holds 504.8 tonnes of gold. This gold was transferred by the Euro members to the ECB at the launch of the Euro by 1 January 1999. All the ECB gold is de-centrally managed, meaning that it stays where it was when transferred and is still locally ‘managed’ by the bank which transferred that gold to the ECB. Some banks may have transferred gold stored at FRBNY in fulfillment of their requirement, some banks may have transferred gold at the BoE, and countries such as France and Italy may have transferred amounts which are still stored at Banque de France and Banca d’Italia etc. Some of the ECB gold, such as the smaller amount transferred by Latvia, is in the Bank of England. Other amounts of the ECB’s gold are most certainly also at the Bank of England in London.
It would be a separate project to track these transfers. The 1 tonne of Latvian gold transferred to the ECB at the start o 2014 was included in the figures here just as a placeholder, so as to acknowledge that ECB gold is at the Bank of England. Given that the Euro is a competing currency to the US Dollar, the ECB may have more gold than not stored in Europe and not at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, since ECB gold would logically be safer not stored in the main Reserve Bank of a competing currency bloc.

 

Iceland

Iceland holds 2 tonnes of gold reserves (precisely 63,831.46 ozs). Although the Bank of Iceland says that its gold is stored at the Bank of England and in its own vault also, nearly all the gold is stored at the Bank of England.

In its 2014 annual report, the Bank of Iceland said that “The Bank resumed lending gold for investment purposes in June 2014“, and “The Bank loaned gold to foreign financial institutions during the year”.

CB Iceland

The Bank of Iceland lent 99.7% of its gold during 2014 because this is the percentage of the gold reserves which are not payable on demand, but are payable in less than 3 months. See below screenshot.

Central Bank of Iceland - gold deposits
Central Bank of Iceland – gold deposits

For the purposes of this exercise, Iceland stores 2 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.

 

Ghana

Ghana’s central bank, the Bank of Ghana, holds 8.7 tonnes of gold in its official reserves (precisely 280,872.439 ozs). Of this total, 39.3%, or 3.42 tonnes is held at the Bank of England, with 27.5% at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 29.5% with investment bank UBS. See 2014 annual report.

Interestingly, Ghana refers to its gold account at the Bank of England as a ‘gold set aside’ account, which is the correct name for a Bank of England gold custody account of allocated gold. Probably more interestingly is that most central banks do not use this ‘set aside’ term.

Bank of Ghana

 

Conclusion

A number of central banks refuse to confirm the location of their gold reserves. I will document this in a future posting. Some of the large holders undoubtedly hold quite a lot of gold at the Bank of England, as do a number of smaller holders. Countries that could fit into this category include Spain, France, Colombia, Lithuania, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Pakistan, Egypt, Slovenia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Africa. In fact any central bank which has engaged in gold lending is a candidate for having some of its gold stored at the Bank of England.

Spanish people take note. Spain refused to say where its 281.6 tonnes of gold is stored, and Banco de España has the dubious record of being Europe’s least transparent bank as regards gold reserves storage locations. Maybe a project for Spanish journalists.

Banque de France keeps 9% of its 2,435 tonnes of gold reserves abroad, and has in the past engaged in gold lending. So this 9%, or 219 tonnes, is probably stored at the Bank of England.

The ECB and BIS  no doubt have more gold stored at the Bank of England than the figures currently reflect. This would also increase the ‘known gold’ total. Egypt is another country which has had a gold set aside account at the Bank of England so is in my view an obvious candidate for the list.

Adding to the known total is therefore a work in progress.

Spotlight on Greece’s Gold Reserves and Grexit

With the Greek Government and the Troika back in the news right now, it’s a good time to take a look at Greece’s official gold reserves and examine how much gold Greece claims to hold, where this gold might be located, and explore the impact that the European bailouts or a Greek Euro exit might have on the Greek gold holdings.

The 2012 Annual report of the Bank of Greece, the most recent full annual report available, provides some useful background on the Greek gold reserves. The Bank’s full 2013 annual report has not yet been posted on its website, and the 2014 annual report has not yet been published.

In the 2012 report, the Bank of Greece claims to hold on its balance sheet, ‘gold and gold receivables’ of 4,746,000 fine troy ounces (147.6 tonnes).

As of 31st December 2012, based on a gold price of €1,261.179 per fine ounce, this ‘gold and gold receivables’ asset item was valued in the balance sheet at €5.985 billion.

The 147.6 tonne total of gold reserves might seem a lot higher than figures of 112 tonnes or 117 tonnes that are sometimes quoted in economic statistics or in the media. However, the 147.6 tonne figure includes a claim, by the Bank of Greece on the Greek State, for gold that was paid by the Bank of Greece to the IMF (subscriptions and quota increases etc) on behalf of the Greek State.

As the 2012 annual report states:

“The amounts reported above comprise the Bank’s gold holdings (3,597 thousand ounces) and gold receivables from the Greek State (986 thousand ounces) corresponding to Greece’s participation in the IMF (the gold component of Greece’s quota has been paid by the Bank of Greece on behalf of the Greek State), as well as scrap gold and gold coins for melting (163 thousand ounces). A large part of gold holdings is kept with banks abroad.

(Source: ‘Notes on the balance Sheet’ 2012 Annual Report, Page 209 of the pdf, page A15 of the report).

Gold Claim on Hellenic Republic

Why the Greek State has never paid back this 986,000 oz gold debt to the Bank of Greece is puzzling, but there would appear to be little chance of the repayment happening any time soon given the Greek State’s current fiscal position.

Since Greece was one of the original members of he IMF back in 1945, the Bank of Greece gold claim on the Greek State may be a very long-standing claim and would comprise some or all of the initial gold subscription to the IMF in 1947, and various IMF quota increases that were implemented in 1958-59, 1965 and 1970.

I think it’s misleading for the Bank of Greece to throw in this gold claim against the Greek State within its “gold and gold receivables” line item in the balance sheet. Even though it is a receivable in gold, it is not even the type of gold receivable that the European central banks had in mind when they pressured the IMF back in 1999 to deem the “gold and gold receivable” classification device as a legitimate accounting approach. (See below for a background on that issue).

