On August 10, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published an article about the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) custody gold and the NY Fed’s gold vault. This vault is located under the New York Fed’s headquarters at 33 Liberty in Manhattan, New York City.
The article, titled “The Fed Has 6,200 Tons of Gold in a Manhattan Basement – Or Does It?”, can be read on the subscription only WSJ site here, but is also viewable in full on both the Fox News Business and MorningStar websites, here and here. It also appeared on the front page of the Wall Street Journal print edition on Friday, August 11.
The NY Fed offers a ‘custody gold’ storage service to its customers, customers which are exclusively foreign central banks and international financial institutions, except notably, the US Treasury is also a gold storage customer of the NY Fed. The Fed’s gold vault, which is on level E (the lowest level) of its basement area under its downtown Manhattan headquarters, open in 1924, and has been providing a gold storage service for foreign central banks since at least the mid-1920s. Custody gold means that the NY Fed stores the gold on behalf of its customers in the role of custodian, and the gold is supposed to be stored on an allocated and segregate basis, i.e. “Earmarked gold”.
NY Fed stored gold has risen in public consciousness over the last few years arguably because of recent Bundesbank gold repatriation operations from New York as well as also similar gold repatriation from the central bank of the Netherlands. The moves by the Chinese and Russian central banks to actively increasing their gold reserves have also put focus on whether the large traditional central bank / official sector gold holders (such as Germany, Italy and the International Monetary Fund) have all the gold that they claim to have, much of which is supposedly stored at the NY Fed vault.
The main theme of the August 10 WSJ piece, as per the title, is whether the NY Fed actually stores all the gold in the vault that its claims to store, a theme which it introduced as follows:
“Eighty feet below the streets of lower Manhattan, a Federal Reserve vault protected by armed guards contains about 6,200 tons of gold.
The WSJ article intersperses a number of facts about this custody gold alongside various quotes, and while I cannot speak for anyone else quoted in the article, the quotes could probably best be described as being on the sceptical side of the NY Fed’s official claims.
Since I am quoted in the article, it seems appropriate to cover it here on the BullionStar website. The relevant section is as follows:
‘But “no one at all can be sure the gold is really there except Fed employees with access,” said Ronan Manly, a precious-metals analyst at gold dealer BullionStar in Singapore. If it is all there, he said, the central bank has “never in its history provided any proof.”
Mr. Manly is among gold aficionados who wonder if the bank is hiding something about what it’s hiding.’
Let me begin by explaining the basis of my quote.
The only reporting which the New York Fed engages in for the custody gold recorded as being held on behalf of its customers (central banks and official sector organizations) is a single number communicated each month (with a 1 month lag) on Federal Reserve table 3.13 – “Selected Foreign Official Assets Held at Federal Reserve Banks” and listed as “Earmarked Gold”.
As of the end of July 2017, the Fed reported that it was holding $7.84 billion of “Earmarked Gold” in foreign and international accounts. This amount is a valuation at the official US Treasury / Fed price of gold of US $42.22 per fine troy ounce, and which works out at approximately 5775 tonnes of gold.
The reason that this figure differs from the ~6200 tonnes number quoted by the Wall Street Journal is that it doesn’t include 416 tonnes of US treasury gold also claimed to be stored in the NY fed vaults. When the US Treasury claimed quantity is added, the figure comes to 6191 tonnes, hence the WSJ citation of circa 6200 tonnes.
NY Fed Gold – Opacity and Secrecy
Other than that, the Federal Reserve does not publicly communicate any other relevant information or details about the quantity of custody gold bars said to be stored in its vault, and furthermore, the Fed has never in its history publicly communicated any such relevant details or information.
So it is a fact that the Federal Reserve has “never in its history provided any proof” that all the gold it claims is there is really there, hence the quote is factual, and hence the connected quote that “no one at all can be sure the gold is really there except Fed employees with access” is a valid conclusion also.
The NY Fed has never provided any of the following:
– details of the names of the central banks and international financial institutions that it claims to hold gold on behalf of
– details of how much gold is held by each customer
– details of whether any of the gold stored in the vault is under lien, claim encumbrance or other title
– details of whether any of the custody gold is lent or swapped
– details of location swaps and / or purity swaps of gold bars between the NY Fed vaults and other central bank or commercial bank vaults around the world
– details of the fact that nearly all of the gold bars supposedly held in the NY Fed vault are a combination of old US Assay office gold bars and low grade coin bars made from melted coins
The NY fed has never allowed the conduct of any independent physical gold bar audits or published any results of its own audits. It has never published any gold bar weights lists (note one weight list for some US Treasury gold bars stored at the NY Fed vault made it into the public domain in 2011 as part of documentation that was submitted to a ‘Investigate the US Gold’ hearing in front of the US House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. That weight list starts on page 132 of the pdf which can be accessed here.
Mainstream Media Cheerleaders and Detractors
The lack of transparency of the New York Fed as regards the custody gold that it stores for its central bank customers is therefore a valid point. The Wall Street Journal article of August 10 is merely highlighting this valid point. However, predictably this did not stop some mainstream US media critics from denouncing the WSJ article such as can be seen in the following tweet from a CNBC ‘chief economic correspondent‘.
In which the WSJ takes seriously the lunatics who think the NY Fed is lying about what's in its vaults. https://t.co/83LsDN4ApP
I would wager that this Ben White chap from CNBC has never asked the New York Fed any serious questions about its custody gold, preferring instead to throw around tweets using accusatory language such as ‘lunatics’. But this sort of reaction is par for the course from elements of the cheerleading US mainstream media, who seem to feel an obligation to protect the Fed and the status quo of the incumbent central bank led financial system from any valid criticism.
However, I have asked the NY Fed serious questions about its custody gold.
– the number of central banks and official sector institutions that have gold in storage with the NY Fed in Manhattan.
– the identities of these central banks / official sector institutions that have gold in storage.
– could FRBNY CBIAS / Account Relations provide me with gold bar weight lists for the gold holdings that these central banks and official sector institutions hold with the NY Fed?
As the first query went unanswered, I then resubmitted the query a month later in mid-March. On neither occasion did the Fed respond or acknowledge the request. Realistically, I didn’t expect the NY Fed to answer, since they have track record of being aloof and unanswerable to anyone but their own stakeholders, however, the outcome of the emails has established that the NY Fed does not engage on this issue nor provide any transparency in this area to the public.
I had expected the WSJ article to be a lot longer and more in-depth than it actually was, and to obtain some publishable response from the NY Fed. The WSJ however says in the article that:
“The Fed declined to comment”
The lack of any quotation by the Fed within the WSJ article is a glaring omission, and actually proves the complete lack of cooperation by the Fed on the entire topic of gold bar storage. The WSJ article does say that it filed Freedom of Information (FOIA) Requests with the NY Fed, which again underscores that without FOIAs, the Fed wouldn’t voluntarily reveal anything.
What these Freedom of Information requests actually contained is not, however, even revealed by the WSJ, except hilariously in one passing reference to “a heavily redacted tour guide manual“. Hilarious in the sense that the NY Fed would even see fit to heavily redact a simple tour-guide manual. To quote the WSJ:
‘The Wall Street Journal filed Freedom-of-Information requests with the New York Fed. Among the Journal’s findings, from a heavily redacted tour-guide manual provided by the Fed: Tour guides are informed that “visitors are excitable” and should be asked to “please keep their voices down.”‘
Why doesn’t the Wall Street Journal do a full publication of all the NY Fed FOIA responses that it received and publish them on its website? This at least would be some sort of backup evidence to the published article.
There are a multitude of angles that the Wall Street Journal could cover if it wanted to do a proper investigation into the gold bars supposedly stored in the NY Fed vault below 33 Liberty on Manhattan Island.
Why did the German Bundesbank take multiple years to transfer back a small portion of the gold that it claimed to have held at the NY Fed vaults, with much of that gold having to be recast / remelted into new bars en route to Frankfurt in Germany. If the gold was allocated and segregated to the Bundesbank account at the NYFed, there would have been no reason for the multi-year transfer delays and no reason to need to melt down and recast any gold bars.
Why did low-grade coin bars start turning up in the NY Fed vaults from 1968 onwards? The only place they could have come from is Fort Knox in Kentucky. The fact that these low-grade coin bars had to be used suggests there was not enough high-grade gold bars (995 US assay office Good Delivery gold bars) to satisfy central bank customer requirements at the NY Fed vault at that times. Some of these coins bars were over time shifted out of the NY Fed vaults and refined into high-grade bars and sent to the Bank of England in London. How much coin bar gold is still in the NY Fed vault.
For the 3 largest claimed gold holders at the NY Fed, which are the Banca d’Italia, the Bundesbank and the International Monetary Fund, and which between supposedly hold at least 4000 tonnes of gold at the NY Fed, there is no way to validate the accuracy of any of these holdings, neither from IMF, Bundesbank or Banca d’Italia sources, nor from the NY Fed. These gold holdings have, on paper, not changed since the early 1970s, but thats over 40 years ago and there is no way to check the accuracy of these 3 holdings which make up the lions share of all the gold supposedly held at the NYFed.
Why is there a tunnel between the NY Fed level E basement gold vault to the Chase Manhattan Plaza level B5 basement gold vault across the street? i.e. Why is a central bank vault linked to a commercial vault run by a commercial bank (JP Morgan Chase)?
Does, or has the JP Morgan / Chase in the past, facilitated the activation of NY Fed stored central bank gold into the commercial gold market via movements of gold bars from 33 Liberty to Chase Manhattan Plaza vaults?
Why is there no mention in the Wall Street Journal article of the NY Fed’s Auxiliary vault which was built in 1963 and its location, and which supposedly stores gold bars in a “wall of gold”. Was this not newsworthy?
Why did the 2004 version of the NY Fed gold vault brochure ‘The Key to the Gold Vault’ state that gold bars “belonging to some 60 foreign central banks and international monetary organizations” were stored at the NY Fed vault, and then the 2008 version of the same brochure had changed this statement to gold “belonging to some 36 foreign governments, central banks and official international organizations”.
Why the drop from 60 customers to 36 customers. I have heard from a very reliable senior ex-NY Fed executive that some central banks were unhappy to keep their gold in Manhattan in the aftermath of 9/11 and wanted it stored elsewhere. You wouldn’t blame then given what happened to the Scotia gold vaults under the WTC 4 on 9/11.
Why does the NY Fed decline to comment for a Wall Street Journal article? Surely this should ring alarm bells at the Wall Street Journal?
“In the Governor’s absence I attended the meeting in Zijlstra’s room in the BIS on the afternoon of Monday, 10th December to continue discussions about a possible gold pool. Emminger, de la Geniere, de Strycker, Leutwiler, Larre and Pohl were present.”
13 December 1979 – Kit McMahon to Gordon Richardson, Bank of England
A central bank Gold Pool which many people will be familiar with operated in the gold market between November 1961 and March 1968. That Gold Pool was known as the London Gold Pool.
This article is not about the 1961-1968 London Gold Pool. This article is about collusive central bank discussions relating to an entirely different and more recent central bank Gold Pool arrangement. These discussions about a second Gold Pool began in late 1979, i.e. more than 11 years after the London Gold Pool had been abandoned. This article is Part 1 of a 2 part series. Part 2 will be published shortly.
These discussions about a new Gold Pool arrangement took place in an era of soaring free market gold prices and in the midst of the run-up in the gold price to US$850 in January 1980.
The discussions and meetings about a new Gold Pool in 1979 and 1980 and beyond which are detailed below, occurred at the highest levels in the central banking world and involved the world’s most powerful central bankers, some of whose names will be familiar to readers. The aim of these central bank discussions and meetings was to reach agreement on joint central bank action to subdue and manipulate the free market gold price in the early 1980s. Many of these collusive meetings were private meetings between a handful of Group of 10 (G10) central bank governors, and took place in the actual office of the president of the Bank of International Settlements in Basle, Switzerland.
Above all, these central bank meetings show intent. Intent by a group of powerful central banks to manipulate a free market gold price so as to distort free market gold pricing signals. So these documents are timeless in that regard. The documents also illustrate the concern that a rising gold price in the free market creates for senior central bankers, and importantly, also shows that these same central bankers have no qualms, at least from a legal or moral perspective, of intervening to manipulate a gold price when they see it as a threat to their fiat currency monetary system.
The 1961-1968 London Gold Pool was a collusive arrangement between 8 major central banks to attempt to keep a lid on the official gold price at US $35 per ounce. That Gold Pool was instigated at the headquarters of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle, Switzerland and monitored at the BIS by the governors of the Pool’s member central banks. However, day-to-day activities of the 1961-1968 Gold Pool were executed by the Pool’s agent, the Bank of England in London. Hence it was dubbed the London Gold Pool. Famously, this London Gold Pool collapsed on Thursday 14 March 1968 when speculative buying in the London Gold Market overwhelmed available Gold Pool supplies from member central banks.
Whereas the members of the 1961-1968 London Gold Pool consisted of the central banks of the United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, France, Belgium and Italy, the discussions about a new Gold Pool that took place in 1979, 1980 and beyond, involved the very same central banks.
The 1961 -1968 Gold Pool was both a selling syndicate, where the members pooled their gold reserves to intervene in the London gold market, and a buying syndicate where the member central banks attempted to replenish gold that had been used in the gold price capping operations. Similarly, as you will see below, the discussions on a new Gold Pool in 1979 and 1980 involved participant West European central banks which on the whole wished to be able to buy gold for the Pool as well as sell gold from the Pool.
Central to illustrating how the most powerful central bankers in the world colluded to attempt to establish a new Gold Pool are a number of internal documents from the Bank of England which provide a detailed blueprint on the evolution of these collusive discussions at the BIS, as well as providing detailed insights into the thinking of the senior Bank of England executives involved in the meetings. These internal correspondence documents from 1979 and 1980 can be thought of as the equivalent of internal emails in the era before corporate email systems.
As you will see below, so many names of high level central bankers crop up in the discussions and documents, that to provide context, this necessitated some short background summaries on who these people were and what roles they occupied. It is also necessary to provide some brief context on gold price movements during the period under discussion.
The Gold Price Run-up during 1979 and 1980
When the London Gold Pool collapsed in mid-March 1968, a two-tier gold market took its place, with the private market gold price breaking higher, while central banks continued to trade gold with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and US Treasury at the official price of US$ 35 per ounce. However, in August 1971, Nixon closed this FRBNY / Treasury ‘Gold Window’ by ending the convertibility of US dollar liabilities into gold that had been an option for foreign central banks and foreign governments. This was the birth of the free-floating gold price.
By the end of 1974, the US dollar gold price had soared to $187 per troy ounce. Following this, the next 3 years saw the gold price first trade down to near $100 during August 1976 before resuming its uptrend. Year-end gold prices over this period were in the $135 – $165 range. In 1978, the price again broke to a record high and finished the year at $226 per ounce. See chart below.
But it was in 1979 that the US dollar gold price really took off, setting record after record. In July 1979, the $300 level was breached for the first time. During October 1979, the gold price then took out $400 for the first time. During December 1979, the gold price hit $500. While these late 1979 price increases were in themselves phenomenal, what then occurred in January 1980 was even more striking, for in the space of a few weeks, the price rocketed up first through $600, then $700, and then through the $800 level before peaking in late January 1980 at a then record of $850 per ounce. See chart below.
The mid-1970s saw a flurry of official gold sales to the market which although strategically designed in part to subdue the gold price, in practice didn’t achieve that goal over the medium term. Between June 1976 and May 1980, the International Monetary Fund sold 25 million ounces (777 tonnes) of gold in 45 public auctions. Between May 1978 and November 1979, the US Treasury sold 8.05 million ounces of high grade gold (99.5% fine) and 7.75 million ounces of low grade gold (90% fine) in 23 auctions to the private market. That’s just over 15 million ounces (466 tonnes) of gold in total auctioned by the Treasury. The last US Treasury auctions were on 16 October 1979 when 750,000 ounces of low grade coin bars were auctioned, and then on 1 November 1979 when the Treasury implemented a variable sales quantity approach and auctioned 1,250,000 ounces of low grade coin bars. On 15 January 1980, the US Treasury Secretary announced an official end of US gold sales.
As the 1980 annual report of the bank for International Settlements noted when reviewing the 1979 gold market:
“The further increase in [gold] supplies was overshadowed by the dramatic rise in the demand for gold which, in the space of little over a year, caused the London market price to increase more than fourfold to a peak of $850 per ounce in January 1980.”
“In addition to its sheer magnitude, last year’s  gold price rise had three other remarkable features: firstly, it took place against all major currencies, including those whose value had increased most during the 1970s. Secondly, it took place at a time of generally rising interest rates in the industrialised world, one effect of which was to increase the cost of holding gold. Thirdly, it took place at a time when, by and large, the dollar was strengthening in the exchange markets.”
It is against this background of surging gold prices, pre-existing gold auctions, turmoil in currency markets, slow growth and high inflation, that the first of the collusive Gold Pool discussions took place between September 1979 and January 1980 at the BIS.
Gold Pool Revival
There now follows a series of confidential memorandums and briefings from the Bank of England, the first of which, marked ‘SECRET‘ was an analysis written by the Bank of England’s John Sangster to the attention of the Bank of England’s Christopher McMahon. Documents are in blue text and italics, with bold and underlining added where appropriate. A lot of the text in the documents is self-explanatory and the underlying and bold text just draws attention to sections of particular interest.
Christopher McMahon, known as ‘Kit’ McMahon, was an executive director at the Bank of England from 1970 to 1980, before becoming Deputy Governor of the Bank of England on 1 March 1980. Prior to McMahon’s promotion, Jasper Hollom was Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. Kit McMahon’s full name is Christopher William McMahon, hence he signed his his internal Bank of England memos and correspondence with the initials ‘CWM’.
McMahon left the Bank of England in 1986 to take up the role of Chief Executive and Deputy Chairman of Midland Bank. In 1987, McMahon was also made Chairman of Midland Bank. McMahon left Midland in 1991. Since 1974, Midland Bank had also owned Samuel Montagu, one of the five traditional bullion firms of the London Gold Market. HSBC acquired full ownership of Midland in 1992 after acquiring a 15% stake in 1987 when McMahon was Chairman and Chief Executive of Midland. See profiles of McMahon here and here.
John Sangster’s full name was John Laing Sangster, hence he signed his internal Bank of England memos and analysis with the initials ‘JLS’.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, Sangster was the Bank of England’s foreign exchange and gold specialist. In March 1980, Sangster became one of six newly appointed assistant directors at the Bank of England. To give some idea of the senior level at which Sangster was operating at that time at the Bank, when he was promoted to assistant director in March 1980, two of Sangster’s contemporaries that also made assistant director at the time were Eddie George (gilt-edged operations area) and David Walker (economics area). Sangster retired from the Bank of England in 1982. Eddie George went on to be Governor of the Bank of England from 1993 to 2003. David Walker went on to head a whole host of institutions in the City of London including the chairmanship of Barclays Bank.
The first document which follows was written on 21 September 1979 when the gold price closed at $376.41.
Mr McMahon Copy to Mr Byatt
It is just possible that over the next few weeks some central banks may try to discuss a possible revival of the gold pool. Rather like the sterling credit of June 1976, a number of people could spontaneously be thinking that the time is ripe for some joint action.
The main arguments would be: -
(a) gold is even now so much part of the international monetary system that its present performance is a significant element in general currency instability;
(b) whereas previously the weakness in the dollar had been boosting gold, latterly the strength of gold has itself contributed to the dollar’s renewed weakness;
(c) the market now looks overbought, and there is a need to break the psychologyof “the market can only go one way and that is up”. Such an attitude has obvious dangers in any market but given gold’s residual monetary connections, there must be a danger that financial institutions could become over exposed in this area;
(d) a joint demonstration by central bankswould be all the more salutary since the market firmly believes that central banks are only interested in putting a floor under the price and that none wishes to stem its rise.
(e) it could flush out more Russian selling
There would obviously be no question of any permanent stabilisation of the gold price, merely at a critical time holding it within a target area. Such an operation could be mounted alongside the existing US auctions, although it is arguable that these have become too predictable and could, for the time being at least, be better subsumed in a new gold pool arrangement. As far as I know, nothing has yet been mooted to or by the FRBNY, and if there is no American interest the matter would be dropped. Nor would others consider the proposal, if there were no provision for the recapture of gold, were the market temporarily mastered.
