Given that it’s now just over a year since that last set of calculations, it made sense at this point to update the data so as to grasp how many Good Delivery golds bars held in London is spoken for in terms of ownership, versus how much may be unaccounted for. Estimating gold held in London vaults is by definition a tricky exercise, since it must rely on whatever data and statements are made available in what is a notoriously secret market, and there will usually be timing mismatches between the various data points. However, using a combination of published sources from the Bank of England, the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), the Exchange Traded Fund websites, and UK gold import/export data, it is possible to produce some factual numbers.
In the Bank of England vaults
Exactly once per year, the Bank of England publishes a snapshot of how much gold it is holding in custody for its central bank and commercial bank customers. This snapshot is featured in the Bank’s annual report which is usually published around July each year, and reports on its financial year-end, as of end of February. In its 2016 Annual Report, the Bank of England states (on page 31) that:
“At end-February 2016, total assets held by the Bank as custodian were £567 billion (2015: £514 billion), of which £135 billion (2015: £130 billion) were holdings of gold”
With an afternoon LBMA Gold Price fix of £888.588 on Monday 29 February 2016, this equates to 151,926,427 fine troy ounces of gold, or 4725 tonnes held in custody at the Bank of England. This equates to approximately 380,000 London Good Delivery gold bars, each weighing 400 fine troy ounces.
The corresponding figure for end of February 2015 was £130 billion, which, valued at the afternoon fix on that day of £787.545 per ounce, equalled 5,134 tonnes. Therefore between the end of February 2015 end of February 2016, the amount of gold held in custody by the Bank of England fell by 409 tonnes. Since, according to World Gold Council data, there were no central bank sellers of gold over that period apart from Venezuela whose gold was predominantly held in Venezuela at that time, then most of this 409 tonne decline must be either due to unreported central bank sales, central bank gold repatriation movements, London bullion bank sales, or some combination of all three.
The year-on-year drop of 409 tonnes came after a previous decline of 350 tonnes to end of February 2015, and before that a drop of 755 tonnes between February 2013 and February 2014. So overall between February 2013 and February 2016, the amount of gold held in custody in the Bank of England’s vaults fell by 1,514 tonnes.
LBMA Ballpark: 6,500 tonnes in London
Up until at least October 2015, the vaulting page on the LBMA website stated that:
“In total it is estimated that there are approximately 7,500 tonnes of gold held in London vaults, of which about three-quarters is stored in the Bank of England.”
This is based on a Wayback Machine Internet Archive page cache from 9 October 2015.
The current version of that page on the LBMA website now states:
“In total it is estimated that there are approximately 6,500 tonnes of gold held in London vaults, of which about three-quarters is stored in the Bank of England.”
The earliest Internet Archive page cache mentioning 6,500 tonnes is from 8 February 2016. So sometime between October 2015 and February 2016, the LBMA changed its ballpark figure, revising it down by 1000 tonnes. Wayback Machine Archive web crawlers usually update a web page following a change to that page, so its likely that the revision to 6,500 tonnes was done nearer February than October. Using a figure from a LBMA website page is admittedly quite general, but at least it’s an anchor, and someone at the LBMA saw fit to make that actual change from 7,500 tonnes to 6,500 tonnes. In June 2015 (as some readers might recall), the LBMA had said that there were 500,000 Good Delivery gold bars in all the London vaults, which is approximately 6256 tonnes, so perhaps the 6500 tonne estimate was partially based on this statistic from mid-year 2015 that the LBMA was playing catch-up with.
With 6,500 tonnes in London vaults, ~ 75% of which is at the Bank of England, this would mean 4,875 tonnes at the Bank of England, and another 1,625 tonnes at other (commercial) gold vaults in London, mostly at HSBC’s and JP Morgan’s vaults. As per the Bank of England’s annual report as of 29 February 2016, we know now that there were 4,725 tonnes in custody at the Bank, so the LBMA ballpark of 4875 is actually very close to the actual 4725 tonnes reported by the Bank, and the difference is only 150 tonnes. Lets’s move on to the vaulted gold held in London but held outside the Bank of England vaults.
ETF Gold held in London
In the September 2015 calculation exercise, we estimated that there were 1,116 tonnes of gold held in the London vaults within a series of gold-backed Exchange Traded Funds.
The known ETFs and other companies that hold their Good Delivery bar gold in London are as follows:
SPDR Gold Trust: GLD. Custodian HSBC London, all GLD gold held at HSBC vault
The 1,116 tonnes of gold ETF holdings in London, calculated in September 2015, were as follows, with the SPDR Gold Trust accounting for the largest share:
The total figure for all gold held in London that we used in September 2015 was the 6,256 tonne figure implied by the LBMA’s 500,000 gold bars statement from June 2015. With 6,256 tonnes in total, and 5,134 tonnes at the Bank of England (as of end February 2015), this left 1,122 tonnes in London but “not at the Bank of England“, which implied that there was nearly no gold in London outside the Bank of England that was not accounted for by ETF holdings. in other words the ‘London Gold Float’ looks to have been near zero as of September 2015.
Assuming 6,500 tonnes of gold held in London in February 2016, and with 4,725 tonnes at the Bank of England in February 2016, we can repeat this exercise and say that the would leave 1,775 tonnes of gold in London but “not at the Bank of England“, as the following chart shows:
Its well-known by now that the tide of significant gold ETF outflows that occurred in 2015 suddenly turned to very strong inflows into gold ETFs beginning in early 2016. Although our gold ETF holdings data was updated using holdings information as of 30 September 2016, it’s still worth seeing how well the latest London holdings of the gold ETFs help to explain this 1775 tonnes “not in the Bank of England” figure. As it turns out, as of the end of September 2016, the above ETFs collectively held 1,679 tonnes of gold, so right now, if there were 1775 tonnes of gold in London outside of the Bank of England, the ETF holdings would explain all but 96 tonnes of this total.
Taking a quick look at some of the individual ETF holdings, the massive SPDR Gold Trust is currently holding around 950 tonnes of gold in London. The iShares figure reported in the charts of 214.89 tonnes comprises 2 components a) the London held gold within IAU (which can be seen in this daily JP Morgan weight list), and b) the gold bars held in iShares trust SGLN. The bulk of the ETF Securities figure of 276.68 tonnes represents gold held in PHAU (over 150 tonnes), and GBS (over 100 tonnes). The Deutsche Bank total is quite hard to calculate and comprises gold held in 5 Deutsche bank ETFs. Nick Laird receives daily holdings files for these ETFs from Deutsche Bank and performs a number of calculations such as fractional ounces per ETF unit to arrive at a total figure of 88 tonnes. The SOURCE and ABSA ETFs make up the vast majority of the remainder, with the other entities listed, such as BetaShares and Standard Bank ETF, being immaterial to the calculation.
Central Bank gold at the Bank of England
For the purposes of this exercise, data on central bank gold holdings at the Bank of England does not need to be updated since there hasn’t been any reported gold buying or selling activity by any of the relevant central banks since September 2015 (except for Venezuela), so the ‘known figure’ of 3779 tonnes attributed to identified banks in September 2015 remains unchanged. If anything, since the Bank of England revealed last February that its gold under custody fell to 4,725 tonnes, it means that there are now approximately 946 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England that are not explained by known central bank holders.
Given that many central banks around the world will not cooperate in confirming where they store their foreign stored gold, then there are definitely additional central banks storing gold in the Bank of England vaults which would reduce this 946 tonnes of gold with unknown ownership. Therefore some of this total is unknown central bank gold holdings. Some is presumably also gold and borrowed gold held by bullion banks that have gold accounts at the Bank of England. Given that the Bank of England and the LBMA bullion banks maintain a total information blackout about the real extent of the gold lending market out of London, it is difficult to know how much borrowed gold is being held at the Bank of England by bullion bank account holders.
Some of the growth in the SPDR Gold Trust gold holdings this year looks to have been sourced from gold originating from the Bank of England, as was detailed in a July BullionStar article “SPDR Gold Trust gold bars at the Bank of England vaults“, which highlighted that the Bank of England was a subcustodian of the SPDR Golf Trust during Q1 2016. As a SPDR Gold Trust filing stated:
“During the quarter ended March 31, 2016, the greatest amount of gold held by subcustodians was approximately 29 tonnes or approximately 3.8% of the Trust’s gold at such date. The Bank of England held that gold as subcustodian.“
Year to Date ETF changes and UK Gold Imports
It’s important to highlight that the 6,500 tonnes figure reported by the LBMA and the 4,725 tonne figure reported by the Bank of England relate to the February 2016 period, while the ETF gold holdings totals calculated above are from the end of September 2016. So there is a date mismatch. Nick Laird has calculated that during the February to September 2016 period, the London gold ETFs added 399 tonnes of gold, and during the same period the UK net imported (imports – exports) more than 800 tonnes of non-monetary gold. Given the apparent low float of gold in London late last year, its realistic to assume that gold inflows into the London-based ETFs this year were mostly sourced from non-monetary gold imports into the UK because there was apparently no other gold at hand from which to source the ETF gold inflows. ETF demand would also help explain the drivers of UK gold imports year-to-date. Note that monetary gold imports (central bank gold trade flows) are not reported by the respective trade bodies since the opaque basket of deplorables (i.e. central bankers) get an unfair exemption, therefore the 800 tonnes of net gold imports into the UK refers to non-monetary gold imports.
According to the latest comprehensive trade statistics, from January to July 2016 inclusive the UK net imported 735 tonnes of gold from the Rest of the World. To this figure we can add another 84.6 tonnes of gold that the UK net imported from Switzerland in August 2016. This gives total UK gold imports up to August 2016 inclusive of 819.6 tonnes, hence the statement, the UK net imported over 800 tonnes of gold year-to-date.
If 399 tonnes of the 800 tonnes of non-monetary gold imported into the UK during 2016 was channeled into the holdings of gold-backed ETFs, this would still mean that the ‘London Float’ of gold could have been augmented by approximately 400 tonnes year-to-date. However, since most non-monetary gold imports into the UK are for bullion bank customers such as Scotia and Barclays, some of these extra imports could have been for repaying borrowed gold liabilities to central bank customers, and the quantity of gold now held at the Bank of England may be higher than reported by the Bank last February.
In summary, given the large UK gold imports year-to-date, there may now be over 7,000 tonnes of Good Delivery gold bars held in London vaults. But the fact that very large quantities of gold bars had to be imported into the London market during 2016 does suggest that our calculations from September 2015 were valid and that there was a very low float of gold in the London market. This float may now be a few hundred tonnes higher given the imports, but there is still an unquantifiably large number of claims in the form of ‘unallocated gold’ holdings in the London market which are liabilities against the LBMA bullion banks.
Remember that the London Gold Market trades nearly 6000 tonnes of predominantly paper gold each and every day. The latest LBMA ‘gold’ clearing statistics show that on average, 18.8 million ounces (585 tonnes) of ‘gold’ was cleared per trading day in September 2016 which on a 10:1 trading to clearing ratio equates to 5,850 tonnes traded per day, and 128,000 tonnes traded during September. So the LBMA administered market nearly trades as much ‘gold’ connected transaction per day as is held in the entire London vaulting network.
If gold demand from the Rest of the World ticks up, such as from India, then the London market will not have the luxury of being able to import large quantities of gold in the absence of that excess demand putting upward pressure on the gold price. Until then, the London Gold Market looks likely to continue its physical re-stock with one hand, while trading leveraged paper gold with the other hand, all the while rolling over outstanding borrowed central bank gold obligations, such as the short-term gold deposits held by Banco Central de Bolivia, which will be the subject of an upcoming case study into the hidden London gold lending market consortium.
the LBMA was established in 1987 by the Bank of England
the original bullion bank founding members and steering committee members of the LBMA represented 6 commercial banks active in the London Gold Market, namely, N.M. Rothschild, Mocatta & Goldsmid, Morgan Guaranty Trust, J. Aron, Sharps Pixley (former Sharps Pixley), and Rudolf Wolff & Co.
the Bank of England has been involved in the affairs of the LBMA from Day 1 in 1987, and continues to this day to have observer status on the LBMA Management Committee
the Bank of England has observer status on not just the LBMA Management Committee, but also on the LBMA Physical Committee and in the LBMA Vault Managers group
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) also has observer status on the LBMA Management Committee
although there are 2 other London financial market committees closely aligned with the Bank of England, and populated by bank representatives, that publish the minutes of their regular meetings, namely the Foreign Exchange Joint Standing Committee, the Sterling Money Markets Liaison Committee, the LBMA Management Committee does not publish the minutes of its meetings, so the public is in the dark as to what’s discussed in those meetings
Note that “observer status” does not mean to sit and observe on a committee, it just means that the observer has no voting rights at committee meetings. Note also that the structure of the LBMA Management Committee has recently changed to that of a Board, so the Committee is now called the LBMA Board.
One of the most interesting points in the previous article referred to the very recent appointment of a very recently departed Bank of England senior staff member, and former head of the Bank of England Foreign exchange Division, Paul Fisher, as the new ‘independent‘ chairman of the LBMA Management Committee / ‘Board’. Paul Fisher has also in the past, been the Bank of England’s representative, with observer status, on this very same LBMA Management Committee (now LBMA Board) that he is now becoming independent chairman of. Fisher is replacing outgoing LBMA Board chairman Grant Angwin, who if from Asahi Refining (formerly representing Johnson Matthey).
‘Independent’ Non-Executive Chairman
This article continues where the above analysis left off, and looks at the appointment of Fisher as the new ‘independent’ Non-Executive Chairman of the LBMA Board, considers the ‘independence’ of the appointment given the aforementioned very close relationship between the Bank of England and the LBMA, and examines the chairman’s appointment in the context of the UK Corporate Governance Code, which now governs the Constitution and operation of the LBMA Board.
As I commented previously:
Arguably, the pièce de résistance of these Bank of England / FCA relationships with the LBMA Management Committee, is the fact that Paul Fisher, the newly appointed ‘independent‘ Chairman of the LBMA Board, a.k.a. LBMA Management Committee, has already previously been the Bank of England’s “observer” on the LBMA Management Committee.”
This was confirmed in Fisher’s speech to the 2004 LBMA Annual Conference in Shanghai, Fisher, when then Head of Foreign Exchange at the Bank of England, he stated:
“I am glad to be invited to the LBMA’s Management Committee meetings as an observer.”
Fisher was Head of Foreign Exchange Division at the Bank of England from 2000 to 2009, so could in theory have been a Bank of England observer on the LBMA Management Committee throughout this period. The Foreign Exchange Division of the Bank of England is responsible for managing the Sterling exchange rate, and for managing HM Treasury’s official reserves held in the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA), including HM Treasury’s official gold reserves. One would think that when the LBMA announced in a press release in July of this year that Fisher was being appointed as the new LBMA chairman, that the fact that he had previously attended the LBMA Management Committee meetings would be a fact of relevance to the appointment. However, surprisingly, or maybe not so surprisingly, this fact was omitted from the press release.
“The LBMA is delighted to announce the appointment of Dr Paul Fisher as the new Chairman of the Association, effective from 5 September, 2016. Paul is due to retire from the Bank of England at the end of July.”
The press release goes on to say:
“Paul brings with him a wealth of financial market experience following his 26 years at the Bank of England. Prior to joining the LBMA, his last role was as Deputy Head of the Prudential Regulation Authority. Paul was selected by the LBMA Board following an independent Executive search procedure.”
“Previously, from 2002, he [Paul Fisher] ran the Bank’s Foreign Exchange Division where he had a constructive relationship with the LBMA and developed a working knowledge of the bullion market.”
Notwithstanding the capability of the appointment, there is absolutely zero mention in this press release of the fact that Paul Fisher used to be the Bank of England observer on the LBMA Management Committee, a committee that he is now being made chair of. Why so? Was it to make the relationship appear more distant that it actually was, thereby reinforcing the perception of ‘independence’?
In addition, the recently added bio of Paul Fisher on the LBMA Board listings features text identical to the press release, with no indication that Fisher previously attended the LBMA Management Committee meetings.
Notice also the reference to an “Executive search procedure” being used to support the new chairman’s appointment.
At this point, it’s instructive to examine what drove the re-definition of the LBMA Management Committee to become the LBMA “Board”, and the appointment process to that board of an ‘independent‘ Non-Executive Chairperson. It can be seen from the LBMA website archive that until July of this year, the entity providing oversight and strategic direction to the LBMA was the ‘LBMA Management Committee':
Only in July following a LBMA General Meeting on 29 June did the website description change to LBMA Board:
The new Board structure of the LBMA allows it to have 3 representatives from LBMA Market Making firms, 3 representatives from LBMA Full Member entities, 3 ‘independent’ non -executive directors (inclusive of the ‘independent’ chairman), and up to 3 representatives from the LBMA Executive staff, including the LBMA CEO.
One of the first references to a future change in governance structure at the LBMA came in October 2015 at the LBMA annual conference, held in Rome. At this conference, Ruth Crowell, CEO projected that in the future:
“To enhance its governance, the new Board will include for the first time Non-Executive Directors whilst giving more power to the Executive so as to ensure any conflicts of interest are eliminated.”
On 29 April 2016, a LBMA “Future Events” summary document confirmed that a General Meeting (akin to an EGM) of LBMA members would be convened on Wednesday 29 June 2016 in London so as to “update the LBMA’s legal structure and governance“. The same “Future Events” summary also highlighted a change in schedule to the LBMA’s Annual General Meeting (AGM), which due to the 29 June General Meeting, would now be held on 27 September 2016 with an agenda item to “incorporate, into the constitution of the LBMA, the governance and legal structure changes agreed at the General Meeting in June“.
It would be quite presumptuous for any normal organisation of members, in the month of April, to not only assume that resolutions that were only being put to its membership in the month of June would be passed, but to also actually hard-code these assumptions into the agenda of a scheduled September meeting. However, this was what was written in the “Future Events” document and appears to be the pre-ordained roadmap that the LBMA Management Committee had already set in stone.
On Thursday 30 June, the day after its General Meeting in London, the LBMA issued a press release in which it confirmed (as it had predicted) that “Members of the LBMA approved by an overwhelming majority a number of important changes to its Memorandum & Articles of Association“.
As well as endorsing the LBMA’s expansion to acquire the responsibilities of the London Platinum and Palladium Market (LPPM), which was the first motion for consideration at the meeting, the press release confirmed that the membership had endorsed the appointment of an independent Non-Executive Chairman:
“The second change was to further enhance the governance of the Association. TheUK Corporate Governance Code was incorporated and will govern both the Constitution as well as the operation of the Board. While it is vital for the Board to have a strong voice for its Members, it is important that any actual and perceived conflicts between these parties are balanced by having independence on that Board. This independence protects the interests of the wider membership as well as the individuals themselves serving on the Board. To address this, the LBMA has added an independent Non-Executive Chairman as well as two additional Non-Executive Directors (NEDs).”
Notice the reference to 2 other independent non-executive directors. Nine business days later, on 13 July 2016, the LBMA issued a further press release revealing that ex Bank of England Head of Foreign Exchange and former observer on the LBMA Management Committee, Paul Fisher had been appointed as the “independent Non-Executive Chairman“.
Executive Search Procedure
Recall also that the 13 July press release stated “Paul was selected by the LBMA Board following an independent Executive search procedure.””
Nine days is an extremely short period of time to commence, execute, and complete an ‘independent Executive search procedure‘. It immediately throws up questions such as which search firm was retained to run the independent Executive search procedure?, which candidates did the search firm identify?, was there a short-list of candidates?, who was on such a short-list?, what were the criteria that led to the selection of the winning candidate above other candidates?, and how could such a process have been run and completed in such a limited period of time when similar search and selection processes for chairpersons of corporate boards usually take months to complete?
How independent is it also to have a former divisional head of the Bank of England as chairman of the London Gold Market when the Bank of England is the largest custodian of gold in the London Gold Market, and operates in the London Gold Market with absolute secrecy on behalf of its central bank and bullion bank customers.
Since the LBMA voluntarily incorporated the UK Corporate Governance Code into the operations of its Board following the General Meeting on 29 June, its instructive to examine what this UK Corporate Governance Code has to say about the appointment of an independent chairman to a board, and to what extent the Corporate Governance Code principles were adhered to in the LBMA’s ‘independent‘ chairman selection process.
UK Corporate Governance Code
The LBMA is a private company (company number 02205480) limited by guarantee without share capital, with an incorporation filing at UK Companies House on 14 December 1987. Stock exchange-listed companies in the UK are required to implement the principles of the UK Corporate Governance Code and comply with these principles or else explain (to their shareholders) why they have not complied (called the “comply or explain” doctrine). In the world of listed equities, monitoring and interacting with companies about their corporate governance is a very important area of institutional and hedge fund management. It has to be so as the share owners are able to monitor and grasp if any governance issues arise at any of companies held within their institutional / hedge fund equity portfolios.
Non-listed companies in the UK are also encouraged to apply the principles of the Code, but are not obliged to. When a private company chooses to incorporate the UK Corporate Governance Code to govern its Constitution and operation of its Board, one would expect that it would also then ‘comply’ to the principles of the Code or else ‘explain’ in the spirit of the Code, why it is not in compliance.
The UK Corporate Governance Code is administered by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). The April 2016 version of the Code can be read here. The main principles of the Code are divided into 5 sections, namely, Leadership (section A), Effectiveness (section B), Accountability (section C), Remuneration (section D), and Relations with Shareholders (Section E).
One of the main principles of Section B is as follows:
“There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board. “
Section A also addresses the independence of the chairman, and Section A.3.1. states that:
“The chairman should on appointment meet the independence criteria set out in B.1.1″
Section B.1.1, in part, states that:
“The board should determine whether the director is independent in character and judgement and whether there are relationships or circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgement. The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant to its determination, including if the director:
has, or has had within the last three years, a material business relationship with the company either directly, or as a partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body that has such a relationship with the company;
represents a significant shareholder;”
It goes without saying that the Bank of England has a material business relationship with the commercial banks which are represented on the LBMA Board, and I would argue that although the LBMA has no share capital, because the Bank of England has a material business relationship with the LBMA, and because since Paul Fisher was a senior employee of the Bank of England until July of this year, then the LBMA should “state its reasons as to why it determines that this director is independent“.
Furthermore, although the Bank of England is not a ‘significant shareholder’ of the LBMA, it is the next best thing, i.e. it has a significant and vested interest in the workings of the LBMA and interacts with LBMA banks through the London vaulting system, the gold lending market, and in its regulatory capacity of the LBMA member banks. The Bank of England also established the LBMA in 1987 don’t forget, so the extremely close relationship between the two is of material concern when a senior employee of the former suddenly becomes chairman of the latter.
Section B.2 addresses ‘Appointments to the Board':
There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board“
“There should be a nomination committee which should lead the process for board appointments and make recommendations to the board. A majority of members of the nomination committee should be independent non-executive directors.
The nomination committee should make available its terms of reference, explaining its role and the authority delegated to it by the board. 
[Footnote 7]: The requirement to make the information available would be met by including the information on a website that is maintained by or on behalf of the company.“
Was there a nomination committee? As of the time of appointing the new chairman to the LBMA Board, there were zero independent non-executive directors on the Board. And, excluding the newly appointed chairman, there are still zero other independent non-executive directors on the LBMA Board.
If there was a nomination committee, notwithstanding that it couldn’t by definition have a majority of independent non-executive directors when overseeing a search process for an independent chairman, then did it “make available its terms of reference” “on a website that is maintained by or on behalf of the company.” Not that I can see on any part of the LBMA website.
Section B.2.4. of the UK Corporate Governance Code includes the text:
“Where an external search consultancy has been used, it should be identified in the annual report and a statement made as to whether it has any other connection with the company.“
The company here being the LBMA (which is a private company). There has been no public identification as to the identity of the external search consultancy that the LBMA state was used in the appointment of Paul Fisher as ‘independent’ non-executive chairman.
Section B.3.2. states:
“The terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive directors should be made available for inspection.
[Footnote 9]: The terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive directors should be made available for inspection by any person at the company’s registered office during normal business hours and at the AGM (for 15 minutes prior to the meeting and during the meeting).
There is no reference on the LBMA website as to the terms and conditions of appointment of non-executive directors being made available for inspection by any person at the company’s registered office, nor was this communicated in the LBMA’s press release wherein it announced the appointment of the ‘independent’ non-executive chairman. It is one thing to claim to incorporate the UK Corporate Governance Code into a Board’s operations, but an entirely different matter to actually implement the principles into the operations of the Board. Given the above, I can’t see how the LBMA has done much of the latter.
Further ‘Independent’ Non-Executive Director Appointments
Given the opacity in the appointment of the Bank of England’s Paul Fisher as the new ‘independent’ non-executive chairman, it is therefore not unreasonable to suggest that the entire appointment process was a pre-ordained shoo-in. Without substantially more transparency from the LBMA, this view is understandable. Nor have there been any announcements about the appointment of “two additional Non-Executive Directors (NEDs)” that was claimed in the LBMA’s 30 June press release.
The LBMA held its Annual General Meeting this past week, on Tuesday 27 September. During the AGM, the outgoing chairman, Grant Angwin commented in his speech that:
” I’m delighted to have by my side Dr. Paul Fisher who will be replacing me as the first Independent Non-Executive Chairman of your Association – Paul will introduce himself to you in a moment.Paul and I will Co-Chair the Board until the end of this year. This is the first major step to making the Board more independent, Paul will be joined by up to 2 other Independent Directors in the near future.“
“The Board will now comprise of 6 representatives from the market – three each in the categories of Market Markers and Full Members, up to 3 Independent Non-Executive Directors (of which one will be the Chairman) and up to 3 LBMA Executive Directors. We expect to make further announcements on these roles very shortly.”
Given that the new chairman has been appointed, it is odd, in my view, that the 2 other independent directors have yet to be appointed and their identities announced. Likewise, for the 2 new directors from the LBMA Executive, who, if and when they join the Board, will give the LBMA Executive 3 seats on the Board. Surely the AGM would have been the ideal venue in which to make these announcements, since other board changes were being voted on at this meeting.
The New Board Profile
For completeness, the changes to the LBMA Board’s composition that did take place at the AGM, based on Board member resolutions that were put to a vote, are explained below:
Grant Anwin – Asahi Refining (co-chairman of Board)
Paul Fisher (new chairman of Board)
Ruth Crowell – Chief Executive of LBMA
Steven Lowe – Bank of Nova Scotia-ScotiaMocatta (and vice-chairman of Board)
Peter Drabwell – HSBC Bank
Sid Tipples – JP Morgan Chase
Jeremy East – Standard Chartered
Robert Davis, Toronto Dominion Bank
Philip Aubertin – UBS (‘Observer’ status)
Alan Finn, Malca-Amit
Mehdi Barkhordar, PAMP
Notice that there were 5 LBMA Marking Making reps on the Board, namely from HSBC, JP Morgan, Scotia, Standard Chartered and Toronto Dominion Bank. There was also an ‘observer’ from full LBMA Market Maker UBS. There were 3 Full Member representatives, namely from PAMP, Malca-Amit (the security carrier), and Asahi Refining.
At the AGM on 27 September, there was a vote on the Full Member reps to the Board, of which there are 3 positions in the new Board. The existing Full Member reps had to stand down and they, and other Full Member candidates, could re-stand for election:
Grant Angwin, Asahi Refining (and co-chairman of the Board)
Mehdi Barkhordar, PAMP
Hitoshi Kosai, Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo
Because there were 5 Market Maker reps already on the Board, and the new Board structure only allowed 3, there was also an election on which 3 of the 5 would remain: The results were:
Steven Lowe, Bank of Nova Scotia-ScotiaMocatta
Peter Drabwell, HSBC Bank
Sid Tipples, JP Morgan Chase
Noticeably, these 3 remaining reps represent what are probably the 3 most powerful bullion banks in the LBMA / LPMCL system, HSBC, JP Morgan and Scotia, two of which, HSBC and JP Morgan, operate large commercial gold vaults in London, and all 3 of which operate large commercial COMEX approved gold vaults in New York City. The reps from HSBC and Scotia have also been very long serving members of the LBMA Management Committee / Board, having been re-elected in 2015.
The AGM voting results press release also added that:
“The other two Non-Executive Directors of the LBMA Board will be announced in the near future.”
Given the aforementioned profile of the new ‘independent’ LBMA Board Chairman and ex Bank of England senior staffer Paul Fisher, it will be intriguing to examine the new independence credentials of these 2 new Non-Executive Directors who will be announced in the near future. Will they be truly independent, or will they be former bullion bankers previously affiliated with the LBMA and the London Gold Market, or ex FCA people previously affiliated with the LBMA, or maybe a combination of the two.
As per the UK Corporate Governance Code:
“There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board”. The board should also “state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent“. If an external search consultancy is used in finding either of the 2 new non-executive directors, there should be a “statement made as to whether it [the search consultancy] has any other connection with the company [the LBMA]“.
If 2 extra executive directors are also added to the Board from the LBMA’s staffers, to bring the number of Board directors up to 12, who will these 2 people be? My money in the first instance would be on the LBMA’s senior legal counsel (for regulatory reasons) and the LBMA’s communications officer. Whether the minutes of future or past LBMA Board meetings will ever be made public is another matter, but given the persistent secrecy that surrounds all important matters in the London Gold Market, it would probably be very naive to think that real LBMA communication via, for example LBMA Board meeting minutes, will ever see the light of day.
Written by Allan Flynn, specialist researcher in aspects of gold and silver.
Five months have lapsed without decision, since London gold and silver benchmark-rigging class action lawsuits received a cool response in a Manhattan court. Transcripts from April hearings show, in the absence of direct evidence, the claims dissected by a “very skeptical” judge, and criticized by defendants for lack of facts suggesting collusion, among other things.
Judge Valerie E. Caproni, former white-collar defense attorney, SEC Regional Director and controversial FBI General Counsel, presided over oral arguments for motions-to-dismiss totaling 9 hours on April 18 and 20.
Its “based entirely on statistics with no other,” the judge said, pouring cold water on plaintiff’s claims of bank collusion in gold benchmark rigging. Defense attorney scoffed as much at the silver hearing. “There is not a single fact… that shows an agreement between my client and the other alleged conspirators to fix the fix.”
Seven banks are being sued in separate gold and silver class action lawsuits currently before the US. District Court, Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs: gold and silver bullion traders, and traders of various associated financial instruments, allege banks conspired in secret closed meetings, to rig the London PM Gold Fix, and Silver Fix benchmarks during the period from 2001 to 2013.
If the motions to dismiss are allowed, the complaints will be thrown out. Plaintiffs on the other hand, are hoping to crack open the door to “discovery,” where they get to access confidential bank communications and records. Turning the tables earlier in April Deutsche Bank surprised by promising to provide such evidence ratting out its former fellow defendants. “No. I cannot consider it at all,” the judge said, stonewalling plaintiffs’ arguments mentioning the move. The German mega-bank settled claims a week prior to the hearing but is yet to hand over records.
Alleged proof of downward price manipulation is revealed by averaged charts showing “Anomalous” price drops from 2001 to 2013 in the London Silver Fix and PM Gold Fix. In sympathy, even as the gold price quadrupled from around $300 to $1200 through the period, something counter-intuitive happened. Plaintiffs’ claim during London hours between the AM and PM fixes, the average price declined for each of the 13 years, bar one being flat in 2013. More pronounced effects were seen in silver.
“Those were compelling charts,” the judge responded to a presentation of evidence during the silver hearing. “I mean, seriously, they truly show that something happened.”
Defendants argue rather than collusion, the price drops show normal “parallel conduct.” Loads of precious metals producers all needing to sell, and a bunch of savvy bankers hoping to buy low. Plaintiffs say the banks have a near-perfect record betting on the fix outcome. Well of course, they trade on “the best information in the world about supply and demand,” the banks’ attorneys retorted.
Inclusion of a non-fixing bank UBS, in the lawsuit, is described by defendants as “unfair,” and just to “suck in” a Swiss regulator’s findings. If the Court is to be believed, the FINMA report may be all the cases have going for them. Of its 19 pages, the dominating subject is foreign exchange misconduct, with only a few lines about precious metals. Tip-toeing around the topic of collusion, the report describes a process of “cooperation” between UBS and others in precious metals trading. It says the bank shared sensitive client trade information such as “client names”, “stop loss orders,” and “flow information on large or imminent orders” with “third parties.”
Sharing of client trade information by banks, including UBS, in currency trading, the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) reported in 2014, was for the purpose of collusion. Such communication enabled different banks to plan trading strategies, and “attempt to manipulate fix rates and trigger client “stop loss” orders (which are designed to limit the losses a client could face if exposed to adverse currency rate movements).”
Strong similarities exist between the methods and tools used by currency traders to rig benchmarks, and those used by precious metals traders. Referring to the detailed description of UBS offences including collusion in currency benchmarks, the FINMA report said, “the conduct and techniques inadmissible from a regulatory perspective, were also applied at least in part to PM spot trading.”
Hanging by a Thread
One “misconduct” the report emphasized in precious metals trading was UBS’ manipulation of the silver benchmark in the banks proprietary trading. “A substantial element of the conspicuous conduct in PM trading was the repeated front running (especially in the back book) of silver fix orders of one client.” According to the FCA, front running is a kind of insider trading.
“transaction for a “person’s own benefit, on the basis of and ahead of an order (including an order relating to a bid) which he is to carry out with or for another (in respect of which information concerning the order is inside information), which takes advantage of the anticipated impact of the order on the market or auction clearing price.”
Commenting on the brevity of plaintiffs’ evidence in silver, and the FINMA findings, Judge Caproni pointed out, “your hanging your hat pretty heavily on one line in that report.”
Attorney for defendants found the report favorably vague:
“Your Honor, I apologize. I must say he has made a misstatement three times. The FINMA settlement, Section 3.2.3 talks about UBS conduct with respect to silver. There’s not a not a word or hint about coordination with any other bank. It is between UBS and one of its customers or maybe more than one but no collusion.”