In my view this 986,000 Oz gold obligation on the Greek State should be itemised separately and not listed as part of the monetary gold holding line item. Where is this 986,000 Ozs of gold? It doesn’t even exist, except as a gold holding of the IMF and should not be double counted.

Excluding this 986,000 oz (30.66 tonnes) IMF related claim on the Greek State, the Bank of Greece says it holds a total of 3.76 million ozs of gold (3,597,000 ozs + 163,000 ozs) which is roughly 117 tonnes. Excluding the scrap gold and gold coins, the figure is 3.597 million ozs, which is approximately 112 tonnes.

The Fantasy of ‘Gold and Gold Receivables’

Note that the 3.76 million ounce figure from 2012, excluding the IMF gold claim, is still in itself ‘gold and gold receivables’ and not necessarily earmarked gold held. The percentage of ‘gold receivables’ within the 3.76 million ounce figure, such as gold lent or gold swapped, is not divulged.

The Bank of Greece uses the ‘gold and gold receivables’ gimmick because the Bank, along with all Eurosystem banks and most other central banks around the world, follows IMF central bank accounting guidelines when accounting for its gold holdings. And IMF accounting guidelines do not follow generally accepted accounting principles in this area.

In 1999, the IMF, following objections from European central bank officials at the Bank of England, Deutsche Bundesbank, European Central bank (ECB) and Banque de France, back-tracked on a plan to introduce individual line item categories for gold and ‘gold receivables’ in the reserves data template of its Special Data Dissemination Standard, because breaking out this data into separate items would have revealed the workings of the gold loan and gold swap market, or what the IMF calls ‘highly market sensitive’ information.

An IMF Executive Board paper from 1999, explains the issue:

“15. Central bank officials** indicated that they considered information on gold loans and swaps to be highly market-sensitive, in view of the limited number of participants in such transactions. Thus, they considered that the SDDS reserves template should not require the separate disclosure of such information but should instead treat all monetary gold assets, including gold on loan or subject to swap agreements, as a single data item. (page 6)

** The ‘central bank officials’ referred to above were as follows:

“7.  ……At the same time the (IMF) staff consulted the Bank of England, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Banque de France, and the European Central Bank to review practical and methodological difficulties they might encounter in implementing the CGFS template, in light of recent decisions on publication of reserves data in the Eurosystem. (page 4)”

According to the latest IMF official reserves asset data for Greece,  the Bank of Greece now claims to have monetary gold holding of 3.62 million ozs, marginally up from 3.597 million ozs. In fact, the monthly foreign reserves figures for the Bank of Greece (xls) frequently show small increases in the ‘Monetary gold (millions of the troy ounces)’ category, about 9,000 ozs per year or slightly less than 1,000 ozs per month.

This increase in gold holdings could be reflecting interest in the form of gold received on gold deposits (gold loans) with bullion banks, and may suggest that the Bank of Greece has outstanding short-term gold loans that are being rolled over with the bullion banks (in the London gold market). Interest received on central bank gold deposits (time deposits) with bullion banks is often in the form of gold (accrued interest in gold).

Central Bank of Greece

Where is the Greek gold?

On the question of the location of the Bank of Greece gold reserves, the only locational information provided on the gold reserves in the 2012 annual report, was that ‘a large part‘ of the gold was held abroad.

Earlier Bank of Greece annual reports, from 2007 - 2010, state that “The largest part of gold holdings is kept in banks abroad.” It was only since 2011 that the wording ‘a large part is kept abroad‘ was introduced. Semantics maybe, however, the change in wording could indicate that some of the gold that was held abroad had been repatriated back to Greece sometime between 2010 and 2011. This was around the time that the Greek fiscal budget started to deteriorate rapidly.

Alternatively, the previous phraseology could have included the Bank’s IMF gold claim since by definition, this gold is held by the IMF in its gold despositories, which are all located outside of Greece. But it’s not clear from the wording whether the gold claim on the Greek State has ever been included or excluded from the reference to where the gold reserves were located.

Whatever the reason, it became less important on 1st March 2013, when Bloomberg published an article about the size and location of the Greek gold reserves. This article was based on a letter written by the Bank of Greece that had been forwarded by the Finance Ministry to a lawmaker in the Greek Parliament in response to the lawmaker’s query.

The letter stated that as of 31st December 2012, Greek gold reserves totalled 3.76 millon ounces (approximately 117 tonnes). This figure tallies with the figure from the above 2012 annual report.

On the location of the gold, Bloomberg said that, according to the document:

Half is held at the central bank in Greece while the remainder is held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank of England and in Switzerland.”

The same day, 1st March 2013, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various Greek news agencies confirmed the Bloomberg story in slightly more detail, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs releasing a statement stating that:

“Greece’s gold reserves totalled 3.760 million ounces at the end of 2012, worth 4.74 billion euros, the country’s central Bank of Greece (BoG) said on Friday.

In a report to Parliament, communicated through Finance Minister Yannis Stournaras responding to a question by parliament deputies over the country’s gold reserves, the central bank said that Greece’s natural gold reserves at the end of 2012 amounted to 3.760 million ounces, worth 4.74 billion euros, of which half were under the custody of the Bank of Greece and the remaining under the custody of the Federal Bank of New York, the Bank of England and Switzerland.

The central bank noted that gold reserves which had been transferred for custody to the Bank of England during the Second World War were repatriated gradually in 1946-1956.”

The Bank of Greece therefore appears to currently maintain a 50/50 split between domestic and foreign held gold. This again may suggest that something changed after 2010 which altered the wording of ‘the largest part’ of the reserves being stored abroad. Where the domestically stored Greek gold is held, I’m not sure. Possibly in a vault in the Bank’s headquarters in Athens. Who knows.

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and Bank of England as gold custodians for Greece’s gold is not surprising given that many foreign central banks store gold with these two institutions.