There is nothing for us to do at the moment but be aware of the potential for discussion.. If the idea got off the ground and given the comparative paucity of our gold holding, it would obviously [page 2] be preferable to ensure that contributions were made in proportion to gold holdings rather than on any other basis.
21st September 1979
The actual memorandum from JLS to McMahon can be seen here:Page 1andPage 2. The links may take a little while to load first time.
Not surprisingly, as the Bank of England’s gold and foreign exchange specialist, Sangster was privy to the views and conversations of other central banks in this area at that time, for he correctly predicted that a group of central banks were about to embark on discussions about a new Gold Pool.
Sangster also correctly predicted that the European central banks’ preferred structure of the interventions be in the form of a Pool in which the gold used could be recaptured. Notably, Sangster’s assessment of the need for American buyin to the scheme also proved accurate.
It was convention in that day at the Bank of England for internal correspondence to be circulated to the recipients who then read it and added hand-written notes which they signed with their initials before returning the original circulated pages to the author. This was in the time before the advent of corporate email.
Hand-written note on JLS memorandum to Sangster, 21 September 1979
In the above memorandum, a hand-written note by Kit McMahon signed with the initials CWM at the top of page 1 reads as follows:
“Paul Jeanty told me that Zijlstra had told him personally a couple of weeks ago that he would now be in favour of a central bank operation to stabilise the price within a moving band. Leutwiler (frequently) and Clappier have said this to him in the past and he believes (I do not know on what evidence) that de Stryker and Baffi would go along with such a plan. All recognise, however, that Emminger has no disposition to support.
As above, there will be many famous names throughout this article, each of which needs to be briefly profiled so as to add context.
At the time of this correspondence, Paul Jeanty was Deputy Chairman of Samuel Montagu & Co, one of the five bullion dealers in the London Gold Market. Samuel Montagu & Co had been a wholly owned subsidiary of Midland Bank since 1974.
A Who’s Who of Central Bankers
Zijlstra refers to Dr. Jelle Zijlstra, Chairman and President of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) from 1967 to December 1981. Zijlstra was also simultaneously President of the Dutch central bank, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) from 1967 until the end of 1981.Notably,Zijlstra was also Dutch Prime Minister for a short period during 1966-67.
Leutwiler refers to Fritz Leutwiler, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank (Switzerland’s central bank) from May 1974 to December 1984. Leutwiler was also a member of the board of the BIS from 1974 to 1984, and served as President of the BIS between January 1982 and December 1984, as well as Chairman of the Board of the BIS from January 1982 to December 1984.
De Stryker refers to Cecil de Strycker, Governor of the National Bank of Belgium from February 1975 to the end of February 1982. At that time, De Stryker was also president of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund and then president of the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community.
Clappier refers to Bernard Clappier, Governor of the Banque de France from 1974 to 1979. Clappier was also vice-governor of the Banque de France from 1964 to 1973.
The reference to Baffi is Paolo Baffi, Governor of the Banca d’Italia from July 1975 until October 1979, and also a board member of the BIS since 1975. Baffi became Vice-Chairman of the BIS in 1988.
Emminger refers to Otmar Emminger, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1 June 1977 to 31 December 1979. Emminger was one of the principal architects of the IMF’s synthetic Special Drawing Right (SDR) in 1969 which was designed to be a competitor of and replacement for gold.
The next document below, from 18 October 1979 contains references to the above people and also references to other important central bankers, so it is best, at this stage, to explain these additional names also.
THE GOVERNOR of the Bank of England - Gordon Richardson. Richardson was Governor of the Bank of England for 10 years from 1973 to 1983, and a non-executive director of the Bank of England between 1967 and 1973. He was chairman of J. Henry Schroder Wagg from 1962 to 1972, and chairman of Schroders from 1966 to 1973. Richardson was also a director of Saudi International Bank in London. Saudi International Bank was formerly known as Al Bank Al Saudi Al Alami when it was incorporated in London in 1975, and is now known as Gulf International Bank UK Limited.
Ciampi refers to Carlo Ciampi. Ciampi was Governor of Banca d’Italia from October 1979 to April 1993, and also Vice-Chairman of the Bank for International Settlements between 1994 and 1996. Notably, Ciampi was also Prime Minister of Italy from April 1993 until May 1994, and President of Italy from May 1999 until May 2006.
Schmidt refers to Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor (head of state) of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) from 1974 to 1982.
Guth refers to Wilfried Guth, Chairman of the Board of Deutsche Bank (the commercial bank) from 1976, and from 1985 Chairman of the Supervisory Board of Deutsche Bank until 1990.
Al Quraishi refers to Abdulaziz Al-Quraishi. Al-Quraishi was Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) from 1974 to 1983. He was also Chairman of Saudi International Bank in London from 1987 to 1996, and was on the Board of Saudi International Bank at the same time as Gordon Richardson.
The Americans: Miller, Solomon, Volcker and Wallich
Miller refers to William Miller. Miller was US Secretary of the Treasury from August 1979 to January 1981. Before that, he was chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from March 1978 to August 1979.
Solomon refers to Anthony Solomon. From March 1977 to March 1980, Solomon was US Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. In April 1980, he became President of the New York Fed and stayed in that position until the end of 1984.
Volcker refers to Paul Volcker. In August 1979, Volcker took over from Miller as chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Prior to that, Volcker was President of the New York Fed from 1975 to 1979. Volcker had also been Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs 1969 to 1974.
Wallich is a reference to Henry Wallich. Wallich was an economist, who among other things, was a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 1974 to 1986. He was also a member of the Congressional Gold Commission in 1981-1982.
Gold Pool Discussions in Belgrade
This second document below was written by Kit McMahon on 18 October 1979 and addressed to the Bank of England Governor, Gordon Richardson. On 18 October 1979 the gold price closed at $386.84. The reference to Belgrade refers to the annual conference of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank which took place at the beginning of October 1979 at the Sava Center in Belgrade, the capital of the former Yugoslavia. Finance ministers and central bankers from 138 countries attended this IMF annual conference in Belgrade.
THE GOVERNOR O/R
Paul Jeanty came to see me this afternoon to report on a conversation be had with Leutwiler the other day in Zurich.
Leutwiler told him that the Americans had come to see him in Belgrade (the whole team of them – Miller, Solomon, Volcker and Wallich). To Fritz’s great surprise they had asked him whether he might organise a gold selling operation (it was mainly Volcker and Solomon who did the talking). They had apparently mentioned the possibility of being prepared to sell 10% of official reserves and were apparently prepared to join in themselves.
Fritz had replied that if an operation was mounted, nothing like 10% of reserves would be necessary; but that any gold that he sold he would want to buy back later on at a lower price. Again to his surprise the Americans had not demurred at this – a very big change from previous attitudes.
Fritz had told Jeanty, what Jeanty already knew, that Zijlstra would be interested; however, apparently Clappier indicated that he was against. This was a reversal of view which Leutwiler attributed to pressure from the Élysée which was itself influenced by the Germans. Leutwiler had also said that whereas Baffi had been in favour he had no knowledge of Ciampi’s attitude.
Emminger continued to be strongly against. Apparently, however, some attempt had been made to persuade Schmidt of the value of this idea. According to Leutwiler, Guth had urged it on him, but Schmidt does not appear to be prepared to oppose the Bundesbank.
There seems to be some disposition among those in favour to believe that OPEC are increasingly concerned that gold is outpacing oil and increasingly prepared to use this as an argument for higher oil prices. Jeanty asked Leutwiler whether he was sure that Al Quraishi would not rock the boat
and start buying if other central banks sent the price down. Leutwiler had assured him that he had often discussed it with Quraishi and that there would be no problem there. He then apparently gave a very interesting piece of information that Quraishi and Zijlstra are meeting with Emminger in Frankfurt next Tuesday – though not necessarily on this subject. Jeanty suggested it might be a plea to be allowed to diversify.
Finally, according to Jeanty, Fritz had asked if he would be likely to be seeing me, making it fairly clear that he would like the gist of these conversations to get to us. He knew that our reserves are small but he hoped that we might provide moral backing for an initiative to put pressure on Emminger.
I applied to all this, as I have to similar discussions on previous occasions, in a rather discouraging way, saying that while I disliked the instability of the gold price, I thought it was symptomatic more than causal of currency problems and that their would be a sharp fall if and when Volcker’s policy succeeded. Moreover, while it would be easy and nice for central banks to force the price down too hard and quickly, thereafter – and particularly when they started buying back, they could well find that they were riding a tiger.
I would have said this to Jeanty whatever my views, but in fact I remain extremely doubtful about the wisdom of any enterprise of this kind – at least divorced from much more wide-ranging agreements about currency stability. However, I thought the conversation was of interest in a number of ways not least in providing further evidence of the way central bankers will talk to major operators in the gold market. I imagine you might want to have some further conversations on this subject with your colleagues in Basle.
18th October 1979
The above memorandum from McMahon to Richardson can be seen here: Page 1 and Page 2. The links may take a little while to load first time.
The following key points are notable from McMahon’s analysis. Zijlstra, as BIS President and as president of the Dutch central bank was in clear favour of the Gold Pool idea.
At the IMF conference in Belgrade at the start of October 1979, the representatives of the US Treasury (Miller and Solomon) and of the Fed Board of Governors (Volcker and Wallich) approached Fritz Leutwiler, chairman of the Swiss National Bank to discuss coordinated gold sales.
At the time, this was alluded to within the financial media, but only in a very general way and there was no mention of a Gold Pool. On 2 October 1979, the New York Times wrote:
“The United States Government, weighing new plans to stabilize the dollar on exchange markets, suggested today that it might increased the amount of gold it offers at monthly auctions and that it was considering the possibility of internationally coordinated bullion sales.
Anthony M Solomon, Treasury Secretary for Monetary Affairs, said the international effort had been discussed with ‘various’ Government representatives on the fringes of the Belgrade annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank.”
The Americans appear to have had a change of mind by the time they met in Belgrade since they were by then comfortable with the notion of recapturing any gold used in price manipulation operations. i.e. a Gold Pool, but by implication they had previously not been in favour of trying to recapture any gold sold.
Note that Volcker and Miller had also met with Helmut Schmidt and Otmar Emminger in Hamburg on their way to Belgrade when they held a meeting to discuss how best to defend the US dollar on the currency markets.
Bernard Clappier, governor of the Banque de France, was by then less in favour of a Pool due to political pressure from the Élysée, which in this context refers to the French Council of Ministers who meet at the Élysée Palace, home of the French president. But that French reluctance was attributed to influence from the Bundesbank which was itself reluctant to engage in the scheme, but as revealed below, this was more due to the Bundesbank’s desire that the US monetary authorities fix the larger currency / dollar issues of the day in parallel with engaging in any Gold Pool operations.
Volcker Headed back to Washington for FOMC Meeting
During the Belgrade IMF conference, Paul Volcker had unexpectedly and suddenly left Belgrade on Tuesday 2nd October and headed back to Washington. He did this to convene a special secret and previously unscheduled meeting of the Fed’s FOMC which occurred on Saturday 6 October 1979. It was at this meeting that Volcker announced the now famous change in Fed policy that saw it shift its focus to monitoring and managing the volume of bank reserves in the financial system as opposed to trying to micro manage the federal funds rate level, and which ushered in much higher interest rates and a recession in an attempt to rein in inflation.
But there are also some interesting references in the transcripts of that 6 October FOMC meeting and in a transcript of a 5 October FOMC conference call preparatory meeting, that make reference to the discussions on gold that Volcker, Miller, Solomon and Wallich had with their European central banker peers while in Belgrade. In the 5 October FOMC conference call meeting Volcker said:
“Let me summarize some of this by saying that late last week–actually beginning before then but particularly late last week and in the very early part of this week–these markets, by which I mean the gold market very obviously and the foreign exchange markets, were “depressed.” I guess that’s the right word. And the atmosphere was very nervous. I think that has been largely turned around by an expectation that there will be some action.“
In its 6 October 1979 FOMC meeting, Volcker makes reference to the soundings which the Americans made in Belgrade with other central bankers:
“The possibility of gold sales has been canvassed up and down. “
“The question has been debated up and down and I think it is essentially unsettled. There is a possibility [of gold sales], particularly if the gold market acts up again, but there has been no firm consensus reached on that point simply because in our mutual discussions some concern was expressed about whether they are effective or not effective over a period of time. They might be effective immediately. But if the gold sales have a nice effect immediately and we test it a little while later and the gold price goes up again, the question arises: Is it confidence inspiring or is it not?
Or is it really better over a period of time just to leave the [gold] market alone? I think that question has to be left on that basis for the time being.”
“We will have cooperation, I think, from our foreign partners either on gold or on intervention to the degree that they feel that we have done something here; that is an essential part of setting the stage. We will get that kind of cooperation, I suppose, with the limitations of enthusiasm that are inherent in my earlier comments. I don’t mean to suggest that that type of activity is “out” if we mutually think it is advantageous. On the contrary, it is ‘”in” over a period of time with an appropriate background. But it is not “in” in the sense of announcing an international package of that type this weekend.”
Interestingly, on the same day, 18 October 1979, a former Bank of England executive, George Bolton, rang the Bank of England to relay news about rumoured clandestine gold sales by the US to the Saudis:
THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR Copies to DAHB and JLS
Sir George Bolton rang to say that he had heard from a reasonably reliable source of a story current in both Washington and New York. This was to the effect that the USA were planning to sell 10 mn. ounces of gold in four separate unannounced operations before the end of this year. He said that it was being undertaken to placate the Saudi Arabians.
P.W.F. Ironmonger, Governor’s Office 18th October 1979
Sir George Bolton had been an executive director of the Bank of England in the 1950s and a non-executive director of the Bank of England in the 1960s, and is attributed as having playing an important role in the development of the Eurodollar market in London. It is not clear why Bolton was still relaying market intelligence to the Bank of England in 1979. Perhaps he did this on an informal basis for the Governors.
However, it is very interesting that Bolton said that the Americans were selling 10 million ounces (311 tonnes) of gold to the Saudis to placate them, and this ties in with McMahon’s comments to Richardson that “OPEC are increasingly concerned that gold is outpacing oil”, but that Al Quraishi of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA) “would not rock the boat” and buy gold on the market if a new gold pool was selling, but that at the same time Leutwiler thought that Al Quraishi and SAMA were eager to “diversify” i.e. reinvest their oil revenues in a more diversified way including in physical gold.
Since the last US Treasury gold auction was on 1 November 1979 for 1.25 million ounces of low grade coin bar gold, were 10 million ounces of gold sold directly to the Saudis out of US gold stockpiles, 10 million ounces which were never reported to the market? Or did the US use another central bank’s gold as part of a gold swap to ‘placate’ the Saudis with? These questions remain unanswered, but its important to remember the gold and oil connection and the importance to which the Western European and US monetary authorities attached to ‘keeping the Saudis happy’. More on these oil and gold connections in Part 2.
First Gold Pool Meeting – 12 November 1979
In the above memorandum dated 18 October 1979 that Kit McMahon sent to Govenror Gordon Richardson about the Belgrade discussions and the establishment of a new Gold Pool, there is a hand-written reply in red pen from Richardson to McMahon written on 4 November 1979, as follows:
Thank you for this interesting note which I read some days ago. I agree with your comment at X at the bottom of Page 2. I will pursue with Fritz at Baslebut I wonder if it has not now died. GR 4/11’
Fritz refers to Fritz Leutwiler, then Chairman of the Swiss National Bank. X refers to “conversation was of interest in a number of ways not least in providing further evidence of the way central bankers will talk to major operators in the gold market”. A hand-written reply from McMahon to Richardson reads “possible but still worth raising, CWM”.
There is also another handwritten note at the top of page 1 which reads “Copy for November Basle Dossier”.
However, the Gold Pool initiative did not die as Richardson thought it might, for on Tuesday 6 November 1979, Zijlstra called a meeting for the following Monday 12 November to take place at his office at the BIS, and invited the central bank governors of the Bank of England, the Bundesbank, the Banque de France, the Swiss National Bank, the Belgian central bank, and of course, the Dutch central bank which was represented by Zijlstra himself.
NOTE FOR RECORD
Copies to: The Governor, The Deputy Governor, Mr McMahon, Mr Payton, Mr Balfour, Mr Sangster
“Dr. Zijlstra telephoned the Governor to say that he is holding a meeting in his room at the BIS at 10:30am on Monday 12th November. Others invited to attend are de Strycker, Leutwiler, Clappier and Emminger or Pohl. Dr. Zijlstra said that the subject would be that about which the Governor and he spoke while in Belgrade (possibly gold).”
L.C.W Mayes, Governor’s Office 6th November 1979
Handwritten on the note was “Basle Dossier“, and the initials GR in red (for Gordon Richard) with the date 8/11.
The last few months of 1979 was a period that witnessed new governors being installed at both the Banque de France and Banca d’Italia and a new president at the Bundesbank. At the Banca d’Italia, Paolo Baffi resigned on 7 October 1979, and Carlo Ciampi (then deputy governor) became governor. At the Banque de France, Bernard Clappier stepped down as governor on 23 November 1979 , and Renaud de La Genière took his place. At the Bundesbank, Otmar Emminger retired in December 1979, and Karl Otto Pohl became President.
This explains why the meeting invitation above says “Emminger or Pohl” because November and December 1979 was a transition time at the Bundesbank between Emminger and Pohl. Pohl only joined the Bundesbank in 1977, first serving as vice-president between 1 June 1977 to 31 December 1979. Pohl then became president of the Bundesbank on 1 January 1980 and remained as Bundesbank President until 31 July 1991.
This adhoc Gold Pool discussion meeting by a subset of G10 central bank governors at the BIS in Basle, Switzerland, was the first of 3 such meetings that took place on 12 November 1979, 10 December 1979, and 7 January 1980, respectively, and variously involved G10 central banker governors Zijlstra, Leutwiler, Richardson, Emminger, Pöhl, McMahon, de Strycker, de la Genière, Clappier, as well as René Larre, the BIS General Manager.
The Bank of England archives only have a summary of the meeting which took place on 10 December 1979 (which is covered below). The very fact that there is a record of the 10 December 1979 meeting is itself a streak of luck since Kit McMahon attended the meeting that day in the place of Gordon Richardson, since, according to the Governor’s Diary for that day, Richardson had to leave the BIS early on 10 December to return to London in order to attend a meeting with the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at 10 Downing Street.
Additionally, when asked for minutes of these 3 meetings from 12 November 1979, 10 December 1979, and 7 January 1980 where the attendees were the above governors, the BIS Archives claimed it did not have such minutes and responded:
“The Gold Pool came to an end in 1968, so I take it that you are referring to meetings of the Gold and Foreign Exchange Committee. We do have some minutes for this meeting, but unfortunately not for the period which interests you.”
Preparing for the 12 November Gold Pool Meeting
Hand-written on the invitation notice for the 12 November meeting is a note from McMahon to Sangster which says: “JLS, Can you provide a short brief & factual background and thoughts on the advisability of any form of central bank action? (see attached note of a conversation with Jeanty)”. [This is the ‘Paul Jeanty came to see me‘ memorandum from above].
Sangster saw this note from McMahon on 7 November and responded as follows (remember that Sangster had read the “Paul Jeanty – Leutwiler” memorandum). Below is the third main document of the series. It was written by John Sangster on 7 November 1979, a day on which the US dollar gold price closed at $382.92.
Mr McMahon Copies to: Mr Byatt
(handwritten: ‘Copy to the Governor’)
POSSIBLE GOLD POOL
This heat may be now off this question although on a longer term view gold still looks substantially overpriced, unless oil-producing countries are determined to pre-empt a large proportion of current supplies.
$ per fine ounce
End 1974 almost 200
September 1976 almost back to 100
July 1978 through 200
July 1979 through 300
October 1979 through 400
There could obviously be endless argument about when the price was right. One can perhaps say no more than that 200 was obviously too high at end of 1974, as 100 was too low almost two years later. If these brackets are omitted, it seems difficult to justify a price over 300 now. I should certainly be reluctant to recommend purchases, other than for the jobbing book, at above this price.