The judge responded, “We have the FINMA report. I knew that wasn’t exactly what it said.”
Confusion about the Swiss findings wasn’t helped by the events of the day. The conference call in German, reported FINMA boss Mark Branson alluding to perhaps more than the report dare, in, “clear attempts to manipulate precious metals benchmarks.” FINMA declined a request to supply a transcript or recording of the conference call, with a spokesperson responding, “We do not publish a transcript, and besides we have nothing to add to the report.”
A couple of things may help explain the regulators haziness, and thus the challenges for sensitive cases as these. Switzerland is a country long associated with gold and banking. In 1970 Zurich was home to the worlds largest gold market. Most of the worlds’ gold is imported to Switzerland for refining. Consider then this impressive feat: An official inquiry is conducted of Switzerland’s largest bank caught up in a scandal involving “precious metals.” Offenses were identified in its Zurich office. The agency reports “serious misconduct” in precious metals trading including sharing of secret client trade orders with “third parties.” The agency head rallies against manipulation of “precious metals benchmarks.” Action against 11 bank personnel, including industry bans of between one and five years, were brought against two managers and four traders for, “serious breaches of regulation in foreign exchange and precious metals trading.” But yet, the word “gold” is absent from the entire report and announcements.
Secondly, FINMA’s 2015 Annual Report describes the sanctions against four now-former UBS traders. It may concern some, that justice is left to financial market regulators when:
“Four further enhancement actions against UBS foreign exchange traders were discontinued in August 2015. Since there were indications that their behavior had contributed to serious breaches of regulatory provisions, FINMA issued reprimands without taking further action against these individuals.”
If the cases proceed, US commodity futures markets may also come under scrutiny. The Court spotted a not-so-obvious paradox concerning allegations the banks suppress gold prices. “Why would they drive the price down when they are sitting on I don’t know how much bullion? They are driving down the price of their own asset,” Judge Caproni posed.
Plaintiffs claim the banks hold a majority of short gold and silver futures on the US-based Chicago Mercantile Futures Exchange, paper instruments tied to the value of London silver and gold, which increase in value as the bullion prices fall. The banks argue that it’s impossible to tell from mandatory government filings, which banks prosper during the declines, and to what extent. The judge agrees, and defendants are pleased. “I’m very skeptical they have a well-pleaded factual allegation of what the banks’…COMEX position is,” the judge said.
“Mr Feldberg: Then your Honor has said that much better than I ever could.”
Where direct evidence of collusion isn’t available, antitrust law allows the pleading of additional circumstantial evidence that lends plausibility to allegations. Other circumstantial evidence, or “plus-factors,“ listed by gold plaintiffs, namely problematic antitrust facts arising out of the very clubby arrangement of the fix meetings themselves, failed to impress particularly.
“The Court: But weren’t all of your plus factors just the natural – they are just a function of the fix?..I thought every plus factor you pointed to was just that’s the nature of the fix.”
The unconvinced magistrate was likely close to a decision, before four weeks back when the banks had one last throw at dismissal. The court in the silver case was asked to apply a recent ruling where warehouse aluminum price manipulation was deemed not to have impacted end users of aluminum. Any decision on this in silver will likely impact the gold case also.
The question of standing, or which plaintiff’s are close enough to the alleged activity to have suffered injury, was well discussed back in April. For example the Court put to defense: “I’m not saying the two guys at a swap meet from Ohio would be a particularly compelling class representative, but why wouldn’t they have standing?” Plaintiffs seemed to have convinced that the issue could be decided later, if it gets to that. Judge Caproni just wasn’t sure firstly if all the statistics, and facts complained were plausible enough to infer collusion, reminding frustrated gold plaintiffs where the balance lies.
“Unfortunately for you I’m the one who has to make the decision here.
Mr Brocket: Again, with the greatest respect, I am trying to resurrect this here but, look. Every fact alone doesn’t prove collusion.
The Court: I agree.”
Decisions regarding motions to dismiss in the London gold and silver benchmark-rigging class actions against banks, initially expected around the end of August, could come any day sooner or later according to someone familiar with the cases.
The above article was first published at Allan Flynn’s website here.
Allan Flynn is a specialist researcher in aspects of gold and silver. He is currently investigating for future publication on the same topic and works in property and commercial architecture when he needs to eat. He holds shares in precious metals producers and banks.
Today the London Metal Exchange (LME) and the World Gold Council (WGC) jointly announced (here and here) the launch next year of standardised gold and silver spot and futures contracts which will trade on the LME’s electronic platform LMESelect, will clear on the LME central clearing platform LME Clear, and that will be settled ‘loco London’. Together these new products will be known as ‘LMEprecious’ and will launch in the first half of 2017.
However, although these contracts are described by the LME as delivery type ‘Physical’, settlement of trades on these contracts merely consists of unallocated gold or silver being transferred between LME Clear (LMEC) clearing accounts held at London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL) member banks (i.e. paper trading via LPMCL’s AURUM clearing system).
London Metal Exchange: LMEprecious Gold contracts – “unallocated gold” delivery through LPMCL members https://t.co/F9BOUCjh3K
For example, the contract specs for the LME’s planned spot gold trading state that the LME’s proposed settlement procedure is one of:
“Physical settlement two days following termination of trading. Seller transfers unallocated gold to LMEC account at any LPMCL member bank, and buyers receive unallocated gold from LMEC account at any LPMCL member bank”
The range of LME contracts for both gold and silver will consist of a trade date + 1 contract (T+1), aptly named TOM, as well as daily futures from T + 2 (equivalent to Spot settlement) out to and including all trade dates to T + 25. Beyond the daily futures, the suite of contracts also includes approximately 36 monthly futures contracts covering each month out to 2 calendar years, and then each March, June, September and December out to 60 calendar months. The LME / WGC press release also mentions plans for options and calendar spread products based on these futures.
As well as trading electronically on LMESelect, these precious metals futures will also be tradeable via telephone market (inter-office market). Trading hours for the daily contract (TOM) will be 1am – 4pm London hours, while trading hours for all other contracts will be 1am – 8pm London hours, thereby also covering both Asian and US trading hours. Detailed contract specs for these gold and silver contracts are viewable on the LME website. The trading lot size for the LME gold contracts will be 100 ozs, which is significantly smaller than the conventional lot size of 5000 -10,000 ozs for gold trading in the London OTC market (and conventional OTC minimum of 1000 ozs of gold). The planned lot size for the LME’s silver contracts is 5000 ozs, again below the conventional lot size of 100,000 – 200,000 ozs for silver trading in the London OTC market (and conventional OTC minimum of 50,000 ozs of silver).
These LME contracts are being pitched as a real alternative to the incumbent over the counter system of gold and silver trading in London which is overseen by the London Bullion Market Association, an association whose most powerful members are the clearing and vaulting banks in London, namely HSBC, JP Morgan, Scotia, and to a lessor extent UBS and Barclays, but increasing ICBC Standard bank as well. But given that the LME’s clearing will sit on top of the LPMCL clearing system and use unallocated transfers, the chance of any real change to the incumbent London gold and silver market is non-existent. Nor will the trading of these LME products give any visibility into the amount of physical gold and silver that is held within the London Market, nor the coverage ratio between ‘unallocated account’ positions and real underlying physical metals.
Five Supporting Banks
This new LME / WGC initiative is being supported by 5 other investment banks and a trading entity called OSTC. These bank backers comprise US banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, French banks Natixis and Société Générale, and Chinese controlled bank ICBC Standard Bank. According to a Reuters report about the launch, the World Gold Council had approached 30 firms about backing the launch, so with only 5 banks on board that’s a 16.6% take-up ratio of parties that were approached, and 83.4% who were not interested.
Earlier this year in January, Bloomberg said in a report said that the five interested banks were “ICBC Standard Bank Plc, Citigroup Inc., Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Societe Generale SA“, so somewhere along the line Citigroup looks to have taken itself off the list of interested parties, while Natixis came on board. The World Gold Council’s discussions about a proposed gold exchange and its discussions with ‘5 banks’ appear to have begun as early as the 4th quarter of 2014 and were flagged up by the Financial Times on 02 April 2015, when the FT stated that:
“The WGC has hired a number of consultants and spent the past six months pitching a business case for banks to consider the alternative trading infrastructure”
“The World Gold Council…and at least five banks are participating in initial discussions”
Notably, this was around the time that LME found out it had not secured the contracts to run either the LBMA Gold Price or LBMA Silver Price auctions. Note, that all 5 of the LME supporting banks, i.e. Goldman, ICBC Standard, Morgan Stanley, SocGen and Natixis, are members of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), with Goldman, Morgan Stanley, ICBC Standard and SocGen being LBMA market members, and Natixis being a full member of the LBMA. Goldman, Morgan Stanley, ICBC Standard and SocGen are also direct participants in the LBMA Gold Price auction operated by ICE Benchmark Administration. None of these 5 banks are direct participants in the LBMA Silver Price auction. Notably, none of these banks except for ICBC Standard is a member of the precious metals clearing group LPMCL. ICBC Standard Bank also recently acquired a precious metals vault in London from Barclays and also joined the LBMA’s Physical Committee (see BullionStar recent blog ‘Spotlight on LPMCL: London precious MEtals Clearing Limited‘ for details). Therefore, ICBC Standard seems to have a foot in both camps.
Unallocated Balances, Unsecured Creditors
Given the long build-up to this LME / World Gold Council announcement, and the fact that these LME spot and futures products were supposed to be a genuine alternative to the LBMA bank controlled OTC trading system, the continued use of unallocated settlement and the use of LPMCL accounts by these planned LME contracts underscores that the LME contract do not represent any real change in the London Gold and Silver Markets.
As a reminder, the resulting positions following transfers of unallocated gold and silver through the LME Clear accounts of LPMCL members essentially means the following, in the words of none other than the LBMA:
“Unallocated account basis. This is an account where the customer does not own specific bars, but has a general entitlement to an amount of metal. This is similar to the way that a bank account operates”
“settled by credits or debits to the account while the balance represents the indebtedness between the two parties.”
“Credit balances on the account do not entitle the creditor to specific bars of gold or silver or plates or ingots of platinum or palladium but are backed by the general stock of the precious metal dealer with whom the account is held:the client in this scenario is an unsecured creditor.
Alternatively, a negative balance will represent the precious metal indebtedness of the client to the dealer in the case where the client has a precious metal overdraft facility.
Should the client wish to receive actual metal, this is done by “allocating” specific bars, plates or ingots or equivalent precious metal product, the metal content of which is then debited from the unallocated account”.
LME bows to LPMCL
However, it should come as no surprise that these LME spot and futures contracts haven’t taken a new departure away from the entrenched monopoly of the London gold and silver clearing and vaulting systems, for the LME specifically stated in quite a recent submission to the LBMA that it will never rock the boat on LPMCL’s AURUM platform. When the LME presented to the LBMA in October 2014 in a pitch to win the contract for the LBMA Gold Price auction (which it didn’t secure), the pitch said that a centrally cleared solution “would only be introduced with market support and respecting LPMCL settlement“. [See right-hand box in below slide]:
In the same pitch, the LME also stated that:
“LME Clear fully respects existing loco London delivery mechanism and participants“
[See bottom line in below slide]:
Interestingly, following the announcement from the LME and the World Gold Council, the LBMA provided a very short statement that was quoted in the Financial Times, that said:
“The LBMA saw the announcement with interest and reconfirms it has no direct or indirect involvement in this project”.
While that may be true, what the LBMA statement didn’t concede is that 5 of its member banks, 4 of which are LBMA market makers, do have a direct involvement in the LME / World Gold Council project. Nor did the LBMA statement acknowledge that settlement of the planned LME gold and silver contracts will use the LPMCL infrastructure, nor that the LPMCL is now in specific scope of the LBMA’s remit.
“the London Precious Metals Clearing company took part not only [in the LBMA] review, but we have now agreed to formalise our working relationship, with the LBMA providing Executive services going forward. I’m grateful to the LPMCL directors for their leadership and their support for removing fragmentation from the market.”
With the LME contracts planning to use LPMCL, this ‘new dawn’ view of the LME / World Gold Council initiative is in my view mis-guided.
Even COMEX has more Transparency
Anyone familiar with the rudimentary vaulting and delivery procedures for gold and silver deliverable under the COMEX 100 oz gold and 5000 oz silver futures contracts will know that at least that system generates vault facility reports that specify how much eligible gold or silver is being stored in each of the designated New York vaults, the locations of the vaults, and also how much of the eligible gold or silver in storage has warehouse warrants against it (registered positions). The COMEX ‘system’ also generates data on gold and silver deliveries against contracts traded.
However, nothing in the above planned LME contract specs published so far gives any confidence that anyone will be the wiser as to how much gold or silver is in the London vaults backing up the trading of these spot and future contracts, how much gold or silver has been converted post-settlement to allocated positions in the vaults, nor how much gold or silver has been delivered as a consequence of trading in these spot and futures contract, nor importantly, where the actual participating vaults are.
This is because the LMPCL system is totally opaque and there is absolutely zero trade reporting by the LBMA or its member banks as to the volumes of gold and silver trading in the London market, and the volumes of physical metals held versus the volumes of ‘metal’ represented by unallocated account positions. Furthermore, the LBMA’s stated goal of introducing trade reporting looks as dead as a dodo, or at least as frozen as as a dodo on ice.
LBMA stall on Trade Reporting, LPMCL clear as Mud
On 9 October 2015, the LBMA announced that it had launched a Request for Information (RFI) asking financial and technology providers to submit help with formulating solutions to deficiencies which regulators thought the London bullion market such as the need for transparency, and issues such as liquidity that had supposedly been recommended as strategic objectives by consultant EY in its report to the LBMA, a report that incidentally has never been made publicly available. On 25 November 2015, the LBMA then announced that it had received 17 submissions to its RFI from 20 entities spanning “exchange groups, technology firms, brokers and data vendors”.
On 4 February 2016, the LBMA then issued a statement saying that it was launching a Request for Proposals (rRfP) and inviting 5 of these service providers (a short-list) to submit technical solutions that would address requirements such as an LBMA data warehouse and that would support the introduction of services such as trade reporting in the London bullion market. The RfP statement said that the winning service provider would be chosen in Q2 2016, with a planned implementation in H2 2016.
However, no progress was announced by the LBMA about the above RfP during Q2 2016, nor since then. The only coverage of this lack of newsflow came from the Bullion Desk in a 27 May article titled “Frustration Grows over London Gold Market Reform” in which it stated that the 5 solution providers on the short-list were “the LME, CME Group, the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), Autilla/Cinnobar and Markit/ABS“, and that:
“the pace at which the LMBA is moving forward are causes for consternation in some quarters of the sector”
A quote within the Bullion Desk article seems to sum up the sentiment about the LBMA’s lack of progress in its project:
“It’s not going to happen any time soon. Look at how long it’s been going on already,” another market participant said. “Don’t hold your breath. It seems like we still have a long way to go.”
What could the hold up be? Surely 17 submissions from 20 entities that were whittled down to a short-list of 5 very sophisticated groups should have given the LBMA plenty of choice for nominating a winning entry. Whatever else this lack of progress suggests, it demonstrates that increased transparency in London gold and silver market trading data is not going to happen anytime soon, if ever.
Furthermore, the opacity of the London clearing statistics that are generated out of the LPMCL clearing system need no introduction to most, but can be read about here.
According to the LBMA, ‘Loco London’ “refers to gold and silver bullion that is physically held in London“, however, given the secrecy which surrounding trading data in the London gold and silver markets, and the lack of publication by any bank about the proportion of unallocated client balances in gold or silver that it maintains versus the physical gold or silver holdings that it maintains, this ‘loco London‘ term appears to have been abused beyond any reasonable definition, and now predominantly refers to debit and credit entries in the virtual accounting systems of London based bullion banks. Nor, in my opinion, will the LME contracts change any of this. One would therefore be forgiven in thinking that the real underlying inventories of gold and silver in the London market and their associated inverted pyramid unallocated account positions are too ‘precious’ to divulge to the market. The Bank of England is undoubtedly licking its chops to the continued opacity of the market.
And its not just my opinion. This latest LME / World Gold Council / investment bank announcement has generated other skeptical reactions. The last word goes to Jim Rickards, who tweeted this in reaction to the latest LME / World Gold Council news:
In a July 11 BullionStar article, “SPDR Gold Trust gold bars at the Bank of England vaults”, I highlighted that the SPDR Gold Trust (GLD), in it’s Q1 2016 filing to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), disclosed that during the January – March 2016 quarter, the GLD custodian HSBC had employed the Bank of England as a sub-custodian to hold some of the Trust’s gold bars, and that the largest quantity of gold that the Bank of England had held on behalf of GLD during the January – March 2016 period was 29 tonnes.
Note that the financial year-end for the SPDR Gold Trust is 30 September each year, so that its Q1 is October – December, its Q2 is January to March, its Q3 is April – June, and its Q4 is July – September with a year-end at the end of September.
The GLD disclosure for the calendar first quarter of 2016, which revealed details of sub-custodians that the SPDR Gold Trust uses, had begun to appear in the 10-Q filing specifically at the behest of the SEC, which on 29 March 2016 had sent a letter to the GLD Sponsor, World Gold Trust Services, directing the Sponsor to:
“In future Exchange Act periodic reports, to the extent material, please disclose the amount of the Trust’s assets that are held by subcustodians.”
The letter was sent to World Gold Trust Services by the SEC’s Senior Attorney Office of Real Estate and Commodities, Kim McManus.
To Recap, for the quarter ended 31 March 2016, (which is the SPDR Gold Trust’s Q2), the 10-Q report stated:
“Subcustodians held no gold on behalf of the Trust as of March 31, 2016. During the quarter ended March 31, 2016, the greatest amount of gold held by subcustodians was approximately 29 tonnes or approximately 3.8% of the Trust’s gold at such date. The Bank of England held that gold as subcustodian.“
I also pointed out in my previous article that:
“Note that the wording of the 10-Q is such that it does not preclude the possibility that the Bank of England also held GLD gold at other times during Q1 2016, since it states “the greatest amount of gold” that the Bank of England held for the Trust was 29 tonnes. This implies that the Bank of England vaults could, at other times during Q1, have held less than 29 tonnes of gold on behalf of GLD.“
My early July article also documented that:
“The second quarter saw a 15 tonne shrinkage of GLD’s gold holdings in April, but a very large 64.5 tonne increase in May, and a 81.4 tonne increase in June, making for a Q2 increase in GLD’s gold bar holdings of 130.77 tonnes. Very large 1-day gold bar additions occurred on 24 and 27 June(18.4 tonnes and 13 tonnes respectively). Overall, that’s 307 tonnes added to GLD in the first half of 2016.”
Finally, I also looked forward to the release of the 2nd calendar quarter 10-Q filing with the SEC, saying:
“The SPDR Gold Trust 10-Q for the 2nd quarter of 2016 will be filed with the SEC in about 3 weeks time, at the end of July. With the continuing large inflows into GLD in Q2 2016 it will be interesting to see whether the name of Bank of England as subcustodian of GLD reappears in the Q2 filing?”
As it turns out, the Sponsor of the SPDR Gold Trust, World Gold Trust Services, which is a fully owned subsidiary of the World Gold Council, and which is responsible for compiling and submitting GLD quarterly and annual financial reports, actually filed its latest GLD 10-Q report (for the 3 months to June 30, 2016) on 2 August 2016, a few days later than it usually would do for a quarterly report.
Smoke and Mirrors
Quite shockingly and in my opinion misleadingly, this latest GLD 10-Q filing only says the following about sub-custodians:
“Subcustodians held no gold on behalf of the Trust as of June 30, 2016. During the nine months ended June 30, 2016, the greatest amount of gold held by subcustodians was approximately 29 tonnes or approximately 3.8% of the Trust’s gold at such date. The Bank of England held that gold as subcustodian.”
This 10-Q report is signed by the CEO and CFO of WORLD GOLD TRUST SERVICES, LLC, Sponsor of the SPDR® Gold Trust, namely:
Aram Shishmanian, Principal Executive Officer (CEO)
Samantha McDonald, Principal Financial and Accounting Officer (CFO)
In my opinion the latest sub-custodian statement by World Gold Trust Services is misleading in its entirety, as well as being evasive and disingenuous. By failing to address the quarter ended June 30 2016, the World Gold Trust Service CEO and CFO are avoiding disclosure of the quantity of gold that was held by subcustodians of the GLD during April, May and June 2016. Recall the ordinance from the SEC on 29 March:
“In future Exchange Act periodic reports, to the extent material, please disclose the amount of the Trust’s assets that are held by subcustodians.”
This latest 10-Q statement is not in compliance with the SEC’s directive. It also goes against the spirit of the SEC’s request – since it doesn’t address the holdings of sub-custodian during the quarter that’s being reported on, i.e. the April to June 2016 period. The language used in the latest 10-Q seems to conveniently circumvent the SEC’s disclosure request by using evasive phraseology.
For example, what if the Bank of England as GLD subcustodian held 28 tonnes or 20 tonnes of gold bars on a particular day during the second quarter of 2016, would Aram Shishmanian and Samantha McDonald not consider this material enough to tell the SEC about. That’s what their signed statement would suggest. More importantly, what would the SEC think about such a non-divulgence of a 28 tonne or 20 tonne sub-custodied position during any day of the April to June 2016 period, when it had specifically asked to be informed of such occurrences via the 10-Q filing? Recall that there were very large increases in GLD’s holdings during May and June, and some huge one-day increases in GLD gold bar holdings on 24 June (18.4 tonnes) and 27 June (13 tonnes).
Side by Side Comparison
Let’s take the latest quarter and previous quarter sub-custodian statements and compare them side by side. For the quarter ended March 31, 2016, the 10-Q report said:
“Subcustodians held no gold on behalf of the Trust as of March 31, 2016. During the quarter ended March 31, 2016, the greatest amount of gold held by subcustodians was approximately 29 tonnes or approximately 3.8% of the Trust’s gold at such date. The Bank of England held that gold as subcustodian.”
For the quarter ended June 30, 2016, the 10-Q report said:
“Subcustodians held no gold on behalf of the Trust as of June 30, 2016. During the nine months ended June 30, 2016, the greatest amount of gold held by subcustodians was approximately 29 tonnes or approximately 3.8% of the Trust’s gold at such date. The Bank of England held that gold as subcustodian.”
The very fact that the WGTS CEO and CFO revert to repeating a statement that was issued in the previous quarterly report and that applied to the first quarter of 2016, i.e. the statement in red above, shows that they are implicitly evading disclosure of new information from the April to June period. The statement in red is also irrelevant since it had already been disclosed in the previous 10-Q. By bundling it up and referring to the nine months ended June 30 2016, this smoke and mirrors tactic becomes obvious.
Given that it was only on March 29, 2016 that the SEC requested that WGTS disclose sub-custodian information, and that it requested “In future Exchange Act periodic reports … please disclose“ also underscores that the first three months of the nine-month period (i.e. October 2015 – December 2015) are irrelevant, and again highlights the deceptive nature of using a nine month time-frame in the latest statement. The SEC never asked for a disclosure about Q1 (October – December), just for disclosures about the quarters going forward.
Furthermore, the previous quarter disclosure specifically referred to “the quarter ended March 31, 2016”, and not the ‘six months’ ended March 31 2016. So why change the duration reporting to a “nine months ended June 30 2016” phraseology when it was previously a “quarter ended” phraseology? By moving to this ‘nine months’ misleading reporting device, it conveniently masks the disclosure of any sub-custodian details that might be applicable to the April – June quarter, such as Bank of England sub-custodianship of gold bars held within the SPDR Gold Trust.
And furthermore still, if you look at the latest 10-Q you will see that all of the other reporting in the 10-Q, such as financial highlights, divulges full data for three and nine month periods ended June 30, 2016. For example:
The Trust is presenting the following financial highlights related to investment performance and operations of a Share outstanding for the three and nine month periods ended June 30, 2016 and 2015.”
Therefore, the financials in the latest 10-Q follow a reporting format of both 3 months and 9 months, but the WGTS does not see fit to report a statement about sub-custodian holdings during the latest 3 month period. This is inconsistent reporting and again points to a desire not to address sub-custodian activity during April – June 2016, specifically at the Bank of England.
Given that the revelation in the previous 10-Q report about the Bank of England being a sub-custodian of the SPDR Gold Trust was quite substantial news, surely the GLD Sponsor would want to address this topic in its subsequent 10-Q, even if it was to say that no GLD gold whatsoever passed through the Bank of England during the April – June period? However, it appears that they chose to construct and craft a selection of words through which to avoid addressing the issue.
Omission of Facts
Each 10-Q report submitted by World Gold Trust Services includes a number of appendices, one of which is an Exhibit 31.1, which is known as the “Certification of Chief Executive Officer, Pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) AND 15d-14(a), Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as Amended”. For the latest GLD 10-Q, this Exhibit 31.1 includes the statement that:
“I, Aram Shishmanian [WGTS CEO], certify that:
Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.“
I would contend to the above certification, that the latest GLD 10-Q report does omit a statement of a material fact, i.e. disclosure of sub-custodians’ holdings as obligated by the SEC to disclose, or in the SEC’s words “the amount of the Trust’s assets that are held by subcustodians”; and that by omitting this information, the latest 10-Q report is “misleading with respect to the period covered”, which is the 3 months from 1 April 2016 to 30 June 2016.
The statement about sub-custodians in the latest 10-Q does not cover the period covered, i.e April – June 2016. It covers a nine month period. If none of the SPDR Gold Trust’s gold bars were held by sub-custodians during the April – June period, then why not say so?
It would be very interesting to see what the SEC thinks of this latest lack of disclosure from WGTS. It surely will raise some eyebrows at the SEC, since this is not what the SEC intended when it stated in its March 29 letter to WGTS that:
“Since the company and its management are in possession of all facts relating to a company’s disclosure, they are responsible for the accuracy and adequacy of the disclosures they have made.”
It also goes against the spirit of the request from the SEC’s Kim McManus, Senior Attorney Office of Real Estate and Commodities in her 29 March letter, and the promise by World Gold Trust Services’ CFO Samantha McDonald in her March 30, 2016 signed reply to the SEC that:
“We will, to the extent material, disclose in future periodic reports the amount of the Trust’s assets that are held by subcustodians”
I will contact WGTS directly and ask for their opinion on the above, and whatever response is received, if any, I will update readers via this forum.
One of the most notable developments accompanying the gold price rally of 2016 has been the very large additions to the gold bar holdings of the major physically backed gold Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). This is especially true of the SPDR Gold Trust (ticker GLD).
The gold bar holdings of the SPDR Gold Trust peaked at 1353 tonnes on 7 December 2012 before experiencing a precipitous fall in 2013, and additional and continued shrinkage throughout 2014 and 2015. On 17 December 2015, the gold holdings of the SPDR Gold Trust hit a multi-year low of 630 tonnes, a holdings level that had not been seen since September 2008.
By 31 December 2015, GLD ‘only’ held 642 tonnes of gold bars. See above chart. Then as the New Year kicked off in January 2016, something dramatic happened. The SPDR Gold Trust began expanding its gold holdings again, and noticeably so. By 31 March 2016, the Trust held 819 tonnes of gold bars, and by 30 June 2016, it held 950 tonnes of gold bars. The latest figure at time of writing is 981 tonnes of gold bars as of 8 July 2016. (Source: GLD Gold holdings spreadsheet).
This is a year-to-date net change of 338.89 extra tonnes of gold bars being held within the SPDR Gold Trust. See chart below. That’s a 52.8% increase compared to the quantity of gold bars the Trust held at the end of 2015, and a phenomenal amount of gold by any means, since it’s over 10% of annual new mine supply, and also a larger quantity of gold than all but the world’s largest central banks hold in their official gold reserves. Where is all of this gold being sourced from? That is the billion dollar question. Some is obviously being imported from Swiss refineries, but perhaps not all of it.
In January 2016, 26.8 tonnes of gold bars were added to the SPDR Gold Trust, while a massive 108 tonnes of gold bars were added in February 2016. The first quarter was rounded off with an additional 42 tonnes of gold bars added in March, bringing the Q1 additions held by GLD’s gold custodian HSBC London to 176.91 tonnes of gold bars. Noticeably, some large 1-day increases in GLD’s gold bar holdings occurred on 1 February (over 12 tonnes), 11 February (over 14 tonnes), 19 and 22 February (over 19 tonnes each day), and 29th February (nearly 15 tonnes), and also on 17 and 18 March (11.9 tonnes of gold bars added each day).
The second quarter saw a 15 tonne shrinkage of GLD’s gold holdings in April, but a very large 64.5 tonne increase in May, and a 81.4 tonne increase in June, making for a Q2 increase in GLD’s gold bar holdings of 130.77 tonnes. Very large 1-day gold bar additions occurred on 24 and 27 June (18.4 tonnes and 13 tonnes respectively). Overall, that’s 307 tonnes added to GLD in the first half of 2016.
Adding the 31.2 tonne addition for July to date gives the 338.89 tonnes addition figure quoted above. Most of this was due to a large 1-day inflow of 28.81 tonnes of gold bars reported on 5 July.
SEC – Reveal the subcustodians
I have detailed the above GLD gold bar holding changes to provide some background and put more color on the important discussion which follows.
While looking through SEC filings of the SPDR Gold Trust last month, I came across some interesting correspondence between the SEC and the sponsor of the SPDR Gold Trust, World Gold Trust Services. World Gold Trust Services is a fully owned subsidiary of the World Gold Council (WGC).
On 29 March 2016, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sent a letter to the SPDR Gold Trust (c/o World Gold Trust Services, LLC) essentially telling the SPDR Gold Trust to in future specify in its SEC filings the identities of the sub-custodians that are storing any of the Trust’s gold bar holdings during each reporting period. The SEC’s letter stated:
“We understand that the Custodian may appoint one or more subcustodians to hold the Trust’s gold and that the Custodian currently uses a number of subcustodians, identified on page 18. You also outline risks that may arise in connection with the use of subcustodians. In future Exchange Act periodic reports, to the extent material, please disclose the amount of the Trust’s assets that are held by subcustodians.”
The page 18 referred to by the SEC is page 18 of the annual 10-K filing of the SPDR Gold Trust for the year ended 30 September 2015, which includes the following paragraph:
“The Custodian is authorized to appoint from time to time one or more subcustodians to hold the Trust’s gold until it can be transported to the Custodian’s vault. The subcustodians that the Custodian currently uses are the Bank of England, The Bank of Nova Scotia-ScotiaMocatta, Barclays Bank PLC, JPMorgan Chase Bank and UBS AG.
In accordance with LBMA practices and customs, the Custodian does not have written custody agreements with the subcustodians it selects. The Custodian’s selected subcustodians may appoint further subcustodians. These further subcustodians are not expected to have written custody agreements with the Custodian’s subcustodians that selected them. The lack of such written contracts could affect the recourse of the Trust and the Custodian against any subcustodian in the event a subcustodian does not use due care in the safekeeping of the Trust’s gold. See “Risk Factors—The ability of the Trustee and the Custodian to take legal action against subcustodians may be limited.”
LBMA above refers to London Bullion Market Association. Note that the SPDR Gold Trust prospectus defines subcustodian as:
“SUB-CUSTODIAN means a sub-custodian, agent or depository (including an entity within our corporate group) selected by us to perform any of our duties under this agreement including the custody and safekeeping of Bullion.”
The SEC letter was addressed to William Rhind who was CEO of World Gold Trust Services, but who actually had resigned as CEO on 9 February 2016, something the SEC should have known since the resignation statement was also filed with the SEC. After receiving the SEC’s correspondence, Samantha McDonald, CFO of World Gold Trust Services, responded by letter to the SEC the next day, 30 March 2016, confirming that:
“We will, to the extent material, disclose in future periodic reports the amount of the Trust’s assets that are held by subcustodians. Please be advised that during fiscal 2015, no gold was held by subcustodians on behalf of Trust.
Note that filings with the US SEC use the naming convention 10-K for an annual filing, and 10-Q for a quarterly filing.
Following the stipulation from the SEC to World Gold Trust Services telling it to reveal its subcustodian holdings, its intriguing to note that when SPDR Gold Trust filed its next 10-Q on 29 April 2016 for the quarter ended 31 March 2016, page 15 of this filing revealed that the Bank of England, as subcustodian, had, during Q1 2016, held up to 29 tonnes of gold on behalf of the SPDR Gold Trust. The relevant section of page 15 stated the following:
“As at March 31, 2016, the Custodian held 26,484,117 ounces of gold on behalf of the Trust in its vault, 100% of which is allocated gold in the form of London Good Delivery gold bars including gold payable, with a market value of $32,760,852,177 (cost — $32,291,685,964) based on the LBMA Gold Price PM on March 31, 2016. Subcustodians held no gold on behalf of the Trust as of March 31, 2016.
During the quarter ended March 31, 2016, the greatest amount of gold held by subcustodians was approximately 29 tonnes or approximately 3.8% of the Trust’s gold at such date. The Bank of England held that gold as subcustodian.
As at September 30, 2015, the Custodian held 21,995,797 ounces of gold in its vault 100% of which is allocated gold in the form of London Good Delivery gold bars including gold payable, with a market value of $24,503,317,923 (cost — $27,103,546,125). Subcustodians held nil ounces of gold in their vaults on behalf of the Trust.”
From the above revelations, some facts can be stated:
The Bank of England held a maximum of 29 tonnes of gold on behalf of the SPDR Gold Trust on some date during Q1 2016.
Note that the wording of the 10-Q is such that it does not preclude the possibility that the Bank of England also held GLD gold at other times during Q1 2016, since it states “the greatest amount of gold” that the Bank of England held for the Trust was 29 tonnes. This implies that the Bank of England vaults could, at other times during Q1, have held less than 29 tonnes of gold on behalf of GLD.