The Bank of Greece has historically had a gold set-aside account at the Bank of England, not least for the Tripartite Commission’s gold distributions. Separately, in the IMF gold restitutions to its members in the late 1970s, the Bank of Greece did not use the Bank of England or the Banque de France or the Reserve Bank of India to receive restituted gold, so this implies that Greece used the FRBNY and would have needed a gold account at the FRBNY.

The reference to Switzerland by the Greeks would either be a) a gold deposit or earmarked gold held with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), b) earmarked gold held directly with the Swiss National Bank in Berne, or c) gold held with a Swiss commercial bank in Zurich such as Credit Suisse or UBS.

Swiss National Bank

As to how much of the 50% of the Greek gold that’s stored abroad is in each of the three storage locations (New York, London and Switzerland), or how much of this gold is actually earmarked in custody is unclear. Some or all of this gold could be loaned or swapped or, as central banks like to say in their gold legal agreements, the gold may have other “liens, claims or encumbrances” against it.

Given the perilous state of Greek finances, the custodial status of the Greek gold held with the Bank of England, FRBNY and in Switzerland deserves scrutiny. This would also apply to the 50% of the Greek gold that’s supposedly held by the Bank of Greece within Greece. This scrutiny will probably never be forthcoming however due to the unaccountability and lack of transparency on everything gold related within the world of central banking.

Seizing the Greek Gold? Not like Cyprus

In February 2012 during negotiations on Greece’s 2nd bailout (Second Economic Adjustment Programme of March 2012), the New York Times wrote an article quoting a Greek politician, Louka Katseli, who was unhappy that the loan deal undermined Greek sovereignty and believed that under the bailout deal, Greece’s creditors had a claim over the Bank of Greece gold reserves. As the NYTimes stated:

“Ms. Katseli, an economist who was labor minister in the government of George Papandreou until she left in a cabinet reshuffle last June, was also upset that Greece’s lenders will have the right to seize the gold reserves in the Bank of Greece under the terms of the new deal, and that future bonds issued will be governed by English law and in Luxembourg courts, conditions more favorable to creditors.”

According to the NYTimes, Katseli stated that:

“This is the first time ever that a European and probably an O.E.C.D. state abdicates its rights of immunity over all its assets to its lenders.

Although the NYTimes referred in its article to “the fine print of the 400-plus-page document — which Parliament members had a weekend to read and sign“, I am not sure which 400 plus page document was being referred to. I cannot find any reference to gold or gold collateral in the European Commission’s ‘Financial Assistance to Greece’ web pages, nor in the Commission’s “The Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece” document.

There isn’t, as far as I am aware, any collateral connection between the Bank of Greece gold reserves and the sovereign debt of the Greek State. I only say that because I can’t find the specific documentation that Katseli was referring to. However, Louka Katseli is a very credible source for making such a statement, having worked at a high level in the Greek Government, the OECD, and European Community, amongst other posts.

In comparison to the possible lack of Greek documentation, the Troika’s (ECB, IMF and European Commission) bailout deal of the Cypriot banking sector in 2013 (“The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus”) did explicitly mention Cypriot gold and the possible sale of €400 million worth of gold, as follows:

27. The “programme” scenario takes into account a number of policy measures to strengthen debt sustainability, in particular (i) proceeds generated by privatisation of state-owned assets; (ii) the proceeds from the sale of excess gold reserves owned by the Republic of Cyprus;

29. Sale of excess gold reserves: It is envisaged to use the allocation of future central profits of approx. EUR 0.4 bn, subject to the principle of central bank independence and provided such profit allocation is in line with CBC rules and does not undermine the CBC duties under the Treaties and the Statute. This is estimated to generate one-off revenues to the state.

CBC is the Central Bank of Cyprus. But as the above ‘adjustment programme’ points make note of, Eurosystem central banks cannot be forced to sell their gold reserves to meet their government’s financing needs. This is due to Article 7 of the protocols on the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and the ECB which states that the ECB and national central banks can’t seek or take direction from European Union government or institutions and, likewise, European Union governments and institutions are not allowed to influence the national central banks or the ECB.

The Central Bank of Cyprus never did sell any of its gold, but the rumours at the time, especially in April 2013, caused weakness in the gold price and were undoubtedly used by some as justification to accelerate the gold price weakness. Cyprus had, and still has, only 13.9 tonnes of gold and the sale proceeds from any Cypriot gold sale, would, like Greece, have only covered a small fraction of its bailout obligations to the Troika.

By December 2013, Reuters had released an article saying that Cyprus had “no plan to sell gold reserves to fund its €10 billion euro bailout”:

‘”We do not intend to sell the gold,’ a senior official at the central bank told Reuters, declining to be identified.”

“Asked about any alternative method to raise the 400 million euros, the official said: ‘They (the government) have to go back to the troika and say this (a gold sale) is not going to happen.'”

“While the Cypriot government had said sales would be considered, the central bank had typically been cool to the idea. The governor of the central bank would have the final say in such a sale, the central bank sources said.”

With Greek gold reserves eight times the size of those of Cyprus, any talk of Greek gold sales would be sure to have an adverse affect on the gold price. However, given that there does not seem to be any evidence that the Troika have discussed or planned for such gold sales, any suggestions of this in the media would be irresponsible.

dijsselbloem and varoufakis

Grexit and Greece’s gold claim on the ECB

In its balance sheet, the Bank of Greece also lists a claim on the European Central Bank under an item called “Claims equivalent to the transfer of foreign reserves to the ECB” (9.2).

In 1999, the founding member national central banks of the Euro (stage 3 of Economic and Monetary Union) transferred about €40 billion in foreign reserve assets to the ECB, with 85% of this total paid in US dollars and Yen and 15% paid in gold. There are now 19 European national central banks in the Euro, and Greece has a little less than a 2.8% share in the claims on this foreign reserve pool, 15% of which is in gold. The gold in this pool is managed on a decentralised basis by the member national central banks on behalf of the ECB.