It is largely possible that German opposition to any thoughts of a revived ad hoc gold pool was largely tactical. They did not wish to give the US the excuse for further delay by diverting attention with another attack on symptoms, when a fundamental policy appraisal was under way. This would be rather like the general opposition to the third sterling balance arrangement in 1976 before the IMF deal was complete. If this view of the German opposition were correct, the discussion could now revive with more chance of success – particularly as the gold price has become a reflection on currencies in general and not just on the dollar in particular. If it is thought that the US has now got its policy right the action on the gold price could bring the sort of success that would sustain faith while waiting for the important result to come through. Would such an action be any more than the correction of erratic fluctuations which we all advocate in a greater or lesser degree in currencies, but in a market more notoriously subject to violent swings.
Of course the action might fail when it comes to the other leg of the smoothing operation in that the pool might not succeed in buying back at lower levels all that it had previously sold. That is a risk that would have to be accepted from the outset: there should be no question of chasing the price back beyond the level at which the selling operation started.
Given that the US auctions are now discretionary it would obviously be advisable for such sales to be subsumed in any general pool arrangement.
By way of illustration, should we become involved in a G.10 plus Switzerland co-operative endeavour and contributions were clearly in proportion to total gold holdings, our share would be just under 2 7/8%
7th November 1979
The pages of this memorandum from Sangster to McMahon can be seen here: Page 1 and Page 2. The links may take a little while to load first time.
Second Gold Pool Meeting – 10 December 1979
Since there are no records available from the BIS nor elsewhere as to what transpired at the first Gold Pool meeting on 12 November, the best way to glean the thinking from the participants of that meeting is by examining the discussions that took place in the 2nd Gold Pool meeting on 10 December 1979, a meeting for which there is a detailed summary, courtesy of a briefing memorandum from Kit McMahon to Gordon Richardson.
The invitation for the 10 December meeting at Zijlstra’s office at the BIS in Basle was relayed to the Governor’s office at the Bank of England on 6 October 1979 and was, probably not surprisingly for that time, scrawled as a short note on some small blue paper:
President Zijlstra’s secretary rang yesterday to invite you to a meeting he is intending to hold on Monday 10th December from 10.00am. This meeting follows the one held on 12th November. The subject will be the same – gold.
I said I would revert if you were unable to attend.
[Initials illegible] 6/12/79”
Gordon Richardson saw and acknowledged this note with his initials GR in red pen on the note, and the date 6/12 – see below.
The following document is the fourth main document in the Bank of England series covered here. This document is the briefing letter from Kit McMahon to Gordon Richardson referring to the Gold Pool discussion meeting which took place in the office of the BIS President Jelle Dijlstra on Monday 10 December 1979. This is probably the most important documented featured in Part 1 of this two part article series, since it provides an in-depth insight into one of the collusive Gold Pool discussion meetings which the most powerful central bank governors of the time attended discussing the creation of a syndicate to manipulate down the free market price of gold. On 10 December 1979, the gold price closed at $428.14.
In the meeting document, the name Larre refers to RenéLarre, General Manager of the BIS. Larre was BIS General Manager from May 1971 to February 1981.
De la Geniere refers to Renaud de La Genière, Governor of the Banque de France from 1979 to 1984.
The other participants at the 10 December meeting were BIS President Jelle Zijlstra, Chairman of the Swiss National Bank Fritz Leutwiler, Bank of England executive director Kit McMahon, outgoing Bundesbank President Otmar Emminger, incoming Bundesbank president Karl Otto Pohl, and Governor of the National Bank of Belgium Cecil de Strycker.
To: The Governors Copies to : Mr Payton, Mr Balfour, Mr Sangster , Mr Byatt only
In the Governor’s absence I attended the meeting in Zijlstra’s room in the BIS on the afternoon of Monday, 10th December to continue discussions about a possible gold pool. Emminger, de la Geniere, de Strycker, Leutwiler, Larre and Pohl were present.
Larre began by outlining a way in which a possible gold pool might be handled. The BIS could undertake all the operations on behalf of a group of central banks on the basis of rather general criteria which would be reviewed monthly. The criteria would take into account not merely the developments of the price of gold but the affect any such developments appeared to be having on the dollar. Thus they would envisage selling only when gold was relatively strong and the dollar relatively weak and buying only in the reverse circumstances. They thought that they at least might start with a sum of around 20 tons (equals around $300 million at present prices). They could take running profits of losses on their books for a considerable period and though participating central banks would have to envisage the possibility of an ultimate loss or gain in gold, in practice all that might be involved would be a loss or gain in dollars. On this point both Zijlstra and Leutwiler emphasised that they were already liable to suffer substantial losses on their dollar reserves and would not be worried by the potential losses that they might they might sustain on this scheme.
In answer to a question from me, Zijlstra confirmed that the US realised that if any gold pool were developed, the European central banks would intend to buy back in due course any gold they sold. He said they were unhappy that the Europeans were not prepared to sell gold outright but they accepted it. Larre pointed out in parenthesis that TonySolomon was probably the only American now or in the recent past that would be prepared to accept such a line. He knew that Wallich and probably Volcker was against the whole idea.
Zijlstra and Leutwiler said they were both strongly in favour of going ahead on the basis Larre had suggested. They then asked what the other thought.
Emminger said that he had put this proposition to his Central Bank Council who were unanimously against it. His hands were therefore at present totally tied.
De Strycker said he was extremely doubtful about the scheme. He thought it was neither desirable nor necessary and carried considerable dangers. De la Geniere was also negative stressing the great political dangers for him of selling any French gold in this indirect way.
Leutwiler then suggested that they should do it the other way round: wait until the gold price went below 400 and then start the operation by buying. When the BIS had bought, say, 20 tons they would have a masse de manoeuvre which they could then sell. La Geniere said that this might be easier for him and he would consider the possibility of doing something along these lines. Emminger also said, though without much confidence, that it was possible that if the operation were to start along these lines and if it appeared to be going well, it might be possible to persuade the Central Bank Council to join in.
Leutwiler and Zijlstra then said that although they did not think a very large group was necessary to undertake the operation it probably had to be bigger than Two: specifically they really needed either the French of the Germans. Zijlstra said that although he had formal powers to do this he did not wish to do it without carrying his Government with him. The Government was still doubtful and would probably need to know that a number of other countries were going along with it.
At various points during the meeting there was a discussion about publicity for the operation and at an early point Zijlstra said that publicity was both inevitable and desirable if the operation was to have a maximum effect. He brushed aside my suggestion that while the publicity for any selling operations would be helpful, that attached to the later (or on the revised scheme, earlier) buying could be rather inflammatory. However, if the scheme were to be
simply a BIS one, publicity would not necessarily, or perhaps desirably, arise. This point was not really addressed in the discussion.
I made a number of sceptical points about the failure of commodity stabilisation schemes of all kinds in the past and the dangers of getting drawn in gradually to bigger and bigger commitments. Leutwiler said that there was no danger because the losses would be small. I said that I envisaged political dangers. If it got known that the central banks were involving themselves in the price of gold, however much they said it was only a smoothing rather than a stabilising operation, they would find themselves on a tiger. If the price of gold went on rising they would either have to increase their efforts or add to the upward pressure o gold by pulling out.
None of this carried any weight with anybody except perhaps de Strycker. In any case I was not asked for any commitment from us. There was, in fact, no discussion of whether or how contributions to the scheme would be based, but presumably it would be in relation to gold holdings so that they would not expect much from us.
The meeting ended with Leutwiler saying he would approach the Canadians and Japanese to see how they felt about the idea while Zijlstra would talk to the Italians. All would then think further about it and revert in January.
I must say I remain personally extremely sceptical about the desirability and efficacy of any scheme along the lines so far suggested.
13th December 1979
The pages of this meeting description from McMahon can be seen here: Page 1, Page 2 and Page 3. The links may take a little while to load first time.
The Essence of the 10 December Meeting
The following key points are notable from McMahon’s briefing of the 10 December Gold Pool discussions meeting. McMahon opens by stating that the meeting was called “to continue discussions about a possible gold pool“. This proves there was an earlier meeting in November as per the invitation for the November meeting despite the fact that no minutes or summary exist for the November meeting.
Zijlstra and Leutwiler acted as the 2 main advocates of the proposed Gold Pool arrangement. This is important to remember because Zijlstra was the President of the BIS at that time and Leutwiler became President of the BIS at the beginning of 1982 taking over from Zijlstra. So the heads of the BIS in the early 1980s were both firm advocates of the need for a new Gold Pool. Zijlstra and Leutwiler probably also represented the two most independent central banks present at the discussions, namey the Dutch and Swiss central banks.
The following countries were represented at the 10 December meeting: UK, Switzerland, West Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium. The following central banks were represented at the meeting:
Zijlstra – BIS and Netherlands central bank
McMahon – Bank of England
Emminger – Deutsche Bundesbank
Pohl – Deutsche Bundesbank
de la Geniere – Banque de France
de Strycker – Belgian central bank
Leutwiler – Swiss National Bank
Larre – Bank for International Settlements
The fact that Emminger had already put the suggestion to his Central Bank Council implies that this was probably a take-away after the November meeting. According to the Bundesbank 1979 annual report, there were 18 members of the Central bank Council (including Emminger and Pohl).
The market mechanics of the proposals discussed in the meeting are also classic collusive Gold Pool tactics to torpedo the gold price by “selling only when gold was relatively strong and the dollar relatively weak and buying only in the reverse circumstances.”
The discussion also made it clear that the preferred approach would be to operate as both a selling syndicate and a buying consortium as “European central banks would intend to buy back in due course any gold they sold.” It was even suggested that thebuying could occur first so as to create an inventory of physical gold with which to use to fund the selling interventions, i.e “wait until the gold price went below 400 and then start the operation by buying. When the BIS had bought, say, 20 tons they would have a masse de manoeuvre which they could then sell.”
Given that René Larre the BIS general manager began the meeting shows that he was coordinating or spearheading this meeting in his capacity as BIS general manager. It is also very interesting that McMahon states that “the BIS could undertake all the operations on behalf of a group of central banks” that could be “reviewed monthly”, which underlines the fact that overall, this could be viewed as a BIS led scheme, controlled and operated out of Basle.
A BIS scheme would also allow the Gold Pool to operate in secrecy, out of public view. In the words of McMahon “if the scheme were to be simply a BIS one, publicity would not necessarily, or perhaps desirably, arise“.
Following this 10 December meeting, the governors returned to their respective banks and recessed for Christmas and New Year, returning to Basle in early January where the next Gold Pool meeting took place on 7 January 1980, in a historic month in which the gold price rocket from $515 to $850 in a matter of weeks.
This concludes Part 1 of the series. There is a lot to digest in the above. Part 2 will continue where we left off, and will cover discussions of this new BIS Gold Pool during the period from January 1980 onwards. For now, some quotes from Part 2:
“This is not to advocate gold for oil directly; the price haggling would be too acrimonious. Market intermediation should allow the G10 to move with the price while attempting to control its pace as well as break off the experiment when possible or necessary.”
- John Sangster to Gordon Richardson, Anthony Loenhis & Kit McMahon, Bank of England, 17 September 1980
“I feel that it is necessary for us, within the Group of Ten and Switzerland, to consider ways to regulate the price of gold, admittedly within fairly broad limits”
- Jelle Zjilstra, BIS Chairman and President and Dutch central bank President, 27 September 1981
“First, there is the meeting on the Gold Pool, then, after lunch, the same faces show up at the G-10″
- Bundesbank President Karl Otto Pohl (who only began working at the Bundesbank in 1977) to journalist Edward Jay Epstein, in a conversation at the Bundesbank in 1983
In early February 2017 while preparing for a presentation in Gothenburg about central bank gold, I emailed Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank, enquiring whether the bank physically audits Sweden’s gold and whether it would provide me with a gold bar weight list of Sweden’s gold reserves (gold bar holdings). The Swedish official gold reserves are significant and amount to 125.7 tonnes, making the Swedish nation the world’s 28th largest official gold holder.
Before looking at the questions put to the Riksbank and the Riksbank’s responses, some background information is useful. Sweden’s central bank, Sveriges Riksbank aka Riksbanken or Riksbank, has the distinction of being the world’s oldest central bank (founded in 1668). The bank is responsible for the administration of Swedish monetary policy and the issuance of the Swedish currency, the Krona.
Since Sweden is a member of the EU, the Riksbank is a member of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), but since Sweden does not use the Euro, the Riksbank is not a central bank member of the European Central Bank (ECB). Therefore the Riksbank has a degree of independence that ECB member central banks lack, but still finds itself under the umbrella of the ESCB. Since it issues its own currency, the Riksbank is responsible for the management of the Swedish Krona exchange rate against other currencies, a task which should be borne in mind while reading the below.
On 28 October 2013, the Riksbank for the first time revealed the storage locations of its gold reserves via publication of the following list of five storage locations (four of these locations are outside Sweden) and the percentage and gold tonnage stored at each location:
Bank of England 61.4 tonnes (48.8%)
Bank of Canada 33.2 tonnes (26.4%)
Federal Reserve Bank 13.2 tonnes (10.5%)
Swiss National Bank 2.8 tonnes (2.2%)
Sveriges Riksbank 15.1 tonnes (12.0%)
The storage locations of Sweden’s official Gold Reserves: Total 125.7 tonnes
Nearly half of Sweden’s gold is stored at the Bank of England in London. Another quarter of the Swedish gold is supposedly stored with the Bank of Canada. The Bank of Canada’s gold vault was located under it’s headquarters building on Wellington Street in Ottawa. However, this Bank of Canada building has undergone a complete renovation and has been completely empty for a number of years, so wherever Sweden’s gold is in Ottawa, it has not been in the Bank of Canada’s gold vault for the last number of years.
The Swedish gold in Canada (along with gold holdings of the central banks of Switzerland, the Netherlands and Belgium) could, however, have been moved to the Royal Canadian Mint’s vault which is also in Ottawa. Bank of Canada staff are now moving back into the Wellington Street building this year. But is the Swedish gold moving back also or does it even exist? The location of the Swedish gold in Ottawa is a critical question which the Swedish population should be asking their elected representatives at this time, and also asking the Riksbank the same question.
Just over 10% of the Swedish gold is supposedly in the famous (infamous) Manhattan gold vault of the Federal Reserve under the 33 Liberty building. Given the complete lack of cooperation of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) in answering any questions about foreign gold holdings in this vault, then good luck to Swedish citizens in trying to ascertain that gold’s whereabouts or convincing the Riksbank to possibly repatriate that gold.
A very tiny 2% of Swedish gold is also listed as being held with the Swiss National Bank (SNB). The SNB gold vault is in Berne under its headquarters building on Bundesplatz.
The Riksbank also claims to hold 15.1 tonnes of its gold (12%) in its own storage, i.e. stored domestically in Sweden. Interestingly, on 30 October 2013, just two days after the Riksbank released details of its gold storage locations, Finland’s central bank in neighbouring Helsinki, the Bank of Finland, also released the storage locations of its 49 tonnes gold reserves. The Bank of Finland claims its 49 tonnes of gold is spread out as follows: 51% at the Bank of England, 20% at the Riksbank in Sweden, 18% at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 7% in Switzerland at the Swiss National Bank and 4% held in Finland by the Bank of Finland. This means that not only is the Riksbank storing 15.1 tonnes of Swedish gold, it also apparently is also storing 9.8 tonnes of Finland’s gold, making a grand total of 24.9 tonnes of gold stored with the Riksbank. The storage location of this 24.9 tonnes gold is unknown, but one possibility suggested by the Swedish blogger Cornucopia (Lars Wilderäng) is that this gold is being stored in the recently built Riksbank cash management building beside Stockholm’s Arlanda International Airport, a building which was completed in 2012.
On its website, the Riksbank states that its 125.7 tonnes of gold “is equivalent to around 10,000 gold bars”. A rough rule of thumb is that 1 tonne of gold consists of 80 Good Delivery Bars. These Good Delivery Gold gold bars are wholesale market gold bars which, although they are variable weight bars, usually each weigh in the region of 400 troy ounces or 12.5 kilograms. Hence 125.7 tonnes is roughly equal to 125.7 * 80 bars = 10,056 bars, which explains where the Riksbank gets its 10,000 gold bar total figure from.
Using Gold for Foreign Exchange Interventions
On another page on its web site titled ‘Gold and Foreign Currency Reserve’, the Riksbank is surprisingly open about the uses to which it puts its gold holdings, uses such as foreign exchange interventions and emergency liquidity:
“The gold and foreign currency reserve can primarily be used to provide emergency liquidity assistance to banks, to fulfil Sweden’s share of the international lending of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and to intervene on the foreign exchange market, if need be.”
This is not a misprint and is not a statement that somehow only applies to the ‘foreign currency reserve’ component of the reserves, since the same web page goes on to specifically say that:
“The gold can be used to fund emergency liquidity assistance or foreign exchange interventions, among other things.”
Therefore, the Riksbank is conceding that at least some of its gold is actively used in central bank operations and that this gold does not merely sit in quiet unencumbered storage. On the contrary, this gold at times has additional claims and titles attached to it due to being loaned or swapped.
When the Riksbank revealed its gold storage locations back in October 2013, this news was covered by a number of Swedish media outlets, one of which was the Stockholm-based financial newspaper Dagens Industri, commonly known as DI. DI’s article on the topic, published in Swedish with a title translated as “Here is the Swedish Gold“, also featured a series of questions and answers from personnel from the Riksbank asset management department. Some of these answers are worth highlighting here as they touch on the active management of the Swedish gold and also the shockingly poor auditing of the Swedish gold.
In the DI article, Göran Robertsson, Deputy Head of Riksbank’s asset management department, noted that historically the Swedish gold was stored at geographically diversified locations for security reasons, but that this same geographic distribution is now primarily aimed at facilitating the rapid exchange of Swedish gold for major foreign currencies, hence the reason that nearly half of the Swedish gold is held in the Bank of England gold vaults – since the Bank of England London vaults are where gold swaps and gold loans take place.
Robertsson noted that over the 2008-2009 period,50 tonnes of gold Swedish gold located at the Bank of England was exchanged for US dollars:
“London is the dominant international marketplace for gold.We used the gold 2008-2009 during the financial crisis when we switched it to the dollar we then lent to Swedish banks”
One of these Riskbank gold-US Dollar swap transaction was also referenced in a 2011 World Gold Council report on gold market liquidity. This report stated that in 2008 following the Lehman collapse:
“In order to be able to provide liquidity to the Scandinavian banking system, the Swedish Riksbank utilised its gold reserves by swapping some of its gold to obtain dollar liquidity before it was able to gain access to the US dollar swap facilities with the Federal Reserve.”
In the October 2013 DI interview, Göran Robertsson also noted that at some point following this gold – dollar exchange, “the size of the reserve was restored“, which presumably means that the Riksbank received back 50 tonnes of gold. As to whether the restoration of the gold holdings was the exact same 50 tonnes of gold as had been previously held (the same gold bars) is not clear.
Sophie Degenne, Head of the Riksbank’s asset management department, also noted that:
“The main purpose of the gold and foreign exchange reserves is to use it when needed, as in the financial crisis”
Auditing of the Swedish Gold
On the subject of so-called transparency and auditing of the gold, Sophie Degenne said the following in the same DI interview:
“Why do you reveal at which central banks the gold is located? It is a part of the Riksbank endeavours to be as transparent as we can. We have engaged in dialogue with the relevant central banks”
How do you verify that the gold is really where it should be? “We have our own listings of where it is.We reconcile these against extracts that we receive once a year.From now on, we will also start with our own inspections.”
Therefore, the Riksbank gold auditing procedure at that time was one of merely comparing one piece of paper to another piece of paper and in no way involved physically auditing the gold bars in any of the foreign locations. These weak audit methods of the Swedish gold were first highlighted by Liberty Silver CEO, Mikael From in Stockholm-based news daily Aftonbladet’s coverage of the Swedish gold storage locations in an article in early November 2013 titled “Questions about Sweden’s gold reserves persist“.
In Aftonbladet’s article, Mikael From stated that while it was welcome that the Riksbank was at that point signalling an ambition to inspect the Swedish gold reserves, it was not clear that the Riksbank would be conducting a proper audit of the gold reserves at the time of inspection, although such a proper audit would be highly desirable. Mikael stated that without such a proper audit, and without witnessing the gold with their own eyes, the Riksbank and the Swedish State could not be certain that the Swedish gold actually existed.