As per the initial WGTS response to the SEC dated 30 March 2016, no gold was held by HSBC’s subcustodians on behalf of GLD throughout fiscal 2015 (1st October 2014 – 30 September 2015). Furthermore, GLD’s 10-Q to 31 December 2015 states that
To this can be added that according to the SPDR Gold Trust’s 10-Q for Q4 2015, “as at December 31, 2015…Subcustodians held nil ounces of gold in their vaults on behalf of the Trust”
The GLD 10K (annual) for the year to 30 September 2015, filed on 24 November 2015, also contains a few statements addressing whether gold was held by subcustodians on year-end dates in 2014 and 2013. However, it states that subcustodians did not hold gold on behalf of the SPDR Gold Trust on these two dates. Page 44 states:
“As at September 30, 2014, the Custodian held 24,867,158 ounces of gold in its vault 100% of which is allocated gold in the form of London Good Delivery gold bars including gold payable, with a market value of $30,250,898,159 (cost — $30,728,152,437). Subcustodians did not hold any gold in their vaults on behalf of the Trust.”
As at September 30, 2013,the Custodian held 29,244,351 ounces in its vault 100% of which is allocated gold in the form of London Good Delivery gold bars including gold payable, with a market value of $38,792,631,793 (cost — $35,812,777,235). Subcustodians did not hold any gold in their vaults on behalf of the Trust.”
How did Bank of England suddenly become a GLD subcustodian in Q1 2016?
As a member of London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL), HSBC maintains gold bullion account facilities at the Bank of England which can be used within its LPMCL gold clearing role. All 6 LPMCL bullion bank members hold gold accounts at the Bank of England. The 6 LPMCL members can also all call on each other for physical delivery of gold and allocation of gold. All of these bullion banks except ICBC Standard are also Authorized Participants (APs) of GLD, i.e. Barclays, HSBC, JP Morgan, Scotia, and UBS. Other AP’s of GLD include entities of Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley. Many of these bullion banks are also LBMA market makers in gold.
My view is that quite a number of other bullion banks that are members of the LBMA also hold gold accounts at the Bank of England, such as BNP Paribas, Natixis, SocGen and Standard Chartered, otherwise they would not be able to engage in the gold borrowing activities that they are on record of engaging in. If this is the case, then gold bars can easily be moved from central bank accounts at the Bank of England to bullion bank gold accounts at the Bank of England and vice-versa. Only APs of GLD are allowed to create baskets of GLD securities. This creation process requires that when GLD baskets created, APs have to deliver physical gold bars to HSBC.
There are therefore a number of possibilities to explain how the Bank of England ended up being a sub-custodian for GLD in Q1 2016.
An AP(s) had gold bars stored at the Bank of England, and delivered these gold bars to HSBC at the Bank of England in fulfillment of the GLD share creation process
An AP(s) had an unallocated credit balance of gold with a LPMCL clearer or other entity which had gold stored at Bank of England or access to gold at the Bank of England, and as part of the clearing process the AP converted unallocated credit balances into allocated gold bars held at the Bank of England and delivered these gold bars to HSBC.
An AP(s) borrowed gold from a central bank which had gold bars stored at the Bank of England and delivered these gold bars to HSBC as part of the GLD basket creation process.
The quantity of 29 tonnes is a lot of gold for an Authorized Participant or group of APs to have un-utilised in a vault at the Bank of England. It’s about 2320 large Good Delivery gold bars. Likewise, 29 tonnes is a lot of gold bars for LPMCL members to have as a clearing float at the Bank of England.
Furthermore, if an AP had acquired newly refined gold from a refinery with the intention of delivering it to HSBC as part of the GLD security creation process, why would this gold be delivered to the Bank of England vaults, and not directly to the HSBC vault? It would be more practical to have delivered that gold straight to the HSBC vault.
Therefore, its plausible that at least some of the gold being held by the Bank of England as sub-custodian on behalf of the SPDR Gold Trust was sourced from gold borrowed from central bank gold holdings at the Bank of England.
Bullion Bars Database
There is further support for borrowed gold bars being held by the SPDR Gold Trust during Q1 2016.
Warren James maintains a database of the identities of the gold bars held in the GLD over time which allows comparisons between the gold bullion coming in and out of the GLD. Each bar has a unique signature based on its brand, serial number, and weight. Gold bars coming into the SPDR Gold Trust can be tracked based on whether these bars were previously held in the Trust or whether they are bars coming in that have never been held by the Trust before. When a bar returns to the list after it was previously held but disappeared from the holdings, it’s called dark bullion since its identity is familiar but it’s not known where the bar has been since it left the GLD and re-entered.
Up until 10 February 2016, the percentage of dark bullion bars re-entering GLD that had previously been held by the Trust was about 30% of the inflows. As the inflows into GLD rose sharply from the second half of February, dark bullion entering GLD essentially stopped and nearly all of the bars being added to GLD were bars that had never been held by GLD before. These inflows were a combination of newly refined gold and older bars which are no longer produced. For example, gold bars coming into GLD in February 2016 have included hundreds of bars from the US Assay Offices and Mints, AGR Matthey, Johnson Matthey Plc (Royston), the Australian Branch Royal Mint – Perth, Engelhard, Kazzinc etc, all of which are no longer produced.
The fact that a large amount of older gold bars arrived into GLD from the second half of February onwards would suggest that these bars came long-held holdings in the vaults of the Bank of England, and consisted of borrowed central bank gold.
All of the above poses a number of questions:
If this known 29 tonnes of gold was held by the Bank of England as subcustodian for GLD during Q1 2016 but not held by the Bank of England as subcustodian at the end of March 2016, did it physically leave the Bank of England vaults, or was it just transferred to HSBC’s account at the Bank of England?
Note that nothing in the SEC filing rules or directives compels WGTS to specify if the GLD custodian HSBC is holding gold outside its own vaults, so in my view its possible that gold is held by HSBC on behalf of the SPDR Gold Trust at the Bank of England. Indeed, its possible that HSBC even leases vault space in the Bank of England vaults, a sub-leased vault facility. If the HSBC London gold vault is indeed in the location that’s documented here (HSBC’s London Gold Vault: Is this Gold’s Secret Hiding Place?), then it would appear that it’s not big enough to accommodate the entire gold bar holdings of GLD and all other HSBC customers’ gold, especially when GLD holding are and were over 900 tonnes.
Since the Bank of England didn’t hold any gold as subcustodian for GLD in fiscal 2015, but did in Q1 2016, how much of these large inflows of gold into GLD in Q1 and Q2 and July this year (documented above) involved metal stored in vaults at the Bank of England? And what changed in the London Gold Market to require gold held at the Bank of England to suddenly be needed to fulfill GLD gold delivery obligations?
Why are LBMA practices and customs so lax that it allows HSBC the custodian, not to have written custody agreements with the subcustodians. Surely the US SEC should have picked up on this?
Why did the SEC not ask iShares (IAU (which has 3 custodians) and ETF Securities to also alter their SEC filings to reveal subcustodians’ holdings. And for that matter why did the SEC not ask iShares to amend its disclosures to specify subcustodians in the Silver ETF – SLV.
Why do central banks never publish gold bar lists detailing the serial numbers of their bars, and why is the Bank of England so against allowing central banks to do so. There are a number of FOIA requests (including one I made) providing evidence of the Bank of England’s refusal to allow central banks to publish weight lists / bar lists. Could it be that they do not want data on gold bar serial numbers entering the public domain as it would then show that leased and swapped gold is being held by commercial gold ETFs?
Audits of the SPDR Gold Trust’s gold bars
The SPDR Gold Trust ‘s gold bar holdings are physically audited twice per year. A partial physical audit is conducted in February/March of each year, and a full physical audit of the bars is done in September of each year. The current auditor is Inspectorate International Limited. In September 2015, Inspectorate conducted the 2015 full count of the Trust’s gold bullion held by the custodian HSBC London. That audit counted 54,807 London Good Delivery gold bars at the “London Vaults of HSBC Bank USA National Association”. Note that the official custodian of the SPDR Gold Trust changed from HSBC Bank USA to HSBC Bank Plc in late 2014, so this audit should really state HSBC Bank Plc.
Inspectorate then conducted a random sample count audit in early Mach 2016 at the “London Vaults of HSBC Bank Plc” based on a date of 19 February 2016. As of that date, the “account (GLD) held title to 56,913 London Good Delivery, large Gold Bars“. However, this audit was “a statistically random count of 16,493 bars of gold”, based upon the gold inventory as at 19 February 2016, and it was carried out between 29 February and 11 March “at the Custodian’s premises“.
Given that the Bank of England acted as a subcustodian to the SPDR Gold Trust during Q1 2016, the question arises as to whether all of the other 40,420 (56,913 – 16,493) bars were at the “Custodian’s premises” during the audit, or were some of these other bars being held in the Bank of England vaults. It’s not clear why a random sample of 16,493 bars (about 206 tonnes, and 29% of the total holding) was chosen, but it’s about 2/7ths of the gold bars held by GLD.
There is no mention of the Bank of England in Inspectorate’s latest audit report. However, there is nothing to say that some of GLD’s bars were not in the Bank of England at the time of the audit. The audit doesn’t say so one way or the other, and the way its worded means that it doesn’t say all of the inventory is at HSBC’s vault, just that the audit was conducted at HSBC’s vault.
Central banks continue to report leased and swapped gold (gold receivables) as an asset on their balance sheets. This accounting fiction, which doesn’t follow any international accounting standards is a sleight of hand that allows the same gold to appear to be in two places at once. If gold bars that have been leased from central banks are being held in the SPDR Gold Trust, then these gold bars are being double-counted, and GLD shareholders should be made aware that the Trust is holding gold that has been ultimately borrowed from central banks. Using borrowed central bank in an ETF doesn’t put the ETF on the hook, since the ETF owns this gold. But it does mean that the bullion banks will need to return the equivalent amount of borrowed gold to the lending central bank from other sources. Importantly though, this type of activity will overstate the amount of gold held by the combined official sector and ETF sector.
The SPDR Gold Trust 10-Q for the 2nd quarter of 2016 will be filed with the SEC in about 3 weeks time, at the end of July. With the continuing large inflows into GLD in Q2 2016 it will be interesting to see whether the name of Bank of England as subcustodian of GLD reappears in the Q2 filing?
And if gold bars held by GLD are actually stored at the Bank of England vaults when the full physical gold bar audit is conducted next September, surely the full audit report should require a passage stating that some of the gold bars audited were held at the Bank of England, and not just at the ‘London Vaults of HSBC Bank’? Since the SEC have opened this ‘can of worms’ issue, and created more questions than answers, perhaps it is now in the SEC’s interests to go even further and ask World Gold Trust Services to fully clarify the matters raised above. Otherwise, the GLD gold bar holdings will continue to be a source of intrigue and debate in the gold world.
Within the last 2 months, there have been a series of developments in the London Gold Market, each of which has involved Chinese-controlled banking group ICBC Standard Bank Plc.
On 4 April, the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) announced that ICBC Standard Bank had been reclassified as a LBMA Market Making member for the OTC spot trading markets in gold and silver.
On 11 April, ICE Benchmark Administration announced that ICBC Standard Bank had been approved for direct participation in the daily benchmark LBMA Gold Price auctions beginning on 16 May.
On 3 May, the LBMA announced in its Alchemist magazine that ICBC Standard Bank had joined the LBMA’s Physical Committee. This committee is responsible for aspects of the physical bullion market such as the LBMA’s Good Delivery List and it also liaises with the LBMA’s Vault Managers Working Party.
On 11 May, the relatively obscure but powerful London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL)announced that ICBC Standard Bank had joined LPMCL, the first membership addition to London’s monopoly bullion clearing group since 2005.
On 16 May, ICBC Standard Bank announced that it had agreed to acquire a London-based precious metals vault currently owned by Barclays. This precious metals vault was built by, and is operated by Brinks, on behalf of Barclays. ICBC Standard says that the vault acquisition will be completed by July 2016.
Therefore, within a period of approximately 6 weeks, ICBC Standard has positioned itself front and centre of the closely protected London bullion trading, clearing and vaulting infrastructure.
On Monday 16 May 2016, the LBMA also issued its own press release, announcing that ICBC Standard bank had joined LPMCL, and that it would become an ‘active member‘ of LPMCL in early June 2016.
The LBMA press release about LPMCL also quoted LBMA CEO Ruth Crowell as saying:
“I’m delighted to see ICBC Standard Bank join this vital organisation. The LPMCL clearing system is one of the great strengths of the London bullion market. The LBMA welcomes this addition and looks forward to continuing to assist LPMCL in its growth and development.”
Although the same bullion bank representatives, wearing different hats, run, and have always run, all of the precious metals entities that operate in the London market (via a series of different ‘puppet shows’), the ‘assistance’ that the LBMA is now providing to LPMCL is based on the following development that was highlighted by the LBMA CEO at the LBMA conference in Vienna in 2015, when she said:
“I’m delighted to inform you that the London Precious Metals Clearing company took part not only [in the LBMA] review, but we have now agreed to formalise our working relationship, with the LBMA providing Executive services going forward. I’m grateful to the LPMCL directors for their leadership and their support forremoving fragmentation from the market.”
Examination of the Barclays / Brinks vault (most likely near Heathrow in the Brinks complex) which ICBC is now acquiring, is left to a future analysis. This article concentrates solely on the LPMCL clearing system, the protected crux of the London precious metals markets, but an entity which is rarely given anything but a passing glance by the financial media in London or elsewhere.
One important point to mention here though is that it had been widely reported in January (initially by Reuters) that ICBC was acquiring another London-based precious metals vault, a vault that had been built by G4S in Park Royal on behalf of Deutsche Bank, and that had then been leased from G4S by Deutsche Bank. See “G4S London Gold Vault 2.0 – ICBC Standard Bank in, Deutsche Bank out” for details.
It turns out that the deal for the G4S / Deutsche Bank vault “did not go through“, according to ICBC. It appears that ICBC considered the Barclays / Brinks vault to be the preferred transaction over the Deutsche / G4S vault, and that when the Barclays / Brinks vault came on to the market, ICBC backed out of the transaction with Deutsche, in much the same as house-hunters change their mind when a better house comes on the market.
The future of the G4S / Deutsche vault is therefore still unknown. Possibly Standard Chartered, which was also mentioned as a name wanting to join LPMCL, could be a potential buyer of the Deutsche / G4S vault?
London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL) is a UK private company limited by guarantee without share capital, that was incorporated on 5 April 2001, with a company number of 04195299. LPMCL is classified in Companies House with a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code of ‘Administration of financial markets‘. LPMCL has a registered address of C/O Hackwood Secretaries Limited, One Silk Street, London EC2Y 8HQ. Interestingly, this is the same registered address as the London Gold Market Fixing Limited and the London Silver Market Fixing Company Limited, both of which are still active companies and both of which are currently defendants in ongoing New York court class action suits where they and their member banks stand accused of price manipulation in the gold and silver markets, respectively. Hackwood Secretaries Limited is Company Secretary for LPMCL. Hackwood Secretaries is a Linklaters company used for company secretariat services. Linklaters is one of the better known global law firms that is headquartered in London.
LPMCL uses an electronic clearing platform called ‘AURUM’ to clear London-settled precious metals trades. This is done via book entry netting and clearing, entirely using unallocated accounts. The vast majority of the LPMCL clearing trades are processed by HSBC and JP Morgan.
As to the raison d’etre for LPMCL, perhaps the recent LBMA press release sums it up best:
“[the] London clearing system for gold, silver, platinum and palladium [is] managed by London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL).
LPMCL operates a central electronic metal clearing hub, with deals between parties throughout the world, settled and cleared in London.
Most global ‘over-the-counter’ gold and silver trading is cleared through the London clearing system. The London bullion market clearing banks provide a service to their clients in providing the settlement of gold and silver transfers. Ultimately each clearer has to have access to reserves of physical metal and provides an array of services tailored to each client’s specific needs; the most important of which is intermediating credit and providing credit facilities.
This last paragraph in the press release was cut and pasted by the LBMA from the LPMCL website FAQ under the question: “Can you explain the benefits of the London bullion clearing system as compared with a clearing house?” so it can also be viewed there.
You will notice from the above press release that:
a) LPMCL is critically important due to its role as global clearer for all 4 precious metals, and
b) Access to physical precious metals plays a secondary role in the LPMCL system compared to ‘credit facilities and intermediating credit (i.e. The LPMCL system is a credit-based fractional-reserve system of unallocated metal holdings and transfers).
LPMCL was founded in 2001 by 7 bullion bank founding members, namely, NM Rothschilds, JP Morgan Chase, HSBC Bank USA, ScotiaMocatta, UBS AG, Deutsche Bank , and CSFB (Credit Suisse). Credit Suisse resigned in October 2001, Rothschilds resigned in June 2004, and then Barclays joined in September 2005. Deutsche bank resigned in August 2015. HSBC Bank USA NA resigned on 11 February 2015, and was replaced by HSBC Bank Plc. Gold and silver were the two metals originally cleared loco London by LPMCL’s system. Platinum and palladium clearing loco London was added to LPMCL’s clearing offering in September 2009. UBS (a LPMCL member) and Credit Suisse (a previous LPMCL member) also offer loco Zurich clearing of platinum and palladium.
Including ICBC Standard Bank, the current membership of LPMCL as of May/June 2016 now consists of JP Morgan, HSBC, Scotia Mocatta, UBS, Barclays, and ICBC Standard. Since Barclays is withdrawing from much of its precious metals business in London, and is selling its London vault , its possible that Barclays will resign from LPMCL in the near future.
All LPMCL members either have their own precious metals vault in London, or access to vaulting facilities at London vaults. Many of the LPMCL members also have vaulting facilities in other financial capitals around the world. Here are some of the vault operations for each of the LPMCL members:
HSBC – vaults in London, New York (Manhattan) and Hong Kong
JP Morgan – vaults in London, New York (Manhattan) and Singapore (Freeport)
Scotia – vaults in Toronto and New York (JFK)
Barclays – vault in London (being sold), vault in Singapore
UBS – vault in Zurich (Kloten) and Singapore (Freeport)
Deutsche Bank (ex LPMCL) – trying to sell a lease on a G4S vault in London; has / had a vault in Singapore (Freeport)
ICBC Standard – buying vault in London from Barclays. Standard Bank had vaulting facilities at JP Morgan’s vault in London. ICBC has many vaults in China.
Notice also that 4 of the LPMCL member banks, HSBC, JP Morgan, Scotia and UBS are also 4 of the 6 banks represented on the LBMA Management Committee, therefore LPMCL members have a disproportionately large influence on the strategic direction and decision-making of the LBMA.
“to take on and continue the promotion, administration and conduct of precious metals clearing in the London precious metals markets”
According to the original Articles of Association, the registered ‘Office’ of LPMCL was “New Court, St Swithin’s Lane, London EC4P 4DU“, which is the headquarters of N.M. Rothschild & Sons in London. Rothschilds was also the company Secretary at that time. Interestingly, the respective addresses listed for JP Morgan and HSBC in the Memorandum and Articles of Association document are “60 Victoria Embankment”, and “Thames Exchange, 10 Queen Street Place”, which is the location of JP Morgan’s London precious metals vault, and a supposed location of HSBC’s London precious metals vault, respectively.
Why LPMCL was Established
According to the history section of the LPMCL’s website, the London bullion market first felt the need to develop an electronic clearing / matching system in the mid-1990s due to a combination of growing trade volumes, technological change, and also the need for better audit trails. This view is backed up by comments from Peter Smith of JP Morgan in a 2009 article for the LBMA’s Alchemist when he said that:
“Thirteen years ago , the bullion clearers were exchanging transfers between themselves by telephone instructions – a situation that was causing considerable problems in the control and audit departments within those banks. Because of those concerns, the clearers realised that the only sensible and secure solution was to develop a central clearing hub, where transfer instructions could be up loaded and matched. This resulted in the establishment of LPMCL in April 2001″
The LPMCL website’s history section also reveals that the initial legwork on automating London precious metals clearing was done by the LBMA’s physical committee, since this committee “comprised the clearing members”.
Until very recently, the LBMA physical committee was exclusively made up of LPMCL members, indeed, the LBMA physical committee literally looks like an alternate venue for LPMCL members to meet up in. For example, in September 2015, the only members of the LBMA physical committee were representatives from the then 5 members of LPMCL, i.e. JP Morgan, HSBC, Scotia, UBS and Barclays.
The addition of ICBC Standard and Standard Chartered to the LBMA Physical Committee was announced in the LBMA’s Alchemist on 3 May 2016. Currently, all 6 LPMCL members – JP Morgan (chair of physical committee), HSBC, ScotiaMocatta, Barclays, UBS, and ICBC Standard Bank are members of the LBMA physical committee, as is Standard Chartered (a potential member of LPMCL), and TD Bank (Toronto Dominion). Note that Standard Chartered and TD Bank are the 5th and 6th member banks of the LBMA Management Committee. Therefore all 6 bullion banks that are on the LBMA Management Committee are also on the LBMA Physical Committee.
The LBMA physical committee membership is rounded off by Brinks (notably, the vault transaction facilitator between Barclays and ICBC Standard Bank) . Note also, that there is a Bank of England ‘observer’ on the LBMA physical committee, an indication of the Bank of England’s keen interest in monitoring the London Gold Market and the gold market’s physical operations and transactions.
The LPMCL history goes on to say that:
“It was subsequently decided that the most effective way of carrying the electronic matching system project forward would be for the clearing members to form a separate company specifically for the purpose of developing and administering such a system. As a result LPMCL was formed in April, 2001.“
Obscurely, LPMCL was first incorporated on 5 April 2001 with a name of Itemelement Limited (basically a shell company). It changed name to London Precious Metal Clearing Limited on 2 October 2001 (‘Metal’ singular). It then changed name again on 2 November 2001 to London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (‘metals’ plural). The first tranche of LPMCL directors were then installed in November 2001 from the six remaining founder members companies (excluding Credit Suisse First Boston International since CSFB resigned in October 2001).
OM and LBT Computer Services
Its unclear what, if anything, LPMCL did as a company in 2002, however in April 2003 a press release was issued by Swedish technology company OM revealing that:
“London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (”LPMCL”) has chosen OM as an outsourcing partner for Facility Management of their proposed web-based automated bullion matching system to be provided by LBT Computer Services, an Information Technology service provider and partner to OM.”
“We are happy to welcome LPMCL, the leading organization for precious metal clearing, as a Facility Management customer to OM.”
This ‘web-based automated bullion matching system’ is “AURUM”.
The same press release described LPMCL as:
“LPMCL is the administrative company set up by the six clearing members of the LBMA to facilitate the development of an electronic matching system to replace the existing clearing system which is conducted by telephone and / or facsimile.”
In 2003, OM also merged with Finland’s NEX to form OMHEX. Following the merger OM continued to exist as the OM Technology division of OMHEX, providing transaction technology services to the financial and energy industries. OMHEX became OMX in 2004, and was then acquired by NASDAQ in 2007 to form the current group NASDAQ OMX.
However, the relevant entity here is LBT Computer Services, which is still around today as it’s website shows. The LBT web site also still has a short profile of its LPMCL project in the ‘case study’ section of its website, where is states, in a slightly childish way that:
“The LPMCL are the ‘clearing’ organisation for precious metal dealing and are based in London, the centre for such trading. They needed a way of linking together the precious metal bankers to match transactions/deals. They needed to do it in such a fashion that no bank could see anything other than their counterparty bank, and to do it with absolute security.
LBT built an application that is hosted on the Internet and which connects to each bank via a secure link to collect transactions which it then matches to the counterparty bank’s transactions and send the results back to both banks. It runs 24 x 7, unattended, other than via an on-line link. Unfortunately we cannot say more about this innovative solution.“
Why can’t LBT Services say anything more about the LPMCL automated platform? This statement from LBT is perhaps the first clue as to the secrecy, paranoia, and obsessive protectionism that surrounds LPMCL, a company that is the global clearer for all 4 precious metals, yet lies at the heart of the opaque system that is the global precious metals trading system run out of London where real trade-level data that runs through AURUM is never publicly reported.
Between 2003 and the present day, the AURUM platform would obviously have gone through a number of changes, and it may not even be hosted on the LBT platform any longer. Given that lack of publicly available information on the design and functionality of AURUM, its hard to say. There is however a current ‘LPMCL Technical Committee‘ comprising IT and Business Analyst representatives of the member banks (see various Linkedin profiles for details), so perhaps AURUM was brought in-house between the bank members. Many of the in-house systems that AURUM interfaces to would also have changed over the years, requiring various upgrades of the AURUM platform too, and therefore a rationale for the existence of a ‘LPMCL Technical Committee’.
ICBC Standard’s Membership Application to LPMCL
When Reuters reported back in January of this year that ICBC Standard was looking to take on the vault lease for the Deutsche Bank / G4S vault, Reuters also reported in the same article that ICBC Standard had:
“also applied to become a clearing member of the London gold and silver over-the-counter business [LPMCL]”
“These banks are shareholders of the London Precious Metals Clearing (LPMCL) company. They will decide whether to accept or reject ICBC Standard Bank’s application within the next few months.”
“They [ICBC] are applying for clearing membership at the moment, but that’s still subject to a vote, which has not taken place yet”
Therefore, LPMCL’s announcement that it had allowed ICBC Standard to join wasn’t really a surprise. But the application and voting procedure referred to by Reuters gels with the new membership procedure laid out in the Articles of Association of LPMCL, which states that membership of LPMCL is open to “other eligible persons as the directors in their discretion may admit to membership“. (person here means company entities that wish to become members).
In the LPMCL company each ‘member’ (bank) appoints a director. Each director can also appoint an alternate director. During the ICBC membership application, there were 9 directors listed as current directors of LPMCL, comprising 5 directors from each of the 5 members banks of JP Morgan, HSBC, ScotiaMocatta, UBS and Barclays, and 4 alternate directors from all the member banks except Barclays. A list of the current directors names can be seen here.
According to the 2015 annual accounts of LPMCL, the 5 LPMCL directors are Tony Dean (HSBC), Jane Lloyd (Scotia), Andrew Lovell (JP Morgan), Marco Heil (UBS), and Vikas Chamaria (Barclays). The 4 alternate directors are Peter Smith (JP Morgan), William Wolfe (HSBC), Conway Rudd (Scotia) and Daniel Picard (UBS).
Former Deutsche bank LPMCL director , Raj Kumar, has now moved to ICBC Standard Bank and should be in the front running to be appointed a LPMCL director representing ICBC Standard. If Standard Chartered also joins LPMCL, then former Barclays LPMCL director, Martyn Whithead, who moved to Standard Chartered, may also be expected to re-appear as a LPMCL director representing Standard Chartered.
LPMCL’s latest annual Accounts
The most recent set of annual accounts filed by LPMCL at UK Companies House are the accounts for the full year to 31 March 2015. These accounts were, audited by Kingston Smith LLP, signed off on 8 September 2015, and filed with Companies Office on 8 October 2015. The most interesting items in the accounts are as follows:
- 2015 Turnover (Revenue) totalled £223, 599 and is entirely derived from subscription income. This revenue is accounted for on an accruals basis, meaning that it refers to subscription income for the year to 31 March 2014. With 6 bank members of LPMCL for the period under consideration, thats £38,933 per member, which is very small change for investment banks.
- For the year to March 2015, LPMCL actually made an operating loss of £64,944 because Administrative Expenses were £288,543. The bottom line loss was a similar figure.
- The biggest components of Administrative Expenses were Computer Service Fees: £151,978, and Legal and Professional Fees: £118,384, which together totalled £270,362.
Computer Service Fees obviously refers to costs in running AURUM, running the LPMCL web site, and possibly other technology costs that can be billable by the member banks to LPMCL such as, for example, electronic communications and interfacing software for sending trades to and receive data from AURUM. ‘Fees’ suggests a payment to an external provider.
The ‘Legal and Professional Fees’ line item is more unusual. Why would LPMCL need to spend £118,384 on legal and profession fees in one year, which is 41% of total admin expenses, and 78% as large as the ‘computer service fees’? This legal and professional fees line item is also eye-opening since it increased from £69,194 in 2014 to £118,384, a 71% increase. Auditing fees would be fairly constant from year to year, so there is a relatively new and quite large expense under this category. Could it be a legal expense, and if so why?
What does LPMCL’s AURUM actually do?
The London bullion market’s clearing system is a monopoly bullion clearing system run by LPMCL for bullion settled loco London, with “all bullion transactions between the clearing members of the LBMA settled and cleared by The London Precious Metals Clearing Limited.” “Loco London” traditionally meant gold and silver bullion physically held in London. With the rise of the unallocated account transfer system, to what extent unallocated bullion accounts are backed by physical bullion is debatable. The system is now a fractional-reserve credit system. LPMCL’s electronic clearing platform, AURUM, clears all bullion trades via book-entry netting and clearing using unallocated accounts.
Entities trading in the London bullion market maintain a series of unallocated accounts with one or more of the LPMCL clearers. The LMPCL members maintain unallocated accounts between each other used for clearing. The LPMCL also maintain bullion clearing accounts at the Bank of England. Each day, each client of each bullion clearer sends its LPMCL member clearing bank details of bullion trades between that client and its counter-parties. At the end of each trading day, each LPMCL member then processes position settlements by first netting out, in-house, to whatever extent possible, the bullion trades done by its own clients and clients of those clients.
Following this, the LPMCL members send their netted trade data to AURUM which then clears the clearers’ positions. The majority of LPMCL trades cleared are processed by LPMCL members HSBC and JP Morgan. The clearers also ‘settle’ their own positions with each other between 4pm and 4:30pm each day via broker transfers usually involving 3 brokers. This is done to prevent excessive overnight credit exposure between the clearers. The clearing process also involves “close liaison with the Bank of England and the many overseas bullion depositories“.
According to the LBMA, the LPMCL members:
“utilise the unallocated gold and silver, in accounts they maintain between each other, to make ‘paper transfers’ to settle mutual trades. They also settle third-party loco London bullion transfers, conducted on behalf of clients and other members of the London Bullion Market. This system of ‘paper transfers’ avoids the security risks, costs and impracticality of physically moving metal bars”
An overview of the London clearing process can be read on BullionStar’s Gold University profile of the London gold market here. The LBMA web site also provides a summary here. A similar summary is also in an article titled “Gold and Silver Clearing “Loco London” Through the Central Hub Developed by London Precious Metal Clearing Ltd” in Issue 55 of the Alchemist , dated July 2009. The most visible part of LPMCL and AURUM is the generally useless high level monthly clearing statistics that the LPMCL has produced each month since early 1997, and that are published on the LBMA website. These clearing statistics report the “net volume of loco London gold and silver transfers settled between clearing members of the LBMA.”
For each of gold and silver, the statistics are calculated as daily averages and reported each month as three sets of figures, namely, a figure of millions of ounces transferred per day, the USD value of those ounces transferred per day, and also the number of transfers per day. Note that these clearing figures are just a fraction of what the real underlying trading figures are. Overall trading figures of the London gold market are anywhere up to 10 times or more larger than the clearing figures would suggest, since the clearing figures are ‘netted’ trading figures.
London-settled gold and silver clearing statistics were first published in January 1997, with the first clearing data reported for the Q4 period 1996. This was prior to the automation of the daily clearing operations through AURUM.
Even back then in 1997, the daily clearing figures for gold and silver through London were baffling and opaque since the daily clearing volumes were huge compared to the quantities of physical gold and silver that exists in the entire world, and there was no granular explanation or categorisation as to the trade types and client types that these clearing figures represented. In this regards, nothing has changed. Then as of now, the LPMCL only reveal that the monthly figures include 3 types of data:
- Loco London book transfers from one party in a clearing member’s books to another member in the same member’s books or in the books of another clearing member.
- Physical transfers and shipments by clearing members
- Transfers over clearing members accounts at the Bank of England
For example, the LBMA clearing statistics for April 2016 state that 16.5 million ounces (513 tonnes) of gold were cleared each day during the month. With 21 trading days in April 2016, that would be 346 million ounces (10,777 tonnes) of gold cleared during April. Since there is said to be a 10 :1 ratio between the amount of gold traded in London and the amount of gold cleared through AURUM, these clearing figures can be rolled up by a multiple of 10.
The trouble with this type of high level reporting is that it doesn’t even reveal the percentage of transfers in each of the above three groups, but physical transfers would be very very small percentage of the total, because, by definition, physical transfers couldn’t be any larger given that there is only a fraction of physical gold being transacted in the world on any given day relative to these gigantic clearing & trading figures.
An article called “Clearing Volume on the London Bullion Market” in Issue 6 of the Alchemist, by Peter Smith of JP Morgan, dated January 1997, first introduced these predominantly useless clearing statistics and revealed the 3 categories above. Nothing has changed in the reporting since 1997 and this LBMA lack of transparency remains right up to today. Ironically, Issue 6 of the LBMA’s Alchemist was titled ‘Towards Transparency‘ but there was little transparency divulged at that time, and the same opacity of the London bullion market still remains 20 years later.
Issue 6 of the Alchemist also had an introductory editorial from the then chairman of the LBMA, Alan Baker, whose opening line in the editorial was:
“The bullion market in London is often criticised by observers for being secretive and lacking in information and data. Unfortunately to an extent this is inevitable given the need for a duty of care to clients which dictates that a high level of discretion is an essential element in so much of the business that takes place in the market, particularly for gold.”
Notice the secrecy is inevitable spin. The LBMA has been making excuses for the lack of transparency for at least 20 years now. Frankly, I don’t agree with any of the above explanations on the need for opacity. It’s a fiction. Reporting of trade volumes in all other markets globally such as equities, bonds, FX, money market and exchange-based commodities, is detailed, publicly available, and usually granular by transaction types and client types, and this does not, and has never, compromised client confidentiality in any of these asset classes. Why then do the precious metals markets, and the gold market in particular need to be the exception? They do not.