In September 2011 (after the first Greek bailout [May 2010] but before the second Greek bailout [March 2012]), when fears of Greece leaving the EU were in full flight, I wrote to the ECB press office and asked them, in quite precise language, what would become of Greece’s gold contribution to the Eurozone if Greece exited from the Euro. My question to the ECB was as follows:

“In a scenario under which a Eurozone member state left the common currency zone, would the foreign reserve assets of that member state which had been contributed by that member state’s central bank to the ECB (i.e. the claims on the ECB established via Article 30 of the ESCB Statute, initially comprising 15% gold and 85% other currencies and subsequent top ups), be reimbursed to the departing members state’s central bank, or, given that a departing member state would most likely have been one to which the ECB had an outstanding loan (and so having a liability to the ECB), would the ECB seek to net the loan against the member state’s claims (made up of major currencies and gold)?”

The Communications Directorate of the ECB’s Press and Information Division promptly responded that:

Please note that there are no legal provisions for a hypothetical scenario of the kind you describe.

You may be interested in the following Legal Working Paper, although the views expressed in it do not necessarily reflect the views of the ECB:

http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf

The document that the ECB refered me to is titled Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU – Some Reflections – by Phoebus Athanassiou, Legal Working Paper Series. No 10, December 2009.

Coincidentally, or not, Phoebus Athanassiou, the author of the paper, is Greek. According to his faculty profile at the Institute For Law And Finance (ILF) in Frankfurt, Dr Phoebus Athanassiou is “Senior Legal Counsel with the Directorate General Legal Services of the European Central Bank (ECB).”

Athanassiou also has an interesting connection to Cyprus since, according to the ILF profile, he “specialises in European Union, Greek and Cypriot financial law.” Prior to joining the ECB in 2004, Athanassiou “was in private practice, with the Athens Law Firm of Tsibanoulis & Partners, inter alia acting as consultant to the Government of the Republic of Cyprus on the transposition of the acquis in the fields of securities, banking and insurance law.” Acquis refers to Acquis communautaire, which just means the entire body of European laws (treaties, directives and regulations etc).

Athanassiou’s paper is very detailed and technical, and while there has been lots of coverage of it in the media over the last few years, the paper only discusses whether a country is allowed to exit the EU or exit EMU, not whether a departing country would get its gold back if it left EMU.

In summary, Athanassiou says in his 2009 paper:

– that before the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, there was no legal way for a member country to exit from the European Union (EU), and even though there is now (Article 50), it would be still legally problematic;

– that a member country of EMU (in the Euro) could not exit the Euro without exiting the EU;

– that “no right of withdrawal from EMU was ever intended to exist“;

– and that a member of the EU or EMU cannot be forced out because it requires the consent of all members including the member being expelled, i.e. “A Member State’s expulsion from the EU or EMU would inevitably result in an amendment of the treaties, for which the unanimous consent of all Member States is necessary under Article 48 TEU.”

Riot police stand near the euro sign in front of the European Central Bank headquarters during an anti-capitalist "Blockupy" demonstration in Frankfurt

Deal on the Table

With a Greek-Eurogroup deal now back on the table, the Athanassiou legal arguments still look to be sound. Just before the deal, there were reports of the ECB preparing for a Greek exit from the Euro. How this could even be legally undertaken is unclear. On 20th February 2015 Reuters reported that:

“The European Central Bank is preparing for the event that Greece leaves the euro zone and its staff are readying contingency plans for how the rest of the bloc could be kept intact, German news magazine Spiegel reported in a preview of its magazine.”

There is no legal way for a Euro member to exit the Euro. If it did somehow happen, a Greek exit from the Euro would have serious ramifications both financially and politically. Would the Bank of Greece also have to leave the ESCB group?

Anytime the prospect of Greece leaving the Eurozone flares up, there is always chatter that Greece would be somehow forced into selling its gold reserves.

Even though the European Central Bank Gold Agreements (CBGAs) on gold sales are supposedly not legally binding, the Bank of Greece gold holdings, worth less than €4 billion, are tiny in comparison to the colossal sovereign debts the Hellenic Republic faces, and would only make a small dent in the debt repayments.

The gold price should in theory benefit more from the financial volatility of a Grexit than it would suffer from the fear of Greek gold sales. However, the case of the feared Cypriot gold sales in 2013 shows that gold market players can use these fears to their advantage in pushing the gold price around.

If Greece stays in the Eurozone, which looks likely, it cannot independently sell its gold without the go-head of the ECB. This is because the ECB controls, or has a say in, the management of not just the gold transferred to it as part of the foreign reserve transfers of the participating national central banks, but all the monetary gold held as reserve assets by the member national central banks (under the ECB definition, reserve assets includes monetary gold).

Article 31 of the Statute of the ESCB and ECB, which addresses foreign reserve assets held by national central banks, says that beyond certain pre-existing obligations to various international organisations, “all other operations in foreign reserve assets remaining with the national central banks” are “subject to approval by the ECB in order to ensure consistency with the exchange rate and monetary policies of the Union.” So, any Euro member central bank would have to get the approval of the ECB before buying or selling any of its monetary gold.

In conclusion, Greece is not an insignificant holder of monetary gold. Its holding of 110+ tonnes makes it a reasonably sized gold holder amongst the world’s central banks. The supposed storage locations of Greece’s gold are not surprising but as to whether the gold is there and in what form the various holdings are is anyone’s guess.

Greece cannot just walk away from the Euro since such a scenario was never envisaged by the Eurocrates, and they will do whatever it takes to prevent such a scenario happening. As to whether Greece, or any Euro member, would get its gold back if it somehow managed to escape from the Euro, that is a scenario that as the ECB told me, “there are no legal provisions for.”

The IMF’s Gold Depositories – Part 2, Nagpur and Shanghai, the Indian and Chinese connections

Part 1 of the IMF’s Gold Depositories series explained the legal background as to why the IMF originally made the decision to hold gold at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank of England, the Banque de France and the Reserve Bank of India.

See Part 1 for details, but as a quick recap, although the current IMF Rule F-1 on the location of its gold depositories states that “Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India”, the original 1946 version of the rule, then called Rule E-1, said that “Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in New York, London, Shanghai, Paris, and Bombay.