Turning now to the questions which I posed to the Swedish Riksbank in early February 2017 about its gold reserves. I asked the Riskbank two basic and simple questions as follows:
“I am undertaking research into central bank gold reserves, including the gold reserves held by the Riksbank at its 5 storage facilities.
1. Are the gold bars held by the Riksbank in its foreign storage facilities physically audited by the Riksbank (i.e. stored at Bank of England, Bank of Canada, Federal Reserve New York and Swiss National Bank)? In other words, does the Riksbank have a physical audit program for this gold?
2. Secondly, would the Riksbank be able to send me a gold bar weight list which shows the gold bar holdings details for the 125.7 tonnes of gold held by the Riksbank. A weight list being the industry standard list showing bar brand (refiner), serial number, gross weight, fineness, fine weight etc.
A few days after I submitted my questions, the Presschef/Chief Press Officer of the Riksbank responded as follows. On the subject of auditing:
“Answer 1: Yes, the Riksbank performs regularly physical audits of its gold.“
In response to the question about a gold bar weight list, the Chief Press Officer said:
Answer 2: The Riksbank publishes information about where the gold is stored and how much in tonnes is at each place. See table (same distribution table as above). However, the Riksbank does not publish weight lists or other details of the gold holdings.“
So here we have the Riksbank claiming that it personally now performs physical audits of its gold on a regular basis. This is the first time in the public domain, as far as I know, that the Riksbank is claiming to have undertaken physical gold audits of its gold holdings, and it goes beyond the 2013 statement from the Riksbank’s Sophie Degenne when she said “we will also start with our own inspections“.
But critically ,there was zero proof offered by the Riksbank to me, or on its website, that it has undertaken any physical gold audits. There is no documentation or evidence whatsoever that any physical audits have ever been conducted on any of the 10,000 gold bars in any of the 5 supposed storage locations that the Riksbank claims to store gold bars at. Contrast this to the bi-annual physical audits which are carried out on the gold bars in the SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) which are published on the GLD website.
In any other industry, there would be an outcry and court cases and litigation if an entity claimed it had conducted audits while offering no proof of said audits. However, in the world of central banking, perversely, this secrecy is allowed to persist. This is outrageous to say the least and Swedish citizens should be very concerned about this lack of transparency of the Swedish gold reserves.
Official Secrecy about Swedish Gold Reserves
Given the brief and not very useful Riksbank responses to my 2 questions above, I sent a follow on email to the Riksbank asking why the Swedish central bank did not publish a gold bar weight list. My question was as follows:
“Is there any specific reason why the Riksbank does not publish a gold bar weight list in the way, for example, that a gold-backed ETF does publish such a weight list every trading day?
i.e. Why is the Riksbank not transparent about its gold bar holdings?”
This second email was answered by the Riksbank Head of Communications, as follows:
“This kind of information is covered by secrecy relating to foreign affairs, as well as security secrecy and surveillance secrecy in accordance with the relevant provisions in the Swedish Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act.
As far as we are aware of, the Riksbank is among the most transparent central banks, being public with information about the storage locations and volumes, but do let us know if any other central banks are offering the level of transparency you are asking for (except for Germany of course, which we are aware about).”
So here you can see here that gold, which in the words of the Wall Street Journal is just a ‘Pet Rock’, is covered by some very strong secrecy laws in Sweden. Why would a pet rock need ultra strong secrecy laws?
An explanatory document on Sweden’s “Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act” can be accessed here. In Sweden, the rules governing public access to official documents are covered by the Freedom of the Press Act. While its beyond topic to go into the details of Swedish secrecy laws right now, there is a short section in the document titled “What official documents may be kept secret?” (Section 2.2) which includes the following:
“The Freedom of the Press Act lists the interests that may be protected by keeping official documents secret:
National security or Sweden’s relations with a foreign state or an international organisation;
The central financial policy, the monetary policy, or the national foreign exchange policy;
Inspection, control or other supervisory activities of a public authority;
The interest of preventing or prosecuting crime;
The public economic interest;
The protection of the personal or economic circumstances of private subjects; or
The preservation of animal or plant species.
Given that the Riksbank stated that the information in its gold bar weight lists was “covered by secrecy relating to foreign affairs, as well as security secrecy and surveillance secrecy”, I would hazard a guess that the Riksbank would try to reject Freedom of Information requests in this area by pointing to central bank gold storage and gold operations as falling under points 1 or 2, i.e. falling under national security or relations with a foreign state or international organisation, or else monetary policy / foreign exchange policy (especially given that the Riksbank uses gold reserves in its foreign currency interventions). Perhaps the Riksbank would also try to twist point 5 as an excuse, i.e. that it wouldn’t be in the public economic interest to release the Swedish gold bar details.
As to why the Riksbank and nearly all other central banks are ultra secretive about gold bar weight lists and even physical auditing of gold bar holdings usually boils down to the fact that, like the Riksbank, these gold bar holdings are actively managed and are often used in gold loans, gold swaps and even gold location swaps. If identifiable details of the gold bars of such central banks were in the public domain, given that these bars are involved in loans, currency swaps and location swaps, these gold bar details could begin to show up in the gold bar lists of other central banks or of the gold bar lists of publicly listed gold-backed Exchange Traded Funds. This would then blow the cover of the central banks which continue to maintain the fiction that their loaned and swapped gold is still held in unencumbered custody on their balance sheets, and would blow a hole in their contrived and corrupt accounting policies.
A Proposal to the Oldest Central Bank in the World
Since the Riksbank happened to ask me were there any central banks “offering the level of transparency [I was] asking for” i.e. providing gold bar weight lists, I decided to send a final response back to the Riksbank in early March highlighting the central banks that I am aware of that have published such gold bar weight lists, and I also took the opportunity of proposing that the Riksbank should follow suit in publishing its gold bar weight list. My letter to the Riksbank was as follows:
“You had asked which central banks offered a level of transparency on their gold holdings that include publication of a gold bar weight list. Apart from the Deutsche Bundesbank, which you know about, I can think of 3 central banks which have released weight lists of their gold bar holdings.
The 3 examples below (together with the Bundesbank) show that some of the most important central banks and monetary authorities in the world have now deemed it acceptable to include the release of gold bar weight lists as part of their gold communication transparency strategies.
The 4 sets of weight lists below include gold bar holdings at the Bank of England (stored by Mexico, Australia, Germany), and at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (stored by the US Treasury and Bundesbank). Together these two storage locations account for 60% of the Riksbank’s gold holdings (74.6 tonnes).
The Riksbank is the world’s oldest central bank and has a long track record of being progressive and transparent. By releasing the Riksbank’s gold bar weight lists for the gold bars stored over the 5 storage locations (London, New York, Ottawa, Berne and in Sweden), the Swedish central bank would be joining an elite group of central banks and monetary institutions that could be considered the early stage adopters of much needed transparency in this area.”
The RBA list includes refiner brand, gross weight, assay (fineness), and fine weight, as well as bank of England account number.
3. US Treasury
In 2011, the US Treasury’s full detailed schedules of gold bars was published by the US House Committee on Financial Services as part of submissions for its hearing titled “Investigating the Gold: H.R. 1495, the Gold Reserve Transparency Act of 2011 and the Oversight of United States Gold Holdings”.
These US Treasury weight lists are as follows, and are downloadable from the financial services section of the “house.gov” web site.
Weight list of all Treasury gold held at Fort Knox, Denver and West Point – 699,515 bars – pdf format
The Bundesbank list show all the German gold bars held at the Bank of England, NY fed and Banque de France as well as in Frankfurt.”
As of now, the Swedish Riksbank has a) not published a gold bar weight list of any of its gold bar holdings and b) not acknowledged my follow up email where I listed the central banks that have produced such lists and suggested that the Riksbank do likewise.
The Swedish Riksbank claims to hold 10,000 large Good Delivery gold bars in 5 locations across the world and now claims to have conducted physical gold audits of this gold. Yet it has never published any physical gold audit results of any of these gold bars nor published any of the serial numbers of any of the 10,000 gold bars it claims to have in storage. For a so-called progressive democracy this is shocking, although not surprising given the arrogant and unaccountable company that central bankers keep with each other.
If someone with time on their hands, ideally a Swedish citizen, has an interest in this area, it would be worthwhile for them to research the rules of the Swedish Freedom of Information Act, and then craft a few carefully worded Freedom of Information requests to the Riksbank requesting physical audit documents and gold bar weight lists of Sweden’s 125.7 tonnes of gold that is supposedly held in London, New York, Ottawa, Berne and in Sweden, possibly in or around Stockholm or beside Arlanda airport.
While these Freedom of Information requests would probably get rejected due to some spurious secrecy excuse and thrown back at the applicant in short order, at least its worth trying, and might make a good story for one of the Swedish financial newspapers to cover.
On 9 February 2017, the Deutsche Bundesbank issued an update on its extremely long-drawn-out gold repatriation program, an update in which it claimed to have transferred 111 tonnes of gold from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to Germany during 2016, while also transferring an additional 105 tonnes of gold from the Banque de France in Paris to Germany during the same time-period.
Following these assumed gold bar movements, the Bundesbank now claims to have achieved its early 2013 goal of repatriating 300 tonnes of gold from New York to Frankfurt, but after 4 years it is still 91 tonnes short of its planned transfer of 374 tonnes of gold from Paris to Frankfurt. In essence, over an entire 4-year period (i.e. 208 weeks), the Bundesbank has only been able to transfer 583 tonnes of gold back from New York and Paris to Germany. And the Bundesbank still claims to have 1236 tonnes of gold remaining in storage with the New York Fed.
Furthermore, if the mainstream financial media had bothered looking at Federal Reserve “Table 3.13 – Selected Foreign Official Assets Held at Federal Reserve Banks” under ‘Earmarked Gold’ (line item 4), they would have seen that the foreign custody gold figure that the Fed reports has not changed since September 2016, and that the Fed’s foreign custody gold figure had dropped by 113 tonnes between March 2016 and September 2016, meaning that the Bundesbank’s 111 tonne gold transfer from the US to Germany had been completed by September 2016, i.e. at least 4 months before the Bundesbank reported it.
100 tonnes of gold per day Air-Lifted
All gold withdrawals from the Fed’s “earmarked gold” reporting category in 2016 occurred between March and September 2016, with activity each month throughout that period except in May. As to why there were gold withdrawals from the Fed of 113.45 tonnes when the Bundesbank only reported transferring back 111 tonnes is not clear. Was an additional amount withdrawn from the Fed vault by another foreign central bank or did the Bundesbank conduct further melting down of its US Assay office gold bars and lose 2+ tonnes (1.7%) of fine ounce content that was overstated in its Federal Reserve holdings? Or perhaps this amount was lost when weighing old US Assay Office ‘melts’ (batches of 18-22 bars) which had never been properly weighed before.
Whatever the case, we will never know because the Fed does not divulge the identities of its central bank gold custody customers, nor does the Bundesbank divulge simple details such as gold bar serial numbers on its so-called gold bar list (more of which below).
Simple common sense would have alerted the mainstream media robots to the fact that it is not normal for international gold movements to take 4 years to complete, and that there is something absolutely not right with Germany’s foreign held gold taking so long to transport from New York and Paris. Paris is just a 1 hour flight from Frankfurt and 6 hours by road, and New York is less than 9 hours flying time to Frankfurt.
Other simple questions which the mainstream financial media have failed to ask or have failed to think of include why does the Bundesbank need to keep any gold at all stored at the Federal Reserve in New York, let alone 1236 tonnes, when the New York Fed vault is not even an international gold trading center. And is this gold left in New York is under any liens, claims, encumbrances, loans or swaps?
In contrast to the Bundesbank’s laughable repatriation program duration, take for example, the Banco Central do Venezuela, which was able to transfer 160 tonnes of gold from Europe to Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, over a 2 month period from 25 November 2011 to 30 January 2012. See “Venezuela’s Gold Reserves – Part 2: From Repatriation to Reactivation” for details.
That’s 80 tonnes per month, which would equate to a 4 month transfer window for 300 tonnes of the Bundesbank’s gold stored in New York, not 4 years. Furthermore, why is the mainstream media not asking the Bundesbank why it takes more than 4 years to transfer 374 tonnes of gold from Paris to Frankfurt?
More damning to the contemporary Bundesbank, the same Americans (Federal Reserve) were able to fly over 800 tonnes of gold from the US to England exactly 50 year ago, in November and December 1967, to prop up their share of the London Gold Pool gold holdings at the Bank of England. This gold was flown into RAF Mildenhall in Suffolk over 9 days in batches of around 100 tonnes each day using US air force cargo carriers, and then this gold was ferried by police escorted convoys down to the City of London.
The first 4 of these US air force flights were on Tuesday 28 November 1967, Wednesday 29 November, Friday 1 December, and Sunday 3 December, with the Americans flying in 100 tonnes of gold each day to RAF Mildenhall over those 4 days. That’s 400 tonnes of gold flown from the US to Europe in just 6 days. See screenshot below.
These 4 flights in late November and early December 1967 were followed by 5 more flights on Tuesday 19 December, Thursday 21 December, Thursday 28 December , Friday 29 December, and Sunday 31 December 1967. These 5 flights transported another 445 tonnes of gold bars (14,317,458 fine ounces) from the US to the Bank of England vaults (see screenshot below). That’s another 445 tonnes of gold moved from the US to London in just 13 days.
Overall, the November and December 1967 gold airlifts transported nearly 850 tonnes of gold from the US to Europe in just 1 month.
There were also further massive gold airlifts from the US to the Bank of England in the summer of 1968 which ironically the Federal Reserve needed to do so as to pay back physical gold swaps which the Bundesbank had made available to the Americans at the Bank of England during the last days of the London Gold Pool in March 1968.
These rapid and massive physical gold movements over international borders in 1967 and 1968 show how laughable the Bundesbank’s current gold repatriation program actually is, and how servile the mainstream financial media are in not even questioning the timeframe of the Bundesbank’s repatriation operations.
Updated “So-Called” Bar List
Following its press release on 9 February, the Bundesbank then published an updated version of its so-called gold bar list on 23 February, specifying its gold holdings as of 31 December 2016. A so-called gold bar list, because the format of the Bundesbank’s gold bar list does not follow any accepted industry standard format and does not contain basic details such as bar serial number and bar refiner name that are crucial to any normal gold bar weight list. The updated Bundesbank bar list was also released in a very low-key way, and its publication does not seem to have been picked up by any of the mainstream financial media. The updated Bundesbank ‘list’ can be viewed here in a file that the Bundesbank had actually created on 14 February 2017.
The Bundesbank claims that all of its gold bars are good delivery bars, so it and its gold custodians (Bank of England, Banque de France and Federal Reserve Bank of New York) have all of this information stored on their respective gold bar accounting systems, including real bar serial numbers and refiner names. They have to store this information since any bars entering or leaving LBMA network gold vaults need to be accompanied by proper weight lists, including serial number and bar refiner brand.
Compare a proper weight list with the sparse and incomplete what the Bundesbank includes in its gold bar list:
Inventory Number (internal sequence numbers or incomplete bar numbers)
For Germany’s bars listed as held by the Bundesbank, Bank of England and Banque de France, these inventory numbers are merely “internally assigned inventory numbers”, and ludicrously in the case of the Bank of England and Banque de France gold vaults, they only allow other central banks to publish partial internal inventory numbers (the last three digits).
The secrecy with which the Bank of England, Banque de France and other central banks treat real gold bar serial numbers and other identifiers is most likely due to their paranoia that publication of such serial numbers would undermine their ability to operate with secrecy in the gold lending and gold swap market where bar identities might pop up in the gold holdings of commercial operators such as gold-backed Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs).
Numbers listed against Bundesbank bars held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York do supposedly show a refiner number, or a melt number, but without the refiner name and year of manufacture of these bars being divulged by the Bundesbank, there is no way to verify and cross-check these bar numbers.
Note that this new Bundesbank gold bar list is the third such list that it has published, and it is in the same format as the previous two versions, both of which are also not real gold bar weight lists since they lack refiner serial numbers and refiner names.
For the purposes of this article, let’s refer to a “Bundesbank bar list” as an “incomplete partial weight list”. The Bundesbank had actually signalled the publication of its updated list at the bottom of its 9 February press release, where it stated:
“On 23 February, the Bundesbank will publish an updated list of its gold bars on its website. This list contains the bar, melt or inventory numbers, the gross and fine weight as well as the fineness of the gold.”
3 Bundesbank gold bar lists
To recap, the Bundesbank had already published 2 incomplete partial weight lists. The first of these was published on 7 October 2015 and showed holdings as of 31 December 2014. The file can be accessed here, or at the bottom of the page here. The Bundesbank actually created this file on 5 October 2015 and saved it with a file name of 2015_10_07_gold.pdf.
The Bundesbank’s second incomplete partial weight list was created on 4 February 2016 and listed holdings as of 31 December 2015, and was published sometime after 4 February 2016. Confusingly, the incomplete partial weight list as of 31 December 2015 file was uploaded to the same web page and with the same file name as the 31 December 2014 file (i.e. it was uploaded with the filename 2015_10_07_gold.pdf and it over-wrote the first list). This second incomplete partial weight list can be accessed here.
Why no lists prior to December 2014?
Given that the Bundesbank has now demonstrated its ability to generate files itemising its gold holdings, even with limited bar details, the fact that the Bundesbank only began publishing its gold holdings’ lists in October 2015 should immediately raise suspicion as to why it did not publish such bars lists as of the end of 31 December 2012 (prior to the repatriation beginning), and as of 31 December 2013.
A casual observer would deduct that the Bundesbank does not want anyone to see an itemised list of its gold holdings on these dates in 2012 and 2013, and the casual observer would probably be correct in deducing such a conclusion. For its was during 2013 and 2014 that the Bundesbank melted down and recast 55 tonnes of the gold bars that it had held in New York. Five tonnes of its gold was melted down and recast in 2013 and a whopping 50 tonnes was melted down and recast in 2014. Recall that in January 2014, the Bundesbank stated that during 2013:
”We had bars of gold which did not meet the ‘London Good Delivery’ general market standard melted down and recast. We are cooperating with gold smelters in Europe,” Thiele continued. The smelting process is being observed by independent experts. It is set up in such a manner that the Bundesbank’s gold cannot be commingled with foreign gold at any time.’
“Some of the bars in our stocks in New York were produced before the Second World War.” “Our internal audit team was present last year during the on-site removal of gold bars and closely monitored everything. The smelting process is also being monitored by independent experts.”
“The very same gold arrived at the European gold smelters that we had commissioned.” “The gold was removed from the vault in the presence of the internal audit team and transported to Europe. Only once the gold had arrived in Europe was it melted down and brought to the current bar standard.”
If the Bundesbank had published weight lists as of the end of years 2012 and 2013, then details such as bar gross weight, fineness (gold purity), and bar fine weight would have to have been divulged. By not publishing earlier bars lists, no one outside the Bundesbank – Federal Reserve nexus will ever be aware of the weights and purities of these 55 tonnes of gold bars that were melted down and recast. The Bundesbank obviously has or had the details of these smelted bars, since it commissioned and monitored the smelting process. But as Peter Boeringher stated in his October 2015 article “it appears the bar lists for these transferred bars were lost or destroyed.”
What secrets did these bars hold? One distinct possibility was that they were low-grade coin bars, that had been produced from melted gold coin. In this case they would have been bars of 0.90 or .9167 gold purities or similar. Low grade coin bars began appearing at the NY Fed vault in Manhattan in 1968 and most likely came from the US Treasury’s gold holdings at Fort Knox, Kentucky which consist of about 80% low-grade coin bars. It would not look good for the NY Fed if such low grade bars appeared on a foreign central bank’s gold bar list, and would invariably raise questions as to which US vaults this gold was sourced from.
Perhaps the bars that the Bundesbank melted were Prussian Mint bars from the Nazi era which the Bundesbank would be averse to holding in Germany for political reasons? Or maybe they were problematic US Assay office bars which had a lower fine ounce content than was stated on the actual bar, an issue that dogged another portion of the Bundesbank’s gold stocks in London in 1968. Or perhaps they were gold bars with some other embarrassing provenance which the Bundesbank and Federal Reserve needed to mask the true origin of. Without the Bundesbank ever clarifying this issue, we will never know.