The excuses by people such as the ex LBMA chairman are merely helping to protect an entrenched system of opacity in which central banks, sovereign institutions, monetary authorities, the Bank for International Settlements, large bullion banks, and other large operators can move within the gold market without being concerned that any of their transactions and interventions will ever be noticed and reflected in gold price discovery. This is not an efficient market. Far from it. This is a protected and hidden physical trading system upon which is overlaid a massive pyramid of fractional-reserve paper gold trading.
The trade types of the trades from which the massive MPMCL clearing figures are generated could easily be reported by LPMCL and the LBMA, but they choose not to report this information. All positional, transactional, account, account type, and physical allocation data in every database table in AURUM and in every bullion trade database table of each LPMCL member bank could be published publicly while stripping out clients’ account-sensitive data and would still not jeopardize client confidentiality.
Trade Types behind the LPMCL Clearing figures
LPMCL provided one glimpse into London bullion market trade types in October 2003, in an article in Alchemist 32, titled “Clearing the Air Discussing Trends and Influences on London Clearing Statistics“, when the then LMPCL chairman, Peter Fava, and JP Morgan’s Peter Smith, both involved in the compilation of the original clearing statistics in 1997, were interviewed about “some changes in the nature of the market and over the intervening years that might have had an impact on the reported numbers.” This is the only insight that I am aware of that provided a small window into some of trade types of bullion transactions that are processed through AURUM.
Fava was asked about the “changes in the overall pattern of trading activity from certain counterparts”. He then gave a rundown of various bullion trading activities that were showing up in the clearing data. The activities mentioned were:
central bank gold deposits, rolling over monthly, and the hedging transactions connected to that borrowing
interest rate swaps and longer-term collateralised agreements
speculative trading activity on a leveraged, forward basis that is closed out before maturity
investment fund participation via spot transactions* (generally netted by the counterparty banks against EFPs – exchange for physicals) but if not netted would show up in clearing
interbank market trading (multiple times per day)
consignment accounts in physical markets, notably Istanbul, Dubai and India” with purchases out of the consignment account hedged loco London
Since that 2003 article was written, there has been a huge growth in Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) trading, a trading activity that can be added to the above list. In 2014, in the LBMA Silver Price competition proposals, ETF Securities’ bid stated that “our physical precious metal ETCs are created and redeemed for physical metal, with the metal being cleared through the LBMA clearing system and the securities being cleared through the CREST clearing system which is used for LSE trading“.
I have analysed the above London bullion market trade types in more depth, but due to space constraints, I’ll cover this is a future posting, but for now, the point to note is that a lot of London bullion trading activity has very little to do with physical metal movements.
Recall also that Stewart Murray (ex LBMA CEO) had said in a 2011 presentation that investment funds had ‘very large’ unallocated positions in the market.
“Various investors hold very substantial amounts unallocated gold and silver in the London vaults”
I wonder if investment funds which presume they own unallocated gold or silver (which is just a long unallocated spot position put on by a bank), are aware that their positions are then offset against futures. Some unsophisticated funds might think they are actually hold pooled gold or silver holdings within a London bank vault.
Circling the Wagons: Protection of LPMCL’s clearing monopoly
In 2014, the daily fixing auctions for all 4 precious metals in the London market were moved to new electronic platforms. In the case of gold and silver, competitions were held (organised by the LBMA) to decide on which companies would become the new administrators and calculation agents for the auctions. Ultimately, Thomson Reuters / CME Group secured the contract to run the new Silver auctions (LBMA Silver Price), and ICE Benchmark Administration secured the contract to run the new Gold auctions (LBMA Gold Price). In the case of the platinum and palladium auctions, as to whether a competition was held is debatable, since neither LPPM nor the London Platinum and Palladium Fixing Company (LPPFC) would confirm this when asked. However, the London Metal Exchange was ultimately awarded the mandate to run the new platinum and palladium auctions (LBMA Platinum Price and LBMA Palladium Price).
After Thomson Reuters and CME Group had secured the contract for the silver auctions, CME Group maintained (in a public presentation) on 29 July 2014 that it would soon introduce a centrally cleared platform for these auctions trades so as to widen participation in the auctions and eliminate credit risk between participants.
“[for] Extended Participation, we envisage central clearing via CME Clearing Europe under the auspices of the UK and European regulated authoritieswhich should effectively open the door for most participants.”
“We’re basically starting the process as soon as possible. Let’s get this up and running by 15thAugust  andthen it’s all hands to the pumps on the clearing sideso hopefully it will happen soon.”
“The work we’ve got to do is to set this up so that’s it’s part of the platform so it’s a level playing field for participants…”
“Anindya Boral will be starting to do a big drive to enable cleared transactions through our clearing houseand wider participation in August”
In its presentation, CME Group featured a slide which stated that:
“Central counterparty clearing will enable greater direct participation in the London Silver Price”.
We anticipate using CME Group’s London Clearing House – CME Clearing Europe – for the London Silver Price
By serving as the counterparty to every transaction, CME Clearing Europe will become the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer, virtually eliminating credit risk between market participants“
Likewise, when the LME announced that it had been awarded the contract by LPPFC to run the platinum and palladium price auctions, the LME issued a press release on 16 October 2014 stating that it planned to introduce clearing of platinum and palladium auction trades using its clearing platform LME Clear, so as to maximise participation and overcome the credit risk obstacle:
“To maximise participation in the London pricing mechanism, the LME also plans to introduce a cleared platinum and palladium service, which will mitigate the difficulty associated with participants taking bilateral credit risk in positions.
LME Clear, launched on 22 September 2014, was built specifically to enable efficient clearing of metals exposures and will extend its existing precious metals clearing functionality to clear platinum and palladium.“
However, the LME mysteriously pulled its press release a few hours after it had been published, and replaced it with an amended version where the above two paragraphs had been deleted. See BullionStar blog “LPPM – The London Platinum and Palladium Market” for full details.
And so, LME Clear was never introduced for clearing platinum and palladium auction trades.
Similarly, in its Executive Summary proposal submitted to the LBMA in October 2014 to run the new gold price auctions, a contract which it ended up winning, ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) stated that its solution could employ pre-collateralisation to eliminate bi-lateral credit risk between participants, and therefore widen auction participation. ICE also made reference to the logic of using a centrally cleared model, but was shrewd enough at that point in time to defer to the powerful interests of the clearing members who essentially run the LBMA, knowing that the CME Group and LME clearing solutions for Silver and Platinum/Palladium had been shot down:
“It is through the Oversight Committee that the LBMA will continue to have significant involvement in the auction process, including… the decision on whether to move to a centrally cleared model(until that time, weaker credit names can be accommodated via pre-collateralisation).”
“One of the key benefits of WebICE is its ability to allow clients to participate in the auction process with the same information and order management capabilities as the direct participants. This reduces both operational and regulatory risk for direct participants, even before increasing the number of direct participants or moving to a centrally cleared model.”
In its presentation submission to the LBMA in October 2014 during the competition to run the London gold auctions, the LME also seemed to have gotten the message that the LPMCL’s clearing monopoly and its AURUM clearing system were not to be tampered in any proposed LME platform. In a slide titled “Potential credit models” the LME said that a centrally cleared solution “would only be introduced with market support and respecting LPMCL settlement“. See right-hand box in below slide:
Likewise, in the slide that followed the above one, the LME again made it abundantly clear that it had got the message that LMPCL was not to be touched – “LME Clear fully respects existing loco London delivery mechanism and participants“:
The only reference by the LBMA to central clearing counterparties is a short comment on its website about centrally clearing OTC forward trades where itstates:
“..members of a common ‘Central Counterparty’(CCP), that has a facility to clear forwards, may novate their trades and thus avoid bilateral credit risk. In the absence of an exchange, the trade remains one of an OTC nature but has the ability to be cleared. This method of credit mitigation is known as OTC Cleared.”
CME Group already offers a very sparsely used (or not even used) centralised clearing service for OTC unallocated gold forwards using collateral or cash margin. “Delivery occurs at LPMCL member banksvia book entry transfer of ‘London Good Delivery’ gold, which means unallocated loco London book entry gold claims on an LPMCL bank”.
Not surprisingly, the LBMA web site,says nothing about the pros and cons of centrally clearing OTC spot trades nor is there any discussion about exchange-basedtrading and clearing of any London bullion trades.
The LPMCL web site mentions an alternative clearing system (a clearing house), but not surprisingly, this approach is only mentioned as a foil for undermining it, as follows:
Q: Can you explain the benefits of the London bullion clearing system as compared with a clearing house?
A: “…a clearing house usually has a rigid settlement structure, does not provide credit, or assume intra-day or term credit risks, and not being in the banking business, has no ability to use any underlying liquidity. It will thus most likely be less flexible, less efficient and more expensive – particularly as clearing houses by their nature are non-competitive, whereas the London bullion clearing banks compete for clients by providing competitive services and pricing.”
Q: Could a clearing house replace the London bullion clearing system?
“Yes, but it would prove to be less efficient and more expensive than the current arrangement. It would also most likely need strong financial backing and insurance cover – which then directs us back to the London bullion clearing banks, as above, all of whom are first tier global institutions.”
Why is LPMCL being Protected?
In conclusion, why does the LBMA think that LPMCL is a ‘vital organisation’? as the LBMA CEO phrases it.
Firstly, LPMCL keeps the entire pyramid of London’s unallocated precious metals trades spinning. By not reporting any trade information, the LBMA and LPMCL keep the entire gold world in the dark about the extent of the London paper gold trading scheme
Secondly, LPMCL preserves opacity and prevents public reporting of precious metals trades, including central bank gold lending and gold swaps, and therefore keeps this major gold market trading activity out of focus, with the spotlight off the role of the Bank of England in the London Gold Market.
Thirdly, the most powerful banks in the LBMA are the LPMCL members which are also the vaulters in London and the member banks of the LBMA Management Committee. These banks want to maintain the monopoly status quo of LPMCL and to maintain the status quo of the London precious metals vaulting system and their vaulting fees. The same banks run the trading, clearing and vaulting of the entire London bullion system. Perhaps the FCA should be looking at anti-competitive behaviour here, for example vaulting fees, and clearing fees.
Fourthly, the current LPMCL system masks huge amounts of trading for the LBMA members banks and brokers. Huge trading makes large trading commissions. The same system generates the need for the banks to provide credit to bullion market participants, which generates interest income.
Fifthly, by propping up LPMCL, its member banks can push back on any competing initiatives that are proposing a ‘gold exchange’ in London, such as the exchange initiative that’s backed by the World Gold Council and a number of other (non LPMCL) bullion banks.
As the Financial Times said in October 2015 when reporting about the LBMA’s so-called moves to provide trade reporting in light of other initiatives by the LME / World Gold Council and banks such as Goldman, SocGen, Citibank and Morgan Stanley (and previously including ICBC Standard) to move gold trading on to an exchange platform using exchange defined gold contracts:
“In the other camp is the LBMA, the official body set up by the Bank of England in 1987 to regulate the bullion market,which has close ties to the vaulting banks.Many of its biggest members want physical gold trading in London to remain off-exchange, but have conceded that a move towards all trades being cleared in one place could add transparency.”
Look at what the incumbent LBMA banks do, not what they say to newspapers. What the LBMA – LPMCL co-op (same people, different hats) has just done is welcomed another bank (ICBC Standard) into ‘this vital organisation” (the LPMCL), and the LBMA is now looking forward to “continuing to assist LPMCLin its growth and development.”
ICBC Standard had been in the LME / World Gold Council / Goldman / SocGen/ Citi / Morgan Stanley camp, buton the face of it, ICBC now appears to have deserted that faction and fully aligned with the LPMCL cartel of HSBC / JP Morgan / Scotia / UBS and Barclays. ICBC Standard may have been using the LME / Goldman camp as a bargaining tool with which to exert access pressure to join the LPMCL gang, and now that it has done so, it would be surprising if ICBC continues to align itself with the LME’s upcoming gold exchange proposal. However, as a Chinese controlled bank with long-term planning horizons, ICBC may wish to play a strategic game with a seat at both tables.
The platinum and palladium markets arguably receive more focus during the third week of May than at any other time of the year. This is due to a series of events hosted in London known as London Platinum Week. London Platinum Week, which also covers other platinum group metals such as palladium, is coordinated by the London Platinum and Palladium Market (LPPM) association and its members. This year, London Platinum Week runs from Monday 16 May until Friday 20 May.
The LPPM is intrinsically linked to London Platinum Week. Indeed, London Platinum Week is specifically held in the month of May because it commemorates the fact that the LPPM was founded in May, in 1987.
‘L-Phabet Soup': LPPM, LPPFC, LBMA and LME
To coincide with London Platinum Week, this article looks at the relatively low-key organisation known as the London Platinum and Palladium Market (LPPM), and associated entities such as the London Platinum and Palladium Fixing Company (LPPFC), as well as the more recent platinum and palladium fixings, which are now administered by the London Metal Exchange (LME) on behalf of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA). It is also timely to take a look at LPPM since it will most definitely cease to exist as a stand-alone entity later this year after it merges into the LBMA through a series of manoeuvres which have already been planned and scheduled, the first of which is a general meeting of the LBMA on 29 June.
LPPM is a trade association representing the interests of its members on the London platinum and palladium markets. LPPM operates the London/Zurich Good Delivery List for refiners of platinum and palladium, and also liaises with UK regulators and bodies such as HM Revenue and Customs.
Although it’s an association, the LPPM also describes itself conceptually as a members-only ‘Market':
“The LPPM operates on an OTC basis…with trades being undertaken in troy ounces of platinum and palladium. Full membership of the Market is open to those companies in the UK currently engaged in trading in the metals [platinum and palladium] and offering services in the UK to the market, including market-making, clearing services, refining or manufacturing.”
“an international self-management industry organization controlling Platinum and Palladium fair trade and appropriate products”.
Without stating the obvious, the London Platinum and Palladium Market (LPPM) is worth being familiar with because it oversees the London platinum group metals markets. More importantly, the LPPM members, especially its market making members, have a very influential input into daily price discovery in the global platinum and palladium markets, which in a real way impacts all users of and investors in platinum and palladium around the world. And given that LPPM appears to be run in a very informal clubby style with the same opacity and barriers to entry that surround the London Gold and Silver Markets, this should be concerning to platinum and palladium users and investors worldwide.
As an entity, LPPM is structured as an association, but unlike the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA), the LPPM is not a registered company. Both organisations are most usefully viewed as the public faces of the member entities, especially the banks, that operate in the precious metals markets. Currently, LPPM has 17 full members (10 of which are banks), 35 associate members and 52 affiliates.
The full members of LPPM that are banks are JP Morgan, HSBC, Goldman Sachs, UBS, Bank of Nova Scotia, ICBC Standard Bank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Standard Chartered and Toronto-Dominion Bank. All of these 10 banks are market-making members of LPPM along with BASF Metals, which is also a full member. The remaining 6 full members of LPPM are precious metals refiners, namely, Johnson Matthey Plc of the UK, Tanaka Kikinzoku Kogyo of Japan, Germany’s Heraeus, and Metalor, PAMP and Valcambi of Switzerland. Tanaka only became a full member of LPPM in March 2015, where its full membership was voted on at the LPPM AGM. This illustrates that it is not a matter of merely applying for membership when attempting to become a full member of LPPM, the application has to be endorsed by the existing full members. Barclays and Mitsui & Co Precious Metals Inc were also still listed as full members of LPPM as recently as January 2016, but both have now been reclassified as associate members.
The associate members of LPPM also include a large number of banks such as Citibank, SocGen, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Barclays, Commerzbank, Natixis, RBC and BNP Paribas as well as commodities trading companies, brokers and the trading arms of platinum and palladium producers. LPPM therefore appears to be a private, members only trade organisation dominated by a small number of bullion banks, and in that regard is rather like the LBMA.
“The Company’s name is “The London Bullion Market Association”
The 1987 incorporation document of the London Bullion Market Association can be seen here, with its first registered office of ‘New Court, St Swithins Lane’, i.e. the headquarters of N.M Rothschild in London. The LBMA was founded by N.M. Rothschild & Sons Limited, J.Aron & Company (UK) Limited, Mocatta & Goldsmid Limited, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Sharps Pixley Limited, and Rudolf Wolff & Company Limited.
LPPM was also established in 1987. Technically, LPPM was established so that the London platinum and palladium markets could be added to the UK’s Terminal Markets Order (TMO) exemption list so as to receive a zero rate of VAT from HM Revenue & Customs on sales of metal between LPPM members and non-members. LPPM was added to the VAT (Terminal Markets) Order by an amendment to the Order on 5 May 1987.
LPPM was established as an ‘Association’ via a ‘Deed of Establishment’. LPPM confirmed to me recently that it doesn’t have a Memorandum of Association nor Articles of Association, which seems odd given that its structured as an ‘Association’. According to a UK government website on legal forms for business:
“Unincorporated Associations are groups that agree, or ‘contract’, to come together for specific purpose. They normally have a constitution setting out the purpose for which the association has been set up, and the rules for the association and its members. They are typically governed by a management committee”.
LPPM therefore must have a deed of establishment and probably has a constitution, but where these documents are publicly filed, if at all, is anybody’s guess.
All of these 6 founding members of LPPM are still full members of LPPM in one shape or another. Samuel Montagu through it being part of Midland Bank became part of HSBC, as did Mase Westpac which was bought by Republic National Bank of New York in 1993 which was then acquired by HSBC. Aryton Metals became part of Standard Bank in 1994. ICBC has recently acquired Standard Bank, and is now known as ICBC Standard Bank. BASF acquired Engelhard in 2006, hence the entity that was formerly known as Engelhard Metals is now known as BASF metals. The old Sharps Pixley business was bought by Deutsche Bank in 1993. Johnson Matthey still exists today as John Matthey.
It’s very revealing that these founding entities of LPPM represent 4 of the 5 current fixing members (HSBC, BASF, ICBC Standard and Johnson Matthey) in today’s platinum and palladium daily price auctions. These price auctions are widely used throughout the global platinum and palladium industry as valuation and contract benchmarks. The 5 member participants in the daily platinum and palladium price auctions in London, administered by the London Metal Exchange (LME) are:
BASF Metals Ltd
HSBC Bank USA NA
Johnson Matthey plc
ICBC Standard Bank plc
Goldman Sachs International
Note that 4 of the 5 platinum and palladium auction participants are founding members of LPPM. More on the daily platinum and palladium auctions below.
As of 2001, there were still only 9 full members of LPPM (7 of which were banks), namely:
J Aron & Company (UK)
Engelhard Metals Ltd
HSBC USA (London Branch)
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York (London)
Johnson Matthey Plc
NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd
Standard Bank London Ltd
Credit Suisse First Boston (London Branch)
LPPM currently has a 9 person management committee, comprising a chairman from Johnson Matthey Plc, a vice chairman from ICBC Standard Bank, and committee member representatives from HSBC, BASF Metals, SocGen, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Metalor, Heraeus and Anglo Platinum Marketing Ltd. Notably, 4 of the 9 members of the LPPM management committee, ie Johnson Matthey, HSBC, BASF Metals and ICBC Standard Bank, also represent 5 of the 6 founding members of LPPM and are also 4 of the 5 members participants in the daily London platinum and palladium price auctions.
London by name, but no London office
In addition to the fact that it’s a private association without any public filings, there are a number of organisational aspects about LPPM which indicate that it is run on a much more piecemeal style than the LBMA, with a setup more akin to a local golfing society than the global representative of the world’s biggest platinum and palladium trading hub.
Although ‘London’ is in the title of the ‘London Platinum and Palladium Market’, the LPPM doesn’t even have a permanent London address, but sometimes uses the rotating chairman’s company addresses in London for correspondence. The LPPM support staff and setup seems to be summed up as “anywhere but in the City of London”:
The LPPM website address lppm.com is registered to Sharps Pixley at a Suffolk address, some 60 miles outside London. [The LPPM website also states that the site created by a web development company “for Sharps Pixley Ltd”]
The LPPM’s treasurer, who is also the administrative contact for London Precious Metals Clearing Ltd (see lpmcl.com) has his mail server registered at an address in Surrey, 22 miles from London. [The LPPM treasurer was also the administrative contact for the old Gold Fixing and Silver Fixing websites (www.goldfixing.com and www.silverfixing.com)]
The LPPM’s inter-organisational relations contact is a former Chair of LPPM, who at the time represented LPPM member Mitsui, but Mitsui exited the precious metals markets in London last year, although this former chair is still involved through this LPPM role, but at what address?
There are no published details or minutes of LPPM AGMs and very few press releases – ever. The only press releases that are retained on the LPPM website are here, with a few others traceable here and here. All in all, quite a strange and secretive organisation that makes the LBMA look like the epitome of transparency.
London Platinum and Palladium Fixing Company Limited (LPPFC)
The London Platinum and Palladium Fixing Company Limited (LPPFC) is another low-key entity within the London platinum and palladium market, and not surprisingly it has very very close connections with LPPM. LPPFC is a private company made up of directors from HSBC, Goldman Sachs, ICBC Standard Bank and BASF Metals. As its name suggests, LPPFC was established for the purpose of operating the Platinum and Palladium price auctions. LPPFX was incorporated on 3 December 2004, and operated the platinum and palladium fixing auctions up until 1 December 2014, i.e. for 10 years exactly.
The reason LFFPC has not been dissolved is that it is a currently one of the defendants in a consolidated class action suit taking place in the Southern District court in New York, where it is accused of platinum and palladium price manipulation along with the fixing members of LPPFC, namely Goldman Sachs Group Inc, HSBC Bank USA NA, ICBC Standard Bank PLC, and also UBS (not a fixing member of LPPFC). This class action was filed on 21 April 2015. In late 2015, the defendants tried to have the plaintiff’s motion dismissed but this was not upheld by the court. The class action suit against LPPFC and its member companies is in many ways similar to class action suits currently running against the London Gold Market Fixing Company and its members and the London Silver Market Fixing Company and its members, although the gold and silver class actions have received more publicity than the platinum / palladium suit.
LPPFC hands the platinum and palladium fixings to LME
In the summer of 2014, during the period when the London Silver Fixing auctions were transitioning to a new platform via a high-profile competition that eventually resulted in the new LBMA Silver Price auction system being administered by Thomson Reuters (the award of which was announced on 11 July 2014), the LPPFC made a few stealthy moves to jettison its own operational role in the platinum and palladium fixings. These moves went mostly unreported and un-scrutinized in the financial media.
“shortly commence an RFP [Request for Proposals] process with a view to appointing a third party to assume responsibility for the administration of the London Platinum and Palladium Fixing“.
The press release also stated that “The RFP process will be launched shortly. Expressions of interest in that process should be directed to firstname.lastname@example.org by no later than 6 August 2014.” Given that 6 August (a Wednesday) was 3-4 business days after the announcement that an RfP process was being launched, this is extremely short notice for intending applicants to signal their interest in such a process, especially since it was the August holiday season in the City of London and the London financial services and technology industries. It’s as if the LPPFC did not want any potential applicants to express interest in the RfP.
At that time, the LBMA was silent on its role in the RfP process for the platinum and palladium fixings. On 31 July 2014, Bloomberg wrote a story highlighting that the LBMA’s public relations officer, Aelred Connolly, declined to explain the LBMA’s role in the platinum/palladium RfP:
“Aelred Connelly, a spokesman for LBMA, declined to comment on the association’s role in the platinum and palladium request-for-proposal exercise.”
However, a LBMA to LPPFC connection is apparent in a move by the LPPFC on 4 August 2014 when it announced (on the Sharps Pixley website) the appointment of Jonathan Spall as the ‘independent chair’ of the platinum and palladium fixing calls, a role that was said to commence that day on 4 August 2014. Jonathan Spall (ex Barclays and ex London Gold Market Fixing Company) at that time was acting as a consultant for the LBMA in the Silver Price auction competition process. LPPFC also said in the same announcement that Mr Spall would be supporting the LPPFC Board’s “assessment of responses to the RFP process announced by LPPFC on 31 July.”
More notably, there was nothing reported by LPPFC nor by LPPM nor by the financial media about this RfP process, nor about what happened after ‘expressions of interest’ were received by 6 August, until an announcement was made by LPPFC on 16 October 2014 (11 weeks later), again announced on the LPPM web site, that:
“Following completion of the RFP process announced by The London Platinum and Palladium Fixing Company Limited (the LPPFCL) on 31 July 2014, the LPPFCL is pleased to confirm that the London Metal Exchange (LME) has been selected and has committed to become the new administrator of the London Platinum and Palladium Fixing”
Given that there is no evidence to suggest that there were any applicants to this process, not any short list, nor any competition, it would appear that the contract was merely handed to the London Metal Exchange. I asked the LPPM recently to confirm how many applicant companies participated in the LPPFC RfP process that took place between August and October 2014, and of the applicant companies, could they confirm how many applicants were shortlisted and their identities? LPPM eventually responded that they did not carry out the RfP process and had passed my query on to the then chair of the fixing company [LPPFC] who would respond to me ASAP. When no response was received after a week of waiting, I asked the LPPM to confirm who my query had been passed on to. This question itself was not responded to by the LPPM. Hence, my conclusion is that neither the LPPM nor LPPFC wish to discuss the matter, and my conclusion is that there was no contested RfP process to run the replacement platinum and palladium fixings, and that the process was merely handed to the LME.
The reason why this is not surprising, apart from the secretive and stealthy operational culture of the LPPM / LPPFC, is that there is good reason to believe that the LME was being sweetened and placated with the platinum and palladium fixings administrator role after it failed to secure the administrator and operator role in the LBMA Silver Price competition in July 2014, a role which was awarded to Thomson Reuters and the CME Group. I have heard from a number of people in the precious metals sector in London that the LME was not happy about the way in which the LBMA awarded the silver price auction contract.
LME Downplays Silver auction after being awarded Platinum / Palladium
“Matthew Chamberlain, the LME’s head of business development, said the grouphad only been able to get ‘a bare bones’ pitch together in time for the deadline for proposals on the silver fix. For platinum and palladium, ‘we had time to get our technology in place,’ he said.”
Frankly, this ‘bar bones’ pitch statement by Chamberlain in bizarre and preposterous, in light of the fact that the LME is on record during the Silver auction competition in July 2014 as saying it had a full and complete solution that it claims was considered the best solution by much of the market. The reference to not having enough time is also bizarre and hard to fathom.
Proving that the Wall Street Journal reporters don’t seem to read their own previous articles on the same subject, the Wall Street Journal reported in a 29 May 2014 article titled “CME Group, LME Separately Work on Hosting a New Silver Fix” that the LME proposal was at that stage in late May 2014, more advanced that the ultimately winning CME proposal:
“While the LME’s proposal is relatively advanced, CME Group is only in the early stages of considering a new silver fix, people with knowledge of the matter said.
“The LME went one further, saying it already has a proposal that will ‘provide best-practice regulatory compliance while maintaining the global position of the London market.’ The LME, which is owned by Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd., said it would give more detail “at the appropriate time once the market consultation is complete.”
It can only be concluded that the LME was seriously downplaying the Silver Price competition in October 2014, since by that time it was satisfied in getting the platinum and palladium business. Consider the following timeline which shows that the LME had weeks and weeks in which to devise a solution for the Silver auction:
“Our silver auction is based on market best-practice with rigorous regulatory and compliance features, and will be ready for demonstration on our production systems by Friday 27 June.”
“We are the natural London home for silver”
“We have reacted to strong market demand – from both physical and financial players – for the LME to deliver the London Silver Price, and our solution incorporates significant market feedback from across the silver community. Our dedicated team of precious metals experts is ready to support delivery of the solution, and ensure market continuity on 15 August 2014.”
On Wednesday 9 July, 2014, the LME announced that it had formed an alliance with financial technology company Autilla to provide a joint solution in the London Silver Price competition. The LME stated in a press release on that day that:
“’Throughout the LBMA’s process, the market has consistently indicated that Autilla’s technology and the LME’s compliance and price discovery systems are market-leading, and LME and Autilla have received numerous requests from the market to provide a joint solution,’ said Garry Jones, CEO of the LME.”
Two days later on 11 July 2014, the LBMA announced that CME / Thomson Reuters had secured the silver price auctions contract, news which must have caused much chargin and gnashing of teeth to LME and Autilla.
LME amends Press Release and deletes reference to central clearing
On Thursday 16 October 2014, the London Platinum & Palladium Fixing Company Ltd (LPPFC) awarded the contract to run the platinum and palladium price auction fixings to the London Metal Exchange (LME). LPPFC communciated this appointment in a press release which was published on the LPPM website (another example of the unhealthy inter-connectedness between the LPPM and LPPFC).
But the more interesting announcement that day came from the LME’s own web site where it issued a press release that was 7 paragraphs long, and also contained 2 ‘Notes to Editors’ bullet points.
The final two paragraphs of the LME’s press release that morning on 16 October 2014 explained the LME’s plan to use its LME Clear clearing service for platinum and palladium, so as to overcome the problem of bi-lateral credit risk between auction participants in the platinum and palladium auctions. This bilateral credit risk is huge barrier in the London Silver and Gold Price auctions as creates an obstacle for a wide-range of participants such as miners, refiner and mints to (on a practical level) taking part in the auctions. For background on the obstacle posed by not having central clearing, see for example “The LBMA Silver Price – Broken Promises on Wider Participation and Central Clearing“.
The LME original press release included the following two paragraphs:
“To maximise participation in the London pricing mechanism, the LME also plans to introduce a cleared platinum and palladium service, which will mitigate the difficulty associated with participants taking bilateral credit risk in positions.
LME Clear, launched on 22 September 2014, was built specifically to enable efficient clearing of metals exposures and will extend its existing precious metals clearing functionality to clear platinum and palladium.“
I tweeted about this at 11:24 am London time that morning, with a link to LME press release, saying:
LME will use a cleared platinum and palladium service to prevent need for participants taking bilateral credit risk http://t.co/ZpLA0Uhb86
Less than 3 hours later (somewhere between 13:34 and 14:21), the LME removed these 2 critical sentences from its press release and reissued an amended version of the press release on its website. The 13:34 and 14:21 time-stamps are based on Google cache which had made an imprint of the original press release at 16 Oct 2014 13:34:19 GMT and had found the amended press release at 16 Oct 2014 14:21:49 GMT.
Luckily, at least one financial news site, Finance Magnates, used the original press release, and reported as follows:
“To maximise participation in the London pricing mechanism, the LME plans to “introduce a cleared platinum and palladium service, which will mitigate the difficulty associated with participants taking bilateral credit risk in positions”.
LME Clear, launched on 22nd September 2014, was built specifically to enable efficient clearing of metals exposures and will extend its existing precious metals clearing functionality to clear platinum and palladium.”
Therefore, between 1:34pm and 2:21pm, someone at the LME deleted the two sentences on clearing from the press release and the reference to LME Clear. LME Clear was launched on 22 September 2014. The LME press release now remains on its web site in its second incarnation. The most important question is why was this press release altered as soon as it was released, and who requested that it be altered. Was it too revealing to the incumbent parties that central clearing would blow apart current clearing status quo and make redundant the argument that widespread participation in the precious metals auctions is a difficult process? Because with central clearing of auction trades, direct participation in the platinum and palladium auctions for hundreds of platinum and palladium entities around the world would be a very simple process.
Very interestingly, there was also one other change to the 2nd version of the LME press release in the ‘Notes to editors’ section where it was amended as follows:
Original: “The go-live date of 1 December is dependent on the ongoing participation of the four participating members of the LPPFCL.”
Revised: “The pricing mechanism is dependent on market participation. The LME has worked with the LPPFCL to ensure that its solution can be adopted on 1 December by both existing LPPFCL members, and new participants.”
This looks like a re-edit that was designed to distract from the fact that the LME auction was merely the same 4 old fixers in a different disguise, or in other words, “meet the new boss same as the old boss”, or “same old wine, in a new bottle“. It’s highly comical that the exact same participants that were in the old platinum and palladium auctions now appear in the new platinum and palladium auction as the only participants, and the LPPM, LBMA, LPPFC and LME have the gall to keep a straight face when reporting this. In fact, it would be a complete joke, if it were not for the fact that the topic of global price discovery of platinum and palladium is critically important. And finally, neither of the LME executives that were interviewed by Reuters that same week of October 2014 , in an article about the platinum and palladium contract award titled “LME CEO plays Asia card as gold market decides on fix replacement” even mentioned LME Clear to Reuters. Hmm, I wonder why?
The LME’s brochure about LMEBullion now states that “All transactions in platinum and palladium are Loco London and are settled on a bilateral basis“. Again, no mention of LME Clear or the central clearing capabilities of the LME.
The LME Fixings
On the day the LME platinum and palladium price auctions went live on 1 December 2014, it was announced by the LBMA that the auction / benchmark prices would be called the LBMA Platinum Price and the LBMA Palladium Price. This, according to the LBMA, was due to the LPPFC having asked the LBMA to take over the intellectual property for the two sets of daily prices before the new auctions were launched. Trademarks for the LBMA Platinum Price, LBMA Palladium Price and also LBMA Platinum and Palladium Price were registered by the LBMA on 28 November 2014, and a LBMA company called ‘Precious Metals Prices Limited’ was incorporated on 1 December 2014 to manage the intellectual property rights of the LBMA Platinum Price, the LBMA Palladium Price, the LBMA Silver Price and the LBMA Gold Price.
LBMA Platinum Price and LBMA Palladium Price auctions take place twice daily at 9:45am and 2pm London time. The platinum auction is schedule to run first, followed by the palladium auction. LME runs the daily auctions for platinum and palladium on an electronic auction system called LMEBullion.
The are only 5 member participants of LMEBullion, namely:
Goldman Sachs International
HSBC Bank USA NA
ICBC Standard Bank plc
BASF Metals Ltd
Johnson Matthey Plc
The 4 LPPFC members (Goldman, HSBC, ICBC Standard and BASF) were the only member of participants of LMEBullion when it was launched on 1st December 2014. Johnson Matthey Plc joined as a member participant of the auctions on 19 January 2015, a day on which the LME stated that:
“We believe that wider participation will maximise the effectiveness of the process, and we look forward to broadening participation further.”