It is generally known that the central banks in some of these cities are indeed locations are IMF gold depositories, and the IMF will actually, on occasion, bring itself to confirm these facts.

What is less well understood however are the references to the cities in two of the word’s great gold markets, specifically, the reference to the Reserve Bank’s Bombay office, the transfer of IMF gold to another Indian city, Nagpur, and the fact that Shanghai was only removed “temporarily” and could, in theory, be reinstated as an IMF gold depository.

The Road to Nagpur

The original version of Rule E-1 was adopted on 25th September 1946, and then amended in 1956. This amendment in 1956 was triggered by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), but it created some far-reaching implications for where the IMF’s gold can be stored.

The trigger for the amendment of Rule E-1 in 1956 was an initiative by the RBI to move their own gold from their Bombay office to a new office in Nagpur which they had just opened. Nagpur is a city in the very heart of India in the state of Maharashtra.

Nagpur in India
Nagpur, at the heart of India

In moving their own gold, the RBI asked the IMF if it objected to the re-location of the IMF gold at the same time. There was actually not much IMF gold held in Bombay, the only gold held there being India’s initial gold subscription to the IMF that had been transferred at the Fund’s inception, worth $27.5 million at $35 an ounce, or just over 24 tonnes. No other founding nation of the IMF had supplied gold to Bombay at that time.

In a 1956 staff document to the IMF Executive Directors, “Gold Depositories of the Fund”, the IMF staff explained the RBI’s move and recommended that the wording of Rule E-1 should be made more flexible so as to take account of future situations where other gold depositories of the Fund might want, or need, to hold gold at alternative locations in their respective countries, other than those locations already specified.

The IMF staff also proposed to the IMF Executive Directors that they should agree to the RBI’s request:

At the moment, the Fund holds the equivalent of US$27.5 million in gold with the Reserve Bank of India in Bombay. The Fund has received a letter from the Reserve Bank stating that it has recently opened an office at Nagpur, which is situated about 520 miles from Bombay in the interior of the country.

The office is in the Bank’s own building, and it contains a special vault for storing the Bank’s stock of gold. The special vault was constructed partly to enable gold to be stored at a comparatively safer place and partly to relieve the pressure on vault accommodation at the Bombay office. The Reserve Bank is transferring its own gold to Nagpur and inquires whether the Fund would object to the movement of the Fund’s gold.”

The staff document went on to explain the logistics of the move:

“The arrangements for transport would be made under the supervision of the military, and safe custody arrangements at Nagpur would be subject to the same security conditions as are observed at present in Bombay. The Fund’s gold would continue to be held under earmark, and the normal procedures which gold depositories follow in relation to the Fund would continue to be observed.”

A critical point in this IMF document, beyond the Indian gold transfer, is that the IMF staff viewed it as an opportunity to propose more general wording for Rule E-1 so as to allow IMF gold to be stored in any location within the designated countries. The Staff proposed to the Executive Directors.:

“Although Rule E-1 is not free from ambiguity, the more obvious reading of it requires that gold held in India shall be held in Bombay.

The question of the physical transfer of gold may be raised by other gold depositories of the Fund. For example, in the United States, there have been occasions when official stocks of gold have been held simultaneously in New York, Denver, San Francisco and Fort Knox.

The staff believes that it would be advisable to amend Rule E-1 so as to give the Fund more flexibility in dealing with a proposal of the kind made by the Reserve Bank of India. Accordingly, it recommends that Rule E-l should be amended…”

(Source: EBS/56/39, “Gold Depositories of the Fund”)

An IMF Executive Board meeting in November 1956 about the move of the Fund’s gold to Nagpur, approved on January 9th, 1957 (Meeting 57/1),  deemed that “it is agreed that the Fund’s gold held with the Reserve Bank of India shall be held at Nagpur.”

The Executive Directors also used the opportunity of the 1956 amendment to Rule E-1 to delete the reference to Shanghai as an IMF gold depository (‘without prejudice’). This is explained below.

And so, in 1956 the Rule E-1 sentence

Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in New York, London, Shanghai, Paris, and Bombay

became

Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and India

and the phrase “at places agreed with the Fund” was added as follows:

“The gold of the Fund shall be held with the depositories designated by the members in whose territories they are located at places agreed with the Fund”.

Reserve Bank of India, Nagpur
Reserve Bank of India, Nagpur

 

IMF gold, anywhere

Since the 1956 Rule E-1 persists into the current Rule F-1 (see Part 1), it opens up the possibility that IMF gold could be stored in any central bank gold vault (or other outsourced vaults) in any of the four jurisdictions of the US, UK, France and India, and even in China in the future if China looked to use its “without prejudice” option to be re-listed in the current day F-1 Rule list.

For example, the wording of Rule F-1 suggests that IMF gold held at the FRB New York vaults could be transferred to another Federal Reserve Bank vault as long as the other Bank had secure storage facilities.

Whether, in terms of Rule F-1, this transferability extends to US Treasury storage locations such as Fort Knox is unclear; the IMF staff document from 1956 seemed to think that US Treasury locations were feasible storage locations since it mentions them as indirect justification for changing the Rule E-1 wording.

There appears to be legal authority for the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank to use the Treasury’s Mint institutions for storing foreign central bank gold. Such arrangements were even being discussed as early as the 1940s as the following ‘Treasury Department, Inter Office Communication’ letter from a Mr. Luxford to a Mr. Dietrich makes clear:

“The quantity of gold available in New York for sale to foreign governments for earmarking by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has declined to such an extent that it will soon be necessary to ship gold from Fort Knox to New York, or make other arrangements for earmarking.

It has been suggested that, to avoid the tying up of transportation facilities and the high cost of shipping, arrangements be made whereby the Federal Reserve Bank can, with the consent of the governments concerned, earmark gold while it is still in the Mint institutions.”