Comparing the 3 Lists
What can we glean from comparing the 3 lists to each other? The only variable on which to compare the lists are gross weight, fineness, and fine weight, and the bar and melt counts per location.
In theory, the lists from December 2014, December 2015 and December 2016 should be identical assuming that the total amount of gold bars has not changed between versions.
If the lists are not identical, then it could suggest a number of things including:
gold bars that were previously held in Melts have now been individually weighed and itemized on the more recent list. This would most likely be for bars that were transferred to Frankfurt, but could also apply to bars which remained in the other storage locations
further instances of gold bars remelted / recast while being transferred from New York or Paris to Frankfurt that the Bundesbank has kept quiet about
gold bars still held in Paris or New York (or London) that have been being recast and upgraded before being moved. This would apply more to Paris going forward
sales of gold bars to ‘fund’ the German official gold coin program.
gold lending / swap / repo transactions
Since the lists do state melt number, if there are less any melt numbers listed in more recent lists compared to older lists, then it means that the Bundesbank or its agents have weighed and itemised the individual bars in various melts (groups of 18-24 bars). For example, if the entries for 20 melts had disappeared from a more recent version of a list, then there should be about 400 extra individual bars of the newer list.
Using some quick eyeballing, the file dated 31 December 2014 has 2307 pages including introduction. The file dated 31 December 2015 has 2401 pages including introduction, i.e. the latter file has 94 extra pages. There are approximately 44 pages of melts in the 2014 file listed from page 2263 to the last page 2307. There are approximately 40 pages of melts in the 2015 file listed from page 2361 to the last page 2401. From a rough count, there are about 85 rows per page. This would mean about 340 melts were weighed and converted into itemised rows of single bars during 2015. Not all melts have full sets of bars, but assuming they did, that would be about 20 bars per melt, which would be about 20*340 = 6800 bars which would appear in individual rows in the 2015 list if the melts were “broken out”, which is about 80 pages, and is fairly near explaining the reason for the extra 94 pages in the 2025 file.
If you look at the number of gold bars listed in the press releases (current version and archived version), you will see that there were in total 270,326 bars at the end of 2014 and 270,058 bars at the end of 2015, so there were 258 less bars at the end of 2015.
As of the end of 2015, there were 34,808 bars in London vs 35,066 bars at the end of 2014. i.e. There were 258 bars less in London (about 3 tonnes). So the London drop explains the total drop. This could be gold used for a gold coin program.
This is just some quick eyeballing. The next step is to do an automated comparison of the 3 lists side by side by comparing the variables gross weight, fineness and fine weight so see which bar details may have changed over the 2 year period, and to look at what might have changed. This matching and calculation exercise will probably be undertaken by a gold bar database expert in the near future, so watch this space for further details.
During the calendar year to December 2015, the Bundesbank claims to have transported 210 tonnes of gold back to Frankfurt, moving circa 110 tonnes from Paris to Frankfurt, and just under 100 tonnes from New York to Frankfurt.
As a reminder, the Bundesbank is engaged in an unusual multi-year repatriation programme to transport 300 tonnes of gold back to Frankfurt from the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY), and simultaneously to bring 374 tonnes of gold back to Frankfurt from the vaults of the Banque de France in Paris. This programme began in 2013 and is scheduled to complete by 2020. I use the word ‘unusual’ because the Bundesbank could technically transport all 674 tonnes of this gold back to Frankfurt in a few weeks or less if it really wanted to, so there are undoubtedly some unpublished limitations as to why the German central bank has not yet done so.
Given the latest update from the German central bank today, the geographic distribution of the Bundesbank gold reserves is now as follows, with the largest share of the German gold now being stored domestically:
1,402.5 tonnes, or 41.5% now stored domestically by the Bundesbank at its storage vaults in Frankfurt, Germany
1,347.4 tonnes, or 39.9%, stored at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York
434.7 tonnes or 12.9% stored at the Bank of England vaults in London
196.4 tonnes, or 5.8%, stored at the Banque de France in Paris
In January 2013, prior to the commencement of the programme, the geographical distribution of the Bundesbank gold reserves was 1,536 tonnes or 45% at the FRBNY, 374 tonnes or 11%, at the Banque de France, 445 tonnes or 13% at the Bank of England, and 1036 tonnes or 31% in Frankfurt.
The latest moves now mean that over 3 years from January 2013 to December 2015, the Bundesbank has retrieved 366 tonnes of gold back to home soil (189 tonnes from New York (5 tonnes in 2013, 85 tonnes in 2014, and between 99-100 tonnes in 2015), as well as 177 tonnes from Paris (32 tonnes in 2013, 35 tonnes in 2014, and 110 tonnes in 2015)). The latest transfers still leave 110 tonnes of gold to shift out of New York in the future and 196.4 tonnes to move the short distance from Paris to Frankfurt.
In the first year of operation of the repatriation scheme during 2013, the Bundesbank transferred a meagre 37 tonnes of gold in total to Frankfurt, of which a tiny 5 tonnes came from the FRBNY, and only 32 tonnes from Paris. Whatever those excessive limitations were in 2013, they don’t appear to be so constraining now. In 2014, 85 tonnes were let out of the FRBNY and 35 tonnes made the trip from Paris. See Koos Jansen’s January 2015 blog titled “Germany Repatriated 120 Tonnes Of Gold In 2014” for more details on the 2014 repatriation.
Those who track the “Federal Reserve Board Foreign Official Assets Held at Federal Reserve Banks” foreign earmarked gold table may notice that between January 2015 and November 2015 , circa 4 million ounces, or 124 tonnes of gold, were withdrawn from FRB gold vaults. Given that the Bundesbank claims to have moved 110 tonnes from New York during 2015, this implies that there were also at least 14 tonnes of other non-Bundesbank withdrawals from the FRB during 2015. Unless of course the other gold was withdrawn from the FRB, shipped to Paris, and then became part of the Paris withdrawals for the account of the Bundesbank. The FRB will again update its foreign earmarked gold holdings table this week with December 2015 withdrawals (if any), which may show an even larger non-Bundesbank gold delta for year-end 2015.
Notably, the latest press release today does not mention whether any of the gold withdrawn from the FRBNY was melted down / recast into Good Delivery bars. Some readers will recall that the Bundesbank’s updates for 2013 and 2014 did refer to such bar remelting/recasting events.
Today’s press release does however include some ‘assurances’ from the Bundesbank about the authenticity and quality of the returned bars:
“The Bundesbank assures the identity and authenticity of German gold reserves throughout the transfer process – from when they are removed from the storage locations abroad until they are stored in Frankfurt am Main. Once they arrive in Frankfurt am Main, all the transferred gold bars are thoroughly and exhaustively inspected and verified by the Bundesbank. When all the inspections of transfers to date had been concluded, no irregularities came to light with regard to the authenticity, fineness and weight of the bars.”
This above paragraph in today’s press release was actually lifted wholesale from the Bundesbank’s gold repatriation press release dated 19 January 2015 , minus one key sentence:
“The Bundesbank assures the identity and authenticity of German gold reserves throughout the transfer process – from when they are removed from warehouses abroad until they are stored in Frankfurt am Main. As soon as the gold was removed from the warehouse locations abroad, Bundesbank employees cross-checked the lists of bars belonging to the Bundesbank against the information on the bars removed. Finally, once they arrived in Frankfurt am Main, all the transferred gold bars were thoroughly and exhaustively inspected and verified by the Bundesbank. When all the inspections had been concluded, no irregularities came to light with regard to the authenticity, fineness and weight of the bars.”
So, was there no list of bars this time around?
But why the need at all for such a general comment on the quality of the bars while not providing any real details of the bars transferred, their serial numbers, their refiner brands, or their years of manufacture? Perhaps remelting/recasting of bars was undertaken during 2015 and the Bundesbank is now opting for the cautious approach after getting some awkward questions last year about these topics – i.e. the Bundesbank’s approach may well be “don’t mention recasting / remelting and maybe no one will ask“.
This bring us to an important point. Beyond the Bundesbank’s hype, its important to note that the repatriation information in all of the press releases and updates from the Bundesbank since 2013 has excluded most of the critical information about the actual gold bars being moved. So, for example, in this latest update concerning the 2015 transport operations, there is no complete bar list (weight list) of the bars repatriated, no explanation of the quality of gold transferred and whether bars of various purities were involved, no comment on whether any bars had to be re-melted and recast, no indication of which refineries, if any, were used, and no explanation of why it takes a projected 7 years to bring back 300 tonnes of gold that could be flown from New York to Frankfurt in a week using a few C-130 US transporter carriers.
There is also no explanation from the Bundesbank as to why these 100 tonnes of gold were available from New York in 2015 but not available during 2014 or 2013, nor why 110 tonnes of gold somehow became available in Paris during 2015 when these bars were not available in 2014 or 2013, nor why all 374 tonnes to be brought back from Paris can’t make it back on the 1 hour 15 minute air-route between Paris and Frankfurt between which multiple aircraft fly each and every day.
The crucial questions to ask in my view are where was the repatriated gold sourced from that has so far been supplied to the Bundesbank from New York and Paris, what were the refiner brands and years of manufacture for the bars, what are the details of the quality (fineness) of the gold trasnferred, and are these bars the same bars that the Bundesbank purchased when it accumulated its large stock of gold bars during the 1950s and especially the 1960s.
In essence, all of these updates from Frankfurt could be termed ‘limited hangouts’, a term used in the intelligence community, whereby the real behind the scenes details are left unmentioned, only hanging out snippets of information, and questions about the real information are invariably left unasked by the subservient mainstream media. Overall, it’s important to realise that the Bundesbank’s repatriation updates, press releases, and interviews since 2013 are carefully stage-managed, and that the German central bank continually uses weasel words to dodge genuine but simple questions about its gold reserves and the physical gold that is being transported back to Frankfurt.
For example, in October 2015, the Bundesbank released a partial inventory bar list/weight list of it gold holdings. At that time, on 8 October 2015, I asked the Bundesbank:
Hello Bundesbank Press Office,
Regarding the gold bar list published by the Bundesbank yesterday (07 October https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Topics/2015/2015_10_07_gold.html), could the Bundesbank clarify why the published bar list does not include,for each bar, the refiner brand, the bar refinery serial number, and the year of manufacture, as per the normal convention for gold bar weight lists, and as per the requirements of London Good Delivery (LGD) gold bars?
Serial number (see additional comments in section 7 of the GDL Rules)
Assay stamp of refiner
Fineness (to four significant figures)
Year of manufacture (see additional comments in section 7 of the GDL Rules)”
“The marks should include the stamp of the refiner (which, if necessary for clear identification, should include its location), the assay mark (where used), the fineness, the serial number (which must not comprise of more than eleven digits or characters) and the year of manufacture as a four digit number unless incorporated as the first four digits in the bar number. If bar numbers are to be reused each year, then it is strongly recommended that the year of production is shown as the first four digits of the bar number although a separate four digit year stamp may be used in addition. If bar numbers are not to be recycled each year then the year of production must be shown as a separate four digit number.
Best Regards, Ronan Manly
The Bundesbank actually sent back two similar replies t the above email:
“Dear Mr Manly,
Thank you for your query. Information on the refiner and year of production are not relevant for storage or accounting purposes, which require the weight data, the fineness and a unique number identifying each bar or melt. The Bundesbank has all of this information for each of its gold bars. By contrast, particulars relating to the refiner and year of production merely provide supplementary information. They tell us part of the gold bar’s history but do not describe its entire ‘life cycle’.”
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK Communication
“Dear Mr Manly,
The crucial data for storage and accounting purposes are the weight, the fineness and a unique number identifying each bar or melt. The Bundesbank has all of this information for each of its gold bars, which it records electronically and also makes available to the public. In addition to the data on weight and fineness, the Bundesbank, the Bank of England and the Banque de France identify gold bars exclusively on the basis of internally assigned inventory numbers and not using the serial numbers provided by the refiners. These custodians do not classify the bar numbers stamped onto the gold bars by the refiner as individual inventory criteria. They do not use the refiner’s bar numbers as these are not based on a unique numbering system that can be used for identification purposes. Stating the refiner and the year of production is not required for storage or accounting purposes.”
DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK Communication
Even the large gold ETFs produce detailed weight lists of their bar holdings, so you can see from the above answers that the Bundesbank is resorting to flimsy excuses in its inability to explain why it is not following standard practice across the gold industry.
Part 1 of the IMF’s Gold Depositories series explained the legal background as to why the IMF originally made the decision to hold gold at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Bank of England, the Banque de France and the Reserve Bank of India.
See Part 1 for details, but as a quick recap, although the current IMF Rule F-1 on the location of its gold depositories states that “Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India”, the original 1946 version of the rule, then called Rule E-1, said that “Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in New York, London, Shanghai, Paris, and Bombay.”
It is generally known that the central banks in some of these cities are indeed locations are IMF gold depositories, and the IMF will actually, on occasion, bring itself to confirm these facts.
What is less well understood however are the references to the cities in two of the word’s great gold markets, specifically, the reference to the Reserve Bank’s Bombay office, the transfer of IMF gold to another Indian city, Nagpur, and the fact that Shanghai was only removed “temporarily” and could, in theory, be reinstated as an IMF gold depository.
The Road to Nagpur
The original version of Rule E-1 was adopted on 25th September 1946, and then amended in 1956. This amendment in 1956 was triggered by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), but it created some far-reaching implications for where the IMF’s gold can be stored.
The trigger for the amendment of Rule E-1 in 1956 was an initiative by the RBI to move their own gold from their Bombay office to a new office in Nagpur which they had just opened. Nagpur is a city in the very heart of India in the state of Maharashtra.
In moving their own gold, the RBI asked the IMF if it objected to the re-location of the IMF gold at the same time. There was actually not much IMF gold held in Bombay, the only gold held there being India’s initial gold subscription to the IMF that had been transferred at the Fund’s inception, worth $27.5 million at $35 an ounce, or just over 24 tonnes. No other founding nation of the IMF had supplied gold to Bombay at that time.
In a 1956 staff document to the IMF Executive Directors, “Gold Depositories of the Fund”, the IMF staff explained the RBI’s move and recommended that the wording of Rule E-1 should be made more flexible so as to take account of future situations where other gold depositories of the Fund might want, or need, to hold gold at alternative locations in their respective countries, other than those locations already specified.
The IMF staff also proposed to the IMF Executive Directors that they should agree to the RBI’s request:
“At the moment, the Fund holds the equivalent of US$27.5 million in gold with the Reserve Bank of India in Bombay. The Fund has received a letter from the Reserve Bank stating that it has recently opened an office at Nagpur, which is situated about 520 miles from Bombay in the interior of the country.
The office is in the Bank’s own building, and it contains a special vault for storing the Bank’s stock of gold. The special vault was constructed partly to enable gold to be stored at a comparatively safer place and partly to relieve the pressure on vault accommodation at the Bombay office. The Reserve Bank is transferring its own gold to Nagpur and inquires whether the Fund would object to the movement of the Fund’s gold.”
The staff document went on to explain the logistics of the move:
“The arrangements for transport would be made under the supervision of the military, and safe custody arrangements at Nagpur would be subject to the same security conditions as are observed at present in Bombay. The Fund’s gold would continue to be held under earmark, and the normal procedures which gold depositories follow in relation to the Fund would continue to be observed.”
A critical point in this IMF document, beyond the Indian gold transfer, is that the IMF staff viewed it as an opportunity to propose more general wording for Rule E-1 so as to allow IMF gold to be stored in any location within the designated countries. The Staff proposed to the Executive Directors.:
“Although Rule E-1 is not free from ambiguity, the more obvious reading of it requires that gold held in India shall be held in Bombay.
The question of the physical transfer of gold may be raised by other gold depositories of the Fund. For example, in the United States, there have been occasions when official stocks of gold have been held simultaneously in New York, Denver, San Francisco and Fort Knox.
The staff believes that it would be advisable to amend Rule E-1 so as to give the Fund more flexibility in dealing with a proposal of the kind made by the Reserve Bank of India. Accordingly, it recommends that Rule E-l should be amended…”
(Source: EBS/56/39, “Gold Depositories of the Fund”)
An IMF Executive Board meeting in November 1956 about the move of the Fund’s gold to Nagpur, approved on January 9th, 1957 (Meeting 57/1), deemed that “it is agreed that the Fund’s gold held with the Reserve Bank of India shall be held at Nagpur.”
The Executive Directors also used the opportunity of the 1956 amendment to Rule E-1 to delete the reference to Shanghai as an IMF gold depository (‘without prejudice’). This is explained below.
And so, in 1956 the Rule E-1 sentence
“Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in New York, London, Shanghai, Paris, and Bombay”
“Gold depositories of the Fund shall be established in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and India”
and the phrase “at places agreed with the Fund” was added as follows:
“The gold of the Fund shall be held with the depositories designated by the members in whose territories they are located at places agreed with the Fund”.
IMF gold, anywhere
Since the 1956 Rule E-1 persists into the current Rule F-1 (see Part 1), it opens up the possibility that IMF gold could be stored in any central bank gold vault (or other outsourced vaults) in any of the four jurisdictions of the US, UK, France and India, and even in China in the future if China looked to use its “without prejudice” option to be re-listed in the current day F-1 Rule list.
For example, the wording of Rule F-1 suggests that IMF gold held at the FRB New York vaults could be transferred to another Federal Reserve Bank vault as long as the other Bank had secure storage facilities.
Whether, in terms of Rule F-1, this transferability extends to US Treasury storage locations such as Fort Knox is unclear; the IMF staff document from 1956 seemed to think that US Treasury locations were feasible storage locations since it mentions them as indirect justification for changing the Rule E-1 wording.
There appears to be legal authority for the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank to use the Treasury’s Mint institutions for storing foreign central bank gold. Such arrangements were even being discussed as early as the 1940s as the following ‘Treasury Department, Inter Office Communication’ letter from a Mr. Luxford to a Mr. Dietrich makes clear:
“The quantity of gold available in New York for sale to foreign governments for earmarking by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has declined to such an extent that it will soon be necessary to ship gold from Fort Knox to New York, or make other arrangements for earmarking.
It has been suggested that, to avoid the tying up of transportation facilities and the high cost of shipping, arrangements be made whereby the Federal Reserve Bank can, with the consent of the governments concerned, earmark gold while it is still in the Mint institutions.”
The letter goes on to describe a proposal whereby the FRB could earmark foreign central bank gold in the vault of the Denver branch of the FRB of Kansas City, or even lease private bank vaults in Denver, but if this didn’t solve the space issue, then compartments in Fort Knox and the Denver Mint were available:
“Mr. Howard has contacted the superintendents at the Fort Knox and Denver institutions and I am informed that the following spaces are available:
1. Fort Knox – two compartments which, when filled completely, could hold approximately $1,000,000,000 in gold.
2. Denver – three compartments which, when filled completely, could hold approximately $450,000,000 in gold.”
Luxford concluded that:
“I believe that there is legal authority for the use of the mint institutions for the purpose outlined above.”
(Source: ‘Treasury Department, Inter Office Communication’, Sept 1943, Clinton Library, gold files)
So, there appears to be a legal precedent for foreign central banks, governments and international institutions to hold earmarked gold at US Treasury storage locations. These arrangements would be very useful if the US Treasury needed gold at the FRBNY and, for example, the Treasury conducted a gold location swap with the Bundesbank or IMF, swapping Treasury Fort Knox gold for Bundesbank or IMF gold.
The IMF is legally allowed to engage in location swaps for its gold and has done so numerous times in the past with entities such as the FRB and the BIS. Some of these IMF gold location swaps are covered in Part 3.
According to the current Rule F-1, IMF gold could also be stored, for example, in Bank of England provincial branch office vaults (assuming there are any of these vaults still operational). The Bank of England has in the past stored HM Treasury and other customer gold in its branch offices, for example in Liverpool, Birmingham and Southampton. Some of these branch offices have now closed but the Bank of England still maintains various agency offices across the UK.