However, since January 2015 however, no other member participants have joined. Why not? And why are there no industry participants directly participating in the auctions?
ETF Securities, which operates the ETFS Platinum Trust (PPLT) that uses the afternoon LBMA Platinum Price (the PM fix) as a valuation price source, states in an official filing dated 31 December 2015 that:
“Formal participation in the LME PM Fix is limited to participating LPPM members, each of which is a bullion dealer. Twelve LPPM members are currently participating in establishing the LME PM Fix (Barclays Bank PLC, BASF Metals Limited, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs International, HSBC Bank USA NA, ICBC Standard Bank PLC, JP Morgan Chase Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, The Bank of Nova Scotia, ScotiaMocatta, The Toronto-Dominion Bank and UBS AG). Any other market participant wishing to participate in the trading on the LME PM Fix is required to do so through one of the participating LPPM members.”
Similar wording and the same list of 12 banks is also stated in the official filings of the ETFS Palladium Trust (PALL). Therefore, according to ETF Securities, participation in the LBMA Platinum and Palladium daily price discovery auctions is also a closed-shop in a similar way that participation in the LBMA Gold Price and LBMA Silver Price auctions is a closed-shop, with only a handful of dominant bullion banks being allowed to directly participate.
Since the beginning of 2016, Barclays has withdrawn from some activities in the precious metals markets in London. Excluding Barclays from the above list and excluding BASF Metals Ltd, then all of the other 10 banks that are allowed to participate are the only banks that are full members of the LPPM. Therefore, the rules of the auctions are de facto limiting ‘formal participation’ in the platinum and palladium auctions to LPPM bullion dealer full members (i.e. bank entity intermediaries), and by extension, excluding every other platinum and palladium market participant in the world of which there are thousands.
Note that 7 other banks, namely, JP Morgan, Scotia, Barclays, UBS, Deutsche Bank, Toronto Dominion Bank,and Credit Suisse, are ‘participating’ in the fixes in addition to the 5 member participants. Some readers will recognise that 4 of these additional banks, JP Morgan, Scotia, Barclays, and UBS, are clearing members of the London precious metals markets along with HSBC and ICBC Standard through their membership of London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL). The power of LPMCL banks in all four of the London precious metals markets, and their obsession with maintaining the clearing status quo, should not be underestimated, but it is a point which seems to have been ignored by the London financial media.
Participation and Governance of the LME administered prices
There does not appear to be any information on the LME website or associated uploaded documents that explains how interested participants can become participating members in the LBMA Platinum and LBMA Palladium auctions, or what the participation criteria is. These auctions therefore look like private clubs in the same vain of the LBMA Gold Price and LBMA Silver Price auctions, but even more closed and protected than their silver and gold counterparts.
The oversight committee for the platinum and palladium price auctions is even stranger. There is nothing independent about it. On the LME website, a document titled “Control Framework for LPP Prices“, paragraph 14, refers to an LPP Prices Oversight Committee for the Platinum and Palladium fixings, comprising 3 LME representatives, a possible 5 representatives (one each from the 5 member participants) and a potential LBMA observer:
“The Oversight Committee shall be composed of at least three senior individuals from the LME to serve as LME members on the Oversight Committee. These individuals will be appointed by the LME’s Executive Committee. Each member participant may also
nominate a qualified individual to act as a representative on the Oversight Committee. The London Bullion Market Association is entitled to nominate an observer to attend meetings of the Oversight Committee.”
However, the LME website shows that this Oversight Committee only consists of 3 representatives from the LME and no one else. It doesn’t even contain representatives from the member participants. Even if it did though, it’s still not independent, since there are no representatives from the wider global platinum / palladium sectors. Even the LBMA Gold Price and LBMA Silver Price administrators operate independent oversight committees, which while not perfect, are far more diverse than the LME Oversight Committee. See ICE Benchmark Administration (LBMA Gold Price) oversight committee and Thomson Reuters (LBMA Silver Price) oversight committee.
The LBMA’s roadmap for consolidating its power in the London precious metals markets has been well telegraphed since 2014. The fragmented nature of the 3 sets of precious metals fixings in London with 3 different platforms and 3 administrators is one aspect of the ‘Problem-Reaction-Solution’ agenda that has been played out by the LBMA and LPPM strategists since the 2nd half of 2014. An early inception of the idea of the LBMA and LPPM coming together was placed into the ‘Market’ in the October 2014 issue of the LBMA’s Alchemist magazine when LBMA consultant Jonathan Spall, in an article titled ‘No More Fixings‘ posed the question:
“Do we need an umbrella organisation with a strong voice to promote the interests of our rather small area of the global financial community?”
The ‘New World Order’ agenda was again pushed and crafted in the LBMA’s orchestrated ‘LBMA Strategic Review’ conducted by EY consultants, a review which was not open to public consultation during the consultation phase, and the full findings of which have never been published. By June 2015, the LBMA CEO stated that the LBMA was planning to:
“Develop the precious metals market landscape to meet the current and future needs by implementing new services, new corporate structure and new governance“
“A New Trade Association for all four metals will be formed which will hold the current assets of the market such as the Good Delivery List as well as develop new Financial Services to support market trading.”
Bloomberg summed up this October 2015 news as follows:
“The association [LBMA] is consideringexpanding its oversight to include platinum and palladium, rather than just gold and silver, Chief Executive Ruth Crowell said Monday at the conference, citing regulatory, political and competitive changes. Having all four metals under one group would make sense from a banking and vaulting perspective and LBMA members will be asked to vote on the change at the annual general meeting in June , she said.”
c) the location of the HSBC vault in London is not publicised and so the secrecy creates intrigue
d) HSBC every so often throws out some visual or audio-visual media bait about the vault, most famously in the case of CNBC’s Bob Pisani and his camerman and producer visiting and filming inside the actual vault
Despite all of the above, no one seems to have ever tried to figure out where this gold vault is actually located. Until now.
In some ways HSBC has done a very good job keeping the location of its London gold vault under wraps. The main challenge is where does one begin to look for a vault in London from scratch. At first it would appear that there is nothing in the public domain pointing to the HSBC vault location. This is not entirely true however. The gold bullion activities of HSBC in London stem from two companies that over time became part of the HSBC group. My approach was to start by thinking about which London locations HSBC used to be based at. I took this approach because it became obvious that the HSBC London gold vault being used was still a battered looking old vault space in 2004 and 2005, which was after the entire HSBC company had moved to its spanking new London headquarters in Canary Wharf by 2003.
In New York, the location of the HSBC Bank USA precious metals vault in Manhattan is well-known and is even listed in CFTC documents such as here. The vault is at 1 West 39th Street, SC 2 Level , NewYork, NewYork 10018 , which is the same building as 450 Fifth Avenue, which is the former Republic National Bank building that HSBC took over in 1999-2000. This Republic building at 450 Fifth Avenue, when it was being built, “had special vault requirements that reportedly added significantly to the project’s cost“. So its hard to see why HSBC makes such a big deal of not revealing its London vault location.
History of HSBC gold operations in London
In 1993, HSBC Holdings plc relocated its headquarters to London after having acquired Britain’s Midland Bank the previous year. Midland in turn had fully acquired Samuel Montagu in 1974 to form Midland Montagu. Samuel Montagu & Co was a City of London bullion broker, and one of the 5 original gold fixing members of the London Gold Fixing, and in turn, Midland Montagu was also a Gold Fixer. In 1999, HSBC began using the name ‘HSBC’ for the Gold Fixing seat of Midland Montagu.
Between 1999 and 2000, HSBC completed the acquisition of Republic National Bank of New York. Republic National Bank of New York had been a big player in the world gold markets, and in 1993, Republic National had bought one of the London Gold Fixing seats from Mase Westpac, meaning that from 1993 both Republic National and Midland Montagu held Gold Fixing seats, and that HSBC ended up with 2 of the 5 Gold Fixing seats. Therefore, in 2000, following the Republic National takeover, HSBC in London sold one of its newly acquired seats to Credit Suisse.
I also have always thought that the HSBC vault is in central London, and not in some far-flung outer London location. The LPMCL website (www.lpmcl.com) still displays text that says that the bullion clearer’s vaults are in ‘central London locations':
“The five London bullion clearing members each maintain confidential secure vaulting facilities within central London locations, using either their own premises, or those of a secure storage agent…”
Anyone who knows London will understand that ‘central London’ refers to a small number of central districts, and not some broader inside the M25 (ring road) definition. Before moving to Canary Wharf in circa 2003, HSBC occupied a number of buildings clustered around the north bank of the River Thames, including 10 Lower Thames Street (the Banks’ Headquarters), 3 Lower Thames Street (St Magnus House), 10 Queen Street Place at the corner of Upper Thames Street (Thames Exchange – containing a trading floor), and Vintners Place (adjoined to Vintners Hall on the other side of Queen Street Place and Upper Thames Street).
HSBC Bank USA NA (London branch), until 2015, was also the HSBC entity that was listed as a member of London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL) on the LPMCL website. See, for example, September 2009 imprint of LPMCL website. The next step is therefore to see where HSBC Bank USA NA (London branch) was formerly located.
The Financial Services Register (FSA Register) lists HSBC Bank USA, Reference number: 141298, effective from 24 January 2000, with a registered address of Thames Exchange, 10 Queen Street Place, London EC4R 1BE. Recalling the Republic National connection, the previous registered name for this entity was “Republic National Bank of New York”, with the same address, effective from 18 December 1995 to 24 January 2000. The FSA Register entry also lists various well-known names of the HSBC gold world alongside this HSBC Bank USA entity, including Jeremy Charles, Peter Fava and David Rose.
Recalling the Samual Montagu / Midland Montagu connection to HSBC, an entity called Montagu Precious Metals is also listed with an old address at “2nd Floor, Thames Exchange, 10 Queen Street Place, London EC4R 1BQ.
An old gold information website called GoldAvenue from the year 2000, written by Timothy Green, also lists HSBC Bank USA (London branch) address as:
HSBC Bank USA
London branch Thames Exchange 10 Queen Street Place London EC4R 1BQ
That same Gold Avenue web page also correctly listed the HSBC New York vault address as:
HSBC Bank USA 452 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10018
which is the same building as West 39th Street, New York, in Manhattan.
The precursor to the SPDR Gold Trust was called Gold Bullion Ltd, a vehicle set up by Graham Tuckwell, promoted by the World Gold Council, and listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. Gold Bullion Ltd’s first day of trading was 28th March 2003. Following Gold Bullion Ltd’s launch, the SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) was then launched in 2004, but originally it was called STREETracks Gold Shares, and it even had another former working title of ‘Equity Gold Trust’ in early 2004.
A May 2003 Marketwatch article about Gold Bullion Ltd and the early incarnation of the SPDR Gold Trust (Equity Gold Trust) can be seen here, and a speech by Graham Tuckwell about Gold Bullion Ltd to the LBMA annual conference in Lisbon in 2003 can be seen here. Most importantly, an early draft Prospectus of Gold Bullion Ltd (in MS Word), dated 10 February 2003, lists the Custodian of Gold Bullion Ltd as:
HSBC Bank USA
10 Queen Street Place
London EC4R 1BQ
Therefore, Thames Exchange goes to the top of the list for further consideration, as does it’s neighbour Vintner’s Place. Thames Exchange and Vintners Place were both HSBC buildings and both buildings are situated right across the road from each other, with Queen Street Place literally bisecting the 2 buildings. Queen Street Place is also the road that acts as the approach road to Southwark Bridge, with the 10 Queen Street Place building and the Vintners Place building literally creating a canyon either side of the road.
You will see below why Queen Street Place is interesting. Queen Street Place is very near the Bank of England and is in the City of London, so it’s under City of London Police protection. It’s also very near the River Thames, as is the JP Morgan London vault. To get to the Bank of England from Queen Street Place, you literally walk a mintute north up Queens Street, and then a few minutes north-east along Queen Victoria Street and you’re at the Bank of England.
An official HSBC letter-headed note documenting the Thames Exchange address and proving HSBC occupied this building can be seen here. Similarly, an official letter-headed note documenting the Vintner’s Place address, and proving that HSBC occupied that building can be seen here.
“Army of firms called in to help co-ordinate bank’s relocation to Docklands by 2002“
“HSBC has stepped up its retreat from the City of London by instructing agents to open negotiations on the disposal of its outstanding City liabilities.
In one of the most hotly contested pitches of last year, Jones Lang Lasalle has beaten rivals to secure the lead role as strategic adviser for the bank’s relocation to Docklands [Canary Wharf] in 2002.
In addition to JLL, the bank has instructed another seven firms to mastermind the disposal of its 121,000 sq m (1,302,445 sq ft) City portfolio.”
“HSBC has ruled out acquiring freehold or long-leasehold interests and has instructed agents to negotiate the best surrender or assignment of the occupational leases on its 12 City buildings.”
“Morgan Pepper is advising on HSBC’s 17-year lease at Thames Exchange, 10 Queen Street Place, EC4. The Scottish Amicable building is currently under offer to Blackstone Real Estate Advisors for £73m.
Insignia Richard Ellis, Chapman Swabey, Strutt & Parker and Wright Oliphant have positions on the bank’s remaining interests in Vintners Place EC3; Bishop’s Court at Artillery Street, and HSBC’s 37,160 sq m (400,000 sq ft) office complex at St Magnus House and Montagu House.
By the time STREETracks Gold Trust (the original name for the SPDR Gold Trust) was launched in 2004, HSBC Bank USA’s address had moved to HSBC’s new headquarters in Canary Wharf, in the Docklands, east of the City of London. By early 2003, Equity Gold Trust also listed the HSBC custodian with the Canary Wharf address.
“The phased occupation of the [Canary Wharf] building was completed in February 2003 when the last of over 8000 staff moved in, with HSBC Group Chairman Sir John Bond officially opening the building as the Group’s new head office on 2 April 2003.”
However, the old HSBC gold vault did not ‘move’ at the time the rest of HSBC moved lock, stock, and barrel to Canary Wharf between 2002-2003. In fact, the HSBC vault remained where it was in a slightly rundown shabby space with cream-colored walls. See multiple photos of the vault space below. The HSBC vault did however transform from an ‘old’ vault into a ‘new’ vault sometime between 2006 to early 2007. My belief, which I’ll explain below, is that this vault didn’t move, it just received an extensive renovation.
A diagram of the HSBC headquarters in Canary Wharf where the whole London HSBC workforce moved to by early 2003 can be seen below. Notice the car parks in basements B2, B3 and B4. You can also read about the basement construction in the Arup document above. This is not the location for a beat-up old vault that can be seen in the below old gold vault shots. Besides, the vertical pillars/piles in the old and new HSBC vault are nothing like the huge structural pillars/piles found in the HSBC headquarters in Canary Wharf.
The pillars in the old HSBC vault photos are pillars that would be found in an old arched vault, while the support pillars in the new HSBC vault photos are those that would be found in relatively shallow spaces under a road, such as pillars/supports used in the cut and cover New York subway system.
HSBC Gold Vault Photos
Here you can see an early gold vault photo of Graham Tuckwell, joint managing director of Gold Bullion Securities, and Stuart Thomas, managing director of World Gold Trust Services, in the ‘old’ HSBC vault in December 2004 checking a HSBC bar list:
Managing Director Stuart Thomas, Director of Corporate Communications, George Milling-Stanley of World Gold Trust Services, and CFO and Treasurer James Lowe (wearing a gold tie) of World Gold Trust Services
When the gold is stacked 6 pallets high, as in the above photo, it nearly reaches up to where the pillars start to broaden out. Recall for a moment the definition of a vault. A vault is any space covered by arches, or an arched ceiling over a void. This is why the Bank of England ‘vaults’ are called vaults, because in the old vaults of the Bank of England (before the Bank of England was rebuilt in the 1920s/1930s), the gold was stored in the arched vaulted basements. The pillars in the shots of this ‘old’ HSBC vault look like pillars/piles that are the lower parts of arches, since they taper outwards as they go higher and they are positioned in a grid like formation.
You can see how all the pallets of gold were located in a space with quite a lot of walls and chunky support pillars that broaden at the top (i.e. support pillars). Very similar pillars can be seen in old parts of the London Underground pedestrian tunnels, and also in the Vintner’s Hall wine vaults, which is next door to the vaults under Queen Street Place.
The NEW HSBC Vault 2007
During the second half of 2007, a series of 4 photos appeared on the STREETTracks website of a ‘New’ HSBC gold vault in London. The headline title of this series of images was
“The gold in trust at HSBC’s gold vault in London. The gold is being held in Trust for the shareholders of GLD. These images as at June 2007″
This STREETTracks web page can be accessed via the following link, however, the photos don’t render properly.
The MarketWatch website and a GLD SEC submission mentioned the ‘new’ vault move in an article on 11th January 2008:
“…StreetTracks Gold Shares, a wildly popular exchange-traded fund so awash in investor cash that its backers recently scrambled to find a bigger vault to accommodate their ever-growing horde of the precious metal, now valued at $18 billion.”
“Because the StreetTracks reserve expanded faster than expected, its managers had to move the stores to a bigger vault about six months ago to make more room, says George Milling-Stanley, a spokesman for the gold council.”
Graham Tuckwell, Chairman of ETF Securities, also referred to the ‘old’ and ‘new’ vaults at the LBMA Conference in Hong Kong in November 2012. On page 3, section C “Is the Gold Really There?”, Tuckwell shows 2 photos to the audience, one from “10 years ago” and one a recent photo. In the old photo, which is probably this photo
he says “the fellow on the left is a 10-year younger version of me“. He also says: “That was the old vault when we started doing it, and you can see that we are doing a bit of a check“.
Then Tuckwell goes on to say: “This photograph was taken just over a year ago on a recent vault visit“… “Our gold, from the London product, the GBS, is on the left and the gold from the US product, the GLD, is on the right in this picture“. GBS was the Australian product and GLD being the State Street product, listed in November 2004.
As it turns out, there are vaults beneath the road under Queen Street Place, between 10 Queen Street Place (Thames Exchange) and Vintners Place, and these vaults were renovated during the period that would coincide with the HSBC London gold vault transforming from an ‘old’ vault to a ‘new vault’.
Southwark Bridge and The Queen Street Place Vaults
A second bridge, the current Southwark Bridge, replaced the earlier bridge, and it opened in 1921.
A book titled ‘Design Applications of Raft Foundations‘, when discussing the development that became Vintners Place, mentions the vaults under Queen Street Place and shows that the vault space begins maybe 2.0 metres under the roadway, and with the vault space height being about 5 metres high which looks a very similar height to both the ‘old’ and ‘new’ HSBC vault spaces.
In fact, there were up to 17 vaults under Queen Street Place judging by a planning application from 1992 which listed a Vault Q (assuming Vaults A – Q), and the application said that the vaults had been used for storage.
Alterations to Vaults under Queen Street Place
Keeping in mind that the ‘old’ HSBC gold vault became a ‘new’ HSBC gold vault sometime in 2006, or early 2007, then the following, in my view, becomes highly relevant. In September 2004, a building control planning application was submitted to City of London planning department for Alterations to Vaults in the Thames Exchange building at 10 Queen Street Place. See link for the application. See screenshots also.
Following this in November 2005, another building control planning application was received by the City of London planning department for “Fit out of Vaults between 10 Queen Street Place and Vintners Place“. See link below and also screenshots.
Blackstone bought Thames Exchange from Scottish Amicable in 2000 while it was still being leased to HSBC. HSBC then surrendered the lease of the building when it moved to Canary Wharf in 2003. Blackstone then renamed Thames Exchange to 10 Queen Street Place and began renovating it while leasing it to City law firm SJ Berwin for its new London headquarters. However, SJ Berwin only moved its London headquarters from Gray’s Inn Road to 10 Queen Street Place sometime between February and April 2006, so the renovations appear to have gone on during 2003-2005. Norwich Property Trust purchased 10 Queen Street Place from Blackstone in 2006, after it had been renovated. Notably, Norwich retained TFT Consultants to inspect 10 Queen Street Place. TFT Consultants states in a case-study on its website that:
“We inspected this prominent riverside mixed-use building including extensive vaults underneath Southwark Bridge approach road and prepared a TDD report for Norwich Property Trust.”
Property investor Jaguar bought the 10 Queen Street Place building from Norwich in 2008, and then the Malaysian haji pilgrims fund purchased 10 Queen Street Place from Jaguar in September 2012.
Coincidentally, Vintners Place, which adjoins Queen Street Place on the other side of the vaults was also sold in September 2012 when Downtown Properties and a South Korean consortium bought it from Atlas Capital. The tenants at the time included Jefferies International, and Sumitomo and Thomson Reuters. Vintners Place also adjoins Thames House, Five Kings House, and The Worshipful Company of Vintners also has its headquarters in a building called Vintner’s Hall on the corner of Queen Street Place and Upper Thames Street.
And more zoomed in. Notice all of the individual vaults and doors, and all of the walls with rows of pillars marked between the walls.
Compare the above plans to the ‘proposed’ plans. In the proposed plans, which are revision C08 dated 06 April 2006, all of the individual vaults have been removed by removing all the doors and walls, leaving just rows of pillars, and beams (given that it’s a top-down view looking down).
You can see the changes a bit more clearly in the following slightly zoomed in version. Notice the facilities added on the right, such as toilets, kitchen, changing rooms, office, telecoms room etc, and also the rows of supports/ pillars on the left hand side, which is about 7 rows of supports / pillars in the open space, 5 of which run at the same angle, then there is a V shape where the pillars then run at a different angle.
Anyone who has the inclination, given these sets of plans of the vaults under Queen Street Place, please check back over the photos of the ‘old’ HSBC vault and ‘new’ HSBC vault and decide for yourself if the photos in the ‘old’ cramped vault with the pillars and cream wall is reminiscent of the pre-alteration plans above. Likewise, decide for yourself if the ‘new’ HSBC London gold vault with the open plan design and layout of vertical steel support columns looks like the plans above of the ‘proposed’ alterations and ‘Fit Out’ of the vaults under Queen Street Place.
When G4S built its subterranean gold vault in Park Royal, London in 2013 / 2014, it fitted it out the area beside the vault with toilets and a kitchen – See second last sentence in red box below from the G4S building contractor document. Because, if you are working down in a vault all day, there will need to be toilets and a kitchen area, as well as changing rooms, phones and desktop computers etc. For background to G4S vault, see “G4S London Gold Vault 2.0 – ICBC Standard Bank in, Deutsche Bank out“.
The Pisani Files – “This is it folks, this is the Motherlode!”
Now we come to the Bob Pisani videos that were filmed by CNBC in the HSBC London gold vault in 2011. I say videos in plural because there are 4 video segments, and actually 5 segments in total including a trailer. The videos are quite exciting and fast-paced but frustrating because the camera is quite shaky and moves around rapidly for a lot of the vault segments, possibly on purpose. The background music is quite catchy also (at first).
1. The Motherlode
The first video is on a CBNC web page and embedded in an article titled “Gold’s secret hiding place”, however the video is titled “Gold Rush – The Mother Lode”. Its dated Wednesday, 31 Aug 2011 with a byline of “CNBC’s Bob Pisani recently got an exclusive inside look at the HSBC gold vaults in London, where the gold for the SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) is stored.” The video is 4:55 mins long, and introduced by Pisani from the New York studio. The vault shots begin at 1:18, and interestnigly, at 0:40 mins, the camera is in a vehicle travelling down Lower Thames Street.
Let’s call this 2nd video “Gold’s Secret Hiding Place”. This version, which is different to the Motherlode, is on YouTube. I’m not sure of the official segment name. This version is 5:06 mins long, and Bob says the vault is “in a super-secret location only known to a few people”. This is also the version where Bob hands in his cellphone and travels in a blacked-out vehicle saying “we have no idea where we’re going. We only know our final destination. The vault!”
There is a neat online app called Pause House which allows you to look at any YourTube clip frame-by-frame, and can be used on the above clip for those who want to get a good look at the vault interior. (Pause House).
3. The Third version
Lets call this the Third version. Its 2:43 mins long. Pisani starts on Waterloo Bridge on the River Thames and he points towards Westminster Bridge (the exact opposite direction to Southwark Bridge). Then he is in the blacked-out vehicle, and then in the vault from 1:04 mins. At this stage the music might be annoying, so luckily, there is no background music when Bob talks in the vault.
4. Inside the Secret Vault
This clip is 2:42 mins long and is dated Thursday, 8 Mar 2012 with a byline of “CNBC’s Bob Pisani gets unprecedented access inside the largest private gold reserve in the world.” Its slightly similar to version 3 above
There is one sentence in both “Motherlode” and “Gold’s Secret Hiding Place” that I consider very interesting. And it relates to the ‘old’ and ‘new’ vaults. What Bob Pisani says has obviously been told to him by someone at HSBC, since he would not know anything about the vault in advance.
At 3:37 mins in Motherlode, Pisani says “In 2005, there was less than 200 tonnes of gold here, now there’s 6 times as much“.
At 4:05 mins in Gold’s secret hiding place, Pisani says “In 2005, there was less than 200 tonnes of gold in this vault backing the GLD. Now there’s 6 times as much.”
Pisani is essentially saying, probably without realising, that it is the same vault. i.e. that the vault in 2005 is the same vault as in 2011. However, given that the vault in 2005 was the ‘old’ vault, and that the vault in 2011 was the ‘new vault’, this suggests that it is the same space, and that the vault space was just renovated. It therefore supports the view that the vaults under Queen Street Place are a very strong candidate to be the HSBC London Gold Vault that stores the GLD gold and the ETF Securities gold.
You might have spotted above that one of the existing vaults under Southwark Bridge was turned into a riverside walkway. This was probably vault Q, which looked to be the vault nearest the river. This walkway runs under the beginning of the abutment on the north of SouthWark Bridge and is called the slightly humorous name ‘Fruiterers Passage’. The Passage was opened circa the year 2000 (and named after the Worshipful Company of Fruiterers), and is ornately tiled with ceramics, even around its pillar enclosures. Take a look at a photo of Fruiterers Passage and compare it to a photo of the new ‘HSBC’ gold vault that features the yellow-painted steel support pillars. The dimensions and spacings of the pillars in both photos look very similar, even identical.
A video walk-through (2:45 mins) of Fruiterers Passage can be seen here. The first 20-30 seconds shows Southwark Bridge, and then the walk through the Passage begins:
Although there are lots of security cameras around the City of London, the cameras in Fruiterers Passage and security warnings near the entrance to the Passage seem particularly explicit.
A MarketWatch article from 11 January 2008 quoted George Milling-Stanley as saying that the vault was sizable but “not quite as big as a cricket pitch.” On another occasion, Milling-Stanley used another sporting analogy and described the ‘new’ vault as “about the size of a football field“. Can a sporting analogy (or two) help determine the size of the HSBC London gold vault? Possibly, but it’s not as clear-cut as you might think.
Notwithstanding that a ‘cricket pitch’ is the (smallish) 22 yard strip between the wickets, the quotation was presumably referring to a ‘cricket field’. However, there is no standard shape of a ‘cricket field’, let alone standardised dimensions, since the ICC rules only state that the field can be circular or oval with a variable diameter of between 450 and 500 feet on the ‘long’ side (sometimes giving 16,000 sq yards). Regarding Milling-Stanley’s ‘football field’, analogy, it’s not clear whether this analogy was intended for a US audience or non-US audience. So it could mean ‘American’ football, or soccer or rugby.
In soccer, there is no standard size ‘field’. The sidelines (touch lines) have to be between 100 and 130 yards (110 to 120 yards for international matches), while the goal lines (end lines) must be between 50 and 100 yards (70 to 80 yards) in international matches. This could result in over 7000 sq meters or over 1.75 acres. The American football field is thankfully standardised, being 120 by 53.33 yards or 6400 sq yards.
Overall, Milling-Stanley’s descriptions give a flavour for permissible dimensions, but based on Bob Pisani’s video tour, I see the vault as a rectangular space but not quite as big as a soccer pitch. So lets look at the space in Google Earth. I’ve just added a yellow rectangle for illustrative purposes to show where the vaults under Queen Street Place are located.
The Marketwatch January 2008 article also said that the HSBC vault was “located on the outskirts of London” but how would the journalist know this since the same article also said that “a spokeswoman for HSBC declined to provide vault details, citing security policies”. As financial journalists mostly repeat what is told to them, I think this “located on the outskirts of London” bone was thrown out as a red-herring, and means the exact opposite.
At its peak holdings in December 2012, the SPDR Gold Trust stored 1353 tonnes of gold. Some observations from looking at the vault space in the Pisani videos and from talking to other people, are that:
a) the HSBC vault looks quite full in 2011, but it still looks like the space would be hard pushed to store the 1200 tonnes of gold that Pisani says were there
b) based on modelling the number of realistic-sized pallets that could conceivably fit into the Queen Street Place vault space (as per the vault plans), it also seems that it would be hard pressed to store 1,200 tonnes, unless they were crammed in. And the pallets in the CNBC segments are not fully crammed in to the space.
Remember also that the 1200 tonnes of gold reference only referred to the SPDR Gold Trust holdings in mid-2011 around the time the CNBC video segment was filmed. See blue line in chart below (chart from www.sharelynx.com) for GLD holdings over its lifetime. HSBC is also the gold custodian for ETF Securities’ gold-backed ETF which held about 170 tonnes at the time of Pisani’s visit. That would be nearly 1,400 tonnes of gold just between the GLD and ETFS holdings, which would be about 228 piles of pallets stacked 6 high crammed in. Furthermore, that’s not even taking into account any gold holdings of other HSBC customers, and Pisani also says in the videos that HSBC confirmed to him that its vault also stores gold for a range of clients.
When GLD held 1353 tonnes in December 2012, this in itself would be 225 piles of pallets, each 6 high. ETFS held about 170 tonnes in December 2012 also, which would be another 28 piles of pallets stacked 6 high. If this location is the famous storage area for the SPDR Gold Trust then possibly during the boom times when GLD holdings peaked, the HSBC vault may not have been big enough to accommodate the GLD gold let any other gold. Which would mean that HSBC was storing GLD gold elsewhere such as at the Bank of England vault, or the JP Morgan vault, both very close to Queen Street Place. It would also mean that GLD sources new gold inflows from gold that is at the Bank of England, i.e. leased central bank gold.
Another point to consider is that if the vaults under Queen Street Place are the correct location for the HSBC vault, then where did the gold that was being stored there in late 2005 / early 2006 go to during the vault alterations? This would have been at least 200 tonnes of gold as of late 2005, rising to over 350 tonnes of gold by late 2006. As the Bank of England is literally up the road from Queen Street Place, moving it to the Bank of England vaults would be the most likely option during the renovation.
In summary, using publicly available information and evidence, I have described where I think the HSBC London gold vault may be located. Whether I am correct is another matter.
In a surprising development, a group of plaintiffs in an antitrust litigation case against Deutsche Bank, HSBC Bank plc, the Bank of Nova Scotia, and UBS AG, have just announced that Deutsche Bank is in the process of negotiating the formal terms of a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs. Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Scotia are the only members of the London Silver Market Fixing Limited, a private company that had operated the London Silver Fixing auctions until mid August 2014, after which time that auction was superseded by the LBMA Silver Price auction.
The case (# 1:14-md-02573-VEC) is being overseen as a class action suit by federal judge Valerie E Caproni in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York. A large number of different plaintiffs had taken similar actions and the cases were consolidated into one class action suit. The plaintiffs allege in the suit that Deutsche Bank, HSBC and Scotia colluded to fix the price of silver futures by publishing false silver prices, so that they, as members of London Silver Market Fixing Company would benefit (from the price movements).
In a shocking development for the remaining defendants and the entire future of the current LBMA Silver Price auction, owned by the LBMA, administered in London by Thomson Reuters and calculated by the CME Group, the letter states that:
“In addition to valuable monetary consideration, Deutsche Bank has also agreed to provide cooperation to plaintiffs, including the production of instant messages, and other electronic communications, as part of the settlement. In Plaintiff’s estimation, the cooperation to be provided by Deutsche Bank will substantially assist Plaintiffs in the prosecution of their claims against the non-settling defendants.”
The plaintiffs include Modern Settlings LLC (of New York and Florida), American Precious Metals Ltd, Steven E Summer, Christopher Depaoli, Kevin Maher, Jerry Barrett, Rebeccca Barrett, KPFF Investment Inc, Don Tran, and Laurence Hughes.
The defendants include Deutsche Bank AG and various other Deutsche Bank entities, HSBC Bank Plc, HSBC Bank USA NA, HSBC Holdings Plc, and various other HSBC entities, The Bank of Nova Scotia, and various other Scotia entities, and finally The London Silver Market Fixing Ltd.
Coming on the heels of the unresolved and unexplained fiasco that is the LBMA Silver Price auction and the broken promises by the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) about greater auction transparency and wider participation in the new Silver auction (see BullionStar blog “The LBMA Silver Price – Broken Promises on Wider Participation and Central Clearing“) it seems difficult to envisage that the LBMA Silver Price can survive in its current form, with its current participants, of which 2 of the remaining 5 participants are HSBC and Scotia. It will also be interesting to see what the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) will say about this development with Deutsche Bank, especially in light of the fact that HSBC and Scotia are now participating in a ‘Regulated Benchmark’ (the LBMA Silver Price), where price manipulation can be criminally prosecuted.
The directors of the London Silver Market Fixing Limited company in the months before it ceased doing the London Silver Fixing auctions, were Simon Weeks of Scotia, Matthew Keen of Deutsche Bank, and David Rose of HSBC, with alternate directors of David Wilkinson of Scotia, James Vorley of Deutsche Bank and Peter Drabwell of HSBC. Since the above list was drawn up, UK Companies House filings show that, for London Silver Market Fixing Limited, David Rose ceased to be a director on 5 January 2016, David Wilkinson ceased to be a director on 16 October 2015, James Vorley ceased to be a director on 27 May 2014, and Matthew Keen ceased to be a director on 18 February 2014. According to those filings, it means that Simon Weeks of Scotia and Peter Drabwell of HSBC are still directors of the company that is a defendant in the above New York class action suite.