The letter goes on to describe a proposal whereby the FRB could earmark foreign central bank gold in the vault of the Denver branch of the FRB of Kansas City, or even lease private bank vaults in Denver, but if this didn’t solve the space issue, then compartments in Fort Knox and the Denver Mint were available:

“Mr. Howard has contacted the superintendents at the Fort Knox and Denver institutions and I am informed that the following spaces are available:

1. Fort Knox – two compartments which, when filled completely, could hold approximately $1,000,000,000 in gold.

2. Denver – three compartments which, when filled completely, could hold approximately $450,000,000 in gold.”

 Luxford concluded that:

“I believe that there is legal authority for the use of the mint institutions for the purpose outlined above.”

(Source: ‘Treasury Department, Inter Office Communication’, Sept 1943, Clinton Library, gold files)

Fort Knox model

So, there appears to be a legal precedent for foreign central banks, governments and international institutions to hold earmarked gold at US Treasury storage locations. These arrangements would be very useful if the US Treasury needed gold at the FRBNY and, for example, the Treasury conducted a gold location swap with the Bundesbank or IMF, swapping Treasury Fort Knox gold for Bundesbank or IMF gold.

The IMF is legally allowed to engage in location swaps for its gold and has done so numerous times in the past with entities such as the FRB and the BIS. Some of these IMF gold location swaps are covered in Part 3.

According to the current Rule F-1, IMF gold could also be stored, for example, in Bank of England provincial branch office vaults (assuming there are any of these vaults still operational). The Bank of England has in the past stored HM Treasury and other customer gold in its branch offices, for example in Liverpool, Birmingham and Southampton. Some of these branch offices have now closed but the Bank of England still maintains various agency offices across the UK.

In theory it’s possible that IMF gold could be transferred from the Bank of England’s London vaults to secure storage at one of the Bank’s provincial locations or even to emergency storage locations in England or Wales that have, at various times in the past, been considered by HM Treasury and the Ministry of Defence.

The IMF’s Article XIII, Section 2(b) also seems to open up the possibility that the IMF’s gold could be stored in other locations entirely, even in other countries. Remember that Article XIII, Section 2(b) states:

“(b) The Fund may hold other assets, including gold, in the depositories designated by the five members having the largest quotas and in such other designated depositories as the Fund may select”.

The IMF’s Articles will always have precedence over its Rules and Regulations, due to Rule A-1 which states

“A-1: These Rules and Regulations supplement the Articles of Agreement and the By-Laws adopted by the Board of Governors. They are not intended to replace any provision of either the Articles or the By-Laws.”

There is another clause in Article XIII, section 2(b) referring to an emergency, which is pretty self-explanatory:

“In an emergency the Executive Board may transfer all or any part of the Fund’s gold holdings to any place where they can be adequately protected.

There is therefore plenty of legal scope for the IMF’s gold to be stored in locations that at first glance might not appear obvious.

 

Shanghai Surprise

The IMF Executive Board confirmed the five gold depositories of the Fund in November 1946, including the Central Bank of China, Shanghai. However, no IMF gold was ever held in Shanghai because no IMF member country (including China) ever deposited gold to the IMF at Shanghai.

The removal of the reference to Shanghai as an IMF gold depository during the 1956 amendment had its origins in 1949. In 1949 the IMF Executive Board discussed a proposal that Shanghai should be temporarily removed from the gold depositories list due to political instability in the country at that time.

The following Executive Board minutes illustrate the discussion of the proposal that was recommended by the Board Chairman Camille Gutt. The discussion involved Frank Southard (F A Southard), the US Executive Director to the Fund, who had helped plan the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, and Y C Koo, who was subsequently Treasurer of the IMF, and who was part of the nationalist Chinese delegation that attended Bretton Woods:

Gold Depository

The Executive Board considered a recommendation by the Chairman that, in view of recent developments in China, the Fund should remove Shanghai from the list of gold depositories for the time being.”

“Mr. Southard said he assumed the action would be of a temporary character. Mr. Koo said his Government had no objection on the understanding that the action was temporary. However, the Government would wish to reserve the right to raise the matter again with the Fund at an opportune time.

The decision was: In view of recent developments in China and under the emergency provisions of Article XIII, Section 2(b), Shanghai is for the time being removed from the list of depositories in which the Fund may hold assets, including gold. Members shall be so informed. It is understood that China may, at an opportune time, raise the matter again.”

(Source: Executive Board Meeting 465, 21st July 1949)

Central Bank Of China 1940s gold unit

While the decision to temporarily remove Shanghai as a gold depository had been taken in 1949, it re-emerged as an issue in 1956 when the amendment to Rule E-1 was being discussed at a meeting. This was because the Executive Board wanted to ensure that the changed wording to Rule E-1 did not prejudice the previous decision to temporarily remove Shanghai as a gold depository.

The Acting Chairman in the 1956 meeting was H. Merle Cochran, deputy Managing Director of the Fund. The Executive Director for China (representing the Taiwan based government) was Mr Tann:

The Acting Chairman stated that, in order to make it clear that the proposed action would not prejudice a previous decision temporarily removing Shanghai from the list of depositories, the staff wished to recommend the addition of the following paragraph to the decision proposed:

(c) The amendment of Rule E-1 as set forth in paragraph (a) above is without prejudice to the decision of the Executive Board at Meeting 465 (July 21, 1949)”

“Mr. Tann said he had no objection to the staff’s proposals and particularly welcomed the additional paragraph put forward by the management since it would leave no doubt that the 1949 decision was not being nullified.”

(Source:Executive Board Meeting 56, 29th November 1956)

The 1956 amendment to Rule E-1 was adopted by the IMF Executive Board on 9th January 1957, and then reviewed and accepted by the Fund’s Board of Governors at the 12th IMF annual meeting 1957 where Per Jacobsson, Managing Director and Chairman of the Executive Board highlighted to the Governors that

“On November 29, 1956, Rule E-1 was amended to provide for greater flexibility in the location of the Fund’s gold held with designated depositories.”