In theory it’s possible that IMF gold could be transferred from the Bank of England’s London vaults to secure storage at one of the Bank’s provincial locations or even to emergency storage locations in England or Wales that have, at various times in the past, been considered by HM Treasury and the Ministry of Defence.
The IMF’s Article XIII, Section 2(b) also seems to open up the possibility that the IMF’s gold could be stored in other locations entirely, even in other countries. Remember that Article XIII, Section 2(b) states:
“(b) The Fund may hold other assets, including gold, in the depositories designated by the five members having the largest quotas and in such other designated depositories as the Fund may select”.
The IMF’s Articles will always have precedence over its Rules and Regulations, due to Rule A-1 which states
“A-1: These Rules and Regulations supplement the Articles of Agreement and the By-Laws adopted by the Board of Governors. They are not intended to replace any provision of either the Articles or the By-Laws.”
There is another clause in Article XIII, section 2(b) referring to an emergency, which is pretty self-explanatory:
“In an emergency the Executive Board may transfer all or any part of the Fund’s gold holdings to any place where they can be adequately protected.”
There is therefore plenty of legal scope for the IMF’s gold to be stored in locations that at first glance might not appear obvious.
The IMF Executive Board confirmed the five gold depositories of the Fund in November 1946, including the Central Bank of China, Shanghai. However, no IMF gold was ever held in Shanghai because no IMF member country (including China) ever deposited gold to the IMF at Shanghai.
The removal of the reference to Shanghai as an IMF gold depository during the 1956 amendment had its origins in 1949. In 1949 the IMF Executive Board discussed a proposal that Shanghai should be temporarily removed from the gold depositories list due to political instability in the country at that time.
The following Executive Board minutes illustrate the discussion of the proposal that was recommended by the Board Chairman Camille Gutt. The discussion involved Frank Southard (F A Southard), the US Executive Director to the Fund, who had helped plan the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, and Y C Koo, who was subsequently Treasurer of the IMF, and who was part of the nationalist Chinese delegation that attended Bretton Woods:
The Executive Board considered a recommendation by the Chairman that, in view of recent developments in China, the Fund should remove Shanghai from the list of gold depositories for the time being.”
“Mr. Southard said he assumed the action would be of a temporary character. Mr. Koo said his Government had no objection on the understanding that the action was temporary. However, the Government would wish to reserve the right to raise the matter again with the Fund at an opportune time.
The decision was: In view of recent developments in China and under the emergency provisions of Article XIII, Section 2(b), Shanghai is for the time being removed from the list of depositories in which the Fund may hold assets, including gold. Members shall be so informed. It is understood that China may, at an opportune time, raise the matter again.”
(Source: Executive Board Meeting 465, 21st July 1949)
While the decision to temporarily remove Shanghai as a gold depository had been taken in 1949, it re-emerged as an issue in 1956 when the amendment to Rule E-1 was being discussed at a meeting. This was because the Executive Board wanted to ensure that the changed wording to Rule E-1 did not prejudice the previous decision to temporarily remove Shanghai as a gold depository.
The Acting Chairman in the 1956 meeting was H. Merle Cochran, deputy Managing Director of the Fund. The Executive Director for China (representing the Taiwan based government) was Mr Tann:
“The Acting Chairman stated that, in order to make it clear that the proposed action would not prejudice a previous decision temporarily removing Shanghai from the list of depositories, the staff wished to recommend the addition of the following paragraph to the decision proposed:
(c) The amendment of Rule E-1 as set forth in paragraph (a) above is without prejudice to the decision of the Executive Board at Meeting 465 (July 21, 1949)”
“Mr. Tann said he had no objection to the staff’s proposals and particularly welcomed the additional paragraph put forward by the management since it would leave no doubt that the 1949 decision was not being nullified.”
(Source:Executive Board Meeting 56, 29th November 1956)
The 1956 amendment to Rule E-1 was adopted by the IMF Executive Board on 9th January 1957, and then reviewed and accepted by the Fund’s Board of Governors at the 12th IMF annual meeting 1957 where Per Jacobsson, Managing Director and Chairman of the Executive Board highlighted to the Governors that
“On November 29, 1956, Rule E-1 was amended to provide for greater flexibility in the location of the Fund’s gold held with designated depositories.”
(Source: Draft letter by Per Jacobsson to the Chairman of the Board of Governors, twelfth Annual Meeting of the IMF)
On paper, the reinstatement of China as a gold depository of the IMF looks possible, but in reality would be complicated by a number of issues, not least the unravelling of claims and representations that could arise from Taipei and Beijing over the 1949 agreement with the IMF.
With Shanghai now re-emerging as a dominant player in the global gold market, its fitting that the story of the IMF’s Shanghai depository should not be forgotten even though it never really existed.
The Nagpur gold vault, which does exist, is itself a relatively forgotten IMF outpost. But it still contains, or is said to contain, both IMF and Reserve Bank of India gold. For this reason, the Nagpur gold vault, and some of its details, will be the subject of a future post.
Part 1 of this series reviewed Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) publications that cover the Fed’s gold storage vaults in Manhattan, and illustrated how the information in these publications has been watered down over time. Part 1 also showed that the number of foreign central bank customers storing gold with the FRBNY has fallen substantially since the late 1990s.
Part 2 covered the Fed’s rarely discussed ‘Auxiliary Vault’ and suggested that this auxiliary vault of the Fed is probably located in the neighbouring Chase Manhattan Plaza vault facility, now run by JP Morgan.
Part 3 now looks at ‘Coin Bars’, another rarely discussed topic which is relevant to the gold at the New York Fed and that may well explain why the Deutsche Bundesbank needed to melt down the majority of the gold that it has so far repatriated from New York.
‘Coin bars’ is a bullion industry term referring to bars that were made by melting gold coins in a process that did not refine the gold nor remove the other metals or metal alloys that were in the coins. The molten metal was just recast directly into bar form.
Because it’s a concept critical to the FRBNY stored gold, the concept of US Assay Office / Mint gold bar ‘Melts’ is also highlighted below. Melts are batches of gold bars, usually between 18 and 22 bars, that when produced, were stamped with a melt number and a fineness, but were weight-listed as one unit. The US Assay Office produced both 0.995 fine gold bars and coin bars as Melts. The gold bars in a Melt are usually stored together unless that melt has been ‘broken’.
New York Fed – Coin Bars ‘Я’ Us
I think it’s critical to note that a reference to low-grade ‘coin bars’ in the 1991 version of the Fed’s ‘Key to the Gold Vault’ (KTTGV) has been omitted in subsequent additions of KTTGV.
The text in this 1991 ‘Key to the Gold Vault’ is based on older versions of the same publication that go back to the original version written by Charles Parnow in 1973. See Part 1 for discussion of Charles Parnow and the editions of the KTTGV and the ‘A Day at the Fed‘ publications.
The reference to coin bars in the 1991 version of KTTGV is as follows:
“The butter yellow bars in the vault are nearly 100 percent pure and are usually made of newly mined gold.
Reddish bars contain copper and other impurities and generally consist of melted gold coins and jewellery containing alloys. Since 1968, a number of these “coin” bars, dating back to the early 1900s, have been stored in the Bank’s vault.
Silver and platinum impurities make gold white; iron produce shades of green.” (KTTGV 1991)
In comparison, the 1998 and later versions of KTTGV have omitted the reference to ‘coin bars’, and the discussion about gold bars and other metals has been shortened as follows:
“Traces of silver and platinum give the gold a whitish shade, copper is most often found in reddish bars, and iron produces a greenish hue.
The butter-yellow bars in the vault are made of newly mined gold.” (KTTGV 1991, 2004, 2008)
There is also no mention of coin bars on the current NY Fed gold information page here. This is despite the fact that there are still coin bars held in the Fed’s New York gold vaults, as illustrated by the US Treasury’s gold bar inventory weight lists at the FRBNY. See below.
What exactly are Coin Bars?
In the early 20th century, a lot of countries were on a gold standard and gold coins circulated as part of the money supply, for example in Germany, the US, France and Britain. When countries went off the gold standard (or went off a circulating gold standard), some of these gold coins were melted down into bars in the 1920s and early 1930s.
Historically, gold coins that circulated as money were not made of pure gold since other metals (about 10%) were added to the gold to improve the coin’s strength and durability. So if a batch of coins contained 90% gold and 10% of other metals, the bars made by melting these coins would contain 90% gold and 10% other metals, since no refining of the gold was undertaken after the coins were melted.
Because coin bars were being made in the early 1930s, the London Gold Market (a precursor of the London Bullion Market Association (LBMA)) included an exact definition for coin bars in its 1934 London Good Delivery List, in addition to gold bars of 995 (or above) fineness.
“1934 LONDON GOOD DELIVERY LIST
Specification of bars acceptable on the London Gold Market
1. Gold bars conforming to the following specification are Good Delivery in the London market:
(a) Fine bars, i.e. bars assaying 995 per mille or over and containing between 350 and 430 ounces of fine gold;
(b) Coin bars, i.e. bars assaying 899 to 901 per mille or 915 1/2 to 917 per mille and containing between 350 and 420 ounces of fine gold; provided that they bear the stamp of the following:”
(Source: The London Good Delivery List – Building a Global Brand 1750 – 2010)
The 1934 definition specified that if a coin bar was produced by one of nineteen European mints or the United States Assay Office, then it was considered a ‘good delivery’ gold bar at that time. The European mints spanned Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Switzerland.
The specification of coin bars with a gold content (or fineness) of between 899 to 901 in the definition allowed the inclusion of gold coins from Continental Europe such as French Napoleon coins which had this particular gold content. The gold content of some US gold coins also fell within this range since they were made of 0.899 or 0.9 gold.
The 915 ½ to 917 range was included in the definition since 22 carat gold is 22/24 or 0.91667. This 22 carat gold, known as crown gold, was used in various gold coins such as British Sovereigns, and also some US gold coins.
But coin bars were in some ways a historical anomaly or a product of their time. Even at launch in 1919, the London gold fixing was a price quotation for 400 oz bars of 995 fineness. As gold expert Timothy Green said in the book “The London Good Delivery List – Building a Global Brand 1750 – 2010″ about the 1919 gold fixing launch:
“the (fixing) price was now quoted for 400-ounce / 995 Good Delivery bars, rather than the traditional 916 standard coin bars which rapidly became extinct as minting of coin virtually ceased.”
In the 19th century and very early 20th century, some refineries used to specifically produce ‘916 standard’ coin bars back that were used as a source to make gold coins. But the now famous 400 oz fine gold bars had been accepted by the Bank of England since 1871 when Sir Anthony de Rothschild convinced the Bank of England to accept them. The Bank of England had also begun to accept US Assay Office 400 oz bars of 995 fineness (fine bars) in 1919.
There do not appear to have been that many coin bars made in the early 1930s when mints melted down gold coins. In his book, Green cites a 1930 example of the Royal Mint in London embarking on a 2 year programme to melt down 90 million British Sovereigns (916.7 fine gold coins) into 52,000 bars each weighing 450 ozs. This is about 650 – 700 tonnes of gold. Each of these bars was stamped with the stamp of the Royal Mint as well as the fineness and a serial number on each bar.
Green also explains that although in 1936 the London Gold Market produced an updated good delivery list that added some additional refineries and mints to the 1934 list, there did not seem to be a lot of coin bars produced. Green says:
“The inclusion of mints (in the 1936 list) is interesting, suggesting that some like the Royal Mint in London, were melting coin, but there is little evidence of any producing significant quantities of bars.”
By the late 1920s, gold bar demand had shifted to central banks who wanted fine gold bars for their vaults. Green says that by 1929, 90 per cent of ‘monetary’ gold resided in these central bank vaults.
(Source: “The London Good Delivery List – Building a Global Brand 1750 – 2010. Authors: Timothy Green (Part I) and Stewart Murray (Part II). Published by the LBMA, 2010)
Roosevelt’s Coin Bars
Apart from melted coins from Europe, there is another significant source of coin bars, namely the coin bars produced from US gold coins that were melted down during the US gold confiscation period circa 1933-1934.
Some of the US Treasury’s coin bars originated from this gold coin confiscation and melting period, and these coin bars were then shipped to the US Mint’s Fort Knox facility in Kentucky when it opened in 1937.
The authoritative source for information on the different producers of gold bars worldwide is a company called Grendon International who have a web site called http://www.goldbarsworldwide.com. This web site produces guides explaining the whole spectrum of gold bar varieties. In its US Assay Office gold bar guide, Grendon states:
“It is understood that the bars (produced by the US Mint / AssayOffices) had a minimum purity of 995+ parts gold in 1,000 parts, with the exception of those 400 oz bars that contained “Coin Gold”.
“Coin Gold” 400 oz bars were manufactured by melting down and then casting into bars gold coins that had been withdrawn from public circulation, mainly as a result of the prohibition in 1933 of private gold ownership in the United States. The gold purity of these bars reflected the purity of U.S. gold coins, usually 900 or 916 parts gold in a 1,000 parts.
In an article about the US confiscation and the US coins that were actually melted, lawyer and coin expert David Ganz demonstrates that there were not a large amount of US gold coins melted by the US authorities in the 1930s.
In his article, Ganz has a table showing the total number of gold coins minted and melted over the 1930s, classified by coin denomination up to the $20 coin. Given that the $20 coin has 0.9675 ounces, and the $10 has 0.48375 ounces etc, you can work out the total number of millions of ounces that were produced from melted coins. Ganz says:
“Product of gold confiscation was gold melting; the coins were melted into bricks that ultimately found their way to Fort Knox. Although the Mint had a program from the mid-1860’s until about 1950 to melt or re-coin copper, silver and gold coinage, the majority of gold coins were taken in and destroyed in a Seven year period (1932-1939)“.
Ganz’ statistics come directly from the annual reports of the Treasury’s Director of the Mint. Ganz says “All told, over 124 million coins were melted through the years (102 million gold coins were melted as a result of government assistance from 1933- 1939).”
However when you calculate the amount of gold in these 124 million coins, it only works out at about 85.6 million fine ounces, which is 2,662 tonnes of gold.
Some of the European coin bars made it across the Atlantic circa 1934 when the US raised the price of gold to $35 per ounce and the US Treasury offered to buy all gold at this price, including coin bars from the London Gold Market.
All gold arriving into the US Treasury’s assay offices was apparently remelted into US Assay Office bars but statistics on how many European coin bars entered the US market at that time do not seem to be available.
Since there were not that many European coin bars made by European mints in the 1930s (for example, the Royal Mint 1930 programme made only 650-700 tonnes of coin bars), then there cannot have been more than a few thousand tonnes of European coin bars entering the US at that time.
Coin Bars ceased to be ‘Good Delivery’ bars in 1954
During World War II the London Gold Market essentially closed down and really only re-opened in March 1954 when the Gold Fixing restarted. When the London Gold Market re-opened, a new 1954 London Good Delivery List for gold was published. This list only included gold bars of 0.995 fineness or higher, and coin bars ceased to be London good delivery standard. As Stewart Murray, former LBMA CEO says: “The new List published in 1954 only allowed fine bars of 995+.” (page 40, “Good Delivery Accreditation – A Short History”).
It’s therefore very strange that the Fed’s 1991 ‘Key to the Gold Vault’ publication states that it was only “since 1968″ that “a number of these ‘coin bars’, dating back to the early 1900s, have been stored in the Bank’s vault.” This implies that coin bars were not at the New York Fed gold vaults immediately prior to 1968.
Why would these coin bars suddenly appear at the FRBNY vault in 1968? To answer this question, its important to recall that 1968 was the year in which the London Gold Pool collapsed (March 1968).
Since coin bars have not been good delivery bars since 1954, US Treasury coin bars appear to have begun to turn up in the New York gold vaults in 1968 because there was a shortage of good delivery US Assay Office gold bars to satisfy foreign central bank gold transaction settlements.
Scraping the barrel – March 1968
That the US Treasury and Federal Reserve had a major shortage of good delivery gold in March 1968 is illustrated by a Bank of England memo from 14th March 1968, which highlights that the London Gold Pool collapsed because the US monetary authorities were unable to find any good delivery gold in their own stocks, and were confronted with the prospect of having to supply their Fort Knox low-grade ‘coin bars’ to the market.
The Bank of England memo, titled ‘Gold Bars for Delivery in the London Market‘ was written by George Preston (LTGP) and addressed to the Deputy Governor Maurice Parsons and the Chief Cashier John Fforde. It discussed the ramifications of delivering coin bars to the London Gold Market. The memo is referenced as entry ’49’ from file C43/323 i.e. C43/323/49.
Points 1 and 2 in the memo described what was good delivery at that time in 1968, and are included here to illustrate that coin bars were not even being countenanced as good delivery back in 1968. No one had even thought about coin bars since the 1930s.
However, Point 3 is the critical point. A short quote from the memo:
“1. The current specification of bars which are good delivery in the London market requires that they shall be of a minimum fineness of .995 and shall have a minimum gold content of 350 fine ounces and a maximum of 430 fine ounces.”
“2. In the 1930s when the Bank were delivering bars to the market to satisfy French demands for gold, they had to deliver coin bars and the specification in the 1930’s included bars not only .995 fine but coin bars assaying between .899 and .901 and also .915 1/2 to .917. Bars of both varieties had to contain between 350 and 430 ounces of fine gold.”
“3. It has emerged in conversations with the Federal Reserve Bank that the majority of the gold held at Fort Knox is in the form of coin bars, and that in certain cases these bars have a gold content of less than 350 fine ounces.If the drain on U.S. stocks continues it is inevitable that the Federal Reserve Bank will be forced to deliver what bars they have.
Capacity to further refine coin bars to the current minimum fineness of .995 in the United States is entirely inadequate to cope with conversion on the scale that would be required if the Americans wished to continue to deliver bars assaying .995 or better. Equally the capacity in the U.K. is inadequate for this task.”
The Fed asked the Bank of England to discuss the situation with Rothschilds (the chair of the gold market) at partner level. The memo then covers some discussion with Mr Bucks and Mr Hawes of Rothschilds about the acceptability of delivering coin bars to the London Gold Market. Supplying the market with coin bars was thought by the Bank and Rothschilds to be problematic, and the memo concluded, somewhat ominously:
“it would appear that the circumstances might well be such that very few bars of the current acceptable fineness could be found” (by the Americans)
Ominously, because, as some readers will be aware, the London Gold Pool collapsed that evening, Thursday 14th March 1968. On the following day, 15th March 1968, an emergency bank holiday was called for British financial markets, the London gold market remained closed (and stayed close for the next two weeks), and the gold price began to float for non-official transactions.
Migration of Coin Bars from FRBNY to the Bank of England
That foreign central banks were provided with coin bars at the New York Fed is a fact, as illustrated by the following.
In 2004, speaking at a conference of the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER), (AIER Conference May 2004 Gold Standard), H. David Willey, formerly of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
“Gold held by foreign authorities under earmark at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may be in the form of coin bars only approximating 400 ounces and with a much lesser purity.”
“In the last decades, there has been a gradual migration of central bank coin bars from the New York Federal Reserve vaults to the Bank of England. These bars have been first re-refined into London good delivery form. Once at the Bank of England, the bars can readily be used for gold loans or sales.”
H. David Willey was “formerly Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in charge of the discount window, and later responsible for oversight of the Federal Reserve’s accounts (including gold) with foreign central banks (1964-82); advisor to Morgan Stanley’s gold and fixed-income business (1982-2000).”
A central bank would only be confronted with a need to convert its FRBNY coin bar holdings to good delivery gold and move them to London if it didn’t have any 995 fine gold at the FRBNY. As to how many banks engaged in this activity and sent their coin bars to the refineries is unclear.
US Treasury coin bars
While some foreign central banks seem to have tried to get rid of their non-good delivery coin bars over the years by having them melted down, there are still coin bars held in the New York Fed vault(s).
The US Treasury claims to hold gold at four locations, namely Fort Knox in Kentucky, Denver in Colorado, West Point in up-state New York, and at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in Manhattan, NY.
According to the US Treasury’s own full gold inventory schedule (which have never been independently and physically audited), over 80% of the US Treasury gold bars listed are not good delivery bars and are in the form of coin bars and other low fineness gold bars. See pdf here for a detailed list of the gold the US Treasury claims to hold at Fort Knox, Denver and West Point. An excel version of the US Treasury list is here in xls.