Surprisingly to some, Simon Weeks of Scotia is listed on the website of LBMA Silver Price administrator Thomson Reuters as still being a member of the LBMA Silver Price Oversight Committee. See list here. Furthermore, the same Simon Weeks is still listed as being a member of the LBMA Gold Price Oversight Committee, chaired by ICE Benchmark Administration. See list here.
“There are seven custodians offering vaulting services in the London bullion market, three of whom are also clearing members of the LBMA (Barclays, HSBC and JP Morgan). There are also four other security carriers, who are also LBMA members (Brinks, G4S Cash Solutions (UK), Malca Amit and Loomis International (UK) Ltd). The Bank of England also offers a custodian service (gold only).”
These 8 custodians are then listed in a pdf document on the LBMA website with their head office addresses, but not the vault addresses. So where are the actual vaults?
“The London-based Malca-Amit vault is conveniently located close to Heathrow airport. The vault is graded at level XII CD EX, the highest European Vault classification and is complemented by the most up to date security systems including the Avigilon CCTV suite with cameras capturing 29 megapixels per frame.
The vault is authorised by the members of the London Clearing Company and has LBMA approval for the weighing and inspecting of precious metals.“
Notice the reference to London Clearing Company. This is a reference to the London Precious Metals Clearing Limited (LPMCL), a private precious metals clearing consortium comprising HSBC, JP Morgan, Barclays, The Bank of Nova Scotia – ScotiaMocatta, and UBS.
Driving around in Circles?
The London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) actually featured Malca-Amit’s London vault in a slightly tongue in cheek article by Aelred Connelly titled “Visit to Malca-Amit’s New Vault” which appeared in Issue 68 of the LBMA’s Alchemist magazine in October 2012.
The article begins:
“It was a balmy day when we arrived at Feltham station where we were warmly greeted by our host for the day, Allan Finn, Global Commodities Director for Malca-Amit. Allan told us that the location of the vault was top secret so he deviously drove his car round in circles until we were so disorientated we had no idea where he had taken us.”
And ends with:
“Our tour came to an end. Allan drove his car round in circles again until we were so disorientated that we didn’t know where we had come from. But he made up for it by taking us for a nice lunch on the river at Richmond.
Apart from driving around in circles between Feltham Station and the vault destination, the article also tells us that:
“Malca-Amit became a member of the LBMA in March 2012 and shortly afterwards completed the building of a new vault facility close to Heathrow airport…..
…the new secure storage facility was opened in April 2012 near Heathrow airport.“
So it seems that Malca-Amit was granted Ordinary membership status of the LBMA just prior to its new vault becoming operational. The granting of Ordinary membership was probably a precursor to the Malca-Amit vault being, in the words of Malca-Amit, “authorised by the members of the London Clearing Company ..[with].. LBMA approval for the weighing and inspecting of precious metals.”
The LBMA Alchemist profile goes on to say:
“Built above ground, the Malca-Amit vault is one of a number of new facilities that either have been built or which will be opened shortly within the perimeter of the M25….. Proximity to an airport is an advantage.“
“When we eventually arrived at our destination only the sound of planes overhead gave any indication as to where we were.”
“Before we went in to the building Allan explained that the perimeter fencing can withstand a 7.5-ton vehicle at 50 mph and the internal shutter anti-ram barrier which is located behind the entrance gates can withstand a 7.5-ton vehicle at 30 mph.”
“But the thing that strikes you most is the vault. Allan explained that it is a Chubbsafe grade XII which offers the highest possible level of security and provides capacity for more than 300 metric tonnes of gold and 1,000 tonnes of silver.“
“Gold and silver are not the only precious items in storage: there are also diamonds and other precious stones and jewellery which are kept in storage on behalf of clients.”
Where then could Malca-Amit’s recently opened gold and silver vault be located?
Arena Building, Parkway
It turns out that in a similar manner to G4S when it made a planning application amendment for its new vault building at Abbey Road in Park Royal, Malca-Amit was also not shy of listing its building location on the internet, for it too listed the location of its new vault in a planning application amendment submission dated July 2013.
(0 vehicle(s), 0 trailer(s)) New authorisation at this operating centre will be: 4 vehicle(s), 2 trailer(s)
Which leads us to the questions: what is and where is this Arena Building?
In 2011, the already completed Arena Parkway building, profiled in a glossy brochure, was marketed on a UK commercial real estate website called NovaLoca commercial property finder. This brochure pdf file was created on 14 July 2011. So although Malca-Amit may have “completed the building of a new vault facility” as the LBMA stated, it did not build the building in which the vault is located. The building had already been built prior to 2011.
The ‘Arena’ building is in the ‘Parkway Heathrow M4′ industrial estate off Cranford Lane, in Heston, in the Hounslow area to the north-east of Heathrow airport. Anyone who knows that area around Hounslow will know that the one of the landing routes into Heathrow Airport is a very low approach along a route right above where this building is located.
According to the brochure:
“The Arena provides a modern detached warehouse unit of 23,660 sq ft with a self-contained secure yard and benefits from 24-hour security, an on-site management team and surveillance cameras.”
“The unit is available on a new Full Repairing and Insuring lease basis.”
Additional information in the 2011 brochure includes such facts as:
“NEW DISTRIBUTION/WAREHOUSE UNIT 23,660 sq ft (2,198 sq m)”
Description The Arena is a new high quality warehouse suitable for production, storage, research and development, laboratories and general distribution. It has an impressive reception leading to first floor fully fitted offices. The property is constructed of brick and profile metal composite cladding with double glazed windows fitted with solar shading.
Accommodation The property provides the following approximate gross external floor areas: Warehouse 20,430 sq ft 1,898 sq m FF Offices 3,230 sq ft 300 sq m Total 23,660 sq ft 2,198 sq m
Amenities Warehouse, 8m clear height, Two up and over electric loading doors, 200 kVA 3 Phase power supply, Roof lights to 10% of warehouse floor area, Floor loading of 50Kn/m2
Offices Open plan layout, Full access raised floor, Suspended ceilings with recess lighting, Gas central heating, Double glazed windows, Passenger lift Reception area
Exterior Self-contained property, Large secure yard, Access for articulated lorries Allocated parking
Given that this Arena building was being marketed from July 2011 onwards, and that Malca-Amit began operating the vault facility from April 2012, then it would suggest, as would be expected, that Malca-Amit took possession, and then fitted out the building to its own specific requirements, including the vault, before opening for business in April 2012.
The Arena building is in the London Borough of Hounslow, so it is instructive to examine planning applications made for this building in and around the dates that Malca-Amit took occupancy.
A planning search for TW5 9QA on the Hounslow planning website reveals that plans for this Arena Parkway building were submitted from as early as December 2007, but there seems to have been a long drawn out series of planning applications and amendements made for the construction, the latest being submitted in December 2008 and approved by Hounslow Council in February 2009. Therefore, construction of the building would have commenced sometime after February 2009.
The planning applications for the Arena building, which were submitted by CGNU Life Assurance Ltd / Aviva Investors, summarise the project as follows:
“System Reference: P/2008/3669
Planning Reference: 00315/F/P59(6)
Following approval for demolition of the existing office building and construction of new industrial and warehouse unit with ancillary office accommodation, new entrances off existing access road, car parking, landscaping and roof mounted photo-voltaic panels details submitted pursuant to Condition 6 (waste and recycled materials storage) of permission dated 18/03/08
Name Mr Mark Nevitt CGNU Life Assurance Ltd
Address C/O Aviva Investors No.1 Poultry London EC2R 8EJ
The Arena drawings document submitted with the most recent building application shows a layout in keeping with the size and shape of the structure that was actually built, so it looks like the development was completed in accordance with the last approved set of plans.
Following occupancy by Malca-Amit, the only planning application submitted for the Arena Building since then is application “Planning Reference: 00315/F/P61″ which addressed improved fencing around the site.
“System Reference: P/2013/1670
Planning Reference: 00315/F/P61
Site description THE ARENA PARKWAY TRADING ESTATE CRANFORD LANE HOUNSLOW LONDON TW5 9QA
Date received 31/05/2013
Details: Erection of security fencing and bollards along perimeter of site with sliding gate at yard entrance and rising barrier at car park
Ward: Heston West [note that a ward is a sub-unit of a borough]
“The application seeks to improve the existing security around the site. The existing bollards around the site would be made good to existing low-level shrub planting. The fencing around the part of the site would be a 2.4m high 358 mesh panel fence powder 600 mm high electric fence above. This fencing would be on the north, south and west parts of the site. There would be a 6m cantilevered sliding gate, which would be 2.4m high with serrated top – RAL 9005 (black) finish.
In order to secure parking on site a car park gate has been proposed whichruns off the access road. This would be 3m wide rising barrier which wouldbe 1m high, RAL 9003 (white) finish with contrasting red banding. Therewould be 1m wide exit gate which would be next to the unit.”
The Site Plan and Elevation for the above application put some visuals on the above delegated report text. This fencing is therefore the fencing that Allan Finn of Malca-Amit was referring to when he told the LBMA that the”perimeter fencing can withstand a 7.5-ton vehicle at 50 mph and the internal shutter anti-ram barrier which is located behind the entrance gates can withstand a 7.5-ton vehicle at 30 mph.”
The Edinburgh Assay Office and UKAS
Not only is Malca-Amit located in this Arena Parkway Building, but so is the Edinburgh Assay Office. Although the Edinburgh Assay office has its headquarters in Goldsmiths Hall, Edinburgh, in Scotland, it also operates a laboratory at a Heathrow Sub Office where it is accredited for “Chemical Tests for the purpose of hallmarking”.
This fact is revealed in a series of United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) reports that were posted on the UKAS website in June 2015. On 8 June 2015, UKAS posted a report about the Edinburgh Assay Office on its website titled “The Edinburgh Assay Office Issue No: 010 Issue date: 08 June 2015″. This report lists a ‘Heathrow Sub Office’ for the Edinburgh Assay Office without specifying its address.
However, 4 days earlier on 4 June 2015, UKAS posted a report titled “The Edinburgh Assay Office Issue No: 009 Issue date: 04 June 2015” in which the Heathrow Sub Office was listed with an address of “1st Floor, Arena Parkway, Cranford Lane, Heston, TW5 9QA”.
Although the Issue 010 report from UKAS replaced its Issue 009 version a few days later, the Issue 009 version remained in the Google cache as a Google search result and also as a complete cached document:
Cached version of Issue 009
The commercial logic for the Edinburgh Assay Office having a presence in Malca-Amit’s Arena building seems to be that, in addition to Malca-Amit storing precious metals and precious stones and jewellery in the building, the location is also convenient for the rest of the Heathrow area where precious metals and jewellery are constantly arriving into and departing from. This is the ‘Hallmarking in Transit’ service offered by the Edinburgh Assay Office, offered in conjunction with Malca-Amit, and explained on the Assay Office website here, and also on Malca-Amit’s website here.
This is not the only UK-based assay office to maintain a sub-office in the premises of a secure precious metals transport and secure storage operator near Heathrow Airport. The Goldsmiths Company – Assay Office, which is headquartered in the City of London, also operates a Heathrow Sub Office in “Unit 7, Radius Park, Faggs Road, Feltham, Middlesex, TW14 0NG”. This is listed in a UKAS report “The Goldsmiths’ Company – Assay Office Issue 016 Issue Date 05 August 2014″. This ‘Unit 7 Radius Park’ is a Brinks building and it too contains a vault, but that’s another vault profile for another day.
That article highlighted that the amount of gold stored in custody at the Bank of England (BoE) fell by 350 tonnes during the year to 28 February 2015, after also falling by 755 tonnes during the year to end of February 2014. Therefore, by 28 February 2015, there was, according to the BoE’s own statement, £140 billion or 5134.37 tonnes of gold in custody of the BoE, or in other words ~ 410,720 Good Delivery gold bars.
The article also reviewed snapshots of the total amount of gold stored in the London vaults at various recent points in time.
Firstly, a reference on the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) web site for a date sometime before 2013 stated that there had been 9,000 tonnes of gold (i.e. 720,000 Good Delivery bars) stored in London with two-thirds of this amount, or 6,000 tonnes, stored in the Bank of England (about 482,000 bars), and 3,000 tonnes stored in London ex Bank of England vaults (238,000 bars). (Nick Laird of Sharelynx subsequently pointed out to me that the earliest reference to this 9,000 tonne figure was from a LBMA presentation from November 2011.)
Secondly, by early 2014, the LBMA web site stated that there were only 7,500 tonnes of gold in all London vaults, i.e. ~600,000 bars, and of this total, three-quarters or 5,625 tonnes were at in Bank of England, ~ 450,000 bars, and only one-quarter or 1,875 tonnes was stored at LBMA London gold vaults excluding the Bank of England’s gold vaults.
So, the entire London market including the Bank of England had lost 1,500 tonnes (120,000 bars) between 2011 and early 2014, with 375 tonnes less in the BoE and 1,125 tonnes less in the London market outside the BoE.
Finally, on 15 June 2015, the LBMA stated that “There are ~500,000 bars in the London vaults, worth a total of ~US$237 billion”. This ~ 500,000 bars equates to 6,256 tonnes. (On 15th June 2015, the morning LBMA Gold Price was set at $1178.25, which would make $237 billion worth of gold equal to 201.145 million ounces, which is 6,256 tonnes).
Therefore, another ~1,250 tonnes of gold (approximately 100,000 Good Delivery bars) departed from the London gold vaults compared to the early 2014 quotation of 7,500 tonnes of gold in the London vaults.
So overall, between the 9,000 tonnes quotation in 2011, and the 6,256 tonnes 2015 quotation, some 2,750 tonnes (~ 220,000 Good Delivery bars) disappeared from the London gold vaults. With 6,256 tonnes of gold stored in the entire London vault network in 2015, and with 5,134 tonnes of this at the Bank of England, that would leave 1,122 tonnes of gold in London outside the Bank of England vaults.
To reiterate, “the London gold vaults“, in addition to the Bank of England gold vaults, refer to the storage vaults of JP Morgan and HSBC Bank in the City of London, the vaults of Brinks, Malca Amit and Via Mat (Loomis) located near London Heathrow Airport, the vault of G4S in Park Royal, and the Barclays vault managed by Brinks.
Because the Bank of England reveals in its annual report each year the value of gold it has stored in custody for its customers (central banks, international official sector institutions, and LBMA member banks), then it is possible to compare 3 years of gold tonnage figures, namely the years 2011, 2014 and 2015, and then show within each year how much of this gold is stored at the Bank of England, and how much is stored in London but outside the Bank of England vaults.
Nick Laird of www.sharelynx.com / www.goldchartsrus.com has done exactly this in the following sets of fantastic charts which he has created to graphically capture the above London gold trends, and a lot more besides. These charts are just a subset of a suite of inter-related gold charts that Nick has created to address this critical subject in the London Gold Market.
Although the Bank of England is not a LBMA member, the Bank of England gold vaults are a critical part of the LBMA gold vaulting and gold clearing system, and LBMA bullion banks maintain gold accounts with the Bank of England which facilitate, among other things, gold lending and gold swaps transactions with central banks. Hence the above and below charts are titled “LBMA Vaulted Gold in London”.
My “How many Good Delivery gold bars are in all the London Vaults” article had also quantified that nearly all of this ~1,122 tonnes consists of gold from physical gold-backed ETFs which store their gold in the London vaults. (previously rounded up to 1,125 tonnes for ease of calculation).
I had included 5 gold ETFs in my previous analysis namely, SPDR Gold Trust (GLD), Shares Gold Trust (IAU), ETF Securities – ETFS Physical Gold ETF (PHAU & PHGP), ETF Securities – Gold Bullion Securities (GBS & GBSS), and Source Physical Gold ETC (P-ETC), and also some smaller holdings at BullionVault and GoldMoney. In total these ETFs and other holdings accounted for just over 1,000 tonnes of gold in the London market.
However, I had missed a few other gold ETFs which also store their gold in the London vaults. Nick Laird, whose Sharelynx website maintains up-to-date gold ETF data and gold holdings, took the initiative to fill in the missing ETF blanks and Nick re-calculated the more comprehensive ETF holdings figures for London, which worked out at an exact 1,116 tonnes of gold, astonishingly close to the implied figure represented by the 1,122 tonnes outside the Bank of England vaults.
The additional gold backed ETFs also included in Nick Laird’s wider catchment were Deutsche Bank db Physical Gold ETC and associated Deutsche ETFs, ABSA gold ETF (of South Africa), Merk Gold ETF, and some smaller holdings from Betashares and Standard Bank. The following chart from Sharelynx shows the full data for physically backed gold ETFs storing their gold in London:
We then discussed an approach, in conjunction with Koos Jansen and Bron Suchecki, to identify known central bank gold stored in the Bank of England vaults by tallying up this storage data on a country level basis. So, for example, assuming 5,134 tonnes of gold stored at the Bank of England in early 2015, the aim would be to try to account for as much of this gold as possible using central bank sources.
As mentioned in the ‘How many gold bars‘ article, the Bank of England stated in 2014 that 72 central banks (including a few official sector financial organisations) held gold accounts with the Bank. It is not known if any of these gold accounts are inactive or whether any of these accounts have zero gold holdings. The LBMA stated in 2011 that “The Bank of England acts as gold custodian for about 100 customers, including central banks and international financial institutions, LBMA members and the UK government”. Therefore there could also be more than 25 LBMA member commercial banks with gold accounts at the Bank of England.
Some of the Bank of England 5,134 tonne total would therefore be gold held in LBMA member bank gold accounts at the Bank of England, for which data is not public. Likewise, a lot of central banks do not reveal where their gold is stored, let alone how much is stored in specific vaults such as at the Bank of England and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
However, many central banks have more recently begun to provide some information on where they say their official reserve gold is stored. Other central banks have always been to some extent transparent. Overall, a variety of sources, where possible, can be used to source locational data regarding central bank gold storage locations. There will continue to be gaps however, since some central banks remain non-cooperative, even when asked directly about where they stored their gold.
Tallying this type of central bank gold storage data will probably be a work in progress. However, there has to be a cut-off point for doing a first pass through the data, and this is a first pass. As a group, the European central banks have been especially forthcoming with gold storage data, compared to even 3-4 years ago (except for Spain). For other central banks, I looked in various places such as their financial accounts, and I contacted some of them by email with varying degrees of success. About half of the 72 central banks on the Bank of England’s list were identified, again, with varying degrees of accuracy.
The following fantastic chart by Nick Laird captures an overview of this Bank of England gold storage data. Essentially the chart shows that the banks listed hold, or have stated that they hold, the respective quantity listed, and in total the named banks could account for x tonnes gold stored at the bank of England. This is labelled ‘Known Gold‘. Given ‘Known Gold’, this leaves the residual as ‘Unknown Gold‘.
The remainder of this article explains the logic and the sources behind each country, and why that country appears on the list. When a central bank claims to have stored gold at the Bank of England, or the evidence suggests that, it does not necessarily mean that the gold in question is held in custody in a gold set aside account or that it is allocated in identifiable bars, or even that it is actually there. Many central banks engage in gold lending, or have done so in the last 15-20 years, and have at times, or permanently, transferred control of that gold to LBMA bullion banks.
Until all central banks come clean about what form their gold holdings are in, which will never happen, then the amount of central bank gold that’s encumbered by bullion banks or under claims, liens, loan agreements etc will not be apparent.
Germany holds 3,384 tonnes of gold, and 12.9%, or 438 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England. The Bundesbank’s ongoing repatriation of gold from New York and Paris does not alter the amount of Bundesbank gold held at the Bank of England.
“Most of Danmarks Nationalbank’s gold is stored at the Bank of England, where it has been since it was moved for safety reasons during the Cold War. In March 2014, Danmarks Nationalbank inspected its stock of gold in the Bank of England.”
Therefore, the assumption here is that 62.7 tonnes of Danish gold is stored at the Bank of England.
Note the Danmarks Nationalbank’s assertion that in order for gold to be lent it has to be moved to the London, since London is the centre of the gold lending market.
In 1999 “Almost 99 per cent, or 93 per cent of the Nationalbank’s total gold stock, had been lent.” The same 1999 Danish central bank article also said that:
I have underlined the above sentence since it’s of critical importance to understanding that in gold lending, central bank gold lent to LBMA bullion banks at the Bank of England does not necessarily move out of the Bank of England vaults. Lent gold may or may not move out the door, depending on what the borrower plans to do with the borrowed gold.
It also means that the total gold in custody figure that the Bank of England reveals each year (for example £140 billion in February 2015), consists of:
a) central bank gold stored at the Bank of England
b) bullion bank gold stored at the Bank of England
c) central bank gold that has been lent or swapped with bullion banks (gold deposits and gold swaps) and that has not been moved out of the Bank of England vaults. This category of gold is still in custody at the Bank of England. The central bank claims to still own it, the bullion bank has control over it, and the Bank of England still counts it as being in its custody.
The Netherlands holds 612.5 tonnes of gold, and 18%, or 110 tonnes are stored at the Bank of England.
Notice that the UK gold reserves includes holdings of gold coin, as well as gold bars.
Ireland hold 6 tonnes of gold in its official reserves, a small amount of which is in the form of gold coins, but nearly all of which is in the form of gold bars stored at the Bank of England.
Recently, I submitted a Freedom of information (FOI) request to the Central Bank of Ireland requesting information such as a weight list of Ireland’s gold stored at the Bank of England. After the FOI request was refused and the Central Bank of Ireland claimed there was no weight list, I appealed the refusal and was provided with a SWIFT ‘account statement’ from 2010 that the Bank of England had provided to the Central Bank of Ireland. See below:
This statement shows that as of 31 December 2010, the Central Bank of Ireland held 453 gold bars at the Bank of England with a total fine ounce content of 182,555.914 ounces, which equates to an average gold content of 402.993 fine ounces per bar. It also equates to 5.678 tonnes, which rounded up is 5.7 tonnes of gold stored at the Bank of England.
The fact that no weight list could be tracked down is highly suspicious, as is the fact that Ireland had in earlier years engaged in gold lending, so did not, at various times in the 2000s have all of its gold allocated in the Bank of England. How a central bank can claim to hold gold bars but at the same time cannot request a weight list of those same bars is illogical and suggests there is a lot more that the Central Bank of Ireland will not reveal.
Belgium holds 227 tonnes of gold, most of which is stored at the Bank of England with smaller amounts held with the Bank of Canada and with the Bank for International Settlements. Banque Nationale de Belgique (aka Nationale Bank van België (NBB)) does not publish an exact breakdown of the percentage stored at each location, however, in March 2013 in the Belgian Parliament, the deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Finance gave the following response in answer to a question about the Belgian gold reserves:
“Most of the gold reserves of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) is indeed held with the Bank of England. A much smaller amount held with the Bank of Canada and the Bank for International Settlements. A very limited amount stored in the National Bank of Belgium.”
Furthermore, there were a series of reports in late 2014 and early 2015 that would suggest that Belgium stores 200 tonnes of its gold at the Bank of England. Firstly, in December 2014, VTM-nieuws in Belgium reported that the NBB governor Luc Coene had said that the NBB was investigating repatriating all of its gold. See Koos Jansen article here.
On 4 February 2015, Belgian newspaper Het Nieuwsblad said that Belgium would repatriate 200 tonnes of gold from the Bank of England, but the next day on 5 February 2015, another Belgian newspaper De Tijd reported that NBB Luc Coene denied the repatriation report, and quoted him as saying:
“There are other and more effective ways to verify if the gold in London is really ours. We have an audit committee that inspects the Belgian gold in the UK regularly”.
Therefore, the assumption here, backed up by evidence, is that Belgium stores 200 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.
Australia holds approximately 80 tonnes of gold in its official reserves, with 1 tonne on loan, and 99.9% of gold holdings stored at the Bank of England. See 2014 annual report, page 33. According to a weight list of its gold held at the Bank of England, released via an FOIA request in 2014, Australia stores approximately 78.8 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.
South Korea (Bank of Korea) holds 104.4 tonnes of gold, 100% of which, or 104.4 tonnes is stored at the Bank of England. The Bank confirmed this to me in an emailon 11 September 2015. See email here ->
International Monetary Fund
The IMF currently claims to hold 2,814 tonnes of gold after apparently selling 403.3 tonnes over 2009 and 2010 (222 tonnes in ‘off-market transactions and 181.3 tonnes in ‘on-market transactions’). Prior to 2009, IMF gold holdings had been 3,217 tonnes, and had been essentially static at this figure since 1980 [In 1999 IMF undertook some accounting related gold sale transactions which where merely sale and buyback bookkeeping transactions].
Although the IMF no longer provide a breakdown of how much of its gold is stored in each location where it stores gold, the amount of gold held by the IMF at the Bank of England can be calculated by retracing IMF transactions from a time when the IMF did provide such details. In January 1976, the IMF held 898 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England in London, 3,341 tonnes at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 389 tonnes at the Banque de France in Paris, and 144 tonnes at the Reserve Bank of India in Nagpur, India. Therefore, of the IMF’s total 4,772 tonnes holdings at that time, 70% was stored in New York, 19% in London, 8% in Paris and 3% in India. See here and here.
In the late 1970s, the IMF sold 50 million ounces of gold via two methods, namely, 25 million ounces by ‘public’ auctions, and 25 million ounces by distributions to member countries.
In the four-year period between mid-1976 and mid-1980, the IMF sold 25 million ounces of gold to the commercial sector via 45 auctions. Thirty five of these auctions delivered gold at the FRBNY, 7 of these auctions delivered gold at the Bank of England, and 3 of the auctions delivered gold at the Banque de France.
Of the 7 auctions that delivered the IMF’s gold at the Bank of England, these auctions in total delivered 3.74 million ounces [Dec-76: 780,000 ozs, Aug-77: 525,000 ozs, Nov-77: 525,000 ozs, May-78: 525,000 ozs, Oct-78: 470,000 ozs, Mar-79: 470,000, and Dec 79:444,000 ozs], which is 116 tonnes. See IMF annual report 1980.
The IMF also sold 25 million ozs of gold to its member countries within four tranches over the 3 year period from January 1977 to early 1980. These sales, which were also called gold ‘distributions’ or ‘restitutions’ and covered between 112 and 127 member countries across the tranches, were initially quite complicated in the way they were structured since they involved IMF rules around quotas which necessitated the gold being transferred to creditor countries of the IMF and then transferred to the purchasing countries. In the later sales in 1979 and 1980 countries could purchase directly from the IMF.
Countries could choose where to receive their purchased gold, i.e. London, New York, Paris or Nagpur, however, the US, UK, France and India, which had the largest IMF quotas and hence the largest gold distributions, all had to receive their gold at the respective IMF depository in their own country. I don’t have the distribution figures to hand at the moment for the 25 million ozs sold to countries, but about 18 countries took delivery from the Banque de France in Paris, with the rest choosing delivery from New York and London.
Therefore an assumption is needed on the amount of gold the IMF ‘distributed’ to member countries from its Bank of England holdings between 1977 and 1980. Of the 25 million ounces distributed, the US received 5.734 million ozs, the UK received 2.396 million ozs (75 tonnes), France received 1.284 million ozs, and India received 805,000 ozs. Subtracting all of these from 25 million ozs leaves 14.78 million ozs which was distributed to the other ~120 countries. Since the IMF held 70% of its holdings at the FRBNY in 1976, 19% at the Bank of England and 8% at the Banque de France, apportioning these three weights to the remaining 14.78 million ozs would result in 10.76 million ozs (332 tonnes) being sold from the FRBNY, 2.867 million ozs (89 tonnes) from the Bank of England and 1.24 million ozs (38.5 tonnes) from the Banque de France.
Adding this 89 tonnes to the 75 tonnes received by the UK would be 164 tonnes distributed from the Bank of England IMF gold holdings. Add to this the 116 tonnes of London stored IMF gold sold in the auctions equals 280 tonnes. Subtracting this 280 tonnes from the IMF’s London holdings of 898 tonnes in January 1976 leaves 618 tonnes.
In 2009 the IMF said that it had sold 200 tonnes of gold to India, 2 tonnes to Mauritius, 10 tonnes to Sri Lanka,and then 10 tonnes to Bangladesh in 2010. The Bangladesh figures reflect its 10 tonne purchase. However, at the moment, there has been no exact confirmation that the 200 tonnes that India bought is in London. It probably is in London, but leaving this amount under the IMF holdings instead of in India’s holdings makes no difference. Subtracting the Bangladesh sale of 10 tonnes, and rounding down slightly, there are 600 tonnes of IMF gold (excluding the 2009 India 200 tonnes sale) storedat the Bank of England.
The IMF sales of gold to Sri Lanka and Mauritius in 2009 of a combined total of 12 tonnes probably came out of the IMF’s London holdings also. The IMF’s sale of 181.3 tonnes of gold in 2010 via ‘on-market transactions’ may also have come out of the IMF’s London stored gold. These ‘on-market transactions” look to have used the BIS as pricing agent, and the IMF have gone to great lengths to hide the full details of these sales from public view. More about that in a future article.
The Reserve Bank of India holds 557.75 tonnes of gold. Of this total, a combined 265.49 tonnes are stored (outside India) at the Bank of England and with the Bank for International Settlements. In 2009 India purchased 200 tonnes of gold from the IMF via an ‘off-market transaction‘. A slide from this presentation sums up this information.
The questions then are, is the 200 tonne purchase from the IMF stored at the Bank of England, and how much of the earlier 65.49 tonnes is stored at the Bank of England.
A 2013 article in the Indian Business Standard which was reprinted from “Reserve Bank of India history series. Volume 4, 1981-1997, Part A”, explains that in 1991, the Reserve Bank of India entered 2 separate gold loan deals, one deal with UBS in Switzerland (which required 18.36 tonnes of RBI gold to be sent to Switzerland) and the other deal with the Bank of England and Bank of Japan (where 46.91 tonnes was required to be sent to the Bank of England). Together those 2 transactions equals 65.27 tonnes which is 0.222 tonnes short of the 65.49 total.
After the gold loan deals expired, it looks like 18.36 tonnes of Indian gold were left in Switzerland and transferred to safekeeping or deposit with the BIS, and 46.91 tonnes of Indian gold was left at the Bank of England.
Regarding India’s purchase of 200 tonnes of gold in 2009, the IMF only has gold 4 depositories, namely, the Bank of England, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Banque de France, and the Reserve Bank of India in Nagpur, India. Given that the Indian gold stored abroad is “with the Bank of England and the Bank for International Settlements“, then for the 200 tonnes of IMF gold to end up being classified as ‘with’ the BIS, it would have to have either been transferred internally at one of the IMF depositories to aBIS account, or transferred via a location swap or a physical shipment to a BIS gold account at the vaults of the Swiss National Bank in Berne.
For now, the 200 tonnes of gold sold by the IMF to India in 2009 is reflected in the IMF holdings and not the India holdings. It does not make a difference to the calculations, since the 200 tonnes is still at the Bank of England.
Bulgaria has 40.1 tonnes of official gold reserves. The latest BNB annual report states that 513,000 ozs are in standard gold form, and 775,000 ozs are in gold deposits.
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), headquartered in Basle, Switzerland does not have run any gold vaults of its own. However, the BIS is a big player in the global central bank gold market, and it offers its central bank clientele gold safekeeping (and settlement) services using central bank vaults in London, New York and Berne. These services are possible because the BIS maintains gold accounts at the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the Swiss National Bank in Berne. BIS gold accounts can act like omnibus accounts in that many central banks can hold gold in sub-accounts under a BIS gold account at each of these institutions in London, New York and Berne.
Gold can then be transferred around locations using gold swaps where one of the counterparties to the gold swap is the BIS.
The BIS is involved with gold in 3 main categories.
a) the BIS holds gold in custody for customers, off of the BIS balance sheet
b) the BIS has its own gold holdings which are classified as its gold investment portfolio, and which are on its balance sheet
c) the BIS accepts gold deposits from central banks. These gold deposits appear as a liability on the BIS balance sheet. Then the BIS turns around and places these gold liabilities in the market under its own name. These placing are also in the form of gold deposits and gold loans with other institutions including commercial banks. These ‘assets’ are then classified on the BIS balance sheet as BIS’ “gold banking” assets.
a) In its latest annual report, as of the end of March 2015, the BIS stated that it holds 443 tonnes of gold under earmark for its central bank customers on a custody basis. This gold is not on the BIS balance sheet. i.e. it is ‘off-balance sheet’ gold held by the BIS.
b) The BIS also holds 108 tonnes of its own gold (on balance sheet within an investment portfolio). This BIS gold is either kept in custody or transferred to bullion banks as gold deposits. The BIS does not provide granular data in its annual report as to how much of its own gold is ever put into gold deposits.
c) As of 31 March 2015, the BIS had 510 tonnes of gold assets on its balance sheet. Of this total, 108 tonnes was the BIS’ own gold, leaving 403 tonnes as banking assets (i.e. customer gold . Of this same 510 tonnes total, 55 tonnes were classified as gold loans, so 457 tonnes were not gold loans. If all 55 tonnes of gold loans were from customer gold, this would leave 348 tonnes of customer backed gold banking assets. On the same date (31 March 2015), the BIS held 356 tonnes of gold deposits from customers (sight deposits and short-term deposits) on the liability side of its balance sheet which originate entirely from central banks depositing gold with the BIS in sight and term deposits.
The question then is how to reflect BIS gold storage holdings at the Bank of England. While most if not all gold deposit transactions between central banks/BIS and bullion banks take place in London, the data is not readily published.