(Source: Draft letter by Per Jacobsson to the Chairman of the Board of Governors, twelfth Annual Meeting of the IMF)

On paper, the reinstatement of China as a gold depository of the IMF looks possible, but in reality would be complicated by a number of issues, not least the unravelling of claims and representations that could arise from Taipei and Beijing over the 1949 agreement with the IMF.

With Shanghai now re-emerging as a dominant player in the global gold market, its fitting that the story of the IMF’s Shanghai depository should not be forgotten even though it never really existed.

The Nagpur gold vault, which does exist, is itself a relatively forgotten IMF outpost.  But it still contains, or is said to contain, both IMF and Reserve Bank of India gold. For this reason, the Nagpur gold vault, and some of its details, will be the subject of a future post.

The IMF’s Gold Depositories – Part 1, The Legal Background

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the world’s third largest official sector holder of gold behind the United States and Germany. According to the Fund’s web site, as at October 2014 “the IMF holds around 90.5 million ounces (2,814.1 metric tons) of gold at designated depositories.”

The IMF’s gold holdings were accumulated between 1946 and the late 1970s via Members’ initial quota subscriptions to the Fund, various quota increases, and through a number of additional methods where a Member either sold gold to the Fund or transferred gold to the Fund as part of a repayment obligation. Likewise, gold sometimes flowed in the other direction back to Members, in payment for a Member’s currency, during the 1970s gold restitutions, and via other sales to Members.

With renewed interest in central bank and official gold holdings at international storage locations, it is worth examining what exactly the IMF means by designated depositories and which specific depositories its gold was deposited into.

At this stage its worth stating that the designated gold depositories of the IMF really just mean that a gold account was opened by various authorised signatories in the name of the IMF at certain central banks that offered gold vaulting or storage facilities. There are no stand-alone IMF gold depositories, just gold accounts at existing third-party depositories.

There are many ways to verify the identity of the IMF’s gold depositories. However, the legal approach is the most complete, and also highlights some little known facts.

“Depositories” is a specific legal term appearing in the Articles and Rules and Regulations of the Fund. All aspects of the governance and functioning of the IMF are based on the Fund’s Articles of Agreement, supplemented by its By-Laws, and its Rules and Regulations.

Bank of England

Rule F-1 of the Rules and Regulations relates to the establishment of gold depositories. Article XIII, Section 2(b) also addresses gold depositories and holdings.

The current Rule F-1 reads:

Rule F-1. Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India. The gold of the Fund shall be held with the depositories designated by the members in whose territories they are located at places agreed with the Fund.” (Adopted September 25, 1946, amended November 29, 1956, and April 1, 1978)

Note that Rule F-1 has been amended twice. These amendments are key to understanding the genesis of the designated depositories, their locations and their potential locations. The last amendment was applied on 1st April 1978, and before that on 29th November 1956.

In April 1978 the IMF implemented the Second Amendment to its Articles, By-Laws, and Rules and Regulations so as to reflect a number of changes in the international economy including the shift from a par value system to a system of flexible exchange rates, and a reduced role for gold in the international system. As part of the Second Amendment, the Rules and Regulations underwent an extensive overhaul with rules deleted, rewritten and even renamed.

The rule on gold depositories required amending because Members were no longer required to pay subscriptions in gold. During this amendment the gold depository rule was renamed as Rule F-1. It had previously been called Rule E-1.

Rule E-1 prior to the 1978 change read:

Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India. The gold of the Fund shall be held with the depositories designated by the members in whose territories they are located at places agreed with the Fund. A member may pay its gold subscription to the Fund at one or more of the specified gold depositories within the terms of Article XIII, Section 2.

According to comments on the revision of the Rules in 1977, the IMF’s Legal Department staff wrote that “The first two sentences of the provision have been transferred to Rule F-1. The last sentence has been omitted because of the changes in the provisions governing the payment of subscriptions.” Likewise, a comment beside the newly named Rule F-1 stated that “This provision incorporates the first two sentences of the present Rule E-1”.

SM/77/134 “Implementation of the Second Amendment: Revised Rules and Regulations – A through N”

http://adlib.imf.org/digital_assets/wwwopac.ashx?command=getcontent&server=webdocs&value=EB/1977/SM/172483.PDF

Since gold was no longer used to pay subscriptions following the Second Amendment in 1978, the reference to paying gold to gold depositories, based on Article XIII, Section 2, was no longer needed.

Article XIII, Section 2(b) specifies the framework on how gold depositories are designated, the target percentages between which the Fund’s gold was to be initially held between the designated depositories, and the way transfers could occur between locations, including emergency transfers.

Article XIII, Section 2(b) reads as follows:

Section 2. Depositories (b) The Fund may hold other assets, including gold, in the depositories designated by the five members having the largest quotas and in such other designated depositories as the Fund may select.

Initially, at least one-half of the holdings of the Fund shall be held in the depository designated by the member in whose territories the Fund has its principal office and at least forty percent shall be held in the depositories designated by the remaining four members referred to above.

However, all transfers of gold by the Fund shall be made with due regard to the costs of transport and anticipated requirements of the Fund. In an emergency the Executive Board may transfer all or any part of the Fund’s gold holdings to any place where they can be adequately protected.

Whereas the current Rule F-1 and the pre-1978 Rule E-1 list only four country locations as gold depositories, there is a reference in Article XIII, Section 2 to designated gold depositories of five members. This difference can be understood by looking at the version of Rule E-1 prior to the November 1956 amendment. This is the original version adopted on 25th September 1946 that persisted until 1956.

The originally adopted, pre-1956 version of E-1 read as follows:

Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in New York, London, Shanghai, Paris, and Bombay. The gold of the Fund shall be held with the depositories designated by the members in whose territories they are located. A member may pay its gold subscription to the Fund at one or more of the specified gold depositories, within the terms of Article XIII, Section 2.

Banque de France entrance door

These five locations of New York, London, Shanghai, Paris and Bombay were chosen since the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France and India were given the five largest quotas (in that order) when the Fund went live, and these countries each designated a depository in these five locations.

India appeared onto the top five quota member list when the Soviet Union declined to join the IMF in late 1946, despite the Russian delegation having attended the Bretton Woods conference and being involved in detailed Fund negotiations after the conference.