There is a neat table summarising the weight and purity of the US Treasury’s gold bar ‘lists’ here, taken from the goldchat blog site.
There has been very little gold bar activity in or out of Fort Knox since 1968. If there was nothing, or next to nothing, except coin bars at Fort Knox in March 1968 (as the FRB told the Bank of England in March 1968), then how could there now be over 147 million ozs of gold (over 4,500 tonnes) at Fort Knox if its all or nearly all in the form of coin bars? The numbers don’t add up.
Said another way, if the US melted around 2,600 tonnes of US gold coins in the 1930s into coin bars, and if some European coin bars were converted into US Assay Office coin bars (also in the 1930s), how could this add up to even 4,500 tonnes, let alone add up to all the coin bar gold that the US Treasury claims to hold at Fort Knox, Denver and West Point combined, and all the coin bars held by foreign central banks at the FRBNY?
US Treasury coin bars at the FRBNY
Surprisingly, the US Treasury lists how many coins bars it holds at the FRBNY. According to its custodial inventory statement, about 5% of the US Treasury’s gold is held at the FRBNY in the form of 31,204 bars stored in 11 compartments (listed as compartments A – K).
The US Treasury gold claimed to be stored at the FRBNY is listed in weight lists here, starting on page 132 of the pdf (or page 128 of file).
Of the US Treasury’s eleven compartments listed at the FRBNY, coin bars are listed as being held in four of these compartments, namely compartments H, J, K and E.
Compartment H of the US Treasury’s gold at the FRBNY contains coin bars produced by the US Assay Office. These bars are listed in ‘melts’, with more than 60 melts listed, each with about 20+ bars. This would be in excess of 12-13 tonnes. See the following screenshots as examples.
All the bars listed in the Treasury’s Compartment J are US Assay Office coin bars, listed in melts. This amounts to 968,000 fine ounces, or about 30 tonnes. See the following two screenshots.
Compartment K also contains about 5 tonnes of coin bars belonging to the US Treasury. Screenshot not shown for brevity.
Additionally, Compartment E contains approximately 1 tonne of coin bars that are not US Assay Office coin bars. These coin bars are listed as being produced by refiners such as Marret-Bonnin, Rothschild, Comptoir-Lyon and the Royal Canadian Mint. All four of these refiners were listed on the 1934 Good Delivery List of refiners of coin bars.
Overall, a quick calculation of the above weight lists suggests that the US Treasury holds about 50 tonnes of coin bars at the New York Fed. Interestingly, this is roughly the same amount of gold that the Bundesbank says that it melted/smelted in 2014 after repatriating it from the New York Fed.
US Assay Office 0.995 fine bars vs US Assay Office coin bars
Its important to understand the difference between good delivery US Assay Office gold bars and US Assay Office coin bars (circa 0.90 fine). US Assay Office gold bars that have a gold content of 0.995 fine or higher are still good delivery in the London Gold Market and in international transactions because US Assay Office 0.995 bars are still on the ‘former’ London good delivery list.
The LBMA’s London Good Delivery List is a list of refineries worldwide whose gold bars are acceptable by the London Gold Market. This list contains two parts, a current list and a former list. The former list includes refineries whose gold bars are still accepted by the London Gold Market but who no longer produce these gold bars.
In September 1997, the LBMA transferred ‘US Assay Office’ gold bars to the former list because they were no longer produced by the US Assay Office after this date. These are bars that were produced by the New York Assay Office and the San Francisco and Denver Mints.
Gold bars that are on the former list are still accepted as London Good Delivery as long as they have been produced prior to the date of transfer to the former list, and as long as the bars meet the London Good Delivery standards.
Therefore, US Assay Office gold bars (995 fine) are still accepted as London good delivery bars. Just look at the bar list for the SPDR Gold Trust (GLD) and you will see plenty of US Assay Office gold bars listed. These bars have appeared at various times recently with a variety of descriptions such as ‘US ASSAY OFFICE NY’, ‘U.S Assay Office’, ‘United States Assay Offices & Mints’, ‘US ASSAY OFFICE NEW YORK’, ‘UNITED STATES ASSAY OFFICE’ etc etc.
US Assay Office gold bar MELTS
Its important to grasp what a MELT is as applied to US Assay Office Gold because it applies to a lot of the gold held at the FRBNY vaults. Non US refineries and mints also produced gold bars in batches but they didn’t make use of a melt numbering system in such an obvious way as the US Assay Office.
Here’s the Federal Reserve Board explaining 0.995 Melts:
“US Assay Office bars, like bars in other countries, are produced in melts or a series of bars, numbered in succession. For instance, melt No. I contains 20 bars. Hence, the bars are stamped 1-1, 1-2, etc… , 1-20.”
“US Assay Office bars are gold bars that are originally issued by the US Assay Office and that have not been mutilated and which, if originally issued in the form of a melt, are re-deposited as a complete melt. These bars are not melted and assayed. They weigh approximately 400 troy ounces, the fineness of their gold content is .995 (99.5% purity or better), and they come in complete melts.
“When an US Assay Office bar is removed from a melt, it is referred to as a mutilated US Assay Office bar.”
Source: ‘Final report of the gold team’, draft June 30th, 2000. Page 13 of document: (http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/assets/storage/Research-Digital-Library/holocaust/Holocaust-Theft/Box-227/6997222-final-report-of-gold-team.pdf)
Here’s a very good description of Melts from none other than the International Monetary Fund. This description comes from an IMF document in 1976 when they were preparing their gold auctions and restitutions:
“..most of the gold of the Fund (IMF) is not in the form of individually stamped and weighed bars but consists, with the exception of the gold held in depositories in the United Kingdom and India, ofmelts, comprising 18-22 individual bars, which will first need to be identified, weighed, and selected before they can be delivered. 1/ “
Footnote 1/ on the same IMF page describes ‘Melts’ as:
“1/ A melt is an original cast of a number of bars, usually between 18 and 22. The bars of an unbroken melt are stamped with the melt number and fineness but weight-listed as one unit; when a melt is broken, individual bars must be weighed and stamped for identification. It is the practice in New York and Paris to keep melts intact.”
Swiss National Bank refining operations
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) admits that it too has held non-good delivery gold, and has sought, over a 30 year period from 1977-2007, to get it refined to good delivery status:
“The National Bank has commissioned numerous refining operations during the last thirty years in order to obtain the ‘good delivery’ quality label for its entire gold holdings.
Swiss gold refining firms were prepared to undertake these operations free of charge, as the SNB provided them, in return, with a ‘working capital’ of several tonnes – more than was strictly necessary for their activity on behalf of the central bank.
This mutually profitable arrangement was challenged in 1982, when the SNB’s legal services concluded that it raised a number of problems, in particular that it effectively constituted an unsecured advance, similar to a gold loan. The National Bank’s deposits with refining firms were therefore liquidated in the same year, and subsequently, the cost of refining operations was invoiced directly to the SNB.“
The SNB had a lot of gold at the FRBNY up until at least the mid to late 1990s (since there are large FRBNY gold outflows during that period), and the Swiss gold sales appear to have targeted this New York gold, however, the Swiss gold sales settled out of London so it looks like Swiss gold may have been on the move in the late 1990s, even before the SNB had got the go-ahead to engage in gold sales over the 2000-2004 period. Perhaps the SNB’s Swiss refinery operations cited above involved some of the SNB’s New York gold as it stopped off in Switzerland on its way to London?
The Curious Case of the German Bundesbank
There has been widespread coverage of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s attempts to repatriate some of its gold reserves from New York and Paris back to Frankfurt. A lot of this coverage is, in my view, failing to ask the right questions about the fineness of the gold bars repatriated.
In January 2014, the Bundesbank announced that it had repatriated a paltry 5 tonnes of gold from the New York Federal Reserve Bank during 2013.
The Bundesbank press release from 20th January 2014, quoted Bundesbank Executive Board member Carl-Ludwig Thiele as follows:
‘”We had bars of gold which did not meet the ‘London Good Delivery’ general market standard melted down and recast. We are cooperating with gold smelters in Europe,” Thiele continued. The smelting process is being observed by independent experts. It is set up in such a manner that the Bundesbank’s gold cannot be commingled with foreign gold at any time.’
Since the Bundesbank is fond of using the term ‘smelting‘ and ‘smelters‘ in their gold bar discussions, what exactly does ‘smelting’ mean?
SMELT dictionary definition: Smelt (verb):
1. to fuse or melt (ore) in order to separate the metal contained
2. to obtain or refine (metal) in this way.
To me, it appears that the Bundesbank melted down and refined coin bars into London Good Delivery bars, otherwise why else would they need to bring gold up to good delivery standard? After all, normal US Assay Office gold bars of 0.995 fineness are already good delivery. So I emailed the Bundesbank at that time (January 2014) and asked them straight out:
“How many tonnes of coin bars does the Bundesbank hold at the Federal Reserve in New York in addition to the 5 tonnes of coin bar gold recently remelted? And will all the gold (circa 300 tonnes) that is planned to be brought back from New York be in the form of coin bars? Regards,“
The Bundesbank replied, directing me back to their press release:
“in the Link attached you will find more information about your matter. http://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/BBK/2014/2014_01_21_gold_en.html Yours sincerely, DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK“
Since I had asked about ‘coin bars’ and the Bundesbank had sent me a link to the press release about smelting, could the Bundesbank have been conceding that the smelting was of coin bars? Quite Possibly.
On 19th February 2014, Carl-Ludwig Thiele popped up again referring to the ‘smelting’ operation in an interview conducted with German newspaper Handelsblatt:
“Some of the bars in our stocks in New York were produced before the Second World War.”
“Our internal audit team was present last year during the on-site removal of gold bars and closely monitored everything. The smelting process is also being monitored by independent experts.”
“The very same gold arrived at the European gold smelters that we had commissioned.”
“The gold was removed from the vault in the presence of the internal audit team and transported to Europe. Only once the gold had arrived in Europe was it melted down and brought to the current bar standard.”
The frequent use of the words ‘smelting’ and ‘smelters’, in my opinion, suggests that not only were the Bundesbank’s gold bars melted and reformed into fresh bars, but that the gold was smelted and refined from a lessor purity to a ‘good delivery’ purity. This is why the opaque manoeuvres of the Bundesbank suggest ‘coin bars’.
Thiele’s reference to “some of the bars in our stocks in New York were produced before the Second World War” is again hinting at the 1930s, and to me is clearly suggesting ‘Coin Bars’.
From 5 to 50 tonnes
The 2013 five tonne smelting mystery was merely a prelude to much more of the same in 2014, because in January 2015, the Bundesbank issued a press release in which it claimed to have repatriated 85 tonnes of gold from the FRB in New York, of which approximately 50 tonnes was melted and recast.
Smelting/Melting expert Carl-Ludwig Thiele was again on hand to explain:
“The Bundesbank took advantage of the transfer from New York to have roughly 50 tonnes of gold melted down and recast according to the London Good Delivery standard, today’s internationally recognised standard.”
I then emailed the Bundesbank and asked:
“The Bundesbank press release from yesterday (see link below) refers to the fact that 50 tonnes of gold that was repatriated from the Federal Reserve in New York was recast / remelted before being received by the Bundesbank.
Can you clarify what the gold fineness (parts per thousand of gold in the bars) of these 50 tonnes of bars was before they were recast / remelted?
“Please understand that we do not provide any information on the physical details of single gold bars owned by Deutsche Bundesbank. Nevertheless, we would like to draw your attention on the fact that no irregularities where found concerning the gold melted down and recast according to the London Good Delivery standard. Please take into account that this standard asks i.a. for a minimum fineness of 995 parts per thousand.“
(i.a.= inter alia = among other things)
Notwithstanding that I didn’t ask about single gold bars, its very interesting that the Bundesbank mentions 995. Why mention the fineness of 995? If the bars were already 995, why melt them down in the first place?
I then sent the Bundesbank a follow-up email:
“Thanks for the reply but I wasn’t asking about the details of single gold bars.
My question is what was the average fineness of the 50 tonnes of gold bars that the Bundesbank had remelted in 2014. That’s the average fineness on approximately 4,000 bars.
The Bundesbank replied:
“Please understand that we do not provide any further information on the details of specific gold bars or a specific amount of gold bars owned by Deutsche Bundesbank.”
In my view, the Bundesbank’s complete secrecy on this smelting issue speaks volumes. And you also see now that the Bundesbank cannot give a straight answer when asked simple questions about its gold.
In both January 2014 and January 2015, the Bundesbank claims that the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was in some way involved in the Bundesbank’s gold smelting shenanigans. This makes little or no sense unless there was some type of location swap involved or the BIS has some deal with a refinery such as Metalor in Neuchâtel.
In January 2014 Thiele said:
“The Bundesbank has repatriated the gold from New York City in close cooperation with the Bank for International Settlements. “The Bank for International Settlements is a repository of expertise in the repatriation of gold. It is a very trustworthy institution.”
In January 2015 Thiele said:
“We also called on the expertise of the Bank for International Settlements for the spot checks that had to be carried out. As expected, there were no irregularities.”
The BIS trades gold ‘loco Berne’ using its account at the Swiss National bank (SNB) vaults, and the BIS maintains safekeeping and settlements facilities that are “available loco London, Berne or New York.”
Bundesbank gold looks like it left the FRBNY vaults during 2013 and 2014 in batches of 5.16 tonnes. See the Fed’s foreign earmarked gold statistics here. But on a net basis there is a shortfall of about 32 tonnes in 2014 between the amount of gold that left the FRBNY vaults and the amount of gold that the Bundesbank and De Nederlandsche Bank combined claim that they repatriated from the FRBNY during 2014.
Therefore, there may have been a gold location swap involved somewhere along the line. For some of the Bundesbank’s melting operations, gold may not have moved physically from the FRBNY at all. A gold location swap could have been done between a BIS FRBNY gold account and a BIS SNB gold account. Since the gold needed to be remelted / recast (to bring it to good delivery status), that would mean there were coin bars at the SNB.
The Metalor gold refinery (one of the 4 big gold refineries in Switzerland and one of the 6 biggest in the world) is very near the SNB’s Berne vault. Its located at Neuchâtel, about 50kms from Berne. The three other large Swiss gold refineries are all quite far from Berne as they are situated in southern Switzerland near the Italian border within a mile or two of each other, (Valcambi is in Balerna, Pamp in Castel San Pietro, and Argor-Heraeus is in Mendrisio).
If the BIS did some location swaps between the FRBNY and the SNB, it could get coin bars at the SNB vaults remelted at Metalor and then get the new gold bars flown to the Bundesbank in Frankfurt.
This would prevent the need to fly gold from New York City, and it would explain the “close cooperation” of the BIS in the operations.
In contrast, that other great gold repatriating nation of 2014, namely the Netherlands, did not see the need to melt any of the bars that it repatriated. In its press release in November 2014, the De Nederlandsche Bank simply said they had repatriated their gold to Amsterdam, apparently in quite a quick fashion.
And why would the Dutch need to melt anything, since after all, their gold in New York was in 995 Melts, as confirmed by Dutch Central Bank official Jan Lamers.
“The New York stock does not meet the standards prevailing on the international gold market, the so-called London “good delivery” standards. The biggest difference is that the bars in New York are not individualized, but are part of a package of about 20 bars, wherein the package as a whole has an overall weight and number.The bars in the package would need to be weighed and numbered individually to meet ‘good delivery’ standards.”
I translated the above, so here is the original Dutch from Lamers:
“De voorraad in New York voldoet echter niet aan de standaarden die gelden op de internationale goudmarkt, de zogenoemde Londense ‘good delivery’ standaard. Het grootste verschil is dat de baren in New York niet zijn geïndividualiseerd, maar onderdeel zijn van een pakket van circa 20 baren waarbij het pakket als geheel een gewicht en nummer heeft. Door de baren in het pakket individueel te wegen en te nummeren, konden deze op‘good delivery’ standaard worden gebracht.”
(Source: “Gold Management of the Bank” by Jan Lamers, Senior Policy, Financial Markets Division. http://web.archive.org/web/20081117183716/http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/goudbeheer%20van%20DNB_tcm46-146095.pdf pages 7-8 of the pdf.)
So, the fact that the Dutch didn’t need to smelt anything but the German’s did shows that the bars that the Germans sent to the European Smelters were not regular 995 fine US Assay Office bars. If the Germans had possessed 995 US Assay Office bars, they would just need to be weighed and individually stamped with their weights, not melted down and recast.
The fact that the Bundesbank will not publish any weight lists is very suspicious. Even the US Treasury published their weight lists of their bars held at the FRBNY (see above).
Peter Boehringer, of the German ‘Repatriate our Gold’ campaign, says that allegedly, the bar lists of the gold that the Bundesbank had melted have now been destroyed. If this has happened, then this is further bizarre behaviour from the Bundesbank.
There are various other theories apart from ‘coin bars’ as to why the Bundesbank may have wanted to melt down gold bars from New York but the other alternatives are also embarrassing to the bar holder.
The old bars may have had cracks or fissures in them. This has happened to some of the old gold that is stored in the Bank of England as this report from 2007 shows. The Bank of England spokesman at the time said:
“This is not about purity, this is about physical appearance.”
Speaking of Peter Boehringer, a recent Bloomberg article from February 2015 about Boehringer and the Bundesbank gold quoted a Bundesbank spokesman as telling Bloomberg, on the subject of gold melting, that:
‘meeting the London good delivery standard “cannot be reduced entirely to the weight of a gold bar but needs to take various other features into account, one criterion being the outer appearance.”‘
However, this Bloomberg article is the first time that the Bundesbank has mentioned ‘appearance’ of bars, and to me it looks like a story that keeps changing, possibly with some inspiration from the Bank of England 2007 story.
Cracks and fissures in 55 tonnes of gold would be quite alarming given that the LBMA said that ‘defects’ are ‘fortunately not typical!’ (see slide 13 here), and this would throw the quality of all the Fed’s New York held gold into doubt.
The quality of US Assay Office 995 fine bars was seen to be less than perfect by London refiners in 1968, as demonstrated by this 2012 article from Zerohedge, but if the Bundesbank was melting down US Assay Office 995 fine bars this would also be an alarm bell for all holders of similar gold. And why would the Dutch not think its necessary to melt down their repatriated US Assay Office bars if the Germans thought this was a problem?
The Bundesbank gives some details of a gold swap with the FRB back in 1968, and claim that a portion of the gold returned to the Bundesbank (the return leg of the gold swap) was gold of a lessor quality than good delivery. They say “the remaining bars with a countervalue of $750 million were of a different quality”. This is absolutely not correct. All of the gold bars returned to the Bundesbank in that potion of the swap were good delivery US Assay Office bars and a lot of it came from Ottawa where the Fed had sourced some bars from the Canadians.
I have the details on that swap from Bank of England gold ledgers and the 1,200 gold bars (sent to Johnson Matthey) out of over 50,000 bars shipped to London were merely being ‘adjusted’ into good delivery bars, and were supposed to be good delivery bars, hence the need to remelt and recast. I will cover this Bundesbank gold swap in a future article. The Bundesbank seems to be using this gold swap as as some sort of ambiguous evidence of why they are melting down 55 tonnes of gold but it is misleading to do so.
So, in conclusion, I would lean towards the probability that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has given the Deutsche Bundesbank tonnes of coin bars and the smelting operations have been bringing this gold up to London Good delivery purity levels. This begs the question, where did all the other Bundesbank gold bars stored at the New York Fed disappear to?
The alternative to the coin bar thesis, that the Bundesbank does not trust the gold purity of supposedly 995 fine US Assay Office bars, is probably more concerning since it undermines confidence in the purity levels of all US Assay Office fine gold Melts.
As mentioned in Part 1 of Keys to the Gold Vaults at the New York Fed, there are two gold vaults at the New York Fed, the main vault and the auxiliary vault. Very little is written anywhere about the FRBNY’s auxiliary vault, or the ‘aux vault’ as it has sometimes been referred to.
The auxiliary vault also fails to make an appearance during the New York Fed’s famous gold vault tour. It’s as if the Fed specifically wants to keep this aux vault off the radar, or at least flying under the radar.