It was therefore decided, in the spirit of being conservative, to make an assumption on the BIS gold, and only use BIS customer custody gold and BIS own gold as inputs, and because BIS has gold accounts with 3 vaults (London, NY and Berne), to then just divide by 3 and say that one-third of BIS own gold and one-third of BIS ‘central bank custody gold’ is in London This would be 183.66 tonnes, i.e. (108+443)/3.
Therefore, this model states that 183.66 tonnes of BIS gold is stored in the Bank of England. This is probably being very conservative, especially given that no on-balance gold deposited by BIS customers is reflected in this figure.
In September 2010, the IMF sold 10 tonnes of gold to Bangladesh Bank, bringing total gold holdings up from 3.5 tonnes to 13.5 tonnes. The fact that this gold is stored at the Bank of England shows that the IMF sold this gold from its holdings that were stored at the Bank of England. (Note, Bangladesh has recently added some small amounts of domestic confiscated gold to its reserves).
Mexico’s central bank, Banco de Mexico (Banxico) currently hold 122.1 tonnes of gold. At the end of 2012, Mexican official gold reserves totalled 4,034,802 ounces (125 tonnes), of which only 194,539 ounces (6 tonnes) was in Mexico, and 119 tonnes abroad.
With Banxico now holding 122 tonnes according to the World Gold Council, and not 125 tonnes, the assumption is that the 3 tonne reduction came from domestic holdings.
Poland holds 102.9 tonnes of gold in its reserves. Poland’s central bank (Narodowi Bank Polski (NBP)) published a guide to Poland’s gold in 2014 in which it confirmed that nearly all of its gold is at the Bank of England. See pages 86-90 of the guide.
“How much gold did Poland possess before 1998? Approximately 746,463 ounces, of which almost 721 thousand was invested in deposits in commercial banks. In turn, the gold kept in the country was mainly coins, gold bars and various types of gold “scrap” bought by NBP.” (page 86)
Before 1998, only 25,463 ozs of NBP gold was kept in Poland, and 721,000 ozs (22.43 tonnes) was deposited with bullion banks. Poland then bought 80 tonnes of gold in 1998, bringing its gold reserves up to nearly 103 tonnes. The purchase was done as follows:
“…we used the services of a bank which constantly carries out similar transactions. Next, we made a location swap and the whole of NBP’s foreign gold reserves were deposited onto our account in the Bank of England.” (page 88)
It is likely that the NBP is referring to the BIS as the bank which purchased the gold on behalf of Poland, and then transferred it from one of the BIS gold accounts at the Bank of England to the NBP gold account at the Bank of England.
So that is 102.9 tonnes stored at the Bank of England.
Note also that, the Polish central bank explains that “It can be assumed that the gold that has been placed on the market at any time is precisely the gold that is held by the central banks in London“. In other words, central banks that have places gold on deposit (lent it) have done so with gold that they have stored in the Bank of England. See the following screenshot:
Note 6.1 on page 136 of the 2013 NBP annual report states:
“Gold and gold receivables The item comprises gold stored at NBP and deposited in a foreign bank account. As at 31 December 2013, NBP held 3,308.9 thousand ounces of gold (102.9 tonnes).”
This statement about the “gold stored at NBP and deposited in a foreign bank account” has been in a few of the recent NBP annual reports. In April 2013, before the NBP had published the guide to its gold, I asked the NBP by email, based on the statement, to clarify if the gold held abroad is held in custody, for example at the Bank of England or FRBNY or held in time deposits with commercial banks?”
The NBP responded: “Narodowy Bank Polski does not make gold time deposits with commercial banks”.
This may be true if the NBP is using sight deposits, but the 2013 answer, like so many other central banks currently, avoided providing any real information to the question.
Given that nearly all NBP’s 102.9 tonnes of gold was in the Bank of England when the 80 tonnes purchase was made in 1998, the assumption here is that still is the case, and that for simplicity, 100 tonnes of Poland’s gold is at the Bank of England.
Romania has 103.7 tonnes of gold in its official reserves.
In percentage terms, as at 31 December 2014, 27% of Romania’s gold was in ‘standard form’ which presumably means Good Delivery Bars (400 oz bars), 14% in gold coins, and 59% in ‘Deposits’ abroad. (59% of 103.7 tonnes is 61.2 tonnes)
Note the gold deposits with Bank of Nova Scotia and Fortis Bank Bruxelles in 2005 and additionally with the same two banks and with Barclays and Morgan Stanley NY in 2004.
Since the percentage breakdownbetween Romania’s bullionbankdeposits (59%), standardbars (27%) and coins (14%) hasn’t varied much since 2005, and was at a similar mix over various years that I checked such as 2011 and 2014, the conclusion is that Romania has had more than 50% of its gold on constant deposit since at least 2004 (i.e. the original allocated gold is long gone).
The 2005 annual report also states that there were 61 tonnes of Romanian gold stored at the Bank of England. Since Romania had just under 105 tonnes of gold in 2005, this 61 tonnes was referring to the gold deposits, which central banks, as illustrated in numerous other examples, continue to count as their gold even though it has been lent to bullion banks.
Romania therefore had or has 61 tonnes of gold stored at the bank of England.
Note also the reference to central vault, which probably refers to a vault in Bucharest.
The Philippines hold 225 tonnes of gold in its official reserves. In November 2000, when the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) held 225 tonnes of gold, it explained in a press release titled ‘Shipment of Gold Reserves‘ that it ended up storing 95% of its gold at the Bank of England due to the use of location swaps with a counterparty (probably the BIS) that took delivery of BSP gold, and transferred gold to the BSP account at the Bank of England.
Since 2000, the BSP gold reserves have risen, fallen, and risen again and now total 195 tonnes. Assuming the ‘95% of its gold’ storage arrangement is still in place, then the Philippines has 95% of 195 tonnes, or 185 tonnes stored at the Bank of England.
Greece claims to hold 112.6 tonnes of gold. In 2013, the Greek finance ministry on behalf of the Greek central bank stated that half of Greece’s gold reserves were ‘under custody’ of the Bank of Greece, and the other half was ‘under custody’ of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), the Bank of England and (very vaguely) Switzerland. Who actually controls Greece’s gold reserves at this point in time is anybody’s guess.
Given that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was listed by the Greek MinFin as a foreign gold storage location ahead of the Bank of England, the assumption here is that of the 50% of Greece’s gold held abroad, the FRBNY holds more of this portion than the Bank of England. And so the assumption is that the Bank of England holds 40% of the foreign half, i.e. 20% of the total of Greece’s gold, with the FRBNY holding 50% of the foreign half. Taking 112 tonnes of gold as Greece’s total gold holding, 40% of this is 22.4 tonnes stored at the Bank of England. (Note, Greek gold reserves keep increasing incrementally each month by small amounts. As I am not sure what these increases relates to, a recent rounded figure of 112 tonnes has been chosen).
The Banca d’Italia holds 2.451.8 tonnes of gold. Although in 2014, the Banca d’Italia released a document in which it confirmed that some of this gold is held at the Bank of England, there is no evidence to suggest that Italy’s gold in London amounts to more than a few tonnes left over from 1960s transactions.
Bank of England gold set-aside ledgers show that in 1969 there were less than 1000 ‘Good Delivery’ gold bars in the Banca d’Italia gold account at the Bank of England, weighing less than 400,000 ozs in total. This is equal to about 12 tonnes. Most of the Italian gold at the Bank of England was flown back to Rome (and Milan) in the 1960s.
Since there is no public documentation that Banca d’Italia has ever engaged in gold lending (as far as I am aware), then there would be no need for Italy to keep a lot of gold at the Bank of England. Nearly all of Italy’s foreign held gold (over 1,200 tonnes) looks to be in New York (assuming it hasn’t been swapped or used as loan collateral). Italy could have engaged in non-public gold transactions from the Bank of England using gold location swaps from the FRBNY, or from Rome, but there is no evidence of this.
So, this model assumes 12 tonnes of Italian gold is stored at the Bank of England.
Brazil hold 67.2 tonnes of gold reserves. In 2012, Banco Central do Brasil told me by email that all of its gold reserves were in the form of ‘fixed term gold deposits at commercial banks only’. Since the gold would be required to be stored at the Bank of England for these gold deposit transactions to take place, Brazil therefore holds 67.2 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England. See email below:
Banco Central del Ecuador conducted a 3 year gold swap with Goldman Sachs in June 2014 where it swapped 466,000 ozs for US dollar cash This swapped amount of gold has been factored into the World Gold Council data for Ecuador, and the Ecuadorian reserves dropped by 14.5 tonnes in Q2 2014. from 23.28 tonnes to 11.78 tonnes. This swapped amount of 14.5 tonnes is most probably stored at the Bank of England, since Goldman Sachs proposed a similar deal with Venezuela in 2014 where the gold was required to be at the Bank of England for the swap to be initiated.
Bolivia Central de Bolivia holds 42.5 tonnes of gold, all of which is permanently on deposit with bullion banks. The Bolivian Central Bank is very transparent in explaining where its gold is ‘invested’. Hence, it has (until recently) even provided in its financial accounts, the names of the bullion banks which happened to hold its ‘gold deposits’ and the amounts held by each bank.
A recent Banco Central de Bolivia report for 2014 is less revealing and only shows the country distribution of the gold deposits, with 39% in the UK and the rest in France. While this probably refers to the headquarters of the actual bullion banks in question, i.e. Natixis is French etc, it could mean the gold is being attributed to the Bank of England and the Banque de France, so, a conservative approach here is to attribute 39% of 42.5 tonnes to the Bank of England, i.e. 16.6 tonnes stored at the Bank of England.
Peru holds 34.7 tonnes of gold in its official reserves.
At the end of December 2013, Banco Central de Reserva del Peru held 552,191 ounces (17 tonnes) of gold coins which were stored in the Bank’s own vault, and 562,651 troy ounces of “good delivery” gold bars (17.5 tonnes) which were stored in banks abroad, of which 249,702 ounces were in custody and 312,949 ounces in the form of short-term interest bearing deposits. See 2013 annual report.
Since the gold bars are all ‘good delivery’ bars (which is not the case at the FRBNY), and since Peru has still recently been engaging in gold lending, then the evidence suggests that 17.5 tonnes of Peru’s gold is stored at the Bank of England.
Latvia hold 6.62 tonnes of gold in its official reserves after joining the Euro on 1 January 2014 and after transferring just over 1 tonne of gold to the European Central Bank (ECB). All of Latvia’s gold is stored at the Bank of England, therefore Latvia stores 6.62 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.
Before this transfer of gold to the ECB, Latvia had 248,706 ozs of gold, and it transferred 35,322 ozs to ECB, leaving 213,384 ozs.
The ECB holds 504.8 tonnes of gold. This gold was transferred by the Euro members to the ECB at the launch of the Euro by 1 January 1999. All the ECB gold is de-centrally managed, meaning that it stays where it was when transferred and is still locally ‘managed’ by the bank which transferred that gold to the ECB. Some banks may have transferred gold stored at FRBNY in fulfillment of their requirement, some banks may have transferred gold at the BoE, and countries such as France and Italy may have transferred amounts which are still stored at Banque de France and Banca d’Italia etc. Some of the ECB gold, such as the smaller amount transferred by Latvia, is in the Bank of England. Other amounts of the ECB’s gold are most certainly also at the Bank of England in London.
It would be a separate project to track these transfers. The 1 tonne of Latvian gold transferred to the ECB at the start o 2014 was included in the figures here just as a placeholder, so as to acknowledge that ECB gold is at the Bank of England. Given that the Euro is a competing currency to the US Dollar, the ECB may have more gold than not stored in Europe and not at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, since ECB gold would logically be safer not stored in the main Reserve Bank of a competing currency bloc.
In its 2014 annual report, the Bank of Iceland said that “The Bank resumed lending gold for investment purposes in June 2014“, and “The Bank loaned gold to foreign financial institutions during the year”.
The Bank of Iceland lent 99.7% of its gold during 2014 because this is the percentage of the gold reserves which are not payable on demand, but are payable in less than 3 months. See below screenshot.
For the purposes of this exercise, Iceland stores 2 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England.
Ghana’s central bank, the Bank of Ghana, holds 8.7 tonnes of gold in its official reserves (precisely 280,872.439 ozs). Of this total, 39.3%, or 3.42 tonnes is held at the Bank of England, with 27.5% at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 29.5% with investment bank UBS. See 2014 annual report.
Interestingly, Ghana refers to its gold account at the Bank of England as a ‘gold set aside’ account, which is the correct name for a Bank of England gold custody account of allocated gold. Probably more interestingly is that most central banks do not use this ‘set aside’ term.
A number of central banks refuse to confirm the location of their gold reserves. I will document this in a future posting. Some of the large holders undoubtedly hold quite a lot of gold at the Bank of England, as do a number of smaller holders. Countries that could fit into this category include Spain, France, Colombia, Lithuania, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Pakistan, Egypt, Slovenia, Macedonia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Africa. In fact any central bank which has engaged in gold lending is a candidate for having some of its gold stored at the Bank of England.
Spanish people take note. Spain refused to say where its 281.6 tonnes of gold is stored, and Banco de España has the dubious record of being Europe’s least transparent bank as regards gold reserves storage locations. Maybe a project for Spanish journalists.
Banque de France keeps 9% of its 2,435 tonnes of gold reserves abroad, and has in the past engaged in gold lending. So this 9%, or 219 tonnes, is probably stored at the Bank of England.
The ECB and BIS no doubt have more gold stored at the Bank of England than the figures currently reflect. This would also increase the ‘known gold’ total. Egypt is another country which has had a gold set aside account at the Bank of England so is in my view an obvious candidate for the list.
Adding to the known total is therefore a work in progress.
The financial media has recently pitched the transition of the London daily gold fixings to an ICE Benchmark Administration (IBA) platform as a quantum leap from an antiquated Victorian-era process to a futuristic 21st century electronic auction.
“Four of the banks…had participated in the conference call used to determine the daily fixes, a system largely unchanged for nearly a century” and that“Gold is the last of the precious metals to make the switch to an electronic platform.”
The evidence suggests however, that in the last decade, the technology utilised in the daily gold fixings was far more advanced than the media commentaries imply, and that since 2004, the old gold fixing was not as technologically backward as is generally accepted.
Rothschild Departs, Barclays Joins – 2004
In April 2004, NM Rothschild announced that it was pulling out of commodity and gold trading, and also stepping down from chairing and participating in the twice daily London Gold Fixings. This left four banks as members of the fixing process, namely HSBC, Deutsche Bank, Scotia Mocatta, and SocGen.
According to Risk.net at the time, “the withdrawal of NM Rothschild from the market forced the London Gold Market Fixing company to introduce new fixing arrangements.”
From a practical standpoint, with NM Rothschild no longer part of the fixings after May 2004, the meetings could no longer use Rothschild’s offices in St Swithins Lane near the Bank of England. Another practical point was related to the location of the remaining participants’ offices.
Since Barclays Capital, who took over the fixing seat from Rothschild, was based in Canary Wharf (15-20 minutes train ride east of Bank), the five fixing members were not all located in walking distance of a central physical meeting place in the City of London. Scotia’s and Deutsche’s offices were in the City, but another gold fixing member, HSBC, had also fully moved to Canary Wharf circa 2003. Round trip travel from Canary Wharf to Bank twice a day, or vice versa, would have been prohibitive on all but a temporary basis.
Rothschild’s departure precipitated discussion of three changes to the Fixings process, specifically, 1) an annually rotating chairperson, 2) a conference call, and 3) a far less well-known, ‘web-based commentary’.
On 29th April 2004, Tim Wood of Mineweb.com wrote an article titled “London Gold Fixing Ritual to End”. The article explained the three changes and referred to the web-based commentary:
“As expected, the London Gold Fixing has announced that it will in future rotate the chairmanship of the arrangement and end a tradition of meeting in person to set bellwether gold prices twice a day.
Starting in May, each member bank will assume the chairmanship of the fixing for a one year period starting with ScotiaBank division ScotiaMocatta.
As of the same date, the Fixing will take place by telephone and the five member firms will no longer meet face-to-face as has previously been the case. As part of this change, it is intended that a web-based commentary of the Fixing will be introduced later this year“, the Fixing said in a statement.
The decision by N.M. Rothschild & Sons to quit the gold business leaves a vacancy at the Fixing. Ongoing members are Deutsche Bank, HSBC, and Société Generale.
Simon Weeks is the chairman-elect of the London Gold Fixing.”
[Coincidentally, Tim Wood, currently executive director of Denver Gold Group, has now ended up sitting on the new 2015 LBMA Gold Price Oversight Committee with Simon Weeks, nearly 11 years after the above article was written.]
On 5th May 2004, the twice daily Gold Fixings transitioned from physically attended meetings at Rothschild’s offices to remote conference calls with Scotia as the new chair.
“The London Bullion Market Association, which controls the price-setting process, plans to introduce a live Web-based commentary on the daily price-setting this year.”
‘Nothing was that much different apart from the fact that we didn’t walk down to St. Swithins Lane,’ said Simon Weeks, director of precious metals and foreign exchange at ScotiaMocatta, a unit of the Bank of Nova Scotia.”
(Note: The NY Times meant LGMFL, not LBMA, but they may have got confused because Simon Weeks was chairman of the LBMA at that time, as well as being chairman of the Gold Fixing company LGMFL).
“LGMF (London Gold Market Fixing) said it intends to introduce web-based commentary of the fixing later this year.”
Barclays then joined the fixings on 7th June 2004.
Bank of England refers to a Web-based application
The most authoritative confirmation of this “web-based feature commentary” comes from the May 2004 edition of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin which was kept in the gold fixings loop as per usual, and saw fit to review and report on the changes taking place in the Gold Fixing. See page 14 of pdf where it states:
“Since 5 May, a telephone conference call has replaced the twice-daily physical meetings. A web-based application to allow viewing of the fixing process is to be introduced later in 2004.“
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin screenshot, May 2004:
Fast forward to 2014, and a publication titled “Financial Markets and the ACI Dealing Certificate 310-102“, by Philip J L Parker (ISBN 978-1-291-50352-4) also mentions this web-based commentary for the Fixing, stating:
“With effect from May 2004, the traditional face-to-face meetings (previously at the offices of NM Rothschild and Son), were replaced by a telephone fixing procedure. As part of this change, a web-based commentary of the Fixing has been introduced.“
So it appears that a liveweb-based commentary / web-based application has been used by the five members of the London Gold Fixing since 2004 that allowed the viewing of the fixing process, which would presumably mean viewing the orders entered by each participant and the intra-auction prices. However the existence of such as web-based application is never mentioned by the financial media, who persist in only ever mentioning a conference call, often in conjunction with the words ‘tradition’, ‘antiquated’ or ‘unchanging since 1919′ etc.
Pens and Paper?
It stands to reason that a live web-based application would be introduced and used during a conference call of the daily Gold Fixings. Given that the trader participants were located remotely from each other, it would be essential for the traders at each of the five firms to be able to see prices and current orders on their desktop screens during the fixings, and also essential for final order data to be captured in a trade capture system, then matched, and then sent downstream within trade, clearing and settlement processing systems.
As well as using phones, everything an investment bank trader or an inter-dealer broker does involves using one of their, often, six or more screens as input and output devices. They do not just use ‘bits of paper’ to record orders and trades and then pass these bits of paper to some junior person to run around the precious metals trading desk with. Trading screens are always used in conjunction with phones. Every order has to be captured and displayed, as well as calculated and processed in trade and settlement processing systems and downstream P&L and reporting systems.
We are talking here about order entry, trade execution, trade capture, trade processing, and trade clearing and settlement. We are also talking here about the most sophisticated investment banks on the planet, with the largest and most cutting edge technological and financial resources in any industry. We are talking about HSBC, ScotiaBank, Deutsche Bank, Barclays and Société Générale, not about two-bit bucket shops.
Until August 2014, the daily Silver Fixings comprised three of the same members as the daily Gold Fixings, namely HSBC, ScotiaMocatta and Deutsche. Given that both gold and silver trading would be run from the same precious metals trading desks in these banks, it seems reasonable to suggest that any technological order capture and display systems that were being used in the gold fixings, would also be used in the silver fixings.
It therefore makes the following claim from Harriet Hunnable of the CME Group hard to fathom when she commented last October on how the CME had taken the Silver Fixings out of the dark ages (CME ‘proud’ of silver fix system):
“In a very short time, we’ve taken a market that was doing this on pen and paper on the telephone to an electronic platform.”
I find this ‘pen and paper’ reference extremely hard to believe given the discussion of a web-based application in the Gold Fixings since 2004. Financial media commentaries at the time, in August 2014, also stuck to the dark ages script with CNBC headlining its coverage as “Victorian-era silver fix joins electronic age“.
Note that even ‘voice-brokered trades’ done by the large inter-dealer brokers such as ICAP and Tullet Prebon make use of screens as well as phones. Screens are intrinsic to all modern voice trading, as are messaging apps, and chat apps (although messaging and chat apps will probably be more highly regulated and subject to stricter compliance controls going forward).
It would be naive of anyone to think that daily Gold Fixings involving five distinct dealing rooms of five huge investment banks were not using various forms of order entry, trade capture, and various types of networked technology, to keep track of gold and silver fixing prices and orders and to visually display this updated data on traders’ screens and desktops during the daily fixing auctions.
Furthermore, the resulting net order data would have to be passed to other trade processing systems for downstream processing into London Precious Metals Clearing Ltd’s (LPMCL) metal clearing AURUM system, for netting and clearing and settlement, while the price and time-stamp data would need to be passed to price data vendors for distribution as well as to the LGMFL goldfixing.com web site.
Without a functional specification document, its hard to know what the original specification of a 2004 web-based commentary/web-based application used on the five trading floors would have entailed, and whether it would be originally designed and built in-house by one or a number of the technology departments of the five fixing member banks, or whether this type of project would have been outsourced. But trading floor technology is always changing and evolving and indeed, trading technology did change rapidly from 2004 to 2014.
Applications designed and used within investment banks do not stay static and they also have to be supported and maintained. Applications either evolve with the evolution of an investment bank’s technology environment or they are decommissioned and replaced. So it’s doubtful if a web-based app created in 2004-05 would still exist in its original version 1.0 form in 2014-15.
Examining the observable technology connected to the London Gold Market Fixing Company also brings up some interesting information. One window into the London Gold Market Fixing Ltd was its website www.goldfixing.com. The domain lookup for the www.goldfixing.com provides both registrant and technical support information.
The site was registered on 22nd December 1999 by Emilie Rivoire of NM Rothschild (email@example.com). This would make sense since NM Rothschild was the permanent chair of the daily gold fixings until 2004. The first version of the goldfixing.com website was created by a South African company called Catics Ltd in 2000.
“Rothschild, with approval from the other 4 members, approached us to design an elegant new web site. The site was created as a quick up-to-date historic guide about the London Goldfix. All interested parties can see how the price of gold gets fixed twice a day.”
The key requirements for the website included:
Provide a graphical view that would indicate the five members buying, holding or selling gold.
Build an interactive charting facility so that users can chart historic gold fixes.
Integrate site with Rothschild CMS (Content Management System).
When NM Rothschild departed from the Gold Fixings in 2004 and sold its fixing seat to Barclays, it appears that Rothschild also handed over the responsibility for the website to Barclays, who at some point employed Sapient in a technical capacity for the website. The domain lookup for the site most recently lists a technical support contact for the website of Sapient, with an address of Eden House, 8 Spital Square, London E1 6DU, and an email contact of firstname.lastname@example.org.
Eden House is the London office HQ of Sapient Global Markets. Sapient Global Markets is part of the Publicis.Sapient group, and provides various financial market consultancy and technological services to “capital and commodity market participants” including numerous financial exchanges and clearing houses. Publicis Groupe acquired Sapient in November 2014.
The ‘MSO Support’ in email@example.com refers to Managed Service Operations (MSO), which is an area within Sapient Nitro’s systems integration practice, which operates from various places including Gurgaon in India. This MSO support team was responsible for the www.goldfixing.com web site that was permanently switched off on the morning of 23rd March 2015.
That Sapient was responsible for the www.goldfixing.com web site is a fact because their indian team in Gurgaon confirmed to me early on the morning of 23rd March that the website had been shut down, as follows:
Furthermore, on their email to me, Sapient (Gurgaon) used the following two Sapient email addresses connected to the Gold Fixing and the goldfixing.com website:
A managed service operations team would generally be responsible for content management and delivery, as well as underlying web applications and servers etc.
Before the plug was pulled on the www.goldfixing.com website, fixing prices and associated trading data and gold bar quantities always appeared rapidly on the GoldFixing website straight after the 10.30am and 3.00pm fixings were completed, along with accompanying timestamps down to the exact second.
For example, on 23 October 2014, the morning gold fixing completed at 10:31:16. This information was rapidly updated on to the goldfixing website, as well as being sent out to all the major data vendors such as Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters:
Distribution of near real-time price data could not have been done without an electronic system that captured the fixing data, stored it in a database table, and fed it to a front-end website query.
Likewise, the historical price, bid-offer, bar total and date data which were viewable on the goldfixing website would also have needed to be stored in a database table and accessible via a website query. For example, see the last historical data of gold fixings from 18th and 19th March 2015 to be displayed on the old goldfixing website before it was switched off:
This fixing data that appeared on the goldfixing website has to have been supplied by other connected systems such as a fixings order capture and processing system. There cannot be website outputs within inputs, which by definition implies that there are also calculations performed as well as storage and retrieval. i.e. information systems and not ‘pencils’ and ‘bits of paper’ as some of the financial media seem to think the modern daily fixings made use of.
Managed Service Operations (MSO) offerings from companies such as Sapient, often include software/services that facilitate collaboration, and there are also lots of ready-made collaboration applications available on the market. For example, Microsoft Online Services is a server hosted enterprise software suite that can include Office Communications Online, Microsoft Office Live Meeting, and Sharepoint Online. Suffice to say, these products/services (which can be locally or cloud hosted) provide on-line real-time instant messaging and communications (Microsoft Communications Online), live conferencing with video and audio and messaging (Microsoft Live Meeting), or a collaboration platform (Microsoft Sharepoint Online). Citrix also offers a lot of products/solutions in this space such as GoToMeeting.
So some of the above types of software/services would fit the bill for providing precious metals traders’ workstations with web-based commentary, and messaging and communication apps that could be used in the daily fixings alongside phones. Outputs from some of the above could also be integrated into web site price data feeds through messaging middleware.
But there is another more important connection between the London Gold Market Fixing Company and Sapient Global Markets which points to another Sapient app being more than a web-based ‘commentary’.
The replacement Gold Fix – Request for Proposals
When the London Gold Market Fixing Limited (LGMFL) and the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA) launched a Request for Proposals (RfP) to administer the new LBMA Gold Price auction on 4th September 2014, Sapient Global Markets was one of the applicants to submit a proposal. This proposal was submitted in conjunction with Autilla Ltd. Previously, for the silver fixing replacement in mid 2014, Autilla initially submitted a standalone proposal, and then in the final week in early July, teamed up with the London Metal Exchange (LME) on a joint bid. Interestingly though, for the gold fixing proposal, Autilla joined up with Sapient in a joint bid on Day 1, so Autilla must have deemed a joint bid with Sapient as being advantageous.
Out of eight proposals received, the Autilla/Sapient proposal was among five proposals to get short-listed by the LBMA, and although they didn’t win the new contract, Autilla/Sapient did make a presentation of their proposal at the LBMA closed-door ‘market’ seminar on 24th October which saw presentations by the five short-listed parties. Note also that there was a third member of this Sapient/Autilla partnership called ‘Global Rate Set Service’, which was also referred to in the proposal as ‘Global Rate Set System’ and ‘GRSS’. This appears to be Global Rate Set Systems, a New Zealand based company.
In the Sapient/Autilla proposal summary, which takes the form of a 2-3 page letter to the LBMA dated 27th October, Page 2 describes a ‘current process‘ and also modifications for the new proposed process.
Reading Page 2 of the proposal, its clear that Sapient are intimately familiar with the ‘current process‘ and they only suggest ‘making changes’ to the current process where needed. Sapient state:
“Our solution is one that has a look and feel which is easily recognisable and known to those already familiar with the current process.”
Sapient’s reference to an ‘easily recognisable and known‘ ‘look and feel‘ of its proposed system suggests that ‘those already familiar with the current process‘ were familiar with a similar system.
‘Look and feel’ is a term that’s most commonly used in software development and nowadays rarely means anything outside the software industry. Just google ‘look and feel’ with or without the quotes to see what I mean. In software solutions, ‘look and feel’ will almost always mean “the appearance and function of a program’s user interface”, or “the design and formatting of a graphical user interface (GUI).”
Sapient is saying that those who were using the current process at that time in October 2014 (i.e. the traders of the remaining four fixing members ) would recognise and know an existing graphical user interface that they were familiar with when looking at Sapient’s proposed new graphical user interface.
Sapient states that it has ‘kept’ seven ‘main functions’ of the current process, and then goes on to list the functions that it has kept; these functions include participants logging in, participants entering indicative bar Buy, Sell and No Interest orders in bar amounts, a virtual Flag, matching within tolerance (50 bars), sharing out bars within tolerance, and fx rate pricing:
Sapient then lists the “new or modernised‘ ‘changes’ it is proposing ‘to achieve additional objectives of modernisation, transparency and regulatory cover‘. These new or modernised changes include house and client trades, intra-round price determination, real-time pricing commentary for full distribution, and a GUI messaging portal. Connecting in to the fixing via the messaging portal suggests that any previous messaging would have been done through standalone messaging/chat apps (like those used by interest rate and fx traders).
Interestingly, the Sapient proposal refers to automating some of the tasks that were done by the chairman of the Fixings which sounds like this entailed releasing the final fixing orders for matching, and then processing trade confirms etc.
In its proposal to the LBMA, Sapient therefore appears to be describing an existing electronic networked order capture and processing system that the gold fixing process was already using (up until Thursday 19th March 2015). It makes perfect sense then that Sapient had the contract to run the www.goldfixing.com website if it was also responsible for building, maintaining and supporting other parts of the recent gold fixing technical architecture.
Gold Fixing Document Retention Policy
That networked technology was used within the daily gold fixings prior to the transition to ICE’s WebICE is also supported by the requirements of the “Document Retention Policy” of the London Gold Market Fixing Company, dated 29 October 2014.
This Document Retention Policy, in section 2.3, states that the chairperson of the fixing process is responsible for keeping a record of the following data: member firms participating on each call, names of the individuals from each firm, opening price and sources of opening price, prices tried during the fixing, “bid and offer figures of each member firm at each price tried”, final fix price in dollars, euros and pounds, the time the price was fixed, euro and sterling exchange rates used to determine the fix price, and volume of transactions executed between participating member firms. That is a lot of data to have to record manually twice, each and every day, so again, this suggests that the chairman was not recording this information manually.
Note: As part of the application process to run the new gold fixing, all parties who submitted bids to the LBMA, including Autilla/Sapient, had to sign a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) with the LBMA, so it would be difficult to verify the technical details behind the Sapient/Autilla proposal, as they are most likely covered under the NDA and could not be revealed without the permission of the LBMA.
“The London gold fix, the benchmark used by miners, jewelers and central banks to value the metal, may have been manipulated for a decade by the banks setting it, researchers say.
Abrantes-Metz and Metz screened intraday trading in the spot gold market from 2001 to 2013 for sudden, unexplained moves that may indicate illegal behavior. From 2004, they observed frequent spikes in spot gold prices during the afternoon call. The moves weren’t replicated during the morning call and hadn’t happened before 2004, they found.
Large price moves during the afternoon call were also overwhelmingly in the same direction: down. On days when the authors identified large price moves during the fix, they were downwards at least two-thirds of the time in six different years between 2004and 2013. In 2010, large moves during the fix were negative 92 percent of the time, the authors found.
There’s no obvious explanation as to why the patterns began in 2004, why they were more prevalent in the afternoon fixing, and why price moves tended to be downwards, Abrantes-Metz said in a telephone interview this week.“
Could the introduction of a trading desk web-based application into the fixings in 2004, which would have provided gold trading desks with extra eyes into the auction proceedings, have presented a means for facilitating a type of gold price manipulation which previously was not possible during the purely phone based meetings held at Rothschilds in St Swithins Lane?
The FCA, Barclays and Daniel Plunkett
On 23rd May 2014, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) announced that they were fining Daniel Plunkett, a former Barclays trader and director of its Precious Metals Desk, for manipulation of the gold price during the afternoon gold fix on 28 June 2012, and also fining Barclays for breaches of two Principles of the Authority’s Principles for Businesses between 7 June 2004 and 21 March 2013.
The FCA’s ‘Final Notice’ explaining the fining and prohibition of Daniel Plunkett, provided details of Plunkett’s trading into the gold fix on the afternoon of 28 June 2012. The ease and speed with which Plunkett, on two occasions, rapidly placed and then cancelled proprietary trades into the gold fixing during the fixing that afternoon, suggests that he was using an automated order entry system to place and cancels those trades, and also to unwind the second trade after the fixing completed.
Indeed, at that time in 2012, Barclays’ systems did not differentiate between a Gold Fixing trade executed by a Barclays trader and a gold spot market trade executed by that same trader. And since proprietary gold spot trades would be entered electronically, so too would Gold Fixing trades.
According to section 4.14 of the Final Notice document on Plunkett:
“At 3:06 p.m., shortly after the Chairman had increased the proposed price to USD1,558.50, Mr Plunkett, who had not placed any previous orders during the Gold Fixing, placed a large sell order of between 40,000 oz. (100 bars) and 60,000 oz. (150 bars), with Barclays’ representative on the Gold Fixing. This order was incorporated by Barclays’ representative into Barclays’ net position, which led to Barclays declaring itself to be a seller of 52,000 oz. (130 bars).”
“At 3:07 p.m.Mr Plunkett withdrew his entire sell order, which resulted in Barclays’ representative withdrawing Barclays’ position (selling 130 bars). This reduced the imbalance in the 28 June 2012 Gold Fixing from 190 bars to 60 bars (155 bars buying/215 bars selling)” Section 4.17
“At 3:09 p.m., Mr Plunkett again placed a large sell order, 60,000 oz. (150 bars), with Barclays’ representative, who, also taking into account changes in customers’ orders, declared Barclays’ net position in the 28 June 2012 Gold Fixing to be selling 40,000 oz. (100 bars).” Section 4.21
“Shortly after the conclusion of the 28 June 2012 Gold Fixing, Mr Plunkett repurchased 60,000 oz. (150 bars) of gold by executing an internal trade with Barclays’ Gold Spot Book. The purpose of executing this order was to unwind the 60,000 oz. (150 bars) position he had taken during the 28 June 2012 Gold Fixing.” Section 4.24
If an internal trade that Plunkett executed with the gold Spot Book could unwind an outstanding trade that he placed into the Gold Fixing, then the two trades, and the manner in which they were input would need to be similar, which, we will see below that they were.
Barclays – Gold Fixing trades were identical to Gold Spot trades
The FCA also issued a ‘Final Notice’ detailing the background to the financial penalty imposed on Barclays, for Barclays’ failure to , amongst other things, create systems on its precious metals desk “that allowed for adequate monitoring of traders’ activity in connection with the Gold Fixing”. The Barclays “Precious Metals Desk” was Barclays trading desk responsible for gold, silver, platinum, palladium and rhodium.
“The systems and reports did not formally record orders placed by traders in the Gold Fixing until 5 February 2013 and did not identify Gold Fixing transactions separately from general gold spot trades until 21 March 2013. As a result, Barclays was unable to adequately monitor what trades its traders were executing in the Gold Fixing or whether those traders may have been placing orders to affect inappropriately the price of gold in the Gold Fixing.” Section 2.3
“Barclays relied upon systems and reports that did not differentiate between Gold Fixing and gold spot market trades executed by its traders. (Barclays addressed this on 21 March 2013, when it updated its systems to specifically record Gold Fixing trades as such.) This meant that during the Relevant Period, Barclays could not adequately monitor its traders’ orders and trades executed in the Gold Fixing.” Section 4.36
So, section 2.3 and section 4.36 of this FCA Final Notice tells us that in 2012, gold fix trades executed by Barclays traders were seen as identical to gold spot trades executed by those same traders, and that both sets of trades used the same systems. Plunkett was not being monitored and was independently executing trades that were identical to gold spot trades, and these trades were flowing into Barclay’s net gold fixing position. This would have required an electronic trading platform. If Barclay’s house and customer gold fixing trades were on a technological platform in 2012, then the whole notion of the gold fixing orders with the other fixing participants also not being integrated into an electronic platform prior to 2015 is implausible.
The rapidity with which Plunkett engaged actively in the afternoon gold fixing on 28 June 2012 was also reiterated in the FCA’s Final Notice for Barclays:
“On 28 June 2012, a Barclays trader, Mr Daniel Plunkett, participated actively in the Gold Fixing” Section 2.6
“In particular, he placed a large sell order of between 40,000 oz. (100 bars) and 60,000 oz. (150 bars) with Barclays’ representative on the Gold Fixing, then withdrew it completely one minute later and subsequently placed another large sell order of between 40,000 oz. (100 bars) and 60,000 oz. (150 bars) two minutes after that.” Section 2.9
The move by Barclays on 21 March 2013 to finally differentiate between prop trader executed gold spot trades and prop trader executed gold fixing trades, also suggests that whatever the change was, it took an existing transaction type of gold spot trade and reflagged it as a gold fixing trade. These changes would have all been conducted on a pre-existing electronic platform (since the gold spot book was on an electronic platform), again undermining the notion of a purely pens and paper supported approach to the gold fixing using a system largely unchanged for nearly a century.
Interestingly, neither of the FCA Final Notices issued in connection with Barclays, Plunkett and the gold price, nor any other FCA comments on its investigation into precious metals manipulation in London, make any reference whatsoever to whether the FCA examined precious metals traders’ messaging app logs or other trader online communication dialogues. This is odd given that messaging apps were seen to have been widely used by all other traders in the recent LIBOR and FX price manipulation scandals. See here for some LIBOR examples and here for some FX examples of trader transcript manipulation chats.
Given that there appears to have been a web-based commentary in the gold fixings since 2004, as well as very sophisticated gold fixing order and price data capture in Barclays systems and in the most recent iteration of the Sapient supported goldfixing website, perhaps the financial media can take a look into this before claiming with certainly that the gold fixings only went on to an electronic platform during the 20th March 2015 transition to the ICE/IBA/LBMA Gold Price architecture.
Part 1 was necessary so as to set the scene for the, in some ways, theatrical gold flights and convoys of Part 2, and to also illustrate that a percentage of Venezuela’s gold (50 tonnes) was retained in the vaults of the Bank of England so as to be available for activation into international gold transactions.
And so, the analysis below covers Venezuela’s actual gold repatriation operations in late 2011 and early 2012, especially the first and last flight. You will see that the first batch of gold bars came in on an Air France cargo flight, which opens up key questions about France and the Banque de France as a source for some of the repatriated gold. You will also see the arrival and unloading of the last flight, a World Airways cargo freighter.
The analysis wraps up with a look at the gold swap discussions between Venezuela and a set of investment banks which culminated in a gold swap being agreed with Citibank. The question then arises as to whether further similar gold swaps are in store for Venezuela’s domestically held monetary gold.
The Repatriation – Flights and Convoys
The Venezuelan gold repatriation transport operation took just over two months to complete, beginning on 25 November 2011, and winding up on 30 January 2012. During this time, 23 shipments (by air) are said to have arrived in Caracas, with 160 tonnes of gold flown in.
“In 2012, the central bank completed the repatriation of monetary gold , which began in late 2011. This unprecedented process, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the nation, constitutes the largest movement of physical gold in the world market in recent years . A total of 23 gold shipments were moved, totalling 160 tonnes of metal that had been custodied abroad.”
Notwithstanding the fact that the German Bundesbank claims to have quietly and secretively moved 940 tonnes of its gold from the Bank of England in London to its Bundesbank headquarters in Frankfurt between 2000 and 2001, the Venezuelan gold repatriation is still probably the “largest movement of physical gold in the world market” since that time.
The first and last shipments of Venezuela’s gold repatriation arrived into Maiquetía Airport (aka Simón Bolívar International Airport) in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, so the presumption is that the other shipments did also. Both the first and last shipments received huge media coverage in Venezuela and extensive coverage internationally. Given that the Venezuelan State facilitated and encouraged this domestic media coverage, as well as street scenes thronged with Chavez supporters, this is not surprising. The majority of the other shipments after the first and before the last ones got little or no coverage, probably due to security procedures.
“We cannot give exact dates (for when the rest of the bars will arrive) due to questions of security. When we bring the last shipment, the people will learn about it.“
The Reuters report also quoted a Venezuelan government source as saying that there would be ‘several’ cargo flights.
“A senior government source involved in transporting the bars, which amount to 90 percent of Venezuela’s gold held abroad, has told Reuters they will be shipped in several cargo flights that will be completed before the end of the year.
The total cost of the operation will be no more than $9 million, the source said, without elaborating.”
The First Shipment (by air) came from France
The gold from the first shipment, which consisted of 5 tonnes of gold, was moved from Maiquetía airport to the central bank vaults in Caracas on Friday 25 November 2011 amid much fanfare and coverage. Although the airport to bank journey happened on 25 November, an article here claims that the “the repatriation of gold reserves began on 23 November”.
In various news footage videos below, which cover the transport of the gold from the airport on 25 November 2011, there are no shots of any aircraft being unloaded, which may suggest that the first shipment did indeed arrive prior to 25 November, possibly on 23 November. The first shipment was flown in using Air France (see below).
In contrast, during the last operation on 30 January 2012, the arrival of the aircraft into the airport played a starring role in proceedings, possibly because the shipments were then being wrapped up and there was little harm in broadcasting the identify of aircraft, which you will see below was a chartered World Airways MD-11 cargo freighter.
The first video below from 25 November 2011 shows black plastic crates (presumably with the gold in them) on pallets which in turn are on trailers, positioned beside a line of armoured cars ready for loading.
Very interestingly, central bank governor Merentes (at 0:22) states that this first shipment of gold came from European countries “via Francia” (by way of France).
This is very odd that the first shipment came from France. Given that the gold was stored at the Bank of England and with the BIS, none of the Venezuelan gold should ever have been in France. And with air charters from Europe, there would be no need to fly into and out of a French airport en route from London to Caracas.
“Los primeros lingotes vinieron de Francia en medio de un operativo denominado Oro Patrio y en el que participaron más de 500 funcionarios.”
“The first ingots came from France in the middle of an operation called Golden Homeland and in which over 500 staff participated.”
The most compelling piece of evidence, however, that the first shipment came from France is the fact that the gold was flown into Caracas on Air France, and there were labels on the side of the crates stating this. See screenshot below taken from one of the videos:
This label above shows the ‘Air Waybill No’ of ‘057-53208470′, the ‘Destination’ of CCS (Caracas), and the ‘Total No of Pieces’ – 10, i.e. 10 crates.
See also the below photo of one of the crates, with the same Air Waybill number 057-53208470, after it was loaded into the back of one of the armoured security cars:
Air France Cargo fleet consists of 2 long-range Boeing 777- 200LRF cargo freighters, registration numbers F-GUOB and F-GUOC. You can see a video of F-GUOC taking off (from another airport) here.
Since the gold in the first shipment was flown from France, this gold may have come from the Banque de France in Paris, which would suggest that the bullion banks and/or the BIS had to resort to sourcing gold from the Banque de France. BNP Paribas was one of the five bullion banks that had a borrowed gold liability to the BCV, so this fact may be relevant. (See a section below about the French connection).
The second Venezuelan video from 25 November 2011 states that gold which was located in US, Canadian, and English banks was being repatriated to Venezuela. This does not mean, however, that the gold flights originated in all or any of these locations. The US, Canada and England just refer to the headquarters of the bullion banks involved in the repatriation.
The third video from 25 November 2011 refers to “foreign banks,” “principally in Europe,” and mainly English banks.
Reuters quoted Merentes as having said that “The gold comes from several European countries.”
1. Length: 2:26 – Nelson Merentes interview, and gold ready for loading. 25 November 2011
2. Length: 2:06 – Armoured cars and convoy getting ready to leave the airport, and then departing the airport. 25 November 2011
3. Length 1:53 – Convoy leaves airport and drives to the central bank. 25 November 2011
4. Length 11:03 – Air France label is shown beginning at 9:42. This longer video has extended footage of the unloading and loading operation. 25 November 2011
At a price of $1,688 per ounce on 25 November 2011, that would be roughly 5.5 tonnes. Whether it was 5 tonnes of 5.5 tonnes is not that important. With each of the crates holding 500 kgs or 0.5 tonnes, that would be 10 – 11 crates in the first shipment. There appear to have been 10 crates given that’s what it said on the crate labels and that’s what the BCV maintain their were.
Once the gold was loaded up into the fleet of security vans, a huge convoy of military vehicles and personnel (said to be between 400 – 500 personnel) accompanied the vans out from the airport (by the ocean) and around the mountain to the central bank building in downtown Caracas, on a route, some of which was lined with Chavez’ supporters, especially where they had congregated near the bank’s entrance.
The Last Shipment – The Final Flight of MD-11, N275WA
The final shipment arrived into Maiquetía – Simón Bolívar airport on Monday 30 January 2012 consisting of 14 tonnes of gold in 28 boxes. The novel significance of the media coverage on this day was that news crews were allowed to film the airplane taxiing into the landing area and unloading its cargo.
Six of these MD-11 CFs were built and World Airways were flying two of them at this time. Ironically, the parent company of World Airways, called Global Aviation Holdings Inc, filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on 5 February 2012, six days after N275WA had delivered the last shipment of Venezuela’s gold to Caracas. Interestingly, Global Aviation Holdings was also “the largest commercial provider of charter air transportation for the US military”.
See video below of aircraft N275WA arriving into Caracas on 30 November 2012
5. Length 1:53 – N275WA arriving and unloading its cargo on 30 November 2012
6. Length 3:27 – This is a well produced promotional video from “Servicio Pan Americano de Protección”, the company that transported the gold from the airport to the bank. The video shows the entire unloading and loading operation from 30 January 2012 and is well worth watching.
An MD-11 CF freighter can transport 26 large pallets and has a maximum payload of 89,000 kgs (or 89 metric tonnes). Technically, Venezuela could have had all of its repatriated gold flown in on a lot less than 23 flights. Insurance and other risk management considerations probably dictated the diversification requirement, as well as the gold possibly only becoming available in piecemeal fashion from November 2011 to January 2012.
If there were indeed 23 flights over 2 months totalling 160/161 tonnes, each flight could have flown in 7 tonnes of gold, since this adds up to 161 tonnes (23 * 7). Given that the last batch was said to be 14 tonnes and the first batch 5 tonnes, each of the other 21 flights could have carried a batch of about 6.70 tonnes.
However, a number of batches could have arrived on the same flight, such as the last flight which is said to have flown 14 tonnes. Video footage from the last shipment day, 30 January 2012, shows a crate with lot number ’20’ displayed on it – See above screen shot. So there were at least 20 ‘lots’. Overall, there would have been about 360 crates.
Given that Venezuela was able to repatriate 160 tonnes of gold in cargo flights over the Atlantic Ocean from Europe within 2 months, this proves that the German Bundesbank could have easily repatriated its intended target of 300 tonnes of gold from New York in 2013, by flying the entire 300 tonnes over to Frankfurt within 4 months. Venezuela’s successful operation proves that the Bundesbank’s seven-year repatriation plan is laughable, and that the excuses coming out of Frankfurt are hiding something far more critical to the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve and US Treasury than logistical flight details.
The French Connection – Banque de France
It’s not clear where the last gold shipment on World Airways N275WA aircraft originated from, although Nelson Merentes made the general statement for the overall operation that “the gold comes from several European countries.”
However, in the case of the first shipment on Air France from France, there are not that many places where the flight could have come from, the main suspect being from Charles de Gaulle airport (CDG) in Paris, where Air France has one of its two main cargo hubs (the other hub being Amsterdam – i.e. these are Air France-KLM’s two cargo hubs). This then also makes a good case for the first shipment of gold having come from the Banque de France. If this was the case, then it meant that bullion banks and/or the BIS needed to source gold from the Banque de France. Would this have been feasible? Yes.
A May 2012 article from CentralBanking.com (subscription only) quoted George Milling-Stanley, independent gold consultant, and formerly of the World Gold Council, who had some interesting insights into the role of the Banque de France in being able to mobilise gold:
‘”Gold stored at the Bank of England vaults … can easily be mobilised into the market via trading strategies, or posted as collateral for a currency loan. The London vaults of JPMorgan, HSBC, and other bullion dealing investment banks have a similar status,” saysMilling-Stanley.’
‘Of the Banque de France, Milling-Stanley says it has “recently become more active in this space [mobilising gold into the market], acting primarily as an interface between the Bank for International Settlements in Basel [BIS] and commercial banks requiring dollar liquidity. These commercial banks are primarily located in Europe, especially in France”.’
Milling-Stanley’s reference to the Banque de France acting as an interface to the BIS and commercial banks in Europe may be implying that the Banque de France was a party to the 2010 BIS gold swaps which involved 10 commercial banks including BNP Paribas, Societe Generale and HSBC.
In July 2010 the FT said that “three big banks – HSBC, Société Générale and BNP Paribas – were among more than 10 based in Europe that swapped gold with the Bank for International Settlements in a series of unusual deals.” Note that BNP Paribas and HSBC are two of the five bullion banks with which the BCV had outstanding gold loans to in August 2011.
Despite the BIS’ cryptic, short, and obscure explanation that in these swaps, the commercial banks provided gold to the BIS in return for US dollar liquidity, it could be the case that commercial bullion banks borrowed central bank gold held at the Banque de France via financing from the BIS as part of a tripartite transaction.
Under this type of tripartite transaction, which was first proposed by Adrian Douglas, a Venezuelan – Banque de France version would have involved the Banque de France arranging gold lending to the bullion banks who then transfer the title of this gold to the BIS. The BIS transfers US dollars to the bullion banks who then either transfer this currency to the Banque de France, or owe a cash obligation to the Banque de France. The gold is recorded in the name of the BIS but is actually kept in the Banque de France until required by the bullion banks who borrowed it, then, when needed, gold is withdrawn by the bullion banks and used to pay back central bank gold lenders such as Venezuela’s BCV. Either French gold or Banque de France customer gold (such as IMF gold in Paris) could have been used in such a transaction. This would explain why Venezuela received crates of gold flown in to Caracas by Air France cargo.
The FT also noted in its 2010 BIS gold swap article that “In a short note in its annual report, published at the end of June, the BIS said it had taken 346 tonnes of gold in exchange for foreign currency in “swap operations” in the financial year to March 31.” (2010)
This 346 tonne BIS gold swap figure was said to have continued to grow after March 2010 and was estimated to be as high as 380 tonnes by July 2010.
Venezuela’s 50 tonnes of gold at the Bank of England
At the time of the arrival of the last gold shipment to Caracas in January 2012, Nelson Merentes was reported to have noted that “gold stored in BCV will reach 86% of the total while the rest, about 50 tonnes, will stay in the banks in which the Republic needs to maintain open accounts for international financial operations.” In August 2011, Chavez had referred to wanting to reach a target of 90% of the gold being stored in Caracas, but 86% is quite close.
The 50 ton amount remaining at the Bank of England was possibly chosen as a ’round number’ tonnage by the BCV and its international advisors. From the above bar/ingot total calculations, it seems that there were 4,089 good delivery bars left in London. This 50 tonnes, left in situ in London in January 2012, was to play a far greater role in Venezuela’s international financing arrangements than many envisaged at the time.
The Reactivation of Venezuela’s Gold Reserves
The death of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez in March 2013, and the election of Nicolás Maduro as his successor marked a re-establishment of the relationship between the international investment banks and the Venezuelan central bank.
Recall that in August 2011 when Chavez called for the repatriation of Venezuela’s gold reserves, he also called for the transfer of the BCV’s operating reserves away from US and European banks. These operating reserves, such as cash deposits and short-term fixed interest investments, had been invested with the BIS (BPI in Spanish), Barclays, JP Morgan, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, the FRB (repos), the World Bank and Bladex (the Panamanian based LatAm trade bank). Sight deposits were with JP Morgan, time deposits with the other commercial banks and the BIS, and it negotiable (fixed rate) instruments with the BIS (FIXBIS). See “Proposed Relocation of the International Reserves“.
Prior to the Chavez about-turn, Venezuela had cultivated close working relationships with some of the biggest global investment banks (or vice-versa), and seemed to be especially fond of Wall Street banks. This is illustrated, obviously, by the manner in which it used the investment banks to invest both the operating and gold components of its international reserves, where the names involved read like a who’s who of investment banking giants. But as important as the deposit taking banks appear to be to Venezuela, the advisory and corporate finance relationships look to be as equally important.
According to the Venezuelan media, in the early 2000s, JP Morgan was said to be very close to the Venezuelan finance ministry and finance minister Alejandro Dopazo, and Credit Suisse New York was also said to have had a close relationship with the government.
The use of Venezuelan gold as loan collateral was also not something new to the Maduro years. A Venezuelan media report from August 2011 claims that a few years prior to 2011, Venezuela was involved in financing discussions with New York based investment banks where the banks raised the issue of gold collateral as a means of lowering the required coupon in the financing strategies and products being discussed. These meetings were said to have taken place in the New York offices of Francisco Illaramendi, former manager of the PDVSA pension funds. According to the media report, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and Barclays separately proposed that in order to “avoid the penalty of high coupons, Venezuela could place ‘equivalent in gold in the banks’ to support the issue”, with Credit Suisse proposing that Venezuelan gold be deposited with it in London and Barclays proposing likewise.
Since the Maduro presidency, the investment banks, and especially the Wall Street based banks, have been actively involved again in Venezuela’s financial affairs. Late last year, in December 2014, Venezuela sold Goldman Sachs a $4 billion credit owed to Venezuela by the Dominican Republic which was outstanding under the Petrocaribe arrangement. Petrocaribe is a regional oil programme by which Venezuela supplies oil to other countries in the region.
Lazard, the French investment bank, is a financial advisor to the state of Venezuela, and last year Lazard was chosen by Venezuela to handle the sale of Citgo Petroleum on behalf of the Venezuelan state owned oil company PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela S.A.). Citgo is a US subsidiary of PVDSA. This sale didn’t go ahead but then Deutsche Bank’s New York office was chosen in January 2014 to handle a bond and loan capital raising exercise for Citgo and advisory services for PDVSA. Deutsche had previously worked with PDVSA.
Bank of America-Merrill Lynch also now has a close relationship with the Venezuelan central bank and the Venezuelan government in the form of its chief economist for the Andean region, Francisco Rodríguez. Rodríguez, was chief economist to the National Assembly of Venezuela from 2000-2004, and joined Bank of America in 2011. More about Rodríguez below.
Goldman Gold Swap Plan
The first sign that Venezuela’s gold was back in the sights of the investment banks came in November 2013, when it was reported that the BCV (and the Venezuelan government) were in negotiations with Goldman Sachs about the arrangement of a gold exchange, in other words, a gold – US dollar swap with gold as collateral. A lot of the reporting at the time did not provide very much detail about this swap, so here are some summary details of the Goldman gold swap.
The gold swap was to be between the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) and Goldman Sachs International in London. Eudomar Tovar was BCV president at that time. The swap would involve Venezuela swapping gold from it’s reserves with Goldman Sachs international in exchange for a US dollar loan, with the gold serving as collateral for the loan.
The swap was to be for a four-year duration between 2016 and 2020 (although another media source said it was to be for a seven-year duration from late 2013 until late 2020). The swap was to be for 1.45 million ounces of gold (or nearly 1.45 million ounces according to one media source) which was expected to be deposited at the Bank of England and transferred to Goldman Sachs International at an agreed time. At the time, 1.45m ozs of gold was valued at over $1.85 billion at the then market price of $1,282 per ounce. Venezuela would also pay an annual interest rate of 8% on the loan.
If the price of gold fell over the life of the swap, the BCV would need to deposit more gold into a margin account. If the price of gold rose, Goldman Sachs International would be required to deposit more currency into a margin account. At the swap’s maturity, the contributions made by each party into the margin accounts would be returned to the respective parties.
The swap was said to contain a built-in hedge that would benefit Goldman, which reflected a 10% adjustment of the value of the swap if the gold price fell. The gold swap was said to be tradable on the market. The terms of the swap allowed the BCV to repay the loan and keep the gold, but if the BCV didnt repay the loan, the gold would go Goldman. One report said that the gold would continue to appear on the BCV’s balance sheet throughout the term of the swap.
The BCV had contracted Adar Capital Partners (of which Diego Marynberg is a director), as a consultant to design the swap with Goldman Sachs International. Adar Capital Partners would received 0.25% per annum of the value of the gold in the contract at beginning of each year over the life of the contract.
Any dispute between the parties would be resolved in English courts. Some media articles on the BCV-Goldman gold swap can be viewed in Spanish here and here and here.
Given that there were said to be 16,908 of Venezuela’s gold bars held abroad, of which 12,819 bars were repatriated, this left 4,089 of Venezuela’s bars in the vaults of the Bank of England from early 2012. These 4,089 bars are roughly equal to 51 tonnes, or 1.635 million ounces. It looks like the Goldman swap factored in a 10% adjustment on 50 tonnes of gold (roughly 1,607,500 ozs) at the Bank of England, to arrive at 1.45 million ounces (i.e. 1,607,500 * 0.9 = 1,446,750 ozs). This is the 10% adjustment referred to above. So Goldman would have had an extra buffer built-in as protection against a downward gold price movement.
The discussion of the swap at the time in November 2013 did not reveal what US dollar amount the BCV was to receive from Goldman in exchange for transferring 1.45 million ozs of gold to Goldman. i.e. it did not reveal the intended discount that the BCV was expected to take on gold with a US dollar value of $1.85 billion.
The BCV maintains that this gold swap with Goldman Sachs International did not go ahead, despite what look like detailed terms and negotiations. But the framework of the gold swap discussed with Goldman Sachs looks very similar to the swap structure that was ultimately chosen in April 2015, so it appears that the BCV re-used in some way the plan that they had drawn up with Adar Capital Partners and Goldman Sachs.
Goldman and Ecuador
Where Goldman did get a Latin American gold swap out the door was Ecuador, approximately six months after its negotiations with Venezuela hit a wall.
In early June 2014, it was announced that Ecuador had agreed to swap 1,165 bars of gold as collateral with Goldman, and in return Goldman agreed to provide Ecuador with “instruments of high security and liquidity” i.e. a loan. This gold swap was for 3 years, from 2014 to 2017 after which it will be reversed and Ecuador will get its gold back and pay the 2017 gold price to Goldman.
Rodríguez, Bank of America and the BCV vault visit
In September 2014, there was a rather unusual story from Bloomberg in which Francisco Rodríguez, the Bank of America economist (see above), related the fact that he had been allowed a rare visit into the Venezuelan central bank gold vault to view the gold bars. Rodríguez maintains that he was at a routine meeting in the BCV headquarters when his request to see the gold was granted, and that he and four other people who had attended the meeting were brought down to the underground vault in which all of the gold was stacked in “five small cells that were not even full to the top”, and that the bars were of “different types”.
While Rodríguez is said to be close to the BCV and the Venezuelan government, it still seems odd that at a routine meeting, a Bank of America representative (and some unnamed others) would pop down to see the gold in the vault, while external attendees at countless other meetings at the BCV’s headquarters would not do this tour. Could it he that the Bank of America was running the slide ruler over the Venezuelan gold in preparation for a loan of their own to the Venezuelan State?
Role Call Recall
At this point its worth recalling some of the banks that were interacting with the Venezuelan state and finance ministry, and/or interacting with the BCV (not including the gold deposits and gold lending).
In 2011, Venezuela’s operating reserves were invested with Barclays, JP Morgan, BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank. Earlier in the 2000s, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse and Deutsche were said to be close to or working with Venezuela on various financing matters.
It was also said that a few years prior to 2011, Barclays, Credit Suisse and Deutsche, at meetings in New York held in the PDVSA offices, had proposed that Venezuela could put up gold as collateral so as to lower coupons on unspecified products.
Then there was Goldman Sachs purchasing outstanding debt that the Dominican Republic owed to Venezuela. Then there were Lazard and Deutsche advising the PDVSA and/or Citgo in the US. Finally there was Goldman Sachs negotiating a gold swap with Venezuela in 2013, and Bank of America taking a look at the gold in the BCV vaults in 2014.
Investment Bank beauty parade – March 2015
The topic of Venezuelan gold swaps was again raised on 10 March 2015 when Reuters reported that the BCV was said to be in advanced discussions with a group of Wall Street banks about conducting a 4 year gold swap for 1.4 milion ozs of gold, and that the swap operation would be agreed by the end of April. Reuters reported that the discussions involved at least two institutions, namely “Bank of America and Credit Suisse”.
At the time, the swap was said to involve an exchange of 1.4 million ozs (43.5 tonnes) of Venezuelan gold for cash, on which interest would be paid, and that Venezuela had the option of re-purchasing the gold after the expiry of the 4 year term. Interestingly, it was also said that Venezuela “would most likely be able to maintain the gold as part of its foreign currency reserves” during the swap, i.e. double-counting of gold reserves.
Amid the publicity about these March 2015 swap discussions, confusion arose as to whether the Goldman Sachs gold swap had happened or not, but the BCV stated generally that although it had “received proposals to carry out a similar operation” in late 2013, it “denied any agreements had been completed.“
Local media went further, and named additional investment bank names said to be involved in the pitch to secure the gold swap deal. On 5 March 2015, Nelson Bocaranda Sardi claimed in Venezuelan newspaper El Univeral that there was a pitch competition (implied to be for effect) by Credit Suisse, Goldman, BTGP Brazilian, Deutsche, Bank of America and Citibank, and that it was really a three horse race in which Deutsche Bank, Bank of America and Citibank would be chosen for the gold swap, but for $500 million each. Furthermore, Sardi said that Venezuela was paying $70 million to each bank as a risk premium. El Universal was previously said to be critical of Chavez, but may now not be so critical of Maduro.
On 12 March, on a web site of an organisation called Aporrea, Fresia Ipinza retorted (possibly with more up-to-date information) that rumours were saying that the gold swap would be over 4 years for 1.4 million ozs, and that allegedly Bank of America and Credit Suisse were involved. Aporrea were known to be Chavez supporters.
So, its very possible that the list of investment banks pitching to Venezuela for the gold swap were as follows: Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Citibank, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and BTGP. BTGP refers to BTG Pactual, a Brazilian investment bank.
A combination of sources (see links) yield the following details about the gold swap with Citi. The details are said to be derived from newspaper ‘El Nacional’ and also a former director of the BCV, and also from Reuters.
Venezuela (via the BCV) will put up 1.4 million ozs of gold as collateral in exchange for a $1 billion loan of foreign currency from Citibank. Since 1.4 million ozs of gold, valued at the late April 2015 price of $1,200, is roughly $1.68 billion, then Venezuela is having to accept a near 40% discount on the specified gold collateral. Venezuela also pays interest on the loan at between 6% and 7% per annum.
The swap is for a 4 year duration, and Venezuela will have the “right of first refusal” to re-purchase the gold after 4 years. The 1.4 million ozs of gold (43.5 tonnes and just less than 3,500 Good Delivery bars equivalent) will be held at the vaults of the Bank of England. If Venezuela does not pay the interest payments on time, Citibank can gain control of the gold. The loan was expected to be for $1.5 billion but its unclear why this changed, but probably would have something to do with a bigger haircut being imposed.
According to ‘Venezuela Analysis‘ the “current value [of the gold] will continue to appear on the Central Bank’s balance sheet – an advantage that Goldman Sachs denied the country in earlier talks.” ‘Venezuela Analysis’ also said that some sources think Citibank holds title to the gold, while other say Venezuela holds title. Another relevant newspaper link is here.
None of the media commentary mentioned Adar Capital Partners Ltd in conjunction with the Citibank swap but its possible that this company could have been involved in the more recent swap negotiations, given that it was involved in the late 2013 gold swap negotiations involving Goldman Sachs and a lot of the swap terms are similar. On the other hand, the BCV could have just taken its gold swap file on the Goldman proposal out of the top drawer and reused the Goldman – Adar plan.
Venezuela’s international reserves fell by about US$2 billion during April from a level of $20.8 billion at the beginning of April. Lower oil prices have impacted the country’s ability to comfortably meet principal and interest payments on foreign bond borrowings and for financing imports. Inflation in Venezuela is running high, and there are reports of a shortage of essential goods and an impact on some public services. In short, the economy is contracting.
Rodriguez, the Bank of America economist, said that the gold swap was the ‘logical’ course of action for Venezuela to take. As to why Venezuela can’t negotiate oil swap deals in the current environment or get more financing from the BRICS or China, that is probably more of an international political issue and a reputational issue with the international capital markets.
Maria Corina Machado
On 12 March 2015, Maria Corina Machado, a deputy in the Venezuelan National Assembly and political leader of the opposition party, sent an offical letter to Nelson Merentes, president of the BCV, asking the following 5 questions about the gold swap, which at the time, in early March, was being rumoured.
Questions 1 and 2 are quite standard and to be expected in light of the general rumours about the swap, but questions 3, 4, and 5 seem to suggest that Machado had heard something about the negotiations that made her think that the size of the swap was going to be far larger ($2.6 billion), and that there would be a ‘second operation’ with an even larger swap, and that this would require moving gold out of Venezuela again. See the 5 questions below:
¿Está todo el oro de las reservas venezolanas en las bóvedas del BCV de Venezuela tal como afirmó el ex presidente el Hugo Chavéz 17 de agusto 2011, cuando ordenó “repatriacion de nuestro oro”?
Are all of Venezuela’s gold reserves in the vaults of the Central Bank of Venezuela as stated by the former president Hugo Chavéz on 17 agusto 2011, when he ordered “repatriation of our gold”?
2. ¿Está el BCV en negociación con la banca extranjera para la venta o empeño del oro monetario?
Is the BCV in negotiations with foreign banks for the sale or pawning of monetary gold?
3. ¿Es cierto que en la operacion de empeño del oro actualmente en discusión se pretende disponer de oro por un valor de mercado de 2,6 mil millones US$? ¿Esto representaría comprometer casi el 20% del total de reservas en oro de la Républica en esta primera operación?
Is it true that in the operation to pawn gold currently under discussion, it is intended to dispose of gold with a market value of US$ 2.6 billion? Does this represent / involve almost the 20% of the total gold reserves of the Republic, in this first operation?
4. ¿Es cierto que estarían negociando una segunda operacion de empeño similar a la anterior por un monto aun mayor?
Is it true that they would be negotiating a second operation similar to the previous one for an even greater amount?
5. ¿Estas operaciones implican sacar el oro de las bóvedas del BCV y regresarlas al exterior?
Do these operations involve removing the gold from the vaults of the BCV and returning it abroad?
In the letter, Machado claimed that “the [gold swap] exchange would jeopardize the achievement of economic stability” and “would compromise the future of the Republic and the welfare of millions of Venezuelans“.
She also called for the monetary gold bullion held by the BCV and the exact amount held abroad to be “certified by an independent and trusted international body”.
There does not seem to be any publicly available response from the central bank to Machado’s letter, so its unclear as to which answers, if any, Machado received from the BCV. However, given the deteriorating state of Venezuela’s international finances and international reserves at the present time, it may be sooner rather than later before Venezuelan gold could be on the move again out of the country.
One thing is for sure. Gold leaving Venezuela on a flight back to London, New York, or elsewhere, will not get the fanfare and celebration that was accompanied by the same gold’s arrival into Caracas a few short years ago.