In fact, early IMF drafts about the five depositories include Moscow on the list in addition to New York, London, Shanghai and Paris. Interestingly, South Africa also seemed eager to host an IMF gold depository despite not qualifying on quota size grounds.

On 4th September 1946 at Executive Board Meeting 49, just prior to the Fund’s Rules and Regulations being finalised for adoption, Gijsbert Bruins (G W J Bruins) the Executive Director representing the Netherlands and South Africa “raised the request of South Africa that one of the gold depositories should be located there. It was decided to consider this later”.

Although nothing came of this South African request, it’s notable that four of the five current day BRICS countries were in various ways, at the inception of the Fund, in contention for hosting an IMF gold depository. Perhaps the new BRICs Development Bank has taken note of this historical connection.

So, which gold depositories were nominated by the five largest members in respect of New York, London, Shanghai, Paris and Bombay?

Executive Board Document No. 46, Supplement 1 prepared by the Operations Department and dated 5th November 1946 confirms the five depositories, and the quality of gold that would be accepted:

PAYMENT OF GOLD SUBSCRIPTIONS

1. The nominated gold depositories of the Fund are:-

(1) The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York City,

(2) The Bank of England, London.

(3) The Banque de France, Paris.

(4) The Reserve Bank of India, Bombay.

(5) The Central Bank of China, Shanghai.

2. The Fund requires that part of a Member’s quota payable in gold shall be delivered to one or more of the above-mentioned depositories.

3. The gold must be delivered to the Fund in the form of bars having a fineness of .995 or higher and weighing approximately 400 ozs, i.e., the normal size of bars used in international transactions. The Fund is not prepared to accept gold coin. Members may, however, deliver bars of lower fineness and weight by agreement with the Fund. In such an event, Members must be prepared in gold an amount, which would be estimated by the Fund, to cover the conversion of such gold into bars of the required weight and fineness.

4. Bars tendered by Members must be in a condition and have an assay which would be acceptable to the depository in question if such depository were called upon to buy such bars. The assay therefore, must be recognized by the depository in question, and bars must not be mutilated.

5. The weight of the bars tendered must be verified by the depository to which they are tendered

6. Members will bear all the charges made by the depositories for taking into custody for the Fund the Member’s gold subscriptions. Members will themselves make their own arrangements with the depositories concerned in this regard. “All gold must therefore be received by the Fund free of charges.

FRBNY brass plate

A note from John L. Fisher, Head of the Operations Department, to Andre Van Campenhout, Head of the Legal Department dated 16th September 1946 indicates that there was a view that having gold in New York and London would be most useful from an operational point of view, and that there was also concern about possible security risks in China and India at that time.

Initially, at least 50% of the Fund’s gold must be held in the U.S.A. and 40% in depositories designated by the four Members (other than the U.S.A.) having the largest quotas. But there is a proviso that the Fund shall hold gold where it anticipates that it will want it, subject to its being safe there. The anticipation of the Fund may change from time to time, but in present circumstances it might be thought that the two places where gold might be most useful to the Fund would be the U.S.A. and the UK.

….gold put up for subscriptions, repurchases and charges, should be put up in the centre where the Fund anticipates that it will need it. So far as subscriptions are concerned, the anticipations can only be guesses, since the Fund will have had no experience to guide it. But the factor of security should be considered and it is pertinent to observe that there is civil war in China and political unrest in India.

http://adlib.imf.org/digital_assets/wwwopac.ashx?command=getcontent&server=webdocs&value=\BWC\BWC747-03.pdf

Prior to the payment of member’s initial quota payments into the Fund in 1946-1947, the IMF sent requests to each prospective member informing them of the location of the gold depositories, and asking each country to specify a preferred depository to which it would send its gold payment.

This request appears was made so as to predict whether the Fund would need to actually instruct Member’s to use specific depositories, most likely to direct gold into the depositories so as to satisfy the 50% New York rule, but also so as to result in gold being in “the most useful” locations of New York and London.

The request was in the form of a letter to each country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed by Camille Gutt, Managing Director of the IMF.

My dear Mr. Minister:

I have the honor to inform you that the International Monetary Fund will have gold depositories at New York, London, Shanghai, Paris and Bombay. The gold subscription of your Government will be payable at one of these depositories.

It is desired that, so far as possible, each member deposit its gold subscription at any depository it selects. It is essential, however, that the Fund comply with the provisions of Article XIII, Section 2(b) concerning the initial distribution of gold holdings of the Fund.

In order that it may be determined whether any instructions will be necessary concerning the depository at which your Government’s gold subscriptions should be paid, it is requested that you furnish the Fund, as soon as possible, with the following information:

(1) The depository at which your Government would prefer to make its
gold payment,

(2) The approximate amount of gold which your Government will pay to the Fund on account of its subscription.

Sincerely yours,

Camille Gutt, Managing Director

(Draft Letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of each member relative to Gold Depositories

http://adlib.imf.org/digital_assets/wwwopac.ashx?command=getcontent&server=webdocs&value=EB/1946/EBD/278427.PDF)

INDIA-ECONOMY-RBI

Having an existing gold account in the name of a central bank or a sovereign at a depository such as the FRBNY, Bank of England or Banque de France also most likely affected the choice of depository each Member made. Whatever the reasons behind the initial gold transfers to the various depositories, by the end of June 1947, the IMF’s gold holdings were distributed as follows:

Gold with Depositories, as at 30 June 1947 (fine ounces and per cent distribution)

USA – Federal Reserve Bank of New York 21.782 million 56.72%

UK – Bank of England 13.558 million 35.30%

France – Banque de France 2.283 million 5.94%

India – Reserve Bank of India 0.785 million 2.04%

TOTAL 38.408 million 100%

(Appendix VIII, Schedule 1, Annual Report 1947)

Note that no country deposited gold to the credit of the IMF at the Bank of China in Shanghai, and only India’s initial gold subscription was transferred to the Reserve Bank of India, Bombay.