Although neither the 1991 nor the 1998 versions of the Fed’s publication ‘Key to the Gold Vault’ (KTTGV) refer to the auxiliary vault, the 2004 and 2008 versions do (in passing) as follows:
“Bullion at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York belonging to some 60 foreign central banks and international monetary organizations is stored in 122 separate compartments in the main and auxiliary vaults.” (page 5, 2004)
“Bullion at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York belonging to some 36 foreign governments, central banks and official international organizations is stored in 122 separate compartments in the main and auxiliary vaults.” (page 5, 2008)
All four of the on-line versions of ‘Key to the Gold Vault’ that I sourced (from 1991 – 2008, see Part 1) state that the “main vault was opened in September 1924” and so this statement indirectly implies that there is another ‘non-main’ vault.
The reference to the auxiliary vault in the more recent 2004 and 2008 versions of KTTGV seems to imply that the aux vault is still in active use for gold storage. Otherwise, why would the Fed mention it?
Just to clarify what auxiliary means. Various dictionary definitions of ‘Auxiliary’ include the following: supplementary, additional, subsidiary capacity, backup reserve. In the context of space, auxiliary refers to additional space.
New York Fed writer Charles Parnow’s ‘A Day at the Fed – Charles Parnow’ publication (first published in 1973) explicitly refers to the auxiliary vault with a quite precise reference. This is probably the only detailed description of the auxiliary vault that’s on record, and it states:
“A smaller auxiliary vault built in 1963 holds three accounts. One account with 107,000 bars of gold is stacked with bricklayer precision into a solid wall 12 feet high, 10 feet wide, and 18 feet deep.” (From: ‘A Day at the Fed’)
The above photo from the NY Fed shows a self-described ‘wall of gold’. If you look closely to the very left of the photo, the number ‘2’ is visible about half way up the white column beside the wall. This vault layout is very different to the small cages or compartments featured in most of the FRBNY’s gold vault photos. Therefore this wall of gold shot appears to be from a totally different location than the main vault.
Could this be a shot taken in the auxiliary vault? Most probably. Apart from the above photo, there are two additional photos below that I believe are also shots taken within the auxiliary vault. One shows 3 men with clipboards, presumably Fed staff and auditors, looking at a wall of gold. The other shots shows 2 Fed vault workers, with protective magnesium shoe covers, adding bars to a wall of gold, and out of shot a third person consulting some type of weight list.
If, in the early 1970s, when Charles Parnow’s above comment was first penned, the aux vault stored gold for only three customers, then the Fed may have simply just used three areas or alcoves in the aux vault, listed as 1, 2 and 3, in which to store customer gold for three customers. However, without knowing the vault layout its difficult to say.
Wall of Gold
This literal ‘wall of gold’ is also mentioned in the 1991 ‘Key to the Gold Vault’ but is attributed to a ‘compartment’ and there is no mention of the auxiliary vault. Another mysterious omission by the Fed. The comment is as follows:
“The gold in compartment number 86, which faces the vault entrance, is arranged as a display. The compartment contains 5,160 bars valued at about $87.1 million at the official rate of $42.2222. Its capacity of about 6,000 bars makes it one of the smaller compartments.
The largest compartment contains about 107,000 bars—literally a wall of gold 10 feet high, 10 feet wide and 18 feet deep.”
(KTTGV 1991 – notice the dimensions quoted of the wall are slightly different in height to those specified in the previous specification 12 x 10 x 18).
As an aside, who would be holding 107,000 bars of gold (more than 1,300 tonnes) at the FRBNY back in 1973? By a process of elimination, I think it was the Swiss National Bank (SNB). This is so because, in my view, the only other realistic candidates that held so much gold in New York were the IMF and West Germany, and each of these customers held more than 1,300 tonnes of gold at the NY Fed at that time.
Tours of the Vault(s)
Since the FRBNY never really writes about the aux vault, I emailed the ‘Media Relations Department’ of the FRBNY last year (2014) and asked them to explain the reference to the auxiliary gold vault that was opened in 1963.
The Fed replied by email that “the auxiliary vault is a vault located near the main gold vault; hence it’s referred to as an auxiliary vault.”
Not a very full answer, but at least it’s a confirmation from the NY Fed that there is an auxiliary vault and that it is located ‘near’ the ‘main gold vault’. And the Fed didn’t deny that it was opened in 1963.
When I worked in New York in 1999 my employer booked us a tour of the Fed’s gold vault. During the tour, there was no mention of the auxiliary vault and the gold vault visit just consisted of going into the entrance of the main vault where some gold was brought out from the weighing room for people to pass around.
The FRBNY gold vault tour (open to the public) is quite famous and has been written about extensively, but neither the promotional material for the tour nor the media coverage ever seem to mention the auxiliary vault.
Just to double check what the current tour covers, I recently emailed the Fed gold vault tour people and asked them if the auxiliary vault is included in the current tour in addition to the main vault. Their succinct reply was that “the tour covers the main vault“. Yet again, another very short reply from the Fed and in this case no extra information about the auxiliary vault was volunteered.
Since discussion of the FRBNY’s auxiliary vault is quite rare, its worth looking at the few web references to the aux vault which do exist.
One such reference about the aux vault comes from well-known New York writer Andrew Tobias who appears to have visited the auxiliary vault while on a private or customised tour of the NY Fed in June 2010. In his blog, Tobias wrote that “the door to the auxiliary vault weighs 30 tons, yet is so precisely balanced that I was able to swing it open and shut.”
Where is the Aux Vault?
The exact location of the FRBNY’s auxiliary vault appears to be something that the Fed doesn’t wish to discuss. It’s therefore interesting that there is a comment on the web that appears to state exactly where the aux vault is located.
In July 2002, a forum contributor called Woodman wrote in a bulletin board at www.freerepublic.com that the Federal Reserve aux vault is located at Level B5 of 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza.
While discussing the gold supposedly stored under the WTC, Woodman wrote “…all of the Gold stored in the WTC was really stored 3 blocks east in the basement vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank and the aux. at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza B5.”
For those not familiar, the vault at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza (CMP) on the fifth sub-level (B5) is the famous Chase (now JP Morgan) vault, supposedly the largest bank vault in the world. Some of the details of this vault were uncovered in 2013 and can be read here on Zerohedge.
The interesting angle about the 2002 comment is that, how, in 2002, could someone refer to the Chase Manhattan Plaza (CMP) B5 vault as the aux (auxiliary) of the FRBNY vault unless they knew details about these two adjacent vaults?
Back in 2002, the Chase – JP Morgan merger had only just been completed the previous year, and JP Morgan’s 1 CMP B5 vault was not yet a licensed Comex depository for gold and silver (it only became Comex licensed in 2011). So, in 2002 the Chase (JP Morgan) vault wasn’t yet on the radar (even to the CFTC) as a JP Morgan Comex precious metals vault.
Therefore, in 2002, to refer to the FRB’s aux as 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza – B5, was a very specific statement.
To recap, the main Fed New York gold vault is in basement E of the fifth sub-level. The Chase vault is on B5, also on the fifth sub-level. Indeed, it was highlighted (via a ZeroHedge contributor) that there is a tunnel between the FRBNY and CPM vaults. While discussing the Fed’s gold vault facility, the contributor wrote:
“Chase Plaza (now the Property of JPM) is linked to the facility via tunnel… I have seen it. The elevators on the Chase side are incredible. They could lift a tank.”
Ironically, this Zerohedge comment was originally posted to an article about ‘Key to the Gold Vault’, on 24th January 2012.
Given that the FRBNY auxiliary vault was opened in 1963, around the same time that 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza was completed, it would seem logical that the Fed’s aux vault was built in parallel with the construction of the Chase Manhattan Plaza vault.
Where Charles Parnow states that this auxiliary vault was ‘built in 1963’ he probably means opened in 1963, since like the main vault, although it was opened in 1924, it’s construction was part of a building project which took a few years over 1921-1923.
The Chase Manhattan Plaza building and vault construction project ran from around 1959 to 1963, and the Chase building was fully functional by 1963. Parts of the building were fully functional and occupied in 1962.
Mosler vault doors
The precisely balanced door of the auxiliary vault (referred to above by Andrew Tobias) sounds very different to the cylindrical design of the vault entrance of the main FRBNY vault, opened in 1924.
In the 1991 ‘Key to the Gold Vault’, the ‘door’ of the main vault is described as follows:
“There are no doors into the gold vault. Entry is through a narrow 10-foot passageway cut in a delicately balanced 9-feet tall, 90-ton steel cylinder that revolves vertically in a 140- ton steel and concrete frame. The vault is opened and closed by rotating the cylinder 90 degrees so that the passageway is clear or blocked.”
If, as was claimed above, the Fed´s auxiliary gold vault is situated in the Chase Manhattan Plaza vault facility, or is even part of the Chase vault, then the door of this auxiliary vault would be similar to the vaults doors of the Chase Plaza vault.
As explained below, Andrew Tobias’s description of a 30 tonne door that swings open and shut sounds very similar to the doors of the Chase / JP Morgan vault across the road at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, level B5. These vault doors were built by Mosler.
A number of newspaper articles from 1960 and 1961 provide additional perspective on the Chase Manhattan Plaza vault doors, with slightly differing door details.
“On the lowest level, ninety feet below the street, is the world’s largest bank vault, 350 feet wide and 100 feet long. The vault has six massive doors, each twenty inches thick, which weigh a total of 250 tonnes.”
“The Chase-Manhattan bank building is on a two-block site bounded by Nassau, William, Liberty and Pine. 8th May 1960.”
“With delivery last week, of six doors weighing an average of forty-five tons each, a bank vault that will be the world’s largest is rapidly nearing completion.”
“The vault weighing 985 tonnes and occupies 35,000 square feet of floor space.”
A newspaper article from August 1961 confirms the above vault details, and includes a description of the vault doors being able to be opened and closed with one finger, which is uncannily like Andrew Tobias description.
“The new skyscraper bank just finished here naturally has the world’s largest bank vault, I found on peeking in. its length is 350 feet and width 100 feet, with the height being over 8 feet. Concrete walls seven feet thick encase it and the whole thing weighs about a thousand tons.”
“Although these stainless steel doors weigh 45 tons each, they can be opened or closed with one finger, I was told.”
Recall Tobias´s phrase of “so precisely balanced that I was able to swing it open and shut.”
A photo of one of the six doors of the vault under 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza can be seen here in this old Mosler advert. See photo 7. Notice how the door is of the standard rectangular swinging variety.
The vault doors at Chase Plaza are said to be Mosler Century doors, some weighing 45 tons and 20 inches thick and also some 35 tonnes doors. If 4 of the 6 doors each weighed 45 tons, and the remaining 2 doors weigh 35 tons each, that would give a total weight of 250 tons, as quoted above.
These vault doors were also featured in a reference to the November 1961 issue of Mosler’s newsletter “Mosler Messenger”, as mentioned here. Why there would need to be 6 separate doors to the Chase Plaza bank vault is not clear. Perhaps there are 6 different sections to the vault, each with a distinct entrance door.
Unfortunately, there is little or no information in the public domain about the Chase Plaza vault, despite the fact that there apparently used to be tours of the Chase Plaza building (and vault areas) back in the 1960s.
Structure of the main vault
To appreciate possible construction approaches to the Fed’s auxiliary vault in the early 1960s, and why it would have made sense at the time to leverage the nearby Chase Plaza vault area, it’s worth examining the structure of the FRBNY’s main vault and how it was constructed.
It’s possible that an auxiliary vault could have been built in the early 1960s within the Fed´s existing level E basement by, for example, converting an existing storage room or similar into a reinforced vault room. Whether such a suitable available space would have been adjacent the main vault is unclear.
However, if space constraints dictated the need for further excavations beyond the perimeter of the building at basement level E, then evidence suggests that creating this space would be most practical by excavating south near the corner of Nassau Street and Liberty. The fact that, luckily enough, there were already excavations being done south of Liberty in 1958-1960, makes it entirely logical that the New York Fed piggybacked on the Chase Manhattan vault project.
The main gold vault lies at the bottom of the FRBNY’s, 5 basement level, headquarters in Manhattan. The building is bordered by four streets, namely, Maiden Lane, William St, Liberty, and Nassau St. For ease of explanation, (but simplified slightly) Maiden Lane is roughly to the north of the building, William St to the east, Liberty to the south, and Nassau St to the west.
The main gold vault is actually the bottom level of a three-tier vault structure known as basement levels C, D and E. This three-tier vault was lowered into an excavation that had been dug down to the Manhattan bedrock.
The vault sits within this excavation or ‘hull’, with a corridor running all the way around between the vault and the outer walls of the hull. The walls of the vault, as well as the walls of the corridor are lined with reinforced concrete. Hence the main vault has been, at times, described as a double-vault.
In a section about the HQ building, the Fed’s current website has a few references to the main vault as a “triple-tiered vault system” with a “nine-foot door and door frame (weighing 90 and 140-tons, respectively)” that was “lowered to the bedrock foundation”. Notably, the ‘About the Building’ web page says nothing about the auxiliary vault.
The perimeter of the FRBNY HQ is a trapezoid with the west side wider than the east side, i.e. the length of the perimeter adjacent to Nassau St is a lot longer than the perimeter adjacent to William St.
Floor plans of some of the higher basement levels of the FRBNY HQ are viewable on Cryptome.org here, and were sourced from the Avery Library at Columbia University. You can see the blueprints of Basement A here. Notice that the largest open type space of the basement (with what looks like pillars) is to the west of the building, running north to south.
Staircases and elevators etc are positioned more in the centre, or core, of the building. A narrower open space seems to run west to east parallel to liberty. Thick external walls (and possibly corridors) seem to be indicated around the entire plan and also within the plan one third the way to the left. Although this is said to be Basement A, this drawing would be in keeping with the description of the lower basement levels:
The main vault is described in some detail in the Fed´s older educational material:
“The gold is secured in a most unusual vault, an impressive chamber nearly half the length of a football field”. KTTGV 1991
“The gold vault is actually the bottom floor of a three story bunker of vaults arranged like strongboxes stacked on top of one another. The massive walls surrounding the vault are made of reinforced structural concrete” KTTGV 1991
“The vault’s interior, encased by steel-and-concrete walls several yards thick, resembles a cell block with 122 triple-locked storehouse compartments.” A Day at the Fed 1997
Additional details of the main gold vault structure can be gleaned from old newspaper coverage, including the corridor running all the way around:
“A four-foot corridor surrounds the vault itself and at each turn a mirror is arranged so that a guard standing before the vault may look all the way around it without moving.” Newspaper article 1925
“Completely around this double gold-vault ran a narrow alleyway, with mirrors set at the corners, so that a guard standing at any one point could see the entire circuit. The outer face of this passageway was a concrete wall, set in the foundation rock.” Newspaper article 1931
“The vault below has three floors: bar gold and coins on the bottom, currency on the second, securities on the third.” New Yorker, September 1931
The construction of the main vault faced a number of construction challenges, but you have to go right back to 1921 when it was still being constructed to grasp what these challenges were. Additional information from 1930 provides some more background.
During the FRBNY HQ foundation excavation, the bedrock of Manhattan first appeared at a depth of 87 feet at the corner of Nassau and Liberty streets (south-west). The presence of this bedrock meant that the gold vault couldn’t be much lower than about 80-85 feet below street level (curb), even though the rock undulated lower over other parts of the site.
Because it’s so far down, there was also the problem of the water table to deal with, especially in an area (Manhattan) surrounded by rivers. The water issue was most problematic on the three sides away from the Nassau/Liberty corner.
“The rock underlying the site has proved to have an undulating surface. At the corner of Liberty and Nassau streets it is 87 feet below the curb. At other parts of the site it is as much as 117.3 feet below this same curb. Owing to this condition, to the varying kinds of foundations which support the adjacent buildings, and to the depth of the excavation, the construction of the foundation is considered to be one of the most difficult and exacting pieces of foundation engineering ever undertaken.“
“eighty-five feet below high curb line of the street and fifty-six feet below ground water level. On one side of what used to be a hole there is a piece of the solid rock of Manhattan. The other three sides are held against the pressure of underground water from the East and North rivers by walls of iron rods and concrete, ten feet thick, even stronger than the natural rock.
This is the hull of the bank’s vault, a massive vessel, five stories deep, protected on three sides by a terrific pressure of muck and water.Within that buried hull is the vault itself, a structure of three levels contained within walls of steelcrete – a combination of metal and concrete – a construction developed particularly to protect the treasure of the federal reserve banks.”
(The World’s Greatest Treasure Cave”, Popular Mechanics, January 1930, Volume 50, Number 1, by Boyden Sparks)
With such treacherous and water problem surroundings, especially in the surroundings away from the corner of Nassau and Liberty, any extension of space in those directions would be challenging. The easier option would be to excavate or extend to the south from the area near the Nassau / Liberty corner.
With the Chase vault being built to the south under Liberty, the only construction work to do from the Fed side would be the construction of a link corridor or tunnel to connect the two facilities.
The effort and cost put in by the Fed in the 1920s in researching the structure and strength of the main vault should not be underestimated, as this somewhat humorous quotation demonstrates (1921 FRBNY Annual Report):
“During 1920-21 the Federal Reserve Board conducted a series of tests of different types of vault construction by attacking them with explosives and other modern implements, at the conclusion of which this and other Federal Reserve Banks were enabled to add greatly to the strength of their vaults, and at the same time greatly to reduce their cost. It is believed that the vault of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York will be not only by far the strongest, but by far the cheapest for its size ever built.”
Presumably the Fed Board didn´t carry out these vault attacks themselves. In fact, Popular Mechanics suggests hat they outsourced this job:
“the vault was built in accordance with the findings of a group of scientists of the bureau of standards, army engineers and architects. Previously there had been tests in which every known type of construction was subjected to attack with explosives, oxyacetylene torches that cut steel as a knife cuts cheese, and pneumatic hammers and chisels which are equally effective on concrete. As a result it was found that a fabric of concrete and steel formed an alliance which best resisted all these forms of attack.”
On a more serious note, the above shows that the construction of a standalone auxiliary vault on Basement Level E by converting an existing space within the basement isn´t the simple task of putting a vault door on to a store room. The vault walls would also have to be built up and strengthened substantially.
Would it not be as easy to just burrow through a linked tunnel under Liberty, near the Nassau / Liberty corner and fit out a corridor to the environs of the Chase vault? In that case the aux vault would still be very near the main vault and at the same subterranean level, and substantial construction work in the tight space of the existing E level basement would be avoided.
Why the Secrecy?
When JP Morgan’s 1 CMP B5 vault became a licensed depository of NYMEX/COMEX in 2011, COMEX’s owner, the CME Group, submitted to the CFTC a summary of requirements document as part of the vault application. This summary of requirements (for the JP Morgan vault to act as a licensed vault) took the form of two appendices (Appendix A and Appendix B). This would have included a vault inspection description and vault classification report.
The CME also requested that this confidential treatment continue “until further notice from the Exchanges”, and that if any Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests were received by the CFTC about the vault that the CFTC should notify the CME “immediately after receiving any FOIA request for said Appendix A, Appendix B or any other court order, subpoena or summons for same.”
Unbelievably, the CME also requested that they “be notified in the event the Commission intends to disclose such Appendix A and/or Appendix B to Congress or to any other governmental agency.”
So why would JP Morgan, as a commercial precious metals vault operator, be asking for an FOIA exemption when two other vault operators, namely Brinks and Scotia Mocatta, submitted vault licensing applications, here and here that did not see the need to ask for confidential treatment on the basis of “confidential commercial information”?
Looking at a list of possible FOIA exemptions, there is nothing in the list that would apply to JP Morgan but not to Scotia Mocatta and/or Brinks, except perhaps the first type of FOIA exemption in a scenario in which, were the aux vault at level B5 in the Chase Manhattan Plaza complex, then it could be included under foreign policy considerations i.e. “Those documents properly classified as secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy”. i.e. that the Chase vault facility conducts business for a ´Federal´client and on behalf of foreign central banks and international monetary organisations.
In summary, there is a lot of circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Fed’s aux vault is indeed located at 1 Chase Manhattan Plaza, B5, accessible from the Fed’s Vault E via a link corridor or tunnel structure.
Until the FRBNY writes publicly about its auxiliary vault, which seems unlikely, then circumstantial evidence remains as the only evidence on which to go on.